

# RUSSIA'S AGONY

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**TO  
THE MEMORY  
OF  
THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR ALL  
FOR  
THE GREAT CAUSE**

## PREFACE

### TO MY READERS:

In the following pages I speak of Russian affairs with the experience of an observer who has lived from early boyhood among the Russian people and has shared with them their joys and their sorrows.

"Russia's Agony" was written in compliance with a personal call and with the discharge of a public duty; it combines a human document with a historical treatise. Men, events and conditions have, I believe, been dealt with in a spirit of fairness, for although the original edition of this book was begun and completed a year ago, the storm and stress of later developments call for no substantial changes. That a comprehensive account of Russia from the inside was in demand has been shown by the rapid exhaustion of several impressions of this work, and indicated by the publication of an American edition.

Serious study of Russian affairs is more than ever important, and even necessary, for every thinking man and woman, not only because of the ignorance that prevails on the subject—a great handicap to us in the War—but because of the great social drama that has been staged in that country. Since her collapse, Russia has become the focus of social unrest throughout the world. Bolshevism—a foe more deadly to our civilization than German Militarism—cannot be effectively combated unless we understand the circumstances of its origin and working, indissolubly connected with the so-called Russian Revolution—a Revolution that has still to justify its name.

The questions that have been put to me so often will rise to the reader's lips: "What is Bolshevism?" and "Why did

the Russians succumb to its influences?" This book answers them in full. Here I give a few preliminary outlines:

Bolshevism demands an immediate application of Socialistic ideals. Its protagonists care not by what methods or with whose help they carry out their experiment. Bolshevism recognizes no nationality, no society, no family—nothing but a conglomeration of manual workers governed by "idealists" with the help of a Red Army. It is essentially un-democratic; it involves the forcible subversion of all the laws and covenants upon which human society has been established.

Why then has it obsessed the Russian people? There were predisposing conditions, some permanent, others accidental. A mystic idealism combined with singular proneness to mass action have long characterized the Russians; the sufferings and perplexities of the war have affected with peculiar intensity an ignorant and illiterate people in an ill-governed State. Planted in such favorable soil, the seeds of Bolshevism induced a veritable psychic disorder which defeated—temporarily at least—the fair promise of the Revolution and has spread its contagion to other lands.

The Bolshevik experiment has been applied. Russia to-day is a desolate land; millions of its inhabitants are unclothed and dying of hunger; all the sufferings of the war are as nothing in comparison with the first-fruits of Bolshevism; and, naturally, the workers have suffered most, as they must invariably suffer from any assault upon the social fabric. In Russia to-day the masses, deprived of remunerative toil, despoiled of their savings and even of their bread to feed a ravening horde of mercenaries, are closing their account with Bolshevism. The reaction has already come, sweeping and intense as was the collapse. The Bolshevik garrison in and around Moscow feels the mutterings of the coming storm. Like Ludendorff, it is preparing a final assault. The plundered billion of Russia's gold reserve, the co-operation of the "Blond Beast" and the sentimental ignorance of cranks or enthusiasts in other lands provide for-

midable weapons of offense. Like their friends in Berlin the Bolsheviki dispose of a vast propaganda fund, which even now makes its insidious power felt in all countries, beclouding the public conscience.

Germany's ruthless attempt to dominate the world will not have failed until Bolshevism is overthrown. The lists are still open. Germany, bleeding and distraught, has an unconquered ally in Bolshevism. By sapping the bases of our national life, Berlin still hopes to destroy the fruits of our Victory. Until the evil has been reached in its present stronghold, Moscow, and Russia has revived to new nationhood the German conspiracy will not have been crushed—there can be no real peace in the world.

Bolshevism is not Russian—it is essentially non-national; its leaders belong almost entirely to the race that lost its country and its nationhood long ago. In April, 1918, the Bolshevist "Government," including 384 "Peoples' Commissaries," was represented by 2 negroes, 13 Russians, 15 Chinamen, 22 Armenians and Georgians, and more than 300 Jews. Of the last 264 had come to Russia from the United States during the "Revolution."

Let us awaken to the full significance of this phenomenon. Let us, before all, make reparation to the race that gave us our religion, the very basis of our civilization; let us restore the Jews to their country and to their nationhood. It will be but an act of sacred Justice; it will also be a means of social salvation. The liberation of Palestine from Turkish thralldom and its promised return to the Chosen Race have been rightly heralded and acclaimed by Jew and Gentile alike.

We have fought in order to assure the unfettered progress of nations towards universal brotherhood by placing national life on the sure foundations of peace, ordered liberty and social justice. At a great price we have won this boon for ourselves and for other nations, cementing with our blood a comradeship that eschews class privileges and distinctions. Is this great step in human progress—with all its inevitable

sacrifices—to be imperiled by a mere handful of madmen, seeking to destroy the very existence of nations? The people of the United Kingdom have given their response in the electoral consultation which has just been concluded. Who can doubt that France and the United States will be equally emphatic?

Russia has to voice her sentiment otherwise. The time for peaceful expression will come when the hostile garrison of Bolshevism and its German supporters have been driven out. What form of government may then be adopted by the free decision of the Russian people concerns only themselves. Three centuries ago they elected a Tsar of the Romanovs. The elements of a true democracy were embodied in the Zemsky Sobor, or Assembly of the Land. But Russia then was dominated by Byzantine tradition, and later by German influence. The voice of the people was dulled by these un-Russian forces. Freed of their deadening power, Russia will assert the principles of justice and true democracy that are inherent to the Russian character. Her troubles came not from the Monarchy, but from the alien influences that the Monarchy imbibed. The German incubus will have been removed ere Russia can revive.

Of that revival I perceive sure and certain promise. I believe that the Russian people were destined to play an exalted part in the advancement of mankind, and that the day will soon dawn when the peoples of the world will duly appreciate the sacrifices that the Russians have endured, not less than the services that they render to the common cause of humanity. It is with this confidence that I am leaving the hospitable shores of America to rejoin my Russian comrades in the great adventure of this unparalleled war—the restoration of Russia.

R. W.

BOHEMIAN CLUB,  
SAN FRANCISCO,  
January 4, 1919.

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# RUSSIA'S AGONY

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

**INSPIRED** by conceptions of government borrowed from the adjacent Empire of Byzantium, the Russian autocracy was destined, like its protagonist, to enjoy prosperity so long as it avoided direct conflict with powerful neighbors, and, having exceeded this rule, to suffer a gradual process of internal decay and of external disaster. The influences of western civilization ever acted as a dissolvent upon the eastern system of autocracy.

Weakened and retarded in their development by successive waves of Tatar invasion, the Russian people were long in manifesting any decisive tendency to eschew Asiatic in preference for western models. Peter the Great foresaw and prepared his country for the coming change. His successors, devoid of his genius, interpreting his clear-sighted endeavor to reach the open sea as a mere lust for conquest, remained oblivious to the inward teaching of his reign. They introduced reforms tardily, under the stress of circumstance, never anticipating the dangers of delay except by specious methods of police repression which served only to intensify—even if they concealed—the fires of discontent.

Over a century ago Russian officers, returning from the Napoleonic wars, organized the first revolutionary movement in Russia. The disastrous Crimean War half

a century later, revealing the internal weakness of Russia, led to the emancipation of the serfs and great administrative and judicial reform<sup>1</sup> in the sixties. In the intervals the autocracy had reverted towards reaction, which was enhanced by the successful war against Turkey, undertaken for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs and—as the irony of internal politics demanded—for the strengthening of despotism in Russia.

Yet another fifty years later a war against Japan, lightly entered upon from analogous “internal” motives, led to widespread disorders, which could be repressed then, and to a marked development of a constitutional movement, which had to be satisfied. The semi-Constitution of October, 1905, introducing Representative Government, was followed by another period of reaction and by the further development of the *okhrana* or secret police system, which belittled and discredited the Duma in the eyes of the masses. Temperance—long urged by the Duma, and at last ordained by Imperial Edict in the early part of 1914—opened the eyes of the peasant masses, while it enhanced their material prosperity.

The great war with Germany thus found Russia unprepared—her ruler and her people devoid of an organic bond of union. The popularity of the struggle, its humane and exalted aims, were soon overshadowed by internal differences and by the maladministration and abuses of the Old Regime.

Razputinism, symbolizing the superstitions and favoritism of a Court severed from vivifying contact with the People, undermined the prestige of the Throne and of the Church among the masses.

The blessings of temperance bestowed by the autocrat

<sup>1</sup> These included local government by provincial and district *Zemstvos* elected by all classes, including a numerous contingent of peasants and municipal councils (*Dumas*) elected by a property suffrage, also reform of the Law Courts, assuring “speedy and merciful justice,” and introduction of trial by jury.

proved a fatal gift for the autocracy. The masses only realized more clearly the evils of the autocratic rule. They were many. Disorganization in army supply had involved unnecessary losses of men and territory during the war. Corruption in high places and disorder in railway management had brought about a dearth of food in the cities. Millions of men were needlessly called to the colors. These factors, sufficient in themselves to shake the loyalty of the troops and the people, were aggravated by persistent unwillingness or inability on the part of the autocrat to comply with warnings that had been repeatedly conveyed to him by the representatives of the nation, and even by the Allies, as to the urgent need of Responsible Government.

When he at last gave way in March, 1917, it was too late; the Revolutionary movement—prepared long beforehand—had already acquired too great an impetus to afford the Moderate parties an opportunity for immediate and effective resistance.

History offers nothing comparable with the events of 1917. An empire covering one-sixth of the world's territories and numbering upwards of 180,000,000 souls suddenly cast off its government and remained bereft of authority, of law, and of order for a prolonged period in the very midst of a great war. The human imagination is overwhelmed by the dimensions of the Russian Revolution. Other countries felt its influences, good and bad, profoundly. Its dramatic incidents and lessons, the pathetic fall of the autocrat, a promise of revival followed by disasters that seemed to be irreparable—all these themes engage our curiosity and arrest our attention. Good and evil are closely interwoven in the Revolutionary record. The evil came uppermost, but the good was bound to survive. One great benefit it has already conferred upon Russia and her friends is

the awakening of a deeper interest in her affairs and a desire to know the real truth about her.

An old woman threw a stone at a baker's shop-window and "started" the Russian Revolution. Some days later, in March, 1917, I was standing in the vast square that faces the dull red pile of the Winter Palace, and saw soldiers and civilians, men and women, pulling down the black and yellow standard of the autocracy. It had floated from the high flagstaff surmounting the main gateway ever since that proud building had replaced the humble Dutch cottage—still one of the show places of his metropolis—wherein two centuries ago Peter the Great had made his abode during the foundation of the city that was to be his "window into Europe."


Crude withal and unpolished, his genius, like an uncut diamond of finest water, had shed a new light amid the shadows of Muscovy. Breaking all resistance, severing himself from the trammels of semi-Asiatic tradition, he had boldly, far-sightedly launched and steered the ship of State towards the West. Was this removal of its emblems to be prophetic merely of the end of autocracy? Or was I witnessing the logical sequel to the great work that Peter had begun—the final passing of Russia into the communion of western nations?

The yellow folds, emblazoned with the black double-headed eagle, had been adopted by John the Third, on his marriage to a Byzantine princess. It symbolized the union of temporal and spiritual power wielded by the autocrator over Constantinople and the Roman Empire of the East. That symbol had been the guiding motto of Russia's rulers since the days of the Terrible One. In its place, amid the plaudits of the assembled crowd, the Red Flag of Revolution was soon afterwards

hoisted, brazenly announcing the end of the autocratic era. Some weeks went by, and, under the mellowing influence of wind and weather, its sanguinary hue faded perceptibly, gradually assuming a dull gray tone. The process of time was to exert a like influence upon the shortsighted enthusiasm of the multitude. Wild and dangerous visionaries, acting largely in collusion with the country's foes, applied Socialistic "ideals." Political chimera was to lead to disillusion and apathy, interrupted by sporadic joy and depression as the ephemeral success of the Revolution alternated with crushing disasters in the field and a shameful peace.

Other thoughts and reminiscences obtruded themselves amidst the turmoil of that eventful day and in that historical square. It had witnessed the loyal outpourings of an emancipated people, when the peasant serfs knelt in gratitude before Alexander II. Here also, when the Great War began, a hundred thousand people acclaimed Nicholas II, forgetting the innocent blood that had been shed within its precincts a decade earlier. Then men, women, and children had come to seek the countenance of their Little Father, desiring a larger measure of freedom, and were received with bullets; now they were avenging that ghastly blunder, dominated by long pent-up feelings of revolt.

We had attained at last a closer communion with Russia, and were bound together by the ties of a common interest against a common enemy, only to find the great cause of Country and Freedom, that we had at heart, tragically weakened by Russia's internal troubles—a temporary weakening, it was to be hoped. But upon our comprehension of its causes and of the remedies that were to be an indispensable condition of recovery would depend the future of Russia and of her Allies.



## PART I

# SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

## CHAPTER II

### ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE

The Conflict between Slavdom and the Tatars—Early Civilization Overwhelmed—Republics and Principalities give place to Tsardom—The Autocracy—Its Greatness—Its Evils.

AT the dawn of history the Slav—last-come of the races that migrated from Asia—gradually colonized the vast domain familiar to us under the names of Serbia, Bohemia, Poland, Galicia, and Russia. Originally pagan tribal communities, they slowly developed into Christian principalities and republics—an evolutionary process called forth and stimulated by circumstances of an economic order.

The great rivers of northern Slavdom—the Vistula, the Dvina, and the Dnieper, with their tributaries, and later the Volga—afforded natural avenues for commerce in the exchange of European commodities—largely dominated by the Hansa cities of the Baltic—with Asiatic markets: Byzantium, Persia, India, and Siberia. And the dwellers by these rivers became the sturdiest and most enterprising representatives of the Northern Slav peoples. Their descendants have preserved these traits. Among them are the Cossacks of the Dnieper, the Don, and the Volga, and the *Pomorj* (literally By-the-sea dwellers) of the Far North.

## 8 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

In what is now European Russia we find in the early Middle Ages flourishing commercial organizations, like the republics of Pskov and Novgorod, doing much business with the Hansa and the principality of Kiev, acting as an entrepôt for trade with Byzantium. Those enterprising sea-rovers, the Vikings, who were keen traders as well as fighters, gradually imposed themselves upon the northern Slavs. Hence arose the legend of Rurik, Sineus, and Truvor, the Variag, or Norse brethren, who came to "rule over" these communities. The Norman conquest of northern France and England was attended by circumstances not less far-reaching.

By and by they acquired a permanent status, and their descendants figure largely in the early chronicles of Russia. Among them was Alexander Nevsky, who drove back the Swedes (his ancestors) and Finns many centuries before the time of Peter the Great. Earlier still, Vladimir *Krasnoe Solnyshko* (Little Red Sun) had reigned in Kiev and converted his people to Christianity. He was so well beloved that his name still lives in the memory of simple Russian peasants. Both these Grand Dukes were canonized by the Church. Descendants of "Rurik" associated themselves with their people, and largely, thanks to their spirit of duty and self-sacrifice, the nation did not "go under" during the sad times of Tatar domination. In order to obtain investiture from the Khan they had to travel countless miles—to Mukden, a whole year on the road through Siberia—and to debase themselves in sign of homage; and some never returned.

It is said that the name "Rus" was borne by a Norse tribe, and that the Dnieper warriors coming to Constantinople to vindicate the rights of their merchants were so styled by the Byzantines. The name "Russian" would thus appear to be of Norse origin.

The Tatars converted the Dnieper Valley into a wilderness. Kiev lay in ruins for two centuries, until it was

recolonized by Slavs of Russian stock—the Little Russians of to-day.

Russia's "center of gravity" was lost for a time. Many small "dukedom" had, however, "budded off" north and eastward, which were later to form a new "center" in Muscovy. To this new country came settlers from the Dnieper, the Dvina, and the Volkhov, bringing the names of their original abodes. Thus Nízhni (Lower) Nóvgorod on the Volga recalled Velsky (Great) Nóvgorod, the Northern Dvina recalled the river of the Baltic; many place-names in Little Russia were duplicated in Great Russia.

A new and larger State thus arose. It had attracted numerous elements from the disturbed *okráiny* (borders), where Swedes, Lithuanians, Poles, and German "knights" alternately made incursions. It developed the concomitants of statehood—a defensive and administrative apparatus, necessarily crude in its earlier forms, but essentially Russian. The servants of the State were called *tiáglye liúdi* (burden-bearers). They had to appear *kónno i zbrúyno* (horsed and harnessed) at the summons of the *voyevóda* (war leader), as the local official was called. When the Tatar raids began to molest Muscovy the people naturally preferred the shelter of strong or less affected dukedom or *voyevódstva*. In order to put a stop to these migrations and prevent a weakening of the country's defenses, the settlers or laborers were "bonded" to the local administrator or *pomiéshchik* (fief-holder), land tenure being conditional to military obligations. This measure of State defense afterwards degenerated into the enslavement of the peasants to the *pomiéshchik*—a name that came to be applied to land-owners. Such was the origin of serfdom.

Without attempting to give more than an outline of the broad aspects of early Russian history, I think it is important to note that the Russian people displayed

## 10 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

in remote times a spirit of enterprise and freedom, and that extraneous circumstances subsequently dulled the one and quenched the other. Wave after wave of Asiatic invasion swept over Russia, effacing the landmarks of national growth, and preparing the way for the reign of autocracy, wherein the people saw their only hopes of salvation. In this view they were confirmed by the teachings of the Church.

Autocratic Russia, like its Asiatic predecessors, waxed in might, majesty, and dominion, in the end subjugating other nations, yet remaining herself nationally undeveloped, and, like the Tatar empires of the East, bound to disclose inherent elements of weakness whensoever she came into decisive collision with the progressive nations of the West.

If we carry the parallel farther, we find the subjugation of more highly civilized races was in itself a source of disintegration. The Tatars left a deep and abiding impression upon Russia, yet, weakened, disrupted, and subjugated, the Russians in the end destroyed the power of the Khans. Similarly, by conquest of the Teutonic and Polish borderlands, the Russian autocracy prepared the way for its own downfall. Had Peter the Great not "opened a window," through which western influences forced themselves headlong into the Asiatic calm of Muscovy, had his successors not laid violent hands upon Lithuania and Poland, through which extraneous, disintegrating elements gained admission into the heart of Russian politics, the history of Russia would have been a very different one.

The autocracy could endure only on one condition: that, like the despotisms of China or Turkey, it sedulously avoided active intervention in the affairs of other States. Alexander I having sent his armies into France, his officers, on returning home, conspired to overthrow the autocracy. This was the famous Decembrist plot,

which nearly cost his successor the Throne. When Nicholas I subdued the Magyar revolution in defense of the Hapsburg Crown, he blindly furthered the cause of German world-power, the foundation of which had been laid by former autocrats in starting the Elector of Brandenburg on a career of Empire. The military power of Germany and Austria, with which the Russians and their Allies have engaged in a battle to the death, owes its development to the mistakes of the autocracy, which perished during the war. The Slavophil idea, which prompted the emancipation of Bulgaria, had directly and indirectly sapped the foundations of autocracy. Russia came into the anomalous position of a State that conferred political freedom upon other nations without enjoying it herself. Exalted, humane ideals inspired the autocrats, but were fatal to the autocracy. When Alexander I pledged his word to the Finns to safeguard their civic liberties, he intended to gradually extend the same to his own people, but he found it impossible to do so without sacrificing the autocracy.

The election of the Romanovs three centuries ago did not affect the status of the autocracy, as some students of history would have us believe. Election by the people did not presume a change of principle: it was merely an expedient necessitated by default in the succession. The Tsar Michael Fedorovich and his successors were autocrats enjoying the mystical, unquestioned, and unquestionable power wielded by John the Terrible. In the language of the people they were *Bátiushka Tsar* (Little Father); they impersonated the absolute, God-given authority of the Parent of the State, to whom all owed blind obedience, whose word alone was law, who had the power of life and death over all his children. The besotted German who reigned in Petrograd more than a century ago under the style of Peter III,<sup>1</sup> ignor-

<sup>1</sup> Strangled by order of his wife, who became Catherine the Great.

ant of the language of his subjects, reviling their Church, was none the less an autocrat in the eyes of Russia. The power of the autocracy was so great, so exalted, that it retained its hold upon the people till very recent times. What more striking example can be given than the effect of the Tsar's edict on temperance. Nicholas II could boast with reason that only the autocracy had the power to suddenly convert the Russian nation to total abstinence.

We cannot understand the causes of the Russian Revolution unless we gain a clear insight into the essence of autocracy, its grandeur as well as its weakness. Why has Russian history during the past century been marked and marred by spasmodic attempts to enlarge the social framework, followed by periods, more or less prolonged, of obscure, apparently senseless and hopeless, reaction? Why were the latter days of Alexander II poisoned by a seeming repudiation of the bright promise contained in his emancipation of the Serfs? Old age had not made him a despot. What idea inspired his successor to insist upon the repression of all liberal principles? Yet Alexander III was the very soul of honesty and kindness. How can we reconcile the enlightened personal goodness of Nicholas II with his inveterate distaste for the "vain delusions" of modern statehood? Surely it could not be greed of power. The explanation must be sought in the traditional significance of the autocracy. Under its shadow the nation had waxed in numbers, Russia had become a great empire, wielding enormous power. The sacred, mystical attribute of autocracy, its very essence, had to be maintained at all costs. The mind of the autocrat, indoctrinated by teachers of the school of Pobedonostsev, associated the preservation of the autocracy with the maintenance of the State. In a sense they were right. The Russia of the autocracy would naturally cease to be the same Russia without the

autocracy. And so, quite honestly and sincerely, seeing the good of their people in the maintenance of their absolute power, successive autocrats did their utmost to shield Russia from any change that might imperil that sacred, limitless power with which the greatness and prosperity of the State had been identified. Nicholas II is reputed to have said that he considered it to be his most solemn duty to hand over to his son that sacred power, unbelittled, unimpaired. We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of his purpose or the unselfishness of his motives, although in the light of its tragic end we may well dispute the soundness of the autocratic theory invoked by him and his predecessors.

Without a Chinese wall of isolation, without interference in the affairs of other States, without progress in the western sense, the autocracy might have enjoyed years of calm, unruffled existence, subject only to occasional "palace revolutions." But all these conditions of permanency were lacking, as we have seen. The deadliest foe was "western progress." Its worst feature, industrialism, with its attendant problem of capital and labor, could not be excluded entirely. Developing, it profoundly modified the rural, semi-patriarchal life of the nation, which so easily concurred with the autocratic principle. Its other aspects—education, with its inevitable influx of European thought, the management of their local affairs by the people, and last, but most fatal of all, the advent of Representative Government—one after the other came hammering at the door of autocracy, to the accompaniment of military disasters in far-off Manchuria and, later, in the blood-stained fields of Poland. The war with Japan sounded the first danger-signal to autocracy. Heeding it, Nicholas II granted a Constitution; but falling again under the spell of the autocratic idea, he reasserted the old doctrine. The Great War brought the second and final summons.

## 14 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

But how long, how convulsive was the struggle that came to an end in March of 1917! We have seen the autocrats repeatedly imperiling the autocracy and sometimes the interests of the State by rash, ill-considered or Quixotic adventures in foreign policy; we have noted them acting upon high-minded, humane impulses in the conduct of internal affairs, assuring the liberties of the conquered Finns, abolishing serfdom, curing their people of Russia's worst evil, drink; and we have found them halting midway, unable to give full scope to their noblest efforts. The principle of autocracy reared itself up as an overmastering obsession; it ever dominated the main principle of all sound government: compromise and conciliation.

German influence, all-powerful at the Russian Court, added a baneful stimulus to the autocratic prejudice. One of the greatest of modern Russian statesmen, the late Count Witte, persistently advocated a pro-German policy as an indispensable safeguard to autocracy and a bulwark against Revolution.

## CHAPTER III

### BUREAUCRACY AND *OKHRANA*

The Autocracy Supplanted—Forty Thousand Clerks—Bureaucracy Subordinated to Police—Fear of Progress—National Ignorance—Agrarian Reform.

As Russia waxed great in area and in complexity of population, the autocrat's paternal, all-wise, unlimited authority could not be exercised by one man; it had to be delegated to innumerable agents. Nicholas I once said: "Russia is ruled not by me, but by my forty thousand clerks." The autocracy implied in name, if not in deed, an entirely centralized, one-man government; in practise, in a huge empire like Russia, it resolved itself into government by irresponsible officials, who ruled according to their caste or individual propensities, whether for good or for evil. Herein lies the origin of the bureaucracy.

In becoming the ruling caste in Russia, the bureaucracy was, by its very nature, committed to the support of the autocratic power whence it derived its authority and privileges. The work of administering the Empire was not neglected; indeed, it may be said without exaggeration that, as bureaucrats, the Russian officials were not a whit less competent or efficient than civil servants in other lands; and certainly they had a far more formidable task to cope with. Profit and honor could be gained in the official careers more surely than in any other capacity; it would have been surprising that a gifted race like the Russians should be poor in bureaucratic

talents. The Russian bureaucracy suffered, it is true, from a lack of integrity among the lower grades for reasons which will be dealt with later, but its besetting sin was neither of omission nor commission, but one of origin. Everything that tended to undermine or belittle the autocracy was *per se* repugnant to the bureaucratic caste. Its leaders, with a few distinguished exceptions, saw danger in the slightest concession to liberal tendencies. Freedom of speech, of the Press, and of meeting was tabooed; the enlightenment of the masses was systematically retarded; trade and industry were held under suspicion and hampered by vexatious regulations. Political offenders were relegated to Siberia on a par with convicts, while emigration of the teeming peasant population found no favor. The bureaucracy did not wish to be troubled with too many colonists, who might become difficult to control from a distance.

When Russian trade and industry began to develop by leaps and bounds as a result of the railway and financial reforms of the last twenty-five years, a new terror was added to the many cares of the bureaucracy: it became necessary to keep a firm hand upon the laboring classes, which began to increase in numbers and to provide a rich soil for political and revolutionary propaganda.

The emancipated serfs had been tethered by communal land-holdings to the village, kept in ignorance, deprived of an outlet to the fertile plains and valleys of Siberia, and shorn of their original and rightful share in the Zemstvo (local government) councils created by the Tsar Liberator; now these same peasants found employment in the newly created industries, in the steel and iron works of the South, in the textile factories of the Center and the North, and returning periodically to their homes, sowed the seeds of future revolution.

Above all, the bureaucracy feared war. Plehve, the all-powerful Minister who was assassinated in July, 1904,

committed the unpardonable blunder of conniving at the adventure which led to an armed conflict with Japan. He believed that it would "clear the air." The experiment was a ghastly failure for the bureaucracy. Every bureaucratic nerve was strained thereafter to avoid international complications. For many years after the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia neglected her defenses, starved her army and navy, and, partly as a result of that neglect, was unable to meet the requirements of the great struggle with Germany into which she was drawn.

From what has been said it is apparent that the bureaucracy subordinated its normal activities during the past century to a police system. The fight with "privy conspiracy and rebellion," perceived on all sides by the terrified gaze of the bureaucratic wisecracks, claimed absorbing consideration. Policemen rose to the highest places in the land, not as humble guardians of the public peace or as detectives of crime against the person or property of citizens—these lowly tasks were relegated to the humble constabulary—but as wardens over the autocracy.

It is a sad and characteristic commentary upon the good intentions of one autocrat to recall the reason which led him to institute the famous Third Section. Alexander I wanted to right the wrongs of the fatherless and widows, to wipe away all tears from the eyes of the oppressed. The Third Section of His Majesty's Cabinet was formed to discover these wrongs to tell the Sovereign about them, and to act as his medium for reparation. His most trusted officers and courtiers were placed in charge of the service. We know what was the result. The Third Section began by delving into the life-history of the Tsar's subjects, and found that all was not agreeable to the safety of the autocratic power. By easy and rapid stages it became, not an instrument of mercy, but one of oppression. Its business grew till it embraced

every class and calling in the Empire. The odium of the office led to its transfer to the Ministry of the Interior under the style of Department of Police, more popularly known as the *okhrana*, a word meaning "protection." And verily this institution was intended to "protect" the autocracy and its agents from internal foes. John the Terrible, his bright intellect dimmed in old age by a mania of persecution, treated his subjects as enemies, and to protect himself instituted the *oprichnina*, a brotherhood sworn to defend him, whose members carried at their saddle-bows a dog's head and a broom, indicating fidelity and the sweeping out of sedition. The *oprichniki* could rob and murder whomsoever they chose, always justified in their acts by the high mission confided to them of safeguarding the autocrat. What was even in those rough days regarded as an abomination became under the guise of the *okhrana* the mainstay of the Russian bureaucracy. Its agents did not wear the brutal emblems of their protagonists; they did not openly rob and murder; but we know that they did not scruple to provoke crime and to lend a hand in political assassination. The *okhrana* was not loved by the bureaucracy, be it added. It was repugnant to the best men who held high offices. I include even some of those who in the course of their official career stood at the head of the Police Department. They deplored its abuses. Many would have liked to be rid of it. But the *okhrana* had become an indispensable adjunct of government. Bewail its evils as they might, no one dared to lift a finger against this institution. To have done so would have been tantamount to official suicide. How could the autocracy and the bureaucratic system hope to control and checkmate their many foes if the *okhrana* were abolished? It was a vicious circle, whence escape seemed impossible—a Gordian knot which had to be severed by the Revolution.

With a distorted sense of political perspective, seeing things through the colored glasses of an irresponsible police system, their best intentions warped, the autocrats drew farther and farther away from their people, from the realities of the situation, captives in mind and deed of the *okhrana*. And the people? How did the classes and masses, the many creeds and races peopling the Empire, react under this treatment? Crushed in rebellion, the Poles stolidly awaited the end of their trials. The Cossacks and the Caucasian races, shorn of freedom, held fast their traditions of independence. The Germans of the Baltic provinces, spoilt children of the bureaucracy, flourished mightily, ruling the local Esthonians and Letts, and enjoying fat offices. The Mussulmans, inured to autocracy, were docile. The Jews, poor, prolific, and pushful, adapted themselves to oppression, secretly nurturing plans of revenge. The Finns, long a privileged race, watched for opportunities to enlarge their autonomy. All this conglomeration of races was borne on the broad back of Great Russia, by the might of a loyal army drawn from a hundred millions of peasants, led by nobles, and subservient to the police system of government described above.

When the reservists, who went to fight with Japan over a quarrel that they did not understand, came back to the villages, bringing tales of defeat and inefficiency, the prestige of the old authority dwindled perceptibly. Political propaganda easily started a *jacquerie*, recalling some of the worst features of a similar movement in Ireland. The Government tried to remedy some of its past errors. Emigration to Siberia was encouraged. The accounts brought back by the soldiers of fertile lands beyond the Urals helped greatly to foster a wholesale exodus. It was difficult for the land agents of the Government to keep pace with the demand for allotments. All approachable regions were quickly colonized.

New railways were built, and more were required. Siberia began to accumulate great stores of grain, demanding outlets to the northern and southern seaboard. There was a sure promise of a new and Greater Russia, peopled by the most enterprising and energetic elements from the Old Country.

But this exodus, great as it was, did not attain the proportions necessary to keep pace with the growth of the population, which had reached the enormous figure of over two and a half millions yearly, and, for technical causes mentioned above, it tended rather to diminish. The Great War, with its insatiable demands upon the manhood of Russia, temporarily stopped the movement. The millions that should have gone to people Siberia partly fell in battle or became prisoners of war toiling in German lands.

Simultaneously with the encouragement of emigration, the bureaucracy fostered the introduction of individual ownership of land and the creation of small farms. After the emancipation of the serfs, the existing village communities were retained, and held their lands in common until they had paid off the redemption dues. Primitive, uneducated, unable to think or act on his own initiative, the serf, after his emancipation, could not be expected to become an independent farmer. He clung to his commune as the only familiar landmark in a new world full of pitfalls for the unwary. Meanwhile the village elder continued to draw comfort and guidance from the *pomieshchik* squire, his former owner.

The commune (*obshchina*) was favored by the bureaucracy; in its perpetuation the *okhrana* saw a good hope of preserving the peasant from disagreeable influences; but suddenly the commune lost its popularity. M. Stolypin opened the eyes of his countrymen to the danger of communal ownership. It was a negation of the rights of property, a lure for the socialistic doctrinaire, an

impediment to individual effort and enterprise. All this was very true. The remedy was applied with all the force that this strong statesman could command. The redemption dues having been paid up, it was announced that communal ownership had served its purpose. that the peasants were free to take up their allotments as individual owners, and that the State was prepared to advance them money for the purchase and equipment of small farms. "We place our stakes on the strong men," said M. Stolypin.

Now, as a matter of fact, the communal system was a natural outcome of the primitive conditions and ignorance under which the peasants lived. The more enterprising peasants had already bought up lands, either individually or in companies, from the squirearchy, and with the progress of time and education communal ownership was bound to disappear. The attempt to suddenly disrupt a system organically bound up with ignorance may be justified as a political expedient; it could not fail to bring much friction and disappointment. The laziest, poorer, and less developed members of the commune offered all the resistance of inertia to a scheme that would compel them to rely upon themselves, and were secretly encouraged by the political elements which favored the commune as a profitable soil for socialistic propaganda.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE

**Role of the Aristocracy and Middle Class—Absentee Landlordism—Disunited Elements—The Duma—Its Parties—The Church—National Characteristics—Drunkenness—The Temperance Edict—Its Hidden Aspects.**

PERHAPS the least comprehensible feature of the Old Regime to a western mind was the absence of guiding and controlling centers. Propensity for mass action had been characteristic of the Slavs since their appearance in Europe. Inhabiting a vast plain, remote from the open sea, the Russians had not developed the individualism or self-reliance of the Anglo-Saxon. To the present day, Russian peasants migrate collectively, in whole villages. Democracy had no equivalent in Russia.

The masses were aristocrats owning huge landed estates and enjoying all the privileges of the nobility, such as the right of petition to the Throne and a virtual monopoly of high offices in the civil and military administration, but they had no political power as an aristocracy—only as bureaucrats; and for that reason many of them were not free agents. They were divided into two hostile clans: representatives of bureaucracy on the one side and of the Zemstvos and other local elective bodies on the other side. In the first case they figured as absentee landlords, drawing revenues from their estates, but devoid of direct contact with the peasants; in the second case they formed the moderate wing of a healthy but necessarily weak opposition, including within its ranks the nascent middle class.

Similarly, the middle class, as represented in England, had no corresponding existence. It was not much more numerous than the nobility, and certainly less influential. It included the merchants and the better educated element. But many of the so-called *intelligentsia* were peasants or poor Jews who had obtained a university education, losing their original roots in the process, without engrafting themselves solidly upon their new station. From them were recruited most of the revolutionary leaders. Thus neither in the aristocracy nor in the middle class could Russia find a sheet-anchor against the coming storm.

Many of the nobles and gentry espoused the cause of Reform, and, making use of their right of petition, sent remonstrance after remonstrance to the Tsar. But a Congress of Nobles, instituted under bureaucratic and autocratic auspices, invariably succeeded in stifling these isolated voices.

The middle class was split up into constitutional and socialist factions. Besides, this class was semi-inarticulate. It had not the right to appeal directly to the Monarch. Its voice was heard feebly through the columns of the Press, which was subject to a rigorous censorship.

Every Russian was ticketed and docketed according to class or calling: eighty out of every hundred were peasants, including about ten workmen engaged in industries, nineteen were burgesses (merchants and artisans), a fraction represented the nobility from which the ruling caste was recruited. Sixty per cent were illiterate, twenty-five per cent could read and write, ten per cent were educated, five per cent were *intelligentsia*.

Default of education, the innate conservatism of the farmer, the natural subserviency of masses new-fledged from serfdom, rendered them passive, inert. Their half-

articulate cry during the generations of slavery for *zemliá i volia* (land and freedom) was stilled by the emancipation. Brought into sudden contact with industrialism, they lost their primitive virtues, honesty and godliness, without acquiring the birthright of free men, love of honor and of country. Carefully segregated from enlightening influences, they learnt only what was reprehensible. Drunkenness became a great national curse. The introduction for fiscal purposes of a State Liquor Monopoly placed drink within easy reach of the peasant, exhausting him physically and morally, and draining away the resources of the village into the Exchequer. The artificial impediments to emigration and settlement in the boundless, fertile regions of Siberia caused a glut of the rural population and a renewal of the land hunger. Of this circumstance political parties took full advantage. Land nationalization, expropriation, and the other lures of socialistic doctrine found many willing listeners among the ignorant, and especially among the peasants who had inherited a "starvation" allotment of land.<sup>1</sup>

In response to popular clamor and tumult against the abuses revealed during the war with Japan, and in compliance with the demands of constitutional parties supported by the Zemstvo nobles and by a large section of the middle class, the Tsar signed the Manifesto of October 30, 1905, a semi-Constitution perpetuating the autocracy.

The Church had long been perverted by bureaucratic interference. Since the days of Peter the Great it had been deprived of its Patriarch,<sup>2</sup> who enjoyed an amount

<sup>1</sup> The serfs, on emancipation, could choose a "working" allotment sufficient for their sustenance, by paying for it in instalments (redemption dues), or they could obtain a smaller ("starvation") allotment without payment.

<sup>2</sup> The schism of the *Staróvéry* and *Staróobriádsy* (Old Believers and Followers of the Old Rite) dates back to this period. Schismatics in minor points of dogma and ritual, they were Dissenters in the political and some of them also in the ecclesiastical sense. All were opposed to the violent introduction of

of influence and independence that did not please the masterful reformer, and its affairs had been placed in commission under a Holy Synod, which in its turn was subjected to the dictatorial powers of the Grand Procurator, an agent of the bureaucracy.

The clergy were divided into parish priests, who had to be married, and monks, who alone could hope to attain the prelacy. The white or parish clergy formed a caste, their cures descending from father to son. They were often only a little less ignorant than the peasants, tilled their own fields, and were given, like their parishioners, to indulgence in strong drink. The villagers respected the priestly office, but could not always respect the individuals. They paid them tithes in kind, unwillingly, and bargained with them for the price of their ministrations.

Among the prelates were men of all classes, peasants and nobles. They included some very high-minded and learned divines. But among them were also many time-servers who subordinated their high calling to purely selfish dictates. The Holy Synod, as it was in the days of the autocracy, could not afford much scope for anything else.

Monastic life in Russia offered certain advantages to the peasants. They came there in youth to fill menial offices and casually pick up some rudiments of knowledge. In maturer life they went thither on pilgrimages.

western, chiefly German, dress, customs, and methods of government carried out by the ruthless Peter. Some adopted their priesthood from the Galician or Bielokrynitsa eparchy; others became *bezpopóvtsy* (priestless ones), having sought refuge in the eastern borderlands, where priests were unavailable. All sturdily refused to shave their beards, accounting it a sin. All were total abstainers, unaddicted to the use of tobacco, and hard-working and thrifty. A "reconciliation" between the Old Faith and the Orthodox Church was solemnized in 1907, when the Ukaz on Freedom of Conscience was promulgated. The altars of the Old Believers were then "unsealed" after a lapse of three centuries. The number of adherents of the Old Faith is reputed to be about 20,000,000.

Some of the monasteries were homes of idleness and its usual accompaniments; others, again, became admirable centers of industry. The Solovetsky monastery, situated on an island in the White Sea, was an example of this kind. Its hard-working inmates created a garden amidst an arctic wilderness. They were excellent husbandmen, dairy farmers, architects and builders, and fishermen. Wild birds and animals were sacred at Solovki and at the Ladoga monastery of Balaam. There I have often watched the seagulls and wildfowl, hares, foxes, and badgers enjoying complete impunity amid the pilgrim and tourist crowds.

The Revolution emancipated the Church from its police duties. The reaction that followed upon the excesses of Bolshevism was marked by a great religious revival, which restored much of the influence wielded by the Church in olden times.

The real Russian is naturally good-tempered, kindly, extremely intelligent, and lovable. Qualities of heart perhaps dominate in him over qualities of mind. He is gregarious, sociable, and expansive. He is given to bursts of energy, accomplishing an extraordinary amount of work in a short time, rather than to steady, prolonged labor. The long winter has left a permanent imprint upon him. He is not a hater. He has not even a sense of retributive justice. The peasants would stone a horse-thief caught red-handed, but they would feed and care for him if he recovered. Trial by jury, introduced in the sixties, invariably led to a verdict of "not guilty." Corporal punishment was not permitted in the schools, and the death penalty was held in abhorrence. The soldiers had always been kind to prisoners. Some regiments did not, it is true, take prisoners, but that was only when they had seen their comrades tortured by the Germans or Hungarians, or when they had been exposed too long to the explosive bullets used by the Austrian Army.

But under the influence of drink the Russians, especially the ignorant masses, were capable of committing terrible excesses. Drink had an irresistible fascination for them. The peasant would imbibe as often and as much as he could afford; and, as he grew more prosperous—during the decade preceding the war—he spent more money on vodka. Births, marriages, and bereavements imposed traditional obligations of hospitality. The result was an orgy. Village festivals and holidays—they were all too numerous—involved a general debauch. It was dangerous to enter a village while the people were drunk. They frequently murdered each other, and would not hesitate to assault or murder a stranger. Drink played an important part in the affairs of the commune. Any *muzhik* who had a grievance could be sure of a favorable hearing if he put up “drinks all round.” The more wealthy or fashionable villagers occasionally indulged in beer, but vodka undiluted (potato spirit of 40 degrees) was the staple beverage. It brought about the speediest and pleasantest results. When the ex-Tsar visited the home of his ancestors in Kostroma on the occasion of the Romanov Tercentenary (1913), he heard a good deal about this wretched state of affairs, and probably saw something of village life.

Had he taken the trouble to study the conditions that had prevailed, and still, to a certain extent, prevail in other countries, the ex-Tsar would have understood that a sudden and miraculous cure could not be permanently achieved without first spreading education and enlightenment among the rustics. But he would not listen to the warnings of his able Prime Minister, Count Kokovtsov, who explained to him that any sudden prohibition measure would cripple the Treasury, and in the end fail of its direct purpose. Events subsequently justified the statesman’s arguments. Nicholas II—a typical Russian—inclined towards the dictates of a kind heart. He was

probably unconscious of the fact that the temperance plan was being fostered by the Reactionary gang in order to get rid of a liberal-minded Prime Minister, and that they were leading him (the Tsar) into a trap. Everything seemed at first to accord with the Reactionary scheme. Count Kokovtsov's resignation coincided with the famous edict on temperance at the commencement of 1914. The villages became orderly, peaceful, while deposits in the State savings banks accumulated in unprecedented proportions.

But I had a conversation with some of my *muzhik* acquaintances shortly after the edict had been applied which somewhat surprised me. It was an old peasant who spoke. "We old ones rather like it," he said; "we have had our day. And the young ones—the boys and the girls—used to beat us when we had drink in the villages. But the youngsters are all against total abstinence. They think it is unfair. They have not had their fling yet, and they are rather sulky."

However, we all blessed the Emperor for his temperance edict when the war began, because it enormously helped the mobilization. Many villages had voluntarily abjured the Monopoly shops. Had drink been procurable in the villages, there would have been delay and trouble. The Government would have closed the liquor shops around the depots under the old system, but all the reservists would have been drunk before they left home and drunk on the way. As it was, only one serious disturbance occurred. At Barnaul, in Siberia, the reservists wandered about the streets. No arrangements had been made for them. In disgust they broke open a vodka store and then proceeded "to paint the town red." Half the houses were burned down.

I must say that the enforced absence of liquor was never complained of by the troops. On every occasion when I visited the trenches the men appeared fully con-

scious of the great benefits of temperance. Moreover, with the characteristic responsiveness of the Russian, they had appreciated the good intentions of the Little Father and never repined, although there were times and seasons when a vodka ration would have been extremely welcome and useful.

## CHAPTER V

### RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT

Belief in "Holy Men"—The Advent of Rasputin—Healing the Tsarevich—The Empress's Infatuation—An Anxious Mother—The Tsar and the Dalai Lama—Alexandra's Ambitions—The Weakness of Nicholas II—Rasputin Appoints and Dismisses Ministers—"Remarkable Prophecies"—Rasputin's Peace Intrigue with Germany—"Removed" by the Army—The Circumstances of Rasputin's Death—Protopopov's Madness—The Court at Mogilev.

THE Russian was ever a God-seeker (*bogoiskátel*). This trait found its expression in various ways, bad and good—in the formation of quaint sects, some of which, like the abominable *khlystij* (flagellants), resisted all attempts at conversion; in the schism known as the Old Faith; but above all in the popularity of elders (*stártsy*), to whom multitudes came seeking light and guidance. It was wonderful how quickly the fame of a "holy man" traveled over the country. People of all classes got to hear of him, and traveled enormous distances to see his face and to receive his blessing. Now, as all sects were banned by the Church, these ghostly comforters generally selected their abode under the protection of some monastery. They signalized themselves by their blamelessness and otherwise. They might be ignorant laymen or learned clerics; it mattered not so long as they had the requisite gifts and qualities. We shall see how this characteristic of Russian life was to affect the whole course of politics and to produce one of the contributory causes of the Revolution.

While the semi-skeptical *intelligentsia* professed dis-

dainful tolerance for all beliefs, and the educated classes displayed a widespread laxity of morals—as has been strikingly illustrated in the works of Russian writers—they could never attain the profundities of out-and-out skepticism. The lower orders might, and were often, misled by false prophets like the mad monk Iliodor in Tsaritsyn, who converted his cloister into a revolutionary fortress, or a Father Gapon, who led the workpeople of Petrograd to revolt in 1905, with the connivance of the *okhrana*; the enlightened classes were equally subject to mistake the false prophet for the true.

Father John of Kronstadt was, for many years, the leading “holy man” of Russia. He attracted rich and poor, high and low. Through his hands passed a golden stream of charity. Yet he died comparatively poor. It was by his advice that the Emperor and Empress went on a pilgrimage to disinter the remains of Serafim of Sarov (near Nizhni Novgorod) and beatify that “holy man,” in recompense whereof they were to be blessed with the long-awaited Heir to the Throne. The prophecy came true.

Prior to that, a recourse to occult arts, under the guidance of a well-known charlatan named Philippe, had brought about scandalous disappointment. But the Court did not scruple to revert to these practises. Then follows the first appearance in Petrograd of the notorious Razputin. A peasant of Tobolsk, in Siberia, he had served in a monastery, picking up a smatter of biblical phrases and laying the foundations of his future transformation into a *staretz*. A wealthy merchant’s wife from Moscow “discovered” him during her pilgrimages to the shrines of Siberia, and introduced him to her friends in the great city.

Razputin’s name signified “the vicious one,” or “he of the bad roads.” His record in his native village fully justified these appellations. A drunken and abnormally

perverted and lazy peasant and illiterate, he was yet able to impose upon susceptible people by his monastic verbiage, and particularly by a forceful, if brutal, personality.

I saw him once or twice. His face and appearance reminded me of Repin's celebrated painting of John the Terrible, where the tyrant is depicted holding to his breast the bleeding head of the Tsarevich and glaring upward in a frenzy of despair at having murdered his only son. Razputin's face was coarser, less intelligent. But the two men bore a striking resemblance—the mad, vicious, bloodthirsty genius who, like Louis XI, alternated between orgies of torture and paroxysms of prayer, exterminated the flower of his aristocracy, yet united his country under one scepter, and the depraved peasant who was also destined to exert such a fateful influence upon his native land. The Terrible One and the Tobolsk *muzhik* were cast in the same mold, physical and moral. This fact must be appreciated. It was one of the causes of the extraordinary hold which Razputin obtained upon a superstitious Court.

The lure of occultism ever appealed to Nicholas II. By nature secretive and mistrustful of all who approached him, inherently well-intentioned, devoted to his wife and children, he, like men of weak character, was obstinate, unable to brook dictation or advice. Above all, he was permeated by a profound belief in the sanctity of his mission and office. Any appeal to autocratic prejudice ever found him a ready listener. The Empress unfortunately encouraged rather than corrected these inclinations. Her semi-English, semi-German upbringing had yielded an untoward admixture. She could never identify herself with her adopted people. From the outset of her long sojourn among the Russians she was never liked by them, nor seemed capable of understanding them. But she adopted their superstitions and beliefs. The circum-

stances under which Alexis was born appear to have left an indelible imprint upon her mind. It was on the Tsarevich's account that she first made the acquaintance of Razputin.

The boy suffered from a bodily ailment, inherited from his mother, transmitted to the male issue, known as hæmophilia, a condition of the blood which might cause danger from a ruptured vein or from a mere nose-bleeding. Picture the unceasing anxiety of this mother about her boy, and remember that in him were centered all the hopes of a great empire; remember also how many girl children she had borne before the arrival of the Heir; take into account the mournful fact that no other children would ever bless her home—this boy was to be the only one and the last; then you begin to perceive an incomplete but faithful image of the Empress. Add to this that she was a proud, aloof, masterful woman, living in the hot-house atmosphere of a semi-Byzantine Court, amid people whom she disliked and distrusted, not over-intelligent, yet convinced of her own political sagacity, imbued by a belief instilled into her by courtiers and clerics that the peasants, whom she did not, could not, know would for ever remain loyal to the Throne—that they were the only sound element in the country.

Razputin's fame as a *staretz*, who, by occult powers, could save her boy, appealed to her mother instinct; Razputin's peasant origin enlisted her confidence and political interest. Because Razputin was able by the simple and well-known exercise of animal magnetism to stop nose-bleeding, which the Tsarevich's physicians could not arrest, the Empress was persuaded of his occult powers. He was a "holy man," no matter what evil courses he might pursue or what unkind people might say of him. The charlatan's boastful announcement that the boy's life depended upon him was accepted as an inspired utterance. He became the privileged libertine

of the Court. Worse still, his word—the artless expression of a loyal peasant—carried weight in the highest counsels. As the years went by he became more impudent, more interfering and more dangerous.

Remonstrances reached the Emperor's ears. Among his oldest courtiers were men who saw the danger and had the courage to speak out. Nicholas II always turned the conversation by saying: "These are my private affairs, and they are nobody's concern except mine." In vain it was represented to him that Razputin was interfering in affairs of State, that he was the tool of alien influences, that he was discrediting the Monarchy by scandalous boasts indulged in openly by him during his bouts of drunkenness and debauch. The Emperor treated, or affected to treat, all these attempts to oust the charlatan as an unwarrantable invasion of his domestic life. Presumably he had tried to remonstrate with his wife about the man, and had encountered such opposition that he had decided to tolerate Razputin rather than further incense the Empress. To one old General of my acquaintance, who had ventured to bring up the sore question, he said: "I prefer five Razputins to one hysterical woman."

Occasionally the *staretz* went to visit his wife and children in Tobolsk. He had built a gorgeous hut for them. There he flaunted himself in silk shirt, velvet *sharovary* (pantaloons), and patent leather boots—the acme of *muzhik* dandyism. The peasants could not but feel flattered that one of themselves should have become so rich and powerful. The local authorities, lay and clerical, paid court to him. In Petrograd hope arose each time that he had gone for good. But he came back more impudent than ever. One of his daughters was placed by the Empress in a school reserved for nobles, and became engaged to an officer. His house in Petrograd was besieged by callers, high and low, asking for official favor

and bringing presents. A few words scrawled by Razputin to a Minister would bring immediate results.

Razputin kept a sort of debit and credit account with high functionaries. If they did what he wanted, he would return the favor. Ministers always needed a friend at Court. Some were too squeamish about accepting Razputin's overtures, others dared even to resist. They invariably suffered. M. Samarin, a distinguished public man belonging to the Conservative party, had undertaken to restore the shattered prestige of the Church by accepting the post of Grand Procurator of the Holy Synod. He was summarily dismissed for "coldness" towards one of Razputin's protégés who had been made a bishop. General Djunkovsky, chief of the all-powerful *okhrana*, kicked Razputin out of his office when he came in unbidden to present some impertinent request. He was immediately deprived of his post. No Minister's career, no woman's honor, were safe from the enterprise of the "holy man."

The newspapers had, of course, been forbidden to mention Razputin, but in covert ways, using subterfuges which were understood by their readers, they kept the initiated public aware of all that went on. If the Emperor could have heard what was being said by his faithful and loyal subjects about Razputin's connection with the Court, he might have risked even an open rupture with his Consort to save the Monarchy. Officers and Generals at the Front often discussed the scandal with me in such a tone that I felt sure had Razputin ever ventured to come near the Army he would have been killed. The Grand Duke Nicholas, when he was Generalissimo, openly announced his intention of hanging Razputin if he ever got hold of him. (That was perhaps the main cause of the Grand Duke's transfer to the Caucasus.)

All this was bad enough, but it was not yet irreparable. Soon, however, the scandal became known to the common

people, and the autocracy became discredited. So also did the Church. Razputinism had belittled the Prelacy. The late Mr. John Birkbeck, an old friend of Russia and of the Emperor, was in Moscow in the summer of 1916, and told me how shocked and surprised he had been by unmistakable evidences of the widespread unpopularity of the Empress. During a cinema performance the people had actually hissed when her picture appeared on the screen. This was an unprecedented—an almost incredible—occurrence.

Unfortunately the Emperor did not understand what was happening. He heard of these manifestations from the *okhrana* and other interested parties, who colored them to suit their own purposes. The campaign against Razputin was represented as a malicious intrigue which could be checked only by further police measures, a symptom of revolution which could be doctored only by repression.

The influence of the Empress had for many years estranged the best Russians from the Court. Naturally a sociable man, given to conviviality, Nicholas II had to fall back upon the company of persons who were approved by his Consort. He had no continuous, healthy touch with his subjects.<sup>1</sup> During recent years the Sovereigns lived in retirement. Most of the Tsar's huge revenues were swallowed up for the maintenance of innumerable palaces and retainers; the residue was invested in the War Loans. (Hence the Tsar had to be careful about expenditure. He was poorer than many of the Grand Dukes, or even his own children.)

Razputin's power grew. The highest appointments were within his gift. A word from him to the Empress

<sup>1</sup> Even purely Court functions and entertainments had been given up. The last "function" that the author remembers was given on the occasion of the young Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna's marriage to a Swedish Prince at Tsarskoe Selo—a marriage that ended in a divorce.

and Ministers were dismissed or nominated, probably without the Emperor knowing whence the recommendation came.

Thus Maklakov (a brother of the deputy) was given the all-important post of Home Secretary because he had taken Razputin's fancy, and later the Falstaffian Khvostov, a Deputy of the Right, succeeded him.

Khvostov and his nominal subordinate, Beletsky, then chief of the *okhrana*, were engaged in a duel at cross-purposes for the possession of the Empress's letters to Razputin, which had been abstracted by a brother "saint." The Minister sent funds to Norway to secure the documents, but the emissary with the papers was "intercepted" by Beletsky, who thought he would thereby earn Razputin's gratitude and oust his superior. Beletsky overreached himself, however, and was relegated to the Governor-Generalship of Irkutsk.

This state of affairs grew worse when the Emperor, acting under his wife's influence, decided in an ill-fated moment to assume personal command of the armies. Delighted to be at the Front together with his boy among his soldiers, away from the hateful worries of Tsarskoe and Petrograd, Nicholas II thus relinquished the reins of government to Alexandra, with consequences that might be foreseen. Razputin and his clique did exactly what they pleased. The "holy man" had visions which were interpreted as guides to policy. As a matter of fact they suited the interests, not of Russia, but of Germany, whence they in all probability emanated.

Some years before, the late Count Witte,<sup>1</sup> who had never been a friend of England, was asked for an "interview" by the *Cologne Gazette* to justify Razputin in the

<sup>1</sup> A talented Minister who had played a foremost part in the promotion of Russian industries, the originator of the spirit monopoly and currency reform, chief negotiator of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and Prime Minister during the uprising of 1905.

eyes of the German public. The *staretz* himself declared soon after the war began that had he not been absent in Tobolsk at the time, he would never have allowed Russia to fight, and predicted misfortune because he had not been consulted. The fatherly tone adopted by Wilhelm to Nicholas in the messages which they exchanged on the eve of war argued a degree of assurance in the power of Germany's influence at the Russian Court, and subservience thereto on the part of Nicholas, which reveals consciousness of a very powerful hand being exerted at Tsarskoe in the interests of Germany and "peace." But that influence, or rather the agency through which it had been working, was too far away in Siberia. Later we knew that the Emperor had at the last moment countermanded his own order for a general mobilization, but the Staff could not stop it. Berlin, of course, distorted this fact, attempting to attribute the origin of this war to incompetent and disobedient Generals. But doubtless the "holy man" had something to do with the counter-orders.

While the Emperor remained in supreme command of the armies, some of the most important ministries were being confided to men who had notoriously acted in the interests of Germany. Thus M. Sazonov, who had succeeded M. Izvolsky at the Foreign Office and loyally developed the Entente policy, was suddenly (July, 1916), and without any avowable cause, supplanted by M. Stürmer, an old bureaucrat of Austrian origin, who, moreover, wielded the Premiership. His ultra-reactionary and pro-German antecedents were only too well known. He had been singled out on the recommendation of Ruzputin's friends. He took his orders from the Empress. The British Government showed its disapproval of this extraordinary procedure by demonstratively bestowing the Grand Cross of the Bath upon M. Sazonov.

Next came the appointment of M. Protopopov to the



**GREGORY RAZPUTIN AND HIS "DEVOTEES"**

The photo represents a familiar scene during the palmy days of Rasputinism. The "Saint" is "at home" to his "friends." Among them are ladies of fashion—many bearing distinguished names—all seeking "Grishka's favor and protection," some young men who are on the lookout for official promotion, and a bearded adherent of the "Black Hundred." Note the telephone. The ex-Empress Alexandra was in constant communication with the "Saint," and each night asked for his "blessing" over the wire. Rasputin wears his usual peasant's blouse of finest silk and patent leather topboots. His "nurse" sits at his feet. This picture was sold and distributed in huge numbers during the Revolution.



Home Office. He was a prominent public man who had suddenly displayed marked pro-German sympathies. Returning with a Legislative Delegation from Paris to Petrograd, he arranged a secret meeting with some German emissaries in Stockholm with a view to discussing peace terms. Soon after his arrival in Russia he was honored by an Imperial audience. A fortnight spent with Razputin in a round of restaurant orgies had brought him his opportunity. Afterwards it transpired that he was bankrupt and suffering from an incurable disease which affected his mind. (Later he had to be placed in a lunatic asylum.) The appointment of this broken-down, half-crazed adventurer was flaunted by the agents of the autocracy as a gracious concession to the Duma, of which he had been vice-president in his sane and prosperous days. This Protopopov was to play a fateful part in the Revolution.

All Russia loathed Razputinism, and turned her countenance from the Emperor, who had not sufficient strength to put an end to the scandal. The murder of Grishka (a contemptuous diminutive of his Christian name)<sup>1</sup> was talked of long before it took place. And its occurrence probably stimulated the revolutionary outburst which followed two and a half months later. The Army had more particularly felt the harm and ignominy of Razputinism, and it was the Army that finally "removed" him. Young Guardsmen, including Prince Felix Yusupov and his kinsman, the Grand Duke Dmitry Pavlovich, and a Conservative Deputy named Purishkevich, who had been in charge of relief work at the Front, were present at a supper in the Yusupov Palace on the Moika Canal in Petrograd, to which Razputin was lured by the promise of meeting some fair guests.

It had been resolved that he should die "like a dog," and such indeed was his end. The body, riddled with

<sup>1</sup> December 29, 1916.

bullets, was swiftly removed in a motor-car and flung, weighted so that it should sink, into an arm of the Neva. The weights, hurriedly attached with string, came off, and the corpse floated up, the water at this place being clear of ice. Marks of blood had been found on the bridge whence the body had been flung. So the police were on the lookout. Sure enough, here it was found and conveyed to a mortuary. I read the secret report of the post-mortem examination. It described the body as that of a man of over forty-five years of age, normally constituted.

The Empress, maddened by grief and anger, came from Tsarskoe disguised as a sister of mercy, and together with Protopopov visited the mortuary, where she convinced herself that the "saint" was really dead. She was more than ever convinced that he was a "saint," because the arms were crossed. She had ordered the arrest of her nephew Dmitry, and had summoned the Emperor. Prince Felix had made his escape to the Crimea. Purishkevich had returned to the Front. The Emperor came to Tsarskoe, exiled his nephew to Persia, himself went back to the Front, and the affair was hushed up. The body was quietly buried in a secret place in Tsarskoe Park.

Protopopov, who had been displaying unmistakable signs of mental derangement, came often to condole with the Empress. During his visits he was subject to hallucinations, imagining that the "saint" was holding converse with him. "See, there he is," he would exclaim, stretching out his arms to empty space. "Our blessed one beckons. He is talking. He wishes me to tell you that dire misfortune will befall Russia because he was martyred. Woe unto us! Woe unto us!" And then, the vision ended, Protopopov and the Empress would talk about their lost one. She would recall the circumstances of her first meeting with the "saint." It was

eight years earlier. They had been yachting in the Gulf. Wilhelm had come to visit them at Biorke Sound, near Vyborg. She grew reminiscent.

She related how Nicholas had signed a secret treaty with him earlier—in 1905—that would make war with France impossible. That funny old Admiral Birilev, who could crow like a cock—almost as funny as Minister Maklakov, who could tell such amusing stories, and General Sukhomlinov, a born actor—well, Birilev countersigned it without knowing what was inside. But later the signature of the Minister of Marine had to be endorsed by the Prime Minister, and that was that horrid Witte.<sup>1</sup> He would have nothing to do with the secret treaty, so it lapsed, and he frightened Nicholas into signing the Manifesto and summoning the Duma.

Well, to return to “our beloved saint,” it was at Biorke that five-year-old Alexis, skipping about the yacht, fell and bruised himself. Chagin, the captain of the *Standart*, could never get over that affair. We know he afterwards shot himself, and people talked so much disgusting nonsense about it. Alexis kept his hurt to himself. A tumor formed on the groin, and he was given up for lost. The “saint” appeared, and since then the boy had been saved, and she (Alexandra) had daily prayed for Grisha.

She had kept him with her as much as she could. Every night when he was not in the Palace she asked for his blessing by telephone. He could order her to sleep with a word in that dear commanding voice of his, and then she was sure of getting some rest. He was so intelligent, magnetic, so full of life. It was such a pity that he would not remain always in the Palace. But

<sup>1</sup> Returning then through Germany, Count Witte was received with Imperial honors at Potsdam. The Kaiser presented him with his portrait bearing a mysterious date. “You will know what it means when you see the Tsar,” he said. It was the date of the secret treaty—the “Nicky” and “Willi” treaty.

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then so many interests called to him. She could not expect to have him always by her side. And oh! how much she had always dreaded those wanderings of his. He had so many enemies, dear, good soul. She could not trust the Russian detectives. (Let Protopopov not be offended!) So she had ordered two private detectives from London, and one of them was on guard always. And there was a village girl, very devoted to the saintly one, who went everywhere with him, dressed as a sister of mercy. Yes, everywhere. On the fatal night Grisha had promised to heed her warnings, and not to go out, for they knew that enemies were plotting to kill him. So the detectives and the "sister" were absent, and they—the horrible murderers—had lured him to his doom. Well, what was written was written!

Protopopov would take up the parable. "Our holy one" had ever foretold coming events with clear-sighted perspicacity. He was conscious of his exalted mission. Did the lady recall his prophecy when an abominable peasant girl in Siberia had stuck a knife into him? Everybody was so delighted, and hoped he would not recover. He was himself that way inclined in those benighted days. That was a month or so before the war. Grisha did recover. He said: "My blood has been shed, and, in retribution for it, rivers of blood will flow." How true, how wonderful! And then, just before the disaster in Galicia, in 1915, did she recall another prediction, just as wonderful and true. The "holy one" was kicked and beaten by some of those depraved guardsmen in a restaurant. (Grishka had been caught dining with one of their brother officer's wife. But of this Protopopov, of course, said nothing.) And he had lain two weeks in a private hospital. He said: "I have been ill-treated; soon our armies will suffer defeat." And now Grisha had told him in visions that soon his death would be visited upon all Russia, that there would be sorrow unspeak-

able and pandemonium, but they would have to endure and to make peace.

Oh yes, something terrible would soon happen! The other day an impudent journalist had come to him and begun to take notes with a red pencil. He (Protopopov) had wrenched it from him. Red! red! that awful color! He saw it all round him. It was the hue of Revolution. That awful color would be the ruin of Russia. And then the same impertinent one had looked round at all the Buddhas and icons which adorned the Minister's study. Two of the idols were particularly dangerous. He had told the journalist about them. They had to be placed together in a niche of honor, lest one, becoming jealous, might avenge himself. The journalist had suggested they should be placed apart in separate rooms. "Then, you see, one will counteract the other." There was a great deal in that. He must think about it. Oh! if "our saint" were only with them always! He could help them out of all these terrible difficulties.

These are not fancied conversations; they are genuine, reported by unimpeachable witnesses. Is it surprising that, speaking some months later before the first Great Congress of the Church at Moscow, Prince Eugene Trubetskóy, an eminent Russian *savant* and public man, should have declared: "In the latter years of Nicholas II Russia was like some dark, hellish kingdom"?

The reign had opened with an awful tragedy. On the Hodynka, a field in the outskirts of Moscow, great crowds gathered to receive the Tsar's bounty, as customary at each coronation. By the carelessness of the police, such a crush of people occurred that hundreds were trampled to death. Midway in his reign thousands of soldiers were to die in the wind-swept fields of Manchuria for a cause that they did not even comprehend, and many hundreds of workmen were to be shot down at the doors of his great Palace, craving for freedom. And

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the end of his reign was to come amid still greater bloodshed.

Like the Bourbons, Nicholas II and his Court could "learn nothing and forget nothing." New ideas could not displace the old. He inclined towards the archaic. Soothsayers and occultist charlatans attracted him more than the stern calls of statesmanship. He sent emissaries to the Dalai Lama, seeking a revelation. And the Indian Government imagined he was thirsting for Tibetan territory. He assembled the nations at a Peace Conference at The Hague at the bidding of visionaries, and himself drifted into a senseless war with Japan. At his accession he told the Tver Zemstvoist Rodichev and a deputation craving representative rights for the nation to "put away these vain illusions." Yet when Count Witte came to him in 1905 and said that the Army could not be relied upon to suppress a revolution, he granted what he had previously refused. And then he tried to take back what he had given. Mistrustful of all and everybody, yet led captive at the heels of a distracted woman, bearing upon his shoulders the weight of a gigantic empire, he was a pathetic figure.

He had his cup of bitterness. The boy he loved, that bright, sunny lad with the limp which told its tale—would he live to inherit the great Throne of All the Russias? For him he toiled day and night, poring over reports and papers which gave him knowledge without understanding. And it was so sad to see the boy already comprehending many painful things. He did not seem to like his mother as much as of old; and he would spit fiercely whenever he heard the name of Razputin. Well, he would see. A fatalist, like his subjects, Nicholas II never repined, never lost his temper. One night in 1905, when the mutineers in Kronstadt were shooting and burning the town, he had calmly watched the performance from the windows of his Peterhof villa, across the

bay, and exclaimed to an officer of his suite: "It would be so interesting to know how it will all end."

To the reader of these lines it will seem strange that people who casually approached the former Sovereigns of Russia should have failed to note the slightest taint of Byzantinism. All were impressed by their apparent good sense and charmed by their kind ways. All departed absolutely convinced of the absurdity of the "legends" about Razputin, and of the irremediable mischief that was being wrought within the Empire. Almost on the eve of revolution distinguished foreigners visited Petrograd and saw the ex-Tsar and his Consort. I do not think I exaggerate in saying that they formed no exception to the rule, and that they carried away with them an all too optimistic impression. Only those who had lived in the country and had had experience of its sad realities could appreciate the facts at their true value.

Only three months before the Revolution I saw the Imperial family at Mogilev and talked with Alexis. A winsome lad, bright and full of mischief, he interested and attracted all who knew him. As he had been thoroughly spoiled by his doting parents, and did pretty well what he pleased, this was rather wonderful. On that occasion I had been invited to lunch at the Palace. The Empress and the daughters happened to be in Mogilev. Alexandra had come to talk about Stürmer's resignation.

The Governor's Palace, which was occupied by the Tsar and his suite, forms a semicircular row of buildings overlooking the picturesque valley of the Dneiper. In the large drawing-room twenty-five or thirty guests had assembled, standing in a long row and waiting for the hosts to come out of their apartments. Lieutenant-General Sir John Hanbury Williams and other representatives of the Allied armies, some Grand Dukes, Ministers, and officials, were among them. General Voyéikov, a

heavy-faced but energetic-looking functionary, was in attendance. Although a civilian, I had to wear a sword, such being the etiquette. One of the British officers lent me his.

Walking round to greet their guests, the Sovereigns stopped to say a few words to friends or strangers. The Grand Duchesses filed past like a bevy of school girls, holding up their hands to be kissed. In front of them came Alexis, dressed in soldier's uniform, khaki shirt, trousers and top-boots, and wearing the medal of St. George, of which he was very proud. It had been bestowed on him for service in the trenches. He gave me a friendly nod, and glanced admiringly at my ribbons, which were those of his Order. Everybody then entered the dining-room, where a long table was spread for luncheon. Another table containing the celebrated *zakuska* stood near the windows, from which a glorious snowy view of Russia's historic river offered itself. Having partaken of caviare and other delicacies, we sat down to a modest repast served on silver.

Half an hour later we were again in the drawing-room. This time the Emperor spoke at greater length with those of his guests whom he wished to entertain. He chatted with me about my visits to the Front, displaying a remarkable acquaintance with regiments and their respective positions. He knew about my son's service in the Russian and in the British Guards, remembering even the smallest thing. We spoke English and Russian. He had scarcely any trace of foreign accent. I had never met any one more simple and unaffected. He looked shy and diffident, with a quiet dignity and an indefinable charm of manner. The clear, resonant voice betrayed physical vigor, the mournful eyes an internal dreaminess. Altogether a typical Russian. I never saw him again.

The Empress wore a plain, but not unbecoming, dress of grayish material. Hers and the girls' dresses were



**NICHOLAS II WITH HIS SON AND DAUGHTERS**

The Grand Duchess Olga is on the Tsar's right, and next to her the Grand Duchess Anastasia. Behind the Young Alexis stand his sisters, the Grand Duchesses Tatiana and Marie. Around them are the officers of the Konvóy or Bodyguard, all Princes and Nobles of the Caucasus, whose picturesque Circassian dress the Tsar and the Czarvitch are wearing. The photograph was taken in the Garden of the Palace at Tsarskoe Selo shortly before the Revolution. In this Garden the fallen Monarch afterwards worked to relieve the tedium of captivity. His Bodyguard also went over to the Duma. When he heard this news he was much affected.



evidently home-made. The Grand Duchesses were winsome lasses, while the third, Marie, was decidedly pretty. Their mother looked well. No one could have suspected this rosy-cheeked, somewhat prim matron, with the thin, rather cruel lips, of being the devotee of a Razputin. Mme. Vyubova was also there—a stocky, rather coarse-featured person, very lame since her leg had been broken in an accident to the Tsarskoe train, designed, it was said, to do away with the “saint.” (As it happened, Razputin did not travel with her that night.)

That was in November, 1916. Six months later I visited the same rooms to see General Brusilov, and, in the following month of August I had tea in the dining-room with General Kornilov. General Alexeiev had preferred to remain in his old quarters. An A.D.C. showed me all over the house. The Tsar’s study and the adjoining bedroom, which he had shared with his son, had satisfied his modest requirements. In Count Fredericks’ room I saw the telephone that formerly connected the Palace at Mogilev with the villa at Tsarskoe. It looked a most ingenious and complicated contrivance. What tragic conversations it had carried!

## CHAPTER VI

### GERMAN INFLUENCES

**All-powerful, All-pervasive—Colonists—Merchants—Barons—Monopoly of Trade and Office—The Court—Russia's Allies Belittled—An Insidious Campaign—The Press Dependent on German Advertising—Dalliance with Reaction—Suspicion of France and Great Britain.**

UNDER the Old Regime German influences had been all-powerful and all-pervasive. I shall explain how they operated. They all tended in one direction—to the subordination of Russia in political and commercial matters. When the arch-conspirator at Potsdam discovered that Russia meant to liberate herself from the German yoke, he struck at Russia's ally, France, and then launched his legions into Russia. But later, when the Russian people were in the throes of revolution, he sent into their midst a diabolical firebrand, who, under the flag of Bolshevism, carried ruin and desolation far more terrible than any engine or appliance of war, as waged by the Germans.

During the reign of Nicholas II, and earlier, Reaction had been undoubtedly exploited by dark influences of German origin. That does not necessarily imply that Tsarskoe Selo was in direct collusion with Berlin. The German influence in Russia derived its sources of strength at home as well as abroad. There were many millions of Germans residents in the country. German colonies had been planted in the choicest parts of European Russia: on the western border, in Poland, in the fertile south, on the Volga, and around Petrograd in flagrant disregard of military considerations. Catherine the Great, a German

princess, started the fashion. It had been her intention to promote improved methods of farming. Later, the "peaceful penetration" of Poland and adjacent lands was encouraged in compliance with the anti-Polish policy to which Russia had been committed by the partition of Poland.

As a matter of fact, the German colonists, while thriving by dint of their better adaptation to rural requirements, lived quite apart from the surrounding villagers, preserving their own language and faith, enjoying educational privileges which were denied to the Russian peasants and neither helped the peasants, who were still under the deadening influence of the commune, nor associated themselves with the interests and destinies of the Empire which harbored them. They owed their first allegiance to the Kaiser. They spoke and thought in German, and regarded Germany as their home.

German merchants and manufacturers thrived and multiplied in Russia under the same favorable conditions. They were numerous and wealthy. Goods and machinery could be obtained in abundance from the Fatherland, money also. When the internal prosperity of Russia began to develop rapidly after the Japanese war, the Germans reaped a golden harvest. German manufactured goods flooded the market, while Russian rye exported to Germany went to fatten pigs. Custom-house duties had been suitably arranged in gratitude for German "friendship" during the war. All the benefit of the exchange went into German pockets.

British manufacturers had business enough at home or in the colonies, and were so ignorant of Russian methods that they never attempted to compete seriously with the Germans. Germans came to regard Russia as their lawful domain. The predominance of German capital in the banks and of German enterprise in trade and industry naturally led to a large dependence upon them

of the Russian newspapers. Here came in a potent factor in the political situation. The Germans had helped to build up trade and industry, with great advantage to themselves, it is true, but undoubtedly with benefit to the country, in developing its resources. But the ultimate result was distinctly unfavorable to Russia. Public opinion was being subjected to a pro-German propaganda.

This danger had long ago arisen in another quarter. The Baltic provinces were ruled by German barons and German burgesses. The former, descendants of the Teutonic Knights, who had waged relentless war with Slavdom in the Middle Ages, found themselves included under the Russian scepter as a result of Peter the Great's conquests. But they lost few, if any, of their feudal privileges. German castles and country seats belonging to the barons, and German warehouses which dated back to the days of the Hanseatic League held the provinces in undisputed possession. Thence emanated a stream of powerful German influence throughout the country. High offices of State, Court dignities, commands in the Army and Navy, were monopolized by the numerous heads or cadets of baronial houses. They were efficient, honest, and clannish. The Foreign Office was full of them, so were the Guard regiments.

I do not wish to doubt their loyalty. Far from it. Officers bearing German names fought well, although sometimes their kinsmen were fighting against them. But their German associations and kinship naturally colored their feelings. They were ever inclined to magnify the prowess of their country of origin, and to belittle the power of non-German allies of Russia. This feeling existed throughout the ministries, and had numerous and powerful exponents throughout the country.

Alexander III had realized all the perils of this situa-

tion. He initiated a veritable anti-German campaign. German names diminished in number among courtiers and functionaries during his reign. So wide-awake was he to the necessity of safeguarding the national spirit from dangerous encroachments, so clearly did he realize the aggressiveness of German activity abroad as well as at home, that he concluded the famous alliance with France. That agreement deeply shocked the apostles of autocracy, and was hailed with delight by the Russian people. All saw in it a hope of riddance from Germanism and a blow to despotism.

The pro-German orientation of Russia, promoted by her strong German element, was, indeed, based upon the prejudices and interests of the autocratic regime and its supporters. Germany was regarded by the bureaucracy and the *okhrana* as the refuge of absolutism, and therefore as the natural friend and ally of Russia. The French alliance had always been a bugbear to them. The tendency of the powerful German influence and its bureaucratic adherents was hostile to it. After the disastrous war with Japan, which had been connived at both by Germany and by the bureaucracy—the former desiring to divert Russia's attention to the Far East, the latter stupidly hoping to introduce a counter-irritant to internal unrest—the pro-German movement sustained an unexpected check, which enabled Russia to secure a necessary *rapprochement* with Great Britain—a consummation above all hateful to the bureaucracy, which identified English institutions with revolution. Once the course of foreign policy had been set in the Entente direction, the pro-German intrigue became more difficult.<sup>1</sup>

But in Petrograd, as well as in Berlin, hopes were entertained that Russia would leave her allies in the lurch rather than risk another war, inasmuch as the bureau-

<sup>1</sup> Note Wilhelm's negotiation of a secret treaty with Nicholas II and its failure (1905).

cracy had been taught by bitter experience that war might entail a revolt against the autocratic power.

I have often been asked, even by the Russians—extraordinarily ignorant about political affairs—“Who are the pro-German party?” The answer has been supplied above. Their name was and is Legion. And it would be a mistake to suppose that persons bearing German names—whether Gentiles or Jews—alone nourished covert or open sympathy for Germany. Durnovó and Voyéikov were just as pro-German as Plehve or Stürmer. Many Russians had received their education in German schools and universities, imbibing German science and German ideas. Literature and the Press were largely inspired from German sources. The art of Munich, the fashions of Berlin, the news agencies and the manufactured produce of the Fatherland permeated everyday life in Russia. The height of one pro-German editor’s ambition was to receive the Red Eagle and the rank of Komerzienrat.

Even the Duma had been adapted to German models. Its party leaders were grouped in a “Senioren Convent,” like the Reichstag. And its “Præsidium” and rules of debate were fashioned after the German manner. If Kaiserdom had openly prevailed on the banks of the Neva, it could not have colored the organization of the Russian Empire, its politics, and even its language more than it had done. German influence assumed proportions that can be compared only with the Norman-Variag lordship over the early Russian communities or the Norman-French conquest of Saxon England. German words and German titles (Graf and Baron) were all-pervading. The hierarchy of the Court was eloquent of its German origin: Hof-Marschal, Hof-Meister, Kammer-Junker, Kammer-Herr, Stahl-Meister, Ober-Schenk, Jäger-Meister—such were the honorific dignities that appealed to bureaucratic ambition. Likewise, for an

officer to become Flügel-Adjutant meant adoption into the privileged ranks of Court dignitaries and a brilliant career. For Court rank carried precedence over the civilian and military hierarchies. At the commencement of the war, Nicholas II changed the name of his capital from St. Petersburg to Petrograd. The German Court titles remained.

But just because the German hold upon the country was so all-embracing, the Russians themselves became alive to its dangers, and a great anti-German rally set in. The war intensified it. At first the high commands in the Army were largely in the hands of Generals bearing German names. Two years later they had been weeded out. During the Revolution the soldiers drove out many of their officers simply because their names were German.

One of the causes that led to the downfall of the Old Regime must be sought in the deep-rooted conviction of the masses that they had been sold to the Germans, and that Russia's reverses in the field were part and parcel of a huge pro-German conspiracy. This feeling led to serious anti-German riots in Moscow soon after the outbreak of war. But even here the *okhrana* disclosed its vicious hand. The lawless outburst was insidiously diverted against Russians and Allies, who suffered comparatively more than did the German-owned properties.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE JEWS

**Influx of Jews after the Partition of Poland—The Pale as a Barrier—Misery and Abuses—A Source of Political Poison—Origin of the Pseudo-Jew Extremist—Cause of Pogroms.**

FOR a fuller comprehension of the situation in Russia under the Old Regime, and more particularly of the events that occurred during the Revolution, it becomes necessary to deal at some length with the position of the Jews. It had an intimate bearing upon all that happened in 1917 and 1918.

Something like six millions of Jews inhabited the Russian Empire at the beginning of the war. They were twice as numerous as the Germans, with whom they were largely associated in business. Their numbers had been enormously increased as the result of an evil act—the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. By this political blunder Russia strengthened the Brandenburg-Prussian realm, and saddled herself with the Polish and Jewish questions. Thereby she was destined to come, sooner or later, into direct collision with the Germans and to find herself handicapped in her struggle.

The ancestors of the Polish Jews had fled from Germany—the Biblical Ashkenaz—to escape persecution.<sup>1</sup> But they brought with them a deep-rooted association with that country. During centuries of abode in Teu-

<sup>1</sup> The Jews of Germany and their descendants are known as Ashkenasim; those that settled in Spain as Sephardim—a Jewish "aristocracy."

tonic lands they had evolved a specific language known as Yiddish, a German jargon. They acted as a sort of advance-guard of German penetration. In Poland they enjoyed a large measure of freedom. All business was in their hands. They acted as agents to the great landlords. The urban population was—and remains—mostly Jewish. But Poles and Jews lived peacefully enough together. The Jews certainly had the best of the bargain; they prospered, and were not ungrateful. They helped the Poles with money during the insurrections of 1831 and 1863.

Thirty years ago the Poles began to go into business themselves. Competition arose. The landlords started agricultural associations to shake off the Jewish monopoly. A rift betokened itself, and has been growing ever since,—effectually discrediting Assimilationist theories, largely based upon the earlier and one-sided adjustment of Polish and Jewish interests.<sup>1</sup>

Old Russia tried vainly to denationalize the Poles, and, obeying the dictates of self-preservation, to prevent the Jews from spreading eastward. This was the origin of the Pale.

No Jew was supposed to enjoy rights of residence, roughly speaking, east of the Dnieper. The Little Russians had become more or less inured to Jewish methods, and were left to bear the brunt of an ever-increasing Jewish element. For every Jewish boy and girl had to marry and produce a numerous progeny. Such was the Talmudic law. Unpermitted to hold lands and thus incapacitated for husbandry, the Jewish masses filled the towns and settlements, managing to eke out a

<sup>1</sup> The history of Polish politics during the past three decades does not enter within the scope of this book. In the author's opinion, based on long residence in Poland, it should afford convincing evidence of the utter failure of Assimilation or any other solution of the Jewish problem except Zionism, i.e., the restoration of Jewish nationhood, the Jewish masses in Russia will follow their Rabbis, who, on religious grounds, are favorably disposed towards Zionism.

miserable existence, living under the menace of *pogroms*, which exploited Gentiles were ready to perpetrate whenever the police gave the signal.

That the enforcement of the Pale system would lead to abuses was to be expected. Jews could not own land or reside outside specified settlements, even within the Pale. The police were able to levy blackmail for all kinds of real or alleged infractions of this rule. Wealthier Jews could always evade it by means of bribery. Without this source of income the police could not, indeed, have made ends meet. Their pay and allowances were ludicrously insufficient. But with the help of the Jewish revenue they accumulated comfortable fortunes. Thus the police had an interest in the Jews so long as the Pale was maintained, and tolerated or prompted *pogroms* only when the *okhrana* judged them to be necessary. We shall see how this system of corruption gradually affected the whole Empire.

In addition to his propensity for the accumulation of riches, the Jew living within the Pale was incited thereto by the degrading position of his impecunious co-religionary. The poorest peasant lived like a prince in comparison with the average Jew. A piece of herring, an onion, and a crust of bread formed the Jew's diet. Dirt, squalor, and privation were his destined portion. Besides, the *pogroms* affected rich and poor alike. Was it surprising that the Jew strove to escape from the Pale by fair means or foul, and that to him the lands east of the Dnieper seemed like a Canaan, a land flowing with milk and honey, where he might wax rich and live secure? But how could the moneyless Jew hope to reach it? The struggle to gain affluence was naturally intense. Only the craftiest and least scrupulous could hope to raise their heads above the seething mass of Jewish pauperdom.

Amongst this suffering multitude the devil of class-hatred raised a fearsome harvest. The teachings of

**Karl Marx** were here decocted in their quintessence and spread by migrants from the Pale into more favored lands—into the heart of Russia, into England and far America.

The rich and the poor among the Jews were bound together by ties of religion and charity. The wealthier Israelites gave of their abundance to the less fortunate ones of their faith. But this bond was not a comprehensive one. Certain important elements repudiated it by severing all ties with Jewry. For apostasy was one of the manifold evils arising out of Jewish disabilities. The poorer Jew could also break open the door of his prison by passing stringent academic tests. Then he went into the cities, an isolated, needy adventurer, losing his faith, dominated by a thirst for vengeance, seeing in the most violent political creeds and methods an appeal to redress the wrongs of his people, and ready to implicate the bourgeois Jew and the Gentile in his feelings of class and political hatred.

Through the schools the Jew sought to satisfy his desire for freedom rather than an inclination for learning. University degrees gave certain rights and privileges, including the right to travel or reside anywhere in Russia. Every Jewish boy strove to enter a university. For this purpose he had to matriculate through a high school. The proportion of Jews admissible had to be limited, however, or they would have swamped the "gymnasia" within the Pale. Only the very cleverest Jewish boys could gain access to the State schools and eventually enter the university. And the proportion of Jewish undergraduates was also restricted. It represented more than double the ratio of the Jewish to the Gentile population, but this did not satisfy Jewish appetites. Handicapped, the Jews yet managed to exceed the norm at the close of their studies, because they were more persistent and could endure greater privations than the poorest Russian student. An outcry was raised when the Min-

istry of Education insisted on refusing further admittance to Jewish undergraduates until the proportions had been readjusted.

Attempts to safeguard the Russians from Jewish encroachment became more pronounced and desperate as the tide of Hebrew invasion rose higher, and—I may add—as outcasts from Jewry developed revolutionary tendencies. The Jews were slowly but surely pervading all the lucrative professions: the Bar and medicine<sup>1</sup> and to a lesser degree art and literature. They had small inclination for science or engineering. Commissions in the Army and Navy were barred to them. Commerce and industry could not appeal to the impecunious Jew. These lucrative branches were reserved for wealthy Hebrews, who, by payment of a certain Guild tax (amounting to about \$500 per annum), could reside everywhere. In banking and industries the Jews became all-pervasive, as in the Press. They were confidants of Grand Dukes. The bureaucracy tried to restrain their irresistible sway by introducing senseless restrictions. For instance, a Jew could not be freely elected to boards of companies.

Numerous methods of evading the law of residence arose. Dentists' and chemists' assistants and certain artificers were granted partial exemptions. These callings were glutted with Jews. "Colleges" sprung up which did a profitable trade in "diplomas." The police readily winked at irregularities for a consideration. Petrograd was full of Jews who had no legal right of residence. They lived in suburban districts on payment of a "private tax" to the police, who watched over their interests paternally, and were disposed to molest only those Jews who had a right to reside there.

It becomes clear that the purpose for which the Pale and all the other anti-Jewish restrictions had been devised was mistaken and mischievous. It defeated itself. It

<sup>1</sup> They had almost monopolized them by the time the Revolution broke out.

led to the penetration of Russia by Hebrew elements of the most aggressive kind which had severed themselves from Jewry—had become pseudo-Jews—while it left the Jewish masses to suffer in congestion and misery. The purpose was one of self-preservation, yet it was misrepresented in the eyes of the world by the Jews plausibly enough, for motives that are easily comprehensible.

No instigation was necessary to provoke *pogroms*. They would have occurred oftener if the police had not interfered. The Little Russian, Lithuanian or Polish peasants wrecked Jewish shops whenever Jewish “exploitation” assumed intensive forms. A similar phenomenon had been observed in Austria-Hungary,<sup>1</sup> and its recurrence in Russia since the Revolution puts an end to the fiction that the police alone were responsible. Indeed, the frequency of *pogroms* during 1917 was all the more remarkable because Revolutionary Russia was disposed to champion the Jews as a race that had been oppressed by the Old Regime.

Another point must be explained before I leave the Jewish question. When the Russian armies entered Poland at the beginning of the war many regiments from other parts of the Empire knew little or nothing about the Jews. The soldiers had a religious prejudice against them and also a certain contempt, because the Jews systematically evaded service in the ranks. Here they found enormous populations of Jews who were obsequious and omniscient. Jewish “factors” supplied them with anything for money, even drink. To ingratiate themselves with officers and men they would tell them—long anticipating official knowledge—of promotions and of impending transfers of units. As the Germans displayed by means of derisive placards hoisted over the trenches a similar knowledge of military secrets, the idea gained ground that the Jews were spying in the interests

<sup>1</sup> H. Wickham Steed, “The Hapsburg Monarchy.”

of Germany. "Telephone" wires discovered around Jewish houses confirmed this suspicion. It is interesting to note that the Jews had a habit of "wiring" their compounds in order to evade some of the Talmudic laws of ritual and other observances. This simple explanation accounts for many of the cruelties to which Jews were unjustly subjected. Let me add that to my knowledge Jewish soldiers of the right sort performed many gallant deeds—worthy of their remote ancestors, the Maccabeans.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL

The Ordeal of War—Dearth in the Cities—Disease and Desertion among the Troops—The Government Suspected of Treachery—Silence about the Allies—No more Volunteers—The Drink Evil Revives—Dearthness of Living—What had Become of the Food?—M. Guchkov and the Grand Dukes—Plans for a Palace Revolution—Grand Duke's Letter—Revolt of the Nobles—Last Warnings—The Zemstvos—M. Rodzianko and the Duma—Demands for Responsible Government—Arrest of Labor Members—In Moscow—Protopopov's Confidence.

IN Petrograd, early in 1917, everybody felt that a revolution was impending, and that, sooner or later, it would break out unless some radical change was introduced in the system of government. The old system had been thoroughly discredited by the sad experience of the war—that searching test of a nation's fitness and efficiency. The Russians were a long-suffering people, but continuous evidence of blundering and lack of organization, reverses in the field, corruption and abuse of power on the part of the Government, which the Duma pitilessly exposed, lamentable default of co-ordination between the civilian departments and the Army, the unnecessary mobilization of many millions of peasant farmers affecting the production of food, the breakdown of the transport services provoking scarcity of bread in the cities—all these disheartening symptoms had slowly but surely diminished the ardor of the people. Russia was not so much war-weary as discouraged by the blind or wilful stupidity of her rulers, who were acting like tools of German influence and ambitions. Superadded to this unhappy situation was the tragic discredit in

which the autocracy had been involved by the Razputin scandal, coupled with a diminished prestige of the Church.

As the queues at the bakeries and provision shops lengthened, the prospect of revolution grew nearer. It was sad for the people to wait in their hundreds and thousands for a small ration of coarse bread. The rich had to hire extra servants, who did nothing but stand in line at various shops to obtain the simple necessities of life. For the poor clerk's family it involved great hardship. The working classes were receiving high wages, but the women and children had to spend most of their time in the queues. Waiting the whole day and a good part of the night was trying enough, but standing outside in the bitter winter cold caused suffering that would have tried the temper and exhausted the patience of the hardest. Co-operative food stores were started by the mills, banks, and ministries, by journalists, lawyers, doctors, and other professional men. They were quickly overrun with demands. People tried to obtain food from the villages, where it was to be had in abundance. But the Government had enacted that no food should be transported from one province to another without special permission. This had been done ostensibly in order to prevent speculation. It failed entirely of its purpose. The sack of flour or potatoes consigned to a private individual was impounded by "zealous" officials and appropriated to their own use. At the same time huge transactions were being carried on by the banks in flour and sugar. With the help of bribery they could defy all regulations and "buy" railway cars, reducing thereby the already insufficient supply of rolling-stock.

Meat had become extremely scarce. The countless herds raised on the steppes of southern and southeastern Russia had been used up wastefully to supply the needs of the Army. Two-thirds of the live stock consigned to the Front died on the way. And larger numbers had

to be sent in order to provide copious meat rations for the men in the trenches. The soldiers were being well fed—much better than they had ever fared in the villages, where, indeed, they lived chiefly on bread, cabbage, and *kásha* (a porridge made of buckwheat). The cry was “All for the Army,” and the soldiers were not stinted. But this soon brought about a meat crisis. The peasants and farmers naturally took advantage of the situation to slaughter their calves rather than raise cattle that would be requisitioned. An interdict was placed upon the marketing of veal, but it could not be enforced, owing to the great demand for meat. Then the farmers devoted all their attention to fattening pigs. It became more profitable to use cereals as food for pigs. So the supply of bread grew dearer and more difficult.

Meanwhile the troops could no longer be fed in the old lavish way. Meat and even bread rations had to be cut down. Formerly the soldiers received 3 lb. of rye bread and  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of meat daily. They could not eat all the bread, and used to sell the remainder to peasants, who fed the pigs with it. On the eve of the Revolution they were receiving 2 lb. of bread a day and a smaller ration of meat twice a week; on other days they received salt herring.<sup>1</sup> This diet induced much tribulation in the trenches. Men suffered from thirst, and used up the timbering for fuel to boil tea. (Methylated spirits could not be served out for this purpose, because the men would consume them in the liquid or in the solid state.) During the winter of 1916–17 scurvy was very prevalent at the Front. Desertion began to occur. Many companies were reduced by these causes to one-third of their normal strength.

The huge agglomerations of reserve troops in the towns and cities were not much better off. Tobacco and sugar

<sup>1</sup>In 1917 the Army and the reserve troops required 1,000,000 tons of meat.

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all had in fair abundance, and the men could eke out their rations with food purchased outside. But soldiers' pay amounted to 90 kopeks per month (less than 50 cents at pre-war rates of exchange). They got a little money from the villages occasionally. In some respects they were worse off than the men at the Front, because presents of food and comforts were sent to the active regiments by the towns and provinces whose names they bore, whereas the reserve troops had no territorial designations.

In Petrograd and in the larger cities conditions were somewhat better, but soldiers who had been in my service often came to me to complain that they were underfed. Suspicion prevailed in the minds of all the men, both at the Front and in the Rear, that their food was being tampered with by unscrupulous officials. The wildest stories of profiteering received ready credence. Even the hardships endured by their civilian fellow-citizens did not convince them that there was a real shortage of food in the towns and cities, easily explicable by the disorganization of railway transport. They heard of vast speculations by functionaries and merchants, or bankers; they could see for themselves that money was being spent extravagantly by civilians and officers, never had there been so many luxurious motor-cars about the streets of Petrograd, and they concluded that the "famine" was being "arranged" by speculators for selfish purposes, or by pro-Germans in order to provoke a revolution: they felt that in either case the people were being betrayed and that Russia was doomed to defeat.

Little or nothing was known about the Allies. The Staff and the Government had not done much to remove this ignorance, and, in this respect, the cryptic influence of the German element in the military and civil administrations and in a large section of the Press had asserted itself with persistent disregard of the Allied cause. I must add that the Press was long shorn of information

regarding the achievements of its own Army. Narrow-minded conceptions of the war correspondent's true mission, prevailing at Headquarters, deprived the public of an asset of incalculable importance—of a daily, living, human bond of union between the people and the soldiers. As General Alexeiev aptly defined it to me in a conversation dating back to the end of 1915: "They have converted the Army into an anonymous entity, void of human face or form." I had just then been on a visit to the Front, and had told thousands of the men what I knew about the Allies. It was a revelation to them—and, I may add, to their officers. Generals who were real Russians, in name and in heart, asked me to visit the British Army and French Armies. They realized how important it was that the soldiers should hear more about their comrades in the West. At the same time, General Alexeiev urged the Tsar to break down the wall of silence around his armies. A party of Russian writers soon afterwards visited England and France under my charge.

Much good work was subsequently accomplished. Officers heard enough about the Allies to discount any too obvious insinuations against them which pro-German partisans were always ready to produce. (An insidious campaign had been directed against the Allies after the Russian retreat in 1915.) But the soldiers in the trenches, constantly replacing heavy casualties in the ranks, still remained ignorant of what was really going on. They still imagined that the bulk of the enemy's forces were in front of them, and there was no end of the war in sight. Pro-German agents did their best to perpetuate this belief.

The officers had also become discouraged. It seemed to them that the Government was deliberately trying to quench popular enthusiasm from the outset of the war. All the well-born youth of Russia—and many a poor peasant—had volunteered in the early days. Then,

gradually, the spirit of the nation, reflected in its purest elements, its young men, had been quenched. We all noticed the change, and we knew the cause. The disastrous retreat of 1915 had much to do with it, but it was mainly due to a consciousness of the incapacity of the Government and of the prevalence of German influences. Volunteers diminished, and finally ceased. The young men had to be conscripted. Enormous numbers evaded active service; a majority joined their regiments after a brief preparatory training. But theirs was not a wholehearted service. The *morale* of the Army suffered accordingly.

Discouragement also led to laxity among Staff officers. To the towns in which various staffs were quartered soon came wives and families. There they could be sure of obtaining food. Officers who would not allow their domestic arrangements to interfere with their duties at the Front took the alternative course of sending flour and sugar home. Thus the railways were engaged in carrying food to the Front and of transporting it back to the Rear.

In the Navy everything was quite different; the men suffered very little from the war, either in casualties or in comforts. Discipline was severe, for the officers as well as for the men. Seldom was a naval uniform to be seen in Petrograd. But the long winter anchorage in the Baltic, and particularly the influence of depot life in Kronstadt, reacted badly upon the seamen. Later these conditions were destined to afford a rich soil for revolutionary propaganda, with disastrous consequences to the Navy and to Russia.

Side by side with the growing dearth of food in Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities, the drink evil had been gradually reasserting its sway. In the cities the sale of methylated spirit was strictly regulated; vodka, of course, could not be obtained. But by subterfuges the common

people managed to procure intoxicants. Methylated spirit, varnish, eau-de-cologne, various "knock-out" drops dispensed by the chemists, were all severally or collectively impressed into the secret drink service. The first-named method was the cheapest, although the most deadly. It led to an extraordinary increase in the consumption of cranberry waters. The breweries had had to close down because beer was also forbidden. Some of them began to make cranberry *kvass*. It was soon discovered that a judicious admixture thereof with methylated spirits removed the unpleasant odor and partially neutralized the poison. Small grocers waxed rich on the sale of *kvass*.

Another cause of widespread discontent was the increasing dearness of all the necessaries of life. On the eve of the Revolution they had risen fivefold, and more. Rye bread cost 17 kopeks (8c.) a pound, instead of 2 kopeks (1c.); potatoes 80 kopeks (40c.) instead of 8 kopeks (4c.). Tea was at 3 roubles (\$1.50), or three times its usual price; bacon-fat at 3 roubles 50 kopeks (\$1.75), or six times higher. Sugar could be obtained in small quantities at double the former figure, although it was produced in huge quantities within the country. The cost of heating had risen tenfold. Wood was almost unprocurable. The stoppage of imported coal had diverted wood fuel to the mills. The working-men drew four and five times their former wages, and did not feel the pinch. But the numerous class of employees in private and Government offices suffered terribly. There were cases of women smothering their children rather than see them die of starvation.

To such a pass had the country been brought by an incompetent Government. For three years no cereals had been exported, no bacon, no butter, no eggs, no sugar; yet these staples of life had provided the bulk of Russia's huge export trade without prejudice to home consump-

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Side by side with the growing dearth of food in Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities, the drink evil had been gradually reasserting its sway. In the cities the sale of methylated spirit was strictly regulated; vodka, of course, could not be obtained. But by subterfuges the common

people managed to procure intoxicants. Methylated spirit, varnish, eau-de-cologne, various "knock-out" drops dispensed by the chemists, were all severally or collectively impressed into the secret drink service. The first-named method was the cheapest, although the most deadly. It led to an extraordinary increase in the consumption of cranberry waters. The breweries had had to close down because beer was also forbidden. Some of them began to make cranberry *kvass*. It was soon discovered that a judicious admixture thereof with methylated spirits removed the unpleasant odor and partially neutralized the poison. Small grocers waxed rich on the sale of *kvass*.

Another cause of widespread discontent was the increasing dearness of all the necessaries of life. On the eve of the Revolution they had risen fivefold, and more. Rye bread cost 17 kopeks (8c.) a pound, instead of 2 kopeks (1c.); potatoes 80 kopeks (40c.) instead of 8 kopeks (4c.). Tea was at 3 roubles (\$1.50), or three times its usual price; bacon-fat at 3 roubles 50 kopeks (\$1.75), or six times higher. Sugar could be obtained in small quantities at double the former figure, although it was produced in huge quantities within the country. The cost of heating had risen tenfold. Wood was almost unprocurable. The stoppage of imported coal had diverted wood fuel to the mills. The working-men drew four and five times their former wages, and did not feel the pinch. But the numerous class of employees in private and Government offices suffered terribly. There were cases of women smothering their children rather than see them die of starvation.

To such a pass had the country been brought by an incompetent Government. For three years no cereals had been exported, no bacon, no butter, no eggs, no sugar; yet these staples of life had provided the bulk of Russia's huge export trade without prejudice to home consump-

bev, who had presided in the Upper House, was summarily dismissed. Never had such a revolt been anticipated by the Court clique. Instructions immediately went to the subsidized "Black Hundred" organizations, and telegrams denouncing the Nobles and the Council were promptly forthcoming, which somewhat cheered the Court. However, a memorandum, signed by seventeen leading statesmen, came to hand warning the Emperor, without result.

The British Ambassador saw the Emperor in December for the third time since the summer of 1916, and told him, without the slightest reserve, that he was gravely imperiling his Throne. There was only one way out of the food crisis, he urged, and that was to entrust the whole business of supply to the Zemstvos (County Councils) and other public bodies, so that the people should regain some measure of confidence. Now the Zemstvos had been doing splendid work at the Front in Red Cross and other auxiliary relief services. They had shown their ability, under the able direction of Prince Lvov, to organize and handle such business. Nicholas II listened without wincing, and thanked the Ambassador. It was all quite true, of course, but nothing came of it. The Empress insisted that no concessions should be made. To give the Zemstvos such power would convert Russia into a Constitutional Monarchy before they knew where they were. And then good-bye to the autocracy. The "saint" did not approve, so there was an end of it. Moreover, her own lust of power inclined the scales against any compromise. So the Emperor remained at Headquarters. The "saint's" death steeled the opposition of the Court.

President Rodzianko, acting as spokesman of the Duma, came to Headquarters at the end of January with a last despairing appeal. A tried and faithful supporter of the Throne, he poured out his fears and misgivings.

Members had visited their constituencies and returned with a clear and categorical demand for Responsible Government. The country would not wait any longer. *Periculum in mora*. Vague promises were made to him, but it was urged that reforms must wait till the war was over. A few Ministers might be changed. Stürmer was replaced by M. Pokrovsky, a colorless financier. Protopopov remained. And Razputin's influence survived in the person of Pitirim, the new Metropolitan of Petrograd.

In an Imperial Rescript (January 20th) the Tsar directed his Premier, Prince Golitsyn, to devote special care to the food and transport questions, and to work in harmony with the Duma and the Zemstvos. These generalities, meaningless in themselves, kept hope alive.

The Duma was to reassemble at the end of February. On the 12th, Protopopov arrested twelve Labor members of the Industrial War Committee, an organization which had long previously been started by M. Guchkov to promote munition work. As usual in proceedings against the working class, they were accused of conspiracy to set up a Social-Democratic Republic. There were probably excellent grounds for the accusation this time, as we shall see, but nothing had ostensibly occurred that could lend color to it, and, in any case, the arrest of these men was likely to promote the movement that they were accused of fomenting. The crazy Minister imagined that by this measure he had precluded further trouble. Nevertheless, great anxiety was felt at the *okhrana* headquarters. Rumors of trouble when the Duma met circulated everywhere. However, nothing happened. And people still "hoped."

Some days later I visited Moscow. Conditions there were much the same as in Petrograd. Strikes were constantly occurring. The queues extended down every street. People were perishing with cold and hunger.

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Everybody foresaw trouble, but few thought it was so near. We all hoped, even then, that the Emperor would give way, and all Russia, even then was ready to "bless him and to forgive and forget the sad past." On returning to Petrograd I learned that things were again critical. The Emperor had been to Tsarskoe. Protopopov reassured him. He had reorganized the police in such a fashion that they would stiffen the wavering loyalty of the garrison. He had posted machine-guns on roofs, in garrets, and near basement windows, so that his men, knowing little about machine-guns, would nevertheless be able to sweep all the main squares and thoroughfares. The Emperor returned to Headquarters, almost tranquilized.

As a matter of fact, Protopopov and the Empress wanted an outburst, fondly believing that they could nip incipient revolution in the bud by summarily crushing disorders in the capital.

## CHAPTER IX

### REVOLUTION *VERSUS* EVOLUTION

**Earlier Revolutionary Movements—The Decembrists—Influence of Literary Men—The Emancipation—Origin of Socialist Groups—The Assassination of Alexander II—Reaction—Rôle of the Zemstvos—Growth of Industries—Labor Unrest—The First “Soviet”—Workmen and Peasants in the Duma—The “Cadets” and “Expropriation”—Stolypin and Agrarian Reform—Kokovtsov’s Administration—No more Famines—Unexampled Prosperity—Spread of Education—Progress of Siberia—The Co-operative Movement—The “Third Element.”**

REVOLUTIONARY forces had long been struggling for expression under the autocratic regime. They manifested themselves at the dawn of the nineteenth century in the conspiracy of young officers who had imbibed Liberal ideas while serving in the Napoleonic wars, and had borne the brunt of national disaster and humiliation during the Conqueror’s march to Moscow in 1812. Attracted and inspired by the noble ideals of the French Revolution, they had been correspondingly incensed by the obscurantism, corruption, and inefficiency of their Government at home. But the people were too ignorant to understand them. When Volkonsky and the other Decembrists haled their men to the Square in front of the Senate and Holy Synod buildings, under the shadow of St. Isaac’s Cathedral, with the rallying cry of “Constitution,” these benighted followers imagined they were cheering for their “New Empress,” the wife of the Grand Duke Constantine (Konstantin—Konstitutsia). Falconet’s equestrian statue of the Great Peter witnessed a short and decisive combat between the Decembrists and the supporters of the autocracy. Unbeknown to the conspirators, Constan-

tine, the liberal-minded, then Viceroy at Warsaw, had renounced his right of succeeding Alexander I on marrying a Polish lady, whose name, of course, had nothing to do with "Constitution." Nicholas I had no difficulty in asserting his claims to the autocracy. The noble ringleaders of a premature movement were ruthlessly executed or deported to Siberia.

For half a century no serious movement against the ills of autocracy could assume form. The voice of an enslaved people remained inarticulate. Only Russian "intellectuals," recruited from the gentry, could make themselves heard, but they did so at the risk of having to seek refuge abroad or suffer grievous penalties at home. Herten and Bakunin the forerunners of Russian Socialism, Pushkin the Russian Byron, Dostoievsky the novelist of Despair, Turgeniev the advocate of Emancipation—all felt the heavy hand of the autocrat and of the *okhrana*. But while Herten indited abusive epistles to the despot from London or Paris, while Pushkin satirized the Court (just as Gogol, the inimitable Little Russian genius, had castigated the old-fashioned bureaucracy and the police, and, later, Chekhov in his caustic tales admonished the middle class), while Dostoievsky sensitized the minds of his readers by tear-stained records of suffering, insanity, and revolt, Turgeniev prepared and heralded the great reforms of Alexander II's reign. In "The Memoirs of a Sportsman" Turgeniev sounded the death-knell of serfdom. Count Leo Tolstoy, the author of many remarkable novels, gave promise of continuing the traditions of Turgeniev, but in later years devoted himself to politico-philosophical writings that served, like those of J. J. Rousseau, to provide a literary inspiration for revolutionaries.

The *okhrana* had not yet attained the fatal power it afterwards exercised. Alexander II took to heart the lessons of the Crimean War and laid the foundations of

**Representative Government.** With the enthusiastic support of the highest and best elements in his country, and the help of its best brains, he freed the serfs and endowed them with land, preserving the commune until the land redemption dues should be paid off. He then created the *Zemstvos*, admitting the peasants to a large share in local government thus introduced, so that when the time came for "crowning the edifice" by the institution of a Parliament all classes should have had some experience in public affairs. But he seems to have been frightened by what he had done under the influence of Miliutin and other high-minded statesmen, and for a whole decade reverted to despotism. We know that he again relented, and that almost on the eve of his assassination (March, 1881) he signed, and his son endorsed, a Constitution.

Meanwhile, revolutionary ferment was working. The Government had to deal with a new and, to them, disconcerting element. Students of both sexes—the girls wearing short hair and spectacles—formed the rank and file of a dismal revolutionary battalion. They were the "Nihilists." For them there was no God, no Tsar, no law, no country, no family ties. Sprung from the underworld of poverty and ignorance, uprooted, unclassed, and unsexed, they gloried in trampling underfoot all that was sacred to their elders.

Political groups, successively formed under the banners of "Land and Freedom" and "The People's Will," had been trying to stir up the masses. They meant well, but, like the Socialists in 1917, they were childlike in their ignorance of political realities and in their hopes of attaining a social millennium. Finding no encouragement among the peasants or among the workmen—then few and scattered—they turned to assassination as a panacea for political ills.

The murder of Alexander II, perpetrated by political

enthusiasts to "avenge the execution of revolutionary partisans"—with, perhaps, the tacit connivance of retrograde elements that could not forgive him his great reforms, turned the whole current of Russian political life. The conscience of the masses, who adored him as their Liberator, was inexpressibly shocked and outraged. For many a year to come the emissaries of "The People's Will" (*Narodovóltsy*) appealed to deaf ears, and Reaction enjoyed undisputed sway. One by one the great reforms were truncated, education and emigration placed under a ban. The cauldron of discontent seethed ominously. Terrorism increased.

Perhaps Alexander II had waited too long before signing his still-born Constitution. (The advocates of delay found a plausible argument in the disinclination of the peasants to take an interest in other than purely village affairs.) On the other hand, perhaps had he not signed it his life might have been saved. But certainly the enlightened minority of his subjects took the former view. Finding their hopes of internal political development were not likely to be fulfilled in the near future, they turned their attention abroad. This attitude stimulated the Slavophil (miscalled the Pan-Slav) movement. The names of leading public men like Katkov (the famous editor of the *Moscow Gazette*) and of literary celebrities of this epoch—Aksakov, Homiakov, and others—thus came to be associated with the salvation of the Balkan Slavs. Soldiers like Kireiev volunteered their services. Many generous-hearted Russians enrolled themselves under the Slav banner. Their heroism and self-sacrifice aroused popular interest in the ensuing war with Turkey in 1877-8, undertaken partly with a view to stilling the impatience of the Russians for constitutional reform. Successful in its purpose of freeing the Serbs and Bulgars, the war had, however, failed in its internal object. Indeed, it had shown so much incompetency



**THE TSAR AND HIS MINISTERS**

*Left to right:* M. SAZONOV, Foreign Minister; M. KRIVOSHEIN, Minister of Agriculture; M. BARK, Minister of Finance; GENERAL YANUSHKEVICH; GENERAL POLIVANOV; PRINCE SHAKHOVSKOY; The GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS; The TSAR; M. GOREMYKIN; COUNT FREDERICKS.



and bungling on the part of the Government that a change was felt to be all the more urgent. And two years later under the famous "Dictatorship of the Heart," wielded by Loris-Melikov, the Constitution was signed secretly, only a few days before the Tsar's mangled body reached the Winter Palace. Russia did not know till thirty years later of this tragic coincidence. The ensuing reaction comprised Slavophil as well as constitutional ideals. The administration of a Kaulbars at Sofia degraded the one, the omnipotence of a Pobednostev scoffed at the other.

While the country was being stunted in its political development during the reign of Alexander III, that sovereign studiously avoided war and foreign complications. He set his face against pro-German influences, and pointed to the larger interests of colonizing Siberia. So he is depicted by a sculptor of genius in the symbolic statue that faces the Nicholas railway station—a great burly man astride of a ponderous horse, curbing its restiveness as he contained his legions, and pointing eastwards. But the great political act of his reign, the Franco-Russian Alliance, involved far-reaching economic changes that were destined to bring new revolutionary elements into play.

The French money-market had become available for developing the enormous latent resources of the Empire. Witte used this credit with a free hand to promote railway-building, to introduce a gold currency, and to stimulate industry. But he wanted still more money, and for this purpose he devised the Spirit Monopoly, which pumped all the cash that the peasant used to spend in the village "pub" straight into the Treasury. Thus, while satisfying the peasant's craving for liquor, the Monopoly impoverished the countryside. However, the gradual cessation of periodical famines (after 1909), thanks partly to improved transport, partly to organiza-

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tion of local reserves of grain, and the gradual increase in industrial prosperity, averted agrarian disturbances. Moreover, the growth of industries afforded an outlet for wage-earners. The working class thereby grew vastly more numerous, and revolutionary schemers devoted their attention to this favorable soil.

Yet another revolutionary force was to come from the *Zemstvos*. These bodies had continued their discouraged labors under the guidance of public-spirited landowners belonging almost exclusively to the gentry. All the provinces of European Russia, excepting those of the western border, the Caucasus, and the extreme North, enjoyed the blessings of local government. But they were constantly encroached upon by the bureaucracy. The peasants alone dealt with the affairs of their communes (*obshchiny*) and parishes (*volosti*), cared less about provincial or district<sup>1</sup> concerns, and were willing to leave their management in the hands of the *Zemstvo* leaders. But they had a real grievance. The cost of the parochial and communal administrations had to be defrayed by the peasants, although other classes (merchants, nobles, etc.) had recourse to it. No remedy was, however, provided. The Government would not consider the extension of the *Zemstvo* system to the *volost*, which would have eliminated this injustice, because the Old Regime sought in every way to restrict the *Zemstvos*, not daring, however, to abolish them outright. (The *volost Zemstvo* was introduced in August, 1917, when the Revolution was in progress.)

The main cause of this attitude arose, as usual, in police requirements. The *Zemstvo* schools, hospitals, statistical and other services, had engendered an unrecognized class, composed of the people there employed, which came to be styled the "Third Element," because

<sup>1</sup> A district (*uезд*) averaged 300,000 inhabitants.

the Zemstvos were officially composed only of peasants and other property-owners (nobles, merchants, burgesses, etc.). These teachers, dressers, surveyors, and other employees played an important part in Zemstvo work. They were recruited almost exclusively from the poorer classes, men and women who had struggled to secure a secondary-school education, all more or less predisposed towards radical, and even revolutionary, doctrines. Even the higher branches of the Zemstvo services, the doctors for instance, were inclined in the same direction. Was it surprising that they should be? Their daily work brought them into constant contact with evidences of bureaucratic misrule and the oppression exercised by the *okhrana*. This Third Element afterwards provided some of the *cadres* of revolutionary organization.

It was to be expected that the *okhrana* would battle with the new danger in the old way, and that as the number of village schools multiplied the efforts to sterilize the influence of masters and mistresses would become more intense. Herein we have an explanation of the systematic opposition raised by the police to rural education.

The old *Narodovóltsy* had failed in their attempts to enlist the peasant mass in a revolutionary movement. Their Socialist successors did not fare much better in the abortive revolution of 1905. But the Third Element went on with the work, less obtrusively, but ultimately with signal success.

Meanwhile the working-men had become more adaptable to revolution. As usual, strike movements had marked the growth and developments of industries. But labor organizations were unknown. There were *artels* or companies of workmen, bound together under an elected leader, who undertook contracts, but these primitive organizations had only an outside connection with the mills and factories. In the great textile districts

gravitating around Moscow and Petrograd, and in the steel and iron works, coal mines, and oil fields of the South, many millions of men were massed together, and often suffering unnecessary hardships. Then there were the railway workers—a large and united force. So long as these men had tilled their fields the police did not interfere with them. In fact, the peasant did not feel the oppressive rule of the *okhrana* in his daily life. But as soon as he left the village he became an object of suspicion, particularly if he entered a mill.

“Labor unrest” was precluded by the *okhrana* in a very simple manner—no unions and no strikes were permitted. Factory inspectors, appointed to hear and settle grievances, were constantly torn between the repressive dictates of the *okhrana* and the impatient demands of the men. Still, as there was no resisting the men’s tendency to “organize,” and they were doing so in secret, the *okhrana* devised a plan whereby they fondly imagined the men would be “satisfied” and “the security of the State” assured. Thus arose the famous “Zubatovshchina” (1903). Zubatov, an *agent provocateur*, was permitted to form workmen’s associations in Moscow in order to keep an eye on the men. In Petrograd a similar mission was confided to Father Gapon. We know the tragic sequel of this experiment.

Ninety years after the Decembrist uprising—a Nobles’ movement—came the first semi-popular uprising, the Socialist revolt of 1905. It dominated and partly upset a Constitutional movement organized by the Zemstvo leaders. All the workmen struck, and the railways stopped running. The peasants indulged in excesses, but would not side with the strikers. A council of workmen’s Deputies was formed in Petrograd, but no soldiers joined it. There was, however, a mutiny in the Black Sea fleet, due largely to the sad memories of Tsushima and Port Arthur. The repressions then applied

were destined to find a terrible echo in the great Revolution of 1917. Count Witte brought troops back from Manchuria, quenched the revolt, and at length wrested a Parliament of sorts from the unwilling hands of the autocrat (1905).

Subsequent contests between Constitutional Reform and Reaction have already been dealt with in a previous chapter. The existence of the Duma disconcerted Revolution for a time. Terrorism had previously been increasing. Three Ministers—Bogolepov, Sipiagin, and Plehve—were murdered in rapid succession. The *okhrana* got “into touch” with Terrorist organizations through Azev and other *provocateurs*, and hoped to control their energies. Many of the assassians were young Jews, who also figured in hundreds of murders of policemen and “expropriations” of banks, effected ostensibly to finance Revolution and to divert public attention from the main causes of political crime; a series of *pogroms* followed.

Experience of revolutionary phenomena left its mark upon the bureaucracy. After the rude lesson of 1905 much was done to alleviate the intolerable position of Russian Labor and to introduce agrarian reform. Compulsory insurance of workmen, employers' liability, hospital funds, reduction of hours, restriction of child labor, boards of conciliation—all received more or less attention. A separate Ministry of Commerce and Industry was created with a separate department dealing with “Labor questions.” But the *okhrana* never gave it a fair chance. M. Litvinov-Falinsky, a young factory inspector who had been placed in charge of this service, repeatedly told me of the impediments that were being daily placed in his way. The workmen were entitled under the new law to elect delegates to the various boards. These delegates were always the most moderate and trustworthy representatives of their class. Yet the *okhrana* invariably had them arrested. Employers and

employed were thus systematically deprived of a proper and responsible organization of labor.

Among the peasants, revolutionary organization and propaganda made comparatively little headway. I remember in 1905, during one of my frequent visits to the Zemstvo Congresses then assembling in Moscow to discuss constitutional reform, I was present at one of the first attempts to create a Peasant's Union. My venerable colleague, the late W. T. Stead, had come to Russia on a special mission. He had interceded successfully with Governor-General Trepov for the release of M. Miliukov from the fortress,<sup>1</sup> and had come to Moscow to address the Congress. A lady, who took great interest in politics, a Countess Borbinskaia, invited us to meet some peasants whom she was helping to form a party and union of their own. We went. It was a curious gathering. The real peasants said nothing, but an officer, who claimed rustic origin, talked much. His views became known later in the programs of Radical and Socialist parties: "All the land for the peasants." Our host, an old Etonian, apparently enjoyed the conversation. He was a very large landowner. It amused him to hear his wife quite seriously endorse the doctrine of spoliation. Stead was so overcome by the eloquence of Mazurenko, the quasi-peasant, that he fell asleep. The heat of the room, the endless and fevered speech in Russian, which he did not understand, poured forth too rapidly for interpreting, had been too much even for his iron constitution. How typical of present-day politics in Russia! The well-meaning dame, I think, only then realized that her plans might be misunderstood. But the "Union" was formed. It held two meetings. The police closed the second one, and arrested some of Mazurenko's friends.

<sup>1</sup> M. Miliukov had rashly attempted to address the factory hands in Petrograd.

Later, in the first and in the second Dumas, elected on a very wide peasant suffrage, with an enormous contingent of rustics, we witnessed the same spectacle; many of the peasant Deputies kept aloof from parties, grouping themselves together, unresponsive to the bids offered from the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) benches and from the Socialist camps. Many of these peasants had bought lands, and were frightened by the Cadet scheme and still more by the Socialist plan of land nationalization. M. Stolypin, the new Premier, aided by an able and energetic Minister of Agriculture, M. Krivoshein, introduced and carried out a gigantic measure to promote small holdings—in other words, individual ownership.

In the first and in the second Dumas good evidence was afforded to the Government of their exact position with the people, and had they listened attentively all might have been well. The Moderates and the Left were about equally divided, the Right was nowhere. Trepov wanted to summon a Cadet Ministry. But the Constitutional Democrats had, perhaps unadvisedly, espoused the agrarian program of Hertenstein, a Jewish Deputy, providing for a restricted measure of compulsory expropriation in order to enlarge the peasants' holdings. Nobody could explain satisfactorily how the scheme was to be applied. It "looked attractive"; in reality it was specious, untimely, and needlessly compromising to its authors. It frightened all the propertied classes, and thereby indirectly stimulated reaction. Moreover, Hertenstein had spoken in an unguarded moment (June, 1906) of the "illuminations of May," alluding to agrarian disorders which had notoriously been stimulated by Jewish agitators, "mounted on bicycles," and which he thought would frighten the Government into compliance. It did frighten them, but into resistance. Goremykin told the House that "compul-

sory expropriation" would "under no circumstances be permitted." And when the Cadets wanted to issue an Appeal to the People against the Government, the Duma was dissolved. M. Miliukov and his followers thereupon issued the famous Vyborg Manifesto, summoning the people not to pay taxes. Practically all the best men in the party signed it, although many disapproved. It led to their trial, imprisonment, and disqualification. Their revolutionary acts seriously crippled the Cadets in the second Duma, although in 1917 they assured to them a leading part in the Revolutionary Government. Hertzstein was murdered by an emissary of the "Black Hundred" organization.

The Duma afforded a useful outlet for pent-up grievances, but at the same time it focused and intensified revolutionary feeling. In drafting the election laws prominence had been given to the peasant representation, it being a bureaucratic axiom that the rural vote might be relied upon. The workmen also had a separate delegation. But the Socialist parties "boycotted" the first Duma, on the assumption that parliamentary methods would prejudice the Revolutionary cause. Hence the Labor Deputies then elected had only a casual connection with Socialist parties. The Socialists soon discovered their mistake, and in the second Duma (February, 1907) were exerting great influence under the guise of "Toilists." They, of course, had come to the Duma not to legislate, but to prepare a revolution. What they wanted was a Constituent Assembly, and eventually a Socialist Republic. The *okhrana* "discovered" the plot, and many of the conspirators were arrested and imprisoned. Weakened in numbers and influence, the Cadets had lost all control over the House. Moderate parties like the Octobrists—founded by M. Guchkov to support constitutional reform within the scope of the Tsar's Manifesto of October 30, 1905—had been terrified by revolutionary

excesses, and were inclined to support repressive measures.

Under these auspices M. Stolypin initiated his Premiership. His policy was based on ruthless repression of revolutionary and on the strengthening of conservative elements. In both directions he was handicapped by the *okhrana*, of which he was nominally chief. Repression overran all limits, and in the end was destined to weary Stolypin's most ardent supporters, the Octobrists. Conservatism had been discredited by the creation of a so-called Monarchist party, commonly known as the "Black Hundred." Sycophants and scoundrels like Dulrovin, Glinka-Yanchevsky, and Bulatzel disgraced the cause for which they ostensibly worked. Yet the Tsar supported them with money and favors. The Black Hundred ruled the local police and directed *pogroms*. Cadets and Socialists were included under one ban of political excommunication, and everything was done to favor the Reactionary minority. Stolypin knew the dangers he ran from Reactionary and Revolutionary sources. But he went on boldly with his scheme of agrarian reform, hoping to create a strong reliable peasant farmer class which should provide a safeguard against revolution.

He did not scruple to change the electoral law in order to exclude undesirable elements from the Duma. This meant a *coup d'état*. The organic laws, as amended by the autocrat in 1906, expressly ordained that no change should be made in the law on elections without the consent of the Duma. But feeling at Court was then running so high that Stolypin had to choose the lesser of two evils: either to abolish the Duma, or "amend" it. It had been assumed that the autocracy was "self-limited" by its own act. Exponents of the autocratic doctrine maintained, however, that the Tsar could always reassert his unlimited power and omnipotent will. Such was the

explanation vouchsafed to his subjects when he arbitrarily enacted a new electoral law (June, 1907).

A forceful, fearless man, Stolypin had faced single-handed a howling mob of agrarian rioters in Saratov while Governor of that province in 1905. Just as fearlessly he entered upon his task of "saving Russia." Soon the Socialist ranks were dispersed, Revolutionary organizations disrupted and the leaders executed, deported, or driven to take refuge abroad. The lesser lights of Revolution adopted "neutral" or even "loyal" colors, and the work of agrarian reform proceeded without serious interruption. In the third and fourth Dumas, winnowed by electoral devices, very few Socialists gained entrance. Disqualification of "doubtful" persons was sweepingly applied by the police and local authorities. A few Socialists, who had not been too openly compromised by their antecedent activities, managed here and there to elude official watchfulness. Among them was young Kerensky. He passed as a Toilist from a small urban constituency.<sup>1</sup> The Church had also exerted itself. Parish priests returned to previous Dumas had not been moderate or loyalist enough to please the Holy Synod. Now, the clerical interest had been alarmed by Socialist threats of confiscating Church lands. With the help of the new electoral law a large company of priests appeared in the Duma, voting solidly for the Government.

But even with a subservient Duma little progress could be hoped for in reform legislation. The Lower House might pass an important Bill, only to encounter reactionary opposition in the Upper Chamber. Recourse had to be taken to emergency legislation under a clause that enabled the Government to enact urgent measures during a Parliamentary recess. In this manner the Agrarian Bills were carried into effect, and courts martial

<sup>1</sup> He was selected quite casually by the opponents of Count Uvarov, who had represented the constituency (Volak in Samara, Kerensky's birthplace).

instituted to try revolutionary offenses. It was a two-edged weapon, however. The Duma did not like it, and revenged itself by amending or cutting down the measure when it came up for its subsequent legislative endorsement. In this manner also Stolypin extended the Zemstvo organization to the south-western provinces. Small-holdings were in disfavor with Socialists, Cadets, and Reactionaries alike, though for different reasons. The Stolypin Zemstvos discriminated against Polish landowners in favor of Russian property-owners and Little Russian peasants. Intending to strengthen the bonds uniting the Ukraina with the Empire, he indirectly promoted rural unrest and separatism.

Stolypin's life had been constantly in danger. The Revolutionaries blew up his summer residence on the Neva to avenge their comrades executed by order of courts martial, but he escaped, though one of his daughters was crippled. In Kiev, while attending a performance at the Grand Theater in September, 1911, he was fatally wounded by an agent of the *okhrana*. A monument erected to him outside the theater was destroyed by the Revolutionaries four years later.

The new Premier, M. (afterwards Count) Kokovtsov, had for eight years presided over the administration of Finances. He had never pursued a policy of repression, and he could not associate himself with the methods of the *okhrana*. But as revolution had been stamped out by his predecessor, he did not have to preoccupy himself with this unsavory task. He set his mind steadfastly to carry out economic reforms, to develop the agrarian policy of Stolypin and Krivoshein, and to provide money for education. His was a safe and statesmanlike administration, and it should have met with greater support and encouragement. But the artificial Duma and the Reactionary Upper House were both dissatisfied. Revolution was secretly fermenting, Reaction had already its

Razputin. Neither of them could, or would, accept a policy of gradual evolution. Discontent with the Premier assumed a concrete form in the Temperance movement. Peasants in the Duma and bishops (acting on Razputin's instigation) in the Council led the assault. The Tsar espoused the quarrel, and Kokovtsov resigned.

Never had Russia enjoyed material prosperity comparable with the decade of M. Kokovtsov's administration. He had well earned his elevation to the dignity of a Count of the Russian Empire. What is more, he had enlisted the respect of all parties. Never had the Revolutionaries molested him, and later in the storm and stress of upheaval he was to be one of the few representatives of the Old Regime who did not suffer arrest or imprisonment.

Reaction had triumphed, and Goremykin succeeded to the Premiership. With the subsequent record of Razputinism we have become familiar. Under Goremykin Russia was destined, however, to engage in a world-war. The call of patriotism stilled all party passions. But blindness and incompetency in high places, aggravated by alien intrigue, were afterwards to lead to a foreseen disaster. The workmen, who had been periodically striking in protest against the interference of the *okhrana* in lawful Labor organization, and who on the eve of war were engaged in a strike fomented by German agitators with German money, instantly resumed their labors. Later they were to succumb to these and other influences. And the rustics, dismayed by endless drafts upon the manhood of the villages without hope or prospect of victory, allowed themselves to be swept into the movement.

Great changes had occurred in rural life during the previous decade, partly as a result of the Co-operative movement and partly because of the spread of education. The percentage of illiterate youths had fallen appreciably. In some provinces, notably on the Volga, every boy was

attending school sufficiently to acquire the rudiments of learning.<sup>1</sup> I remember as far back as the winter of 1906, while staying near Yaroslav with a priest whom I had known when we were boys, learning from him that the peasants in his parish gave little heed to revolutionary questions, and were concerned only with one matter: how to introduce compulsory education. By their own efforts they anticipated the scholastic measures afterwards taken by the Government with the approval of the Duma. Moreover, the village youth were particularly keen for technical instruction. Classes in farming, opened by the Government in agricultural districts, were packed to overflowing.

Emigration to Siberia had changed the face of that vast region. Thousands of miles of the railway, and sometimes many hundreds of miles on either side, were dotted with settlements. The emigrants to Siberia had always been recruited from the most energetic and independent forces in the country, political and agricultural. Among them were peasant millionaires and huge Co-operatives. When Stolypin and Krivoshein made their colonial tour (in 1909) they were entertained by some of these "strong men." Stolypin had launched his famous challenge to the supporters of the commune in the Duma: "You want to foster the idleness of the Weak; I mean to stake my policy on the Strong!" Yet after his experiences in Siberia he said candidly: "The Siberian democracy requires careful watching: it may prove too strong."

The Co-operative movement arose and flourished in Western Siberia. Dairy farmers associated themselves together, imported Danish experts, set up modern plants

<sup>1</sup> They formed the bulk of the Russian Army in 1914, which never wavered in its loyalty and patriotism. The older men, called to the colors later, were more ignorant and less reliable. Hence the success of Bolshevik propaganda in 1917.

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and machinery, and did a roaring business with the British market. Thence the movement spread westward into Russia. The Kokovtsov administration encouraged it; the *okhrana*, scenting danger from afar and fearing all organized labor, did its utmost to prevent its growth. One of the advocates of rural Co-operative Associations, M. Nicholas Chaikovsky,<sup>1</sup> a well-known Russian revolutionary, was arrested on returning from exile in England and detained for some time in the Fortress of SS. Peter and Paul. The Co-operatives took up and developed the work that had been already initiated by Zemstvos organizations. The Zemstvos had supplied the peasants and the numerous *kustarny*, or cottage industries, with raw material, and helped them to dispose of their produce.

Thanks to the Zemstvo and the Co-operative organizations, Russia was in a position to deal with the huge problems of supply connected with the war. (It was the Government's fault that this invaluable machinery did not render its full measure of usefulness.) In themselves they were economical forces of the highest value. Placed in revolutionary hands they might become dangerous, and that they were so handled is beyond dispute. The Co-operatives and the Third Element were, indeed, the main channels through which revolutionary influences gained access to the peasantry, and afterwards brought them into temporary alliance with the Soviet.

<sup>1</sup> He was at the head of the Local Government in Northern Russia in 1918.

## CHAPTER X

### REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES

**Russian Socialism—Three Groups—Social Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries—Bolshevism and Maximalism—Terrorist Organisation—The Doctrine of Murder—Lenin and Kerensky.**

HAVING surveyed the revolutionary *terrain*, we may now proceed to analyze the forces that were destined, by the logic of Despotism, to override the Moderate elements in the country and storm the citadel of State. We have seen how these forces looming in the background had sent forth skirmishers to capture all the positions that had been laboriously acquired by the Moderate forces: the Zemstvos, the Duma, and the Co-operatives. We have noted the pernicious influence of German intrigue and of pseudo-Jew vengefulness on the one hand and of pseudo-Conservatism on the other. Traversing the dark mazes of Court life, we have paused briefly to take stock of the progress made by the people. Nowhere did elements manifest themselves in strength, unity, and concord, sufficient to save the country from a sudden internal convulsion.

Socialism, the mainspring of revolution, had assumed three concrete forms in Russia during the early part of the twentieth century. They were: the Labor Emancipation group, initiated by Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Vera Zasulich; the Social-Democratic party, organized with the help of a Russian, Vladimir Uliánov, *alias* Lenin,<sup>1</sup> Ilyin, etc.; and the Socialist-Revolutionary party, formed

<sup>1</sup> See note at the end of this chapter.

under the auspices of Gerschuni, a pseudo-Jew, and E. K. Breshko-Breskovskaia, afterwards nicknamed "grandmother of the Russian Revolution." They were "outlaw" parties. Avowed membership in either of them entailed punishment. The organizations were secret, and the leaders directed affairs from the safe vantage of foreign countries, largely from Switzerland. Plekhanov also a Russian, had formerly been an associate of Lenin, but, unlike him, had grown moderate in his views, and his following was the least numerous. He dealt not in the excitement of murder, nor in the cupidity of "expropriation." Lenin was an early-Marxist. Himself of Russian birth, he owed his inspiration to Germany. Gerschuni was an enthusiast of terrorism. Their parties appealed respectively to the class prejudices and passions of the workmen and the peasants.

Parallel with, but independently of the "out-law" factions, several groups of literary men figured as leaders of "advanced Liberalism." Mikhailovsky was the greatest of them. His death in 1903 was deplored by all the *intelligentsia* of Russia. Korolenko, a lesser light, strove like him, for the material welfare and happiness of the rural masses. They were, so to speak, the enlightened and moderate equivalents of the Socialist-Revolutionary party. M. Peter Struhwe devoted himself, on the other hand, to economic questions more closely concerned with Labor. Using a Russian definition, he was a "literary Marxist" in his earlier career.

But this "intellectual" Socialism, like the disembodied anarchism of Kropotkin, did not appeal to university undergraduates, who had formed the readiest and most daring supporters of revolution up to and during the abortive movement of 1905. During that period of unrest the university and technical colleges in Petrograd were hotbeds of revolutionary propaganda—a fact which led to repressive measures against them, the abolition of

Students' Clubs, and discrimination against Jewish undergraduates, who had been particularly prominent in revolutionary agitation.

The moderate Russian Socialism of the Plekhanov school was side-tracked by the pseudo-Jewish element, and all the force of revolutionary activity found its outlet under the respective flags of industrial Social-Democracy and rural Socialist-Revolution, each formed, led, and developed mainly by pseudo-Jews. But each of these two revolutionary parties underwent considerable changes, as we shall see.

Social-Democracy in Russia followed very much in the footsteps of its German protagonist. The teachings of Karl Marx formed its Alpha and Omega. It held forth the purely academic argument that sooner or later Labor must devour Capitalism. The Russian Social-Democrats divided on the question of method. Lenin represented the extreme tendency which insisted on activist propaganda, immediate and sanguinary conflicts, without quarter to or compromise with the *bourgeoisie*. The matter was broached at a secret congress held abroad (some dozen years ago in Stockholm). A majority sided with Lenin, whence the name of Bolshevik, or "major" group, thenceforth designated his followers. The Menshevist or "lesser" group contented itself with the Marxian theory,<sup>1</sup> leaving the development of class warfare and the promised division of capitalist spoils to the process of time. This circumspect strategy was "justified" by the ruthless methods of the *okhrana* and by all the force and energy that Stolypin displayed in his campaign against the hidden forces of Revolution. The working classes had been sorely tried by the stern lessons of 1905

<sup>1</sup> Lenin adopted the extreme methods advocated by K. Marx in his early days; the Menshevists preferred the later and far more moderate "system" that Marx himself had found to be necessary. Present-day German Socialism contains no element corresponding with the Bolsheviks.

and subsequent years; and as a "burnt child fears the fire," they scented in all appeals to violence the hidden hand of the *agent provocateur*.

So for many years the Menshevist program prevailed, and, belying their name, the Bolsheviki were really in a minority. The Social-Democrats returned by Labor at ensuing elections were almost invariably Mensheviki. Their leaders in the Duma, Chkheidze and Tseretelli (both Georgians), were also the recognized chieftains of the Menshevist group. Lenin and his chief supporters—Bronstein-Trotsky, and others, nearly all pseudo-Jews—hid themselves abroad, biding their time. But they succeeded in imposing a certain Malinovsky upon the Moscow workmen, who returned him as their Deputy. During the Revolution it became known that Malinovsky had been in the pay of the *okhrana*.

With the Socialist-Revolutionaries (political successors of the *Narodovóltsy*, or "People's Will party") matters assumed a somewhat different course. They were not Marxists. They were "rural" as well as "industrial" Socialists. Their motto read: "Land and freedom for all the toiling people. By strife shall they attain their rights." It offered a much broader program than that of the Social-Democrats. It embraced rustic and mill-hand within its scope, but it was intended chiefly for the land-hungry peasant, and appealed more especially to the increasing contingent of parasitic villagers who, through idleness and drink, had lost the capacity of bettering themselves,<sup>1</sup> or of emigrating to the free and fertile lands of Siberia. But no political party, revolutionary or constitutional, can hope to endure if it fails to show cause for its existence—a truism that had disheartened the Russian Radical party, the Constitutional-Democrats or Cadets. (Rendered desperate by reaction, they flung

<sup>1</sup> This parasitic element attained the huge proportion of 15 per cent of the total village population (in 1914).

themselves headlong into demagogue appeals to the populace in 1906, unheeding the very patent argument that on this slippery path they were bound to be outpaced by revolutionary parties. They even renamed themselves "Party of the People's Freedom.") Constant failures had affected the Social-Democrats in another manner, as we have seen, and had the Government not been dominated by *okhrana* methods, that failure might have been prolonged. The Socialist-Revolutionaries could not justify their motto, so, in revenge, they organized political assassination. For internal and tactical reasons they had grouped themselves into Minimalists and Maximalists. The former advocated the first half of the party program: "Land and freedom for all the toiling people." The Maximalists accepted it in its entirety, and proceeded to apply the behest contained in the second half: "By strife shall they attain their rights." The Socialist-Revolutionary members of the Duma figured as "Toilists." Their leader was Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky, a young lawyer, whose hysterical speeches gave no promise of a great political career.<sup>1</sup>

I remember reading a very interesting document prepared by the *okhrana* in 1904, setting forth the origin and growth of what was called "The Fighting Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalist Group." This was the specially selected volunteer corps that carried out political assassination. The demure and respectable intellectuals in the Minimalist camp were not supposed to know how these things were done. Such and such a Minister was "sentenced" by the Maximalists, and the "Fighting Organization" had to "execute" him. Gerschuni was the guiding spirit of this league of murder,

<sup>1</sup> The Minimalists had an "internationalist" wing that naturally inclined towards Bolshevism, which is inherently anti-national and based on "internationalization" of the masses. Kerensky belonged—prior to the Revolution—to the internationalist wing of his party. In 1915 and 1916 he carried on revolutionary propaganda with funds sent from Germany.

and he prided himself upon the perfection and success of the "Organization." Minister after Minister fell. But Gerschuni was himself betrayed by another Jew, the famous Evno Azev, who had been co-director of assassination in the pay of the *okhrana*. Plehve was killed in Petrograd by a bomb thrown at his carriage at the end of July, 1904; the Grand Duke Sergius was murdered in February, 1905. Then the "Organization" suspended further operations. It had been tracked and its members dispersed or executed.

Curiously enough, the Revolutionaries had previously decided to "exempt" the Tsar. They were afraid of compromising themselves like their predecessors in 1881. An attempt had been made in 1887, on the anniversary of Alexander II's death, to assassinate his son and the whole Imperial family by blowing up their train. For that attempt, which failed miraculously, several *Narodovóltsy* were executed, including Lenin's elder brother.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries were unable to practise assassination after the Grand Duke's murder in Moscow, being disrupted. But they attributed their reticence to another cause, viz., to their having succeeded in terrifying the Tsar into making concessions and promises. This theory was unjustifiable and absurd. Never had assassination evoked "concessions" or "promises." On the contrary, it had, in every case, only intensified repression. Moreover, the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves boycotted the Duma, which shows clearly enough what they thought about the "concessions."

In nearly every case the horrible work was imposed upon hapless youths, who fancied they were "saving their country," while the pseudo-Jewish organizers directed murder from afar. One enthusiast entered the *okhrana* office (in 1905) with bombs all over him, so that none dare approach him. Many "expropriations" were carried out by mere hooligans under Maximalist colors.

Within a few short years the Maximalists had acquired such a sanguinary reputation that their name was destined to be misapplied to quite another, although a kindred, group, the Social-Democrat Bolsheviki, who "came into their own" during the Revolution of 1917. By that time the distinction between Maximalist and Minimalist Socialist-Revolutionaries had ceased to have any practical significance. All became—if they had not already become—Maximalists. But the Social-Democrats remained, as hitherto, divided into Bolsheviki and Mensheviki, not so much on strictly tactical or Labor policy, as on the question of continuing the war—for which purpose a coalition with the *bourgeoisie* was indispensable—or of concluding a separate peace. Lenin<sup>1</sup> and his followers

<sup>1</sup> In experience as a revolutionary, Lenin was greatly superior to Kerensky. They both came originally from one Volga city, but while Kerensky was still an undergraduate, Lenin, seventeen years his senior, had already made a name for himself as a leader in the Socialist world. Each had been influenced by environment and circumstances. Lenin was a youth when his brother perished on the scaffold (1887), and while Kerensky passed his early manhood among comfortable surroundings at Tashkent—where his stepfather directed the local high school—Lenin traversed the thorny path of the revolutionary outlaw. In the nineties he had tasted the "sweets" of Siberia. Then after a spell "abroad," controverting Plekhanov in Switzerland, he had proclaimed the doctrine of Bolshevism at Stockholm (1903) and come to Petrograd to act as the guiding-spirit of the first Soviet (1905). At that time Kerensky was just beginning to "conspire." For ten weary years Lenin remained abroad, and when the war broke out was in Austria. He was first "arrested" as a Russian spy, then on the recommendation of an Austrian Socialist named Adler regained his liberty and finally entered into relations with the enemy Governments. Lenin and one of his friends named Ioltuhowski were respectively commissioned by the Germans to foment a revolution in Russia and to start a separatist movement in Ukraina. Passage in a "sealed" car was provided for Lenin and his friends through Germany.

The mentality of the two men who were destined to exercise a fateful influence over the course of the Revolution deserves careful analysis.

Lenin displayed the characteristically Russian proclivity for carrying "ideas" to the uttermost extreme of ratiocination. Fanatics of this stamp were not uncommon among the undergraduates in Russian universities. It was during his early university days that Vladimir Ulianov—his real name—began to devote himself to the study of Karl Marx, and it is symptomatic of his inborn predilection for extreme doctrines that he should have espoused the quasi-

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had espoused the "defeatist" doctrine and "no coalition." Like the other Socialists, they wanted a "new earth," but sought it in the ruin of society. The autocracy was to be overthrown by a defeat of Russia's armies. This was really a confession of their wish and their unaided inability to force a revolution. At any rate, they perpetuated this doctrine after the disappearance of the autocracy under the guise of a "democratic" peace.

Bolshevism of the early-Marxian revelation and steadfastly repudiated the far more moderate tendency of his master's later teachings. Perhaps in this choice he was dominated by feelings of bitterness and vengeance rankling within his mind, since the tragic and violent end of his elder brother. Unlike the great majority of Russian revolutionary undergraduates, Lenin remained a revolutionary in his mature years and grew more uncompromising with age. There is no doubt that he deliberately entered into an arrangement with his country's foes and used German money to propagate his doctrines. To a fanatic who repudiates nationality and nationhood, there was nothing derogatory in such a proceeding. To him all means were good, provided he could achieve his end.

It was in the application of his ideas that Lenin stood apart from his countrymen. He was un-Russian not so much in the tendency to unconscious paradox as in the persistency with which he developed and imposed his doctrines. And we find him constrained to rely on the aid of almost exclusively non-Russian elements. The majority of his principal associates were of the pseudo-Jew class—the hate-laden product of the Pale. Without them and without the help of German agents, like Robert Grimm, and German gold conveyed through well-known banks in Petrograd, he could never have assured the ephemeral triumph of Bolshevism; without these adjuncts there would never have been a separate peace negotiated at Brest-Litovak by two Jews, Bronstein-Trotsky and Joffe, in the name of Russia and signed by four other Jews in Berlin.

Kerensky's was a totally different mentality. A highly strung, somewhat hysterical young man of Jewish descent, he reacted in 1917 to his new surroundings, boasted that he would lead the Army into battle, and adopted the ways of an autocrat. But the greatness that was thrust upon him reached far above his mental and moral caliber. He was not a statesman by genius or experience. Well-intentioned enough, he found himself torn by a thousand conflicting cares and interests. The author recalls a pathetic narrative of Kerensky's conversation with the ex-Tsar, when, as Minister of Justice, he paid one of his periodical visits to the captive at Tsarskoe Selo. They had a friendly smoke and chat. Kerensky began to unbosom himself regarding the burdens of State. He complained that it was all "so difficult and perplexing." Nicholas II sympathized: "I can assure you, Alexander Fedorovich, that I had the same trouble. But you will find, as time goes on, that it comes easier."

## PART II

# “DEMOCRACY,” “SOCIALISM,” AND “FREEDOM”

## CHAPTER XI

### THE REVOLUTION

**Alarm Signals—Kerensky discloses Revolutionary Plans—A well-organized Movement—“Peaceful” Demonstrations—“No Bread” a Pretext—The Duma “Used”—A Diary of the Crucial Days—Protopopov’s Gunners—Mutiny of the Guards—Preobrazhensky support Rodzianko—Last Appeals to the Tsar—The Provisional Committee—Socialists show their Hand—The Soviet—Divided Authority—“Ideals” and “Loot.”**

WE have now passed in review all the principal elements of the situation as it presented itself to the initiated observer of Russian affairs in March, 1917. If the reader has patiently followed the unraveling of this skein, he will be able to understand the causes and the consequences of the Revolution. He will be familiar with the character of the forces that were then let loose, and note without surprise the form and manner in which they were exerted. Above all he will bear in mind that the masses were largely illiterate and politically immature, that revolution had long been fermenting, that it had gained a whole army of adherents among soldiers and civilians, because the country had been engaged for two and a half years in a mismanaged and unsuccessful war. In short, revolutionary dreamers and demagogues were in a position to mislead an ignorant and irresponsible

"democracy," under the banners of miscalled "Socialism" to a "freedom" that quickly resolved itself into anarchy.

Some months before the Revolution I paid a short visit to the Front and visited the men of a regiment with whom I had previously been in action. The officers were as keen as ever, and delighted to see an English friend. The men appeared to be less cheerful than I had been accustomed to find them. On returning to Headquarters I was asked by a friend who held high office: "How did you find the men?" And when I looked at him questioningly, he added: "Were they in good spirits?" I answered that there had seemed to me to be a decline. "Ah!" was the brief but significant commentary. My friend had carefully perused the weekly reports sent by regimental commanders about the feeling among their troops and the military censor's reviews of soldiers' letters to their homes; it was important for him to hear the opinion of a disinterested outsider. The gloomier tone of these communications—then unknown to me—was thus confirmed by my impressions. The causes of this change will be fully explained. I allude to this incident because it serves to emphasize the significance of a certain decline in *morale* among the troops at the Front some little time before the Revolution broke out.

Only a few days before the outbreak I went to Moscow to attend the jubilee of a great Russian publisher, Ivan Dmitrievich Sytin, who began life as a peasant-boy hawking pictures and tracts in the villages and had built up one of the greatest printing and publishing houses in the world, with a million-circulation newspaper, the *Russkoe Slovo*, and many millions of popular publications to its credit. "All Moscow" was present at the celebration. I was struck by the immense cheering that greeted my reference to British sympathy with Russia's progress "on the path of freedom," and painfully impressed by

the speeches of the workmen. Responding to M. Sytin's generous donations to his employees, amounting to several hundreds of thousands of roubles, and the foundation of schools, hospitals, and other institutions for their especial benefit, the spokesman of the printing staff bluntly said: "Ivan Dmitrievich, we do not thank you. We accept your offerings, and we have to say only this, that you should have made them long ago." It was a brutal and altogether un-Russian utterance. Everybody understood that it had been prearranged "elsewhere," and that it was delivered "according to plan" for the benefit of the Socialist gallery in Petrograd. The impending outbreak of revolution was evidently suspected by, if not known to, the workmen.

A speech delivered by M. Kerensky in the Duma explained the tone of the Moscow workmen. In the smother of subsequent events it was unheeded at the time, except by the *okhrana*, which wanted to arrest and impeach him. Speaking two weeks before the outbreak in his usual hysterical and gesticulatory manner, the Socialist-Revolutionary chieftain announced the approach of upheaval. "Its lightnings already illumine the horizon," he cried. It was an indiscreet utterance. It hinted all too clearly that he and his associates were organizing and fomenting the outbreak.

The rest of his speech contained a precise indication of the program that had been decided upon by the Socialists in regard to the war: "We think that the man-power<sup>1</sup> and material resources of this country are exhausted, and that the time has come to prepare for a termination of the European conflict. It must be settled on a basis of self-definition of all nationalities.

<sup>1</sup>This was a misleading statement. Russia's losses in men in the war were the smallest of any European Ally in proportion to population. See pp. 231 and 234. Kerensky, moreover, betrayed a distinctly internationalistic tendency in this utterance.

All Governments must forego to the same extent their Imperialistic aims."

There was no room for misapprehension. The indication of coming internal strife, the intention of the Revolutionaries to conclude peace, and the unwholesome allusion to the Allies afforded an epitome of the revolutionary plan.

Having the workmen well in hand, counting upon disaffection among the troops in Petrograd and relying upon their sympathies among the Third Element (to which must be added the municipal employees) and the apathy of the villagers, the Socialists had decided to give battle with much greater forces than in 1905, and, in view of the discontent and unpreparedness of the Moderate elements, had all the chances of success.

The Socialists waited merely for an opportunity to launch their attack. On February 27th, while Kerensky was making his speech in the Duma, "peaceful" Labor demonstrations began in the streets. The effect of these parades became apparent some days later. People waiting for bread and provisions grew more restive. On Wednesday, March 7th, an old woman indignantly broke a baker's window. Others followed her example. Some looting occurred. Cossack patrols appeared in the streets. But no collisions took place. The people remained quiet. Unrest was, however, visibly growing.

Next day more bakeries were stormed, chiefly in the Vyborg quarter, where a large number of mills and factories concentrated an almost exclusively working-class population. Huge crowds appeared in the streets. The workmen were invading the city. More Cossacks appeared on the scene. There was sporadic firing, apparently by workmen, but no serious conflicts. The Government evidently became much alarmed, for during the day General Habalov, Commander-in-Chief of the Garrison, explained that flour was arriving regularly and

being supplied to the bakers, and that there should be enough bread for everybody. Suspicion was thus cast upon the bakers, who were already in disfavor, and many of whom promptly closed up their businesses.

Later in the day I read a notice in the newspaper windows in the Nevsky stating that the Government had decided to take urgent measures, that a conference with representatives of the Duma, the Zemstvos, and other public bodies would be convened on March 9th (the following day) and that everything would be done to settle the food crisis. Anything more fatuous could not be conceived. Here was a patent confession of laxity. Whom was it expected to satisfy? The Socialists, who had already made up their minds for revolution, or the dissatisfied "man in the street," who did not want revolution, but pined for relief from an incapable Government. However, "At last they are going to act. Let us hope it will not be too late!" Such was the tenor of comment in the Nevsky.

On the Friday morning the police tried to confine the workmen within their quarters, especially on the Vyborg side of the Neva, but they made long *détours*, crossed over the ice, and made their way into the Nevsky. A good deal of shopbreaking occurred in the outlying districts. The central portions of the city remained quiet. Traffic became difficult, owing to the crowded state of the thoroughfares. Cossacks charged up and down the Nevsky without using sabers or knouts. The crowds cheered them. Very few policemen were visible. A few red flags appeared; on the other hand, loyal songs resounded. Besides the Revolutionaries there were many people in the streets who had no sympathy or connection with militant Socialism.

In the Tauris Palace, Deputies talked long about the food crisis. M. Rittich, the Minister of Agriculture, argued fervently in defense of his own acts. He had been saddled with an impossible task. Such measures

as had been taken were not sufficiently supported by the people who were chiefly concerned. This was a direct hit at the Zemstvos and other public organizations. There was some truth in what he said. A certain amount of "passive resistance" had been shown, with a view, probably, to force the Government to capitulate to the Zemstvos. But this was not the time to raise such questions. Everybody agreed that the situation had reached a critical point. And the hope of the Moderate parties lay in the measures promised at the eleventh hour by the Government, with the concurrence of the Duma and the Zemstvos.

On Saturday the crowds were more numerous than ever. Looting of bakeries continued. The workmen again came into the city, although armed resistance was shown by the police and the gendarmes. In order to safeguard the munition works from possible injury by strikers, the Government ventured to order out troops, who, up to this time, had been confined to their barracks. At one of the cartridge factories the strikers shot a young subaltern. His men did not retaliate. They had relatives amongst the strikers. In other cases the soldiers fired a few rounds. Most of the troops and the Cossacks were obviously disinclined to be rough with the people. It was becoming evident that the workmen acted under orders from a revolutionary organization. Nearly all of them were employed in the output of munitions or war supplies, and as such were in receipt of bread rations. They were consequently better off than the ordinary inhabitant, yet they were creating the greatest amount of disorder. Some policemen and gendarmes were killed in the mill districts.

The Duma again discussed the food crisis. At the conference with the Government on the preceding night the fullest information had been obtained regarding the situation, and M. Nekrasov, a prominent Cadet Deputy from Siberia and an authority on railway matters, told

the House, of which he was Vice-President, that in his opinion there was good hope of solving the difficulty, which was mainly one of transport. He announced that the Government had agreed to hand over the whole business of food supply to the Zemstvos and municipalities. Here was a great and undoubted victory. The Government had always refused to make this concession, holding—and rightly so—that it would lead to further and larger measures of responsible administration.

But nobody outside the Duma knew what had happened. The papers did not appear on Sundays, and the effete Golitsyn Ministry took no steps to inform the public. Protopopov did not wish to trumpet his failure, for he had been the arch-opponent of the Zemstvo scheme, and perhaps he recognized the hopelessness of appeasing the Revolutionaries.

Instead of taking the people into their confidence and explaining the situation to them, the Government, feeling satisfied that enormous concessions had been made, decided to take "a strong line." On the Sunday morning, posters at all the street corners informed the inhabitants that all gatherings would be dispersed by force of arms. At once things assumed an ugly look. Up to this point the great majority of the civilians and soldiers, and even the workmen, had no idea that a revolution was inevitable, and actually in process of development. There had been a few people killed; more police than civilians. But when the soldiers appeared in the Nevsky with orders to fire on the crowd, some alarm arose. Nevertheless, it being a fine day, large numbers of people resorted to this popular promenade, undeterred by the stoppage of the tram service.

Protopopov had succumbed to nervous prostration on the Saturday, and remained hidden in his official residence on the Fontanka Canal, flanked by the Police Department and the Gendarmerie. Thence he was in communication

by telephone with the Empress at her residence in Tsarskoe Selo, fifteen miles south of Petrograd, and the Empress could telephone by means of a special wire direct to the Tsar's Headquarters at Mogilev, some three hundred miles further south.

There appears to be no foundation for the report that the Sovereigns were unable to obtain information about events in the Capital up to this stage. On the contrary, both knew what was going on, and they were quite prepared for an outbreak. They knew much more than the public in Petrograd or even the Duma (excepting the Socialists) could know about revolutionary plans and about the unreliability of the garrison, but they trusted in Protopopov's police, and never imagined that events would develop too rapidly to enable them to bring up reinforcements in time. What is more, they were quite aware of the use that the Revolutionaries intended to make of the Duma.

Already the "peaceful" Labor demonstrations on February 27th, when the Duma opened, had indicated the revolutionary plan, and Kerensky's speech confirmed their suspicions. Prince Golitsyn had, therefore, been furnished with an undated ukaz of prorogation, which he could publish as soon as matters began to assume a critical form. Herein lies the explanation of what then appeared to be an incomprehensible measure. The Government had given way to the Duma on Friday evening, yet on Sunday it decided to crush resistance and to close the Duma, realizing somewhat tardily that the Socialists meant to use the Duma as their rallying point and battle-cry. Either because "stern measures" had been decided upon or by some blunder,<sup>1</sup> the bridges had not been closed that morning. So the crowds were very great.

<sup>1</sup> Protopopov and the Empress had agreed that a "local" disturbance should be encouraged in order that reprisals might be justified, they believed that immediate repression would "scotch" the revolution.

Platoons of guardsmen were posted along this thoroughfare, extending two miles in a straight line from the Admiralty to the Nicholas railway station, and shortly before three o'clock they began to clear the street. But the crowds did not seem to mind. There was no roughness on either side. People moved freely and cheered the soldiers. A company of the Pavlovsky Guards, drawn up at the corner of the Sadovaia, then opened fire up the Nevsky in the direction of the Anichkov Palace and the Fontanka, beyond which stood the Anglo-Russian Red Cross Hospital (Dmitri Palace). Some firing came also from the housetops, and one guardsman fell.

Something like one hundred people were killed or wounded. Motor ambulances soon afterwards appeared on the spot and began removing the fallen. I saw hundreds of empty cartridge-cases littering the snow, which was deluged with blood. But the sharp lesson also failed to scare people away or even to provoke resentment against the troops. A woman shouted to them: "We are sorry for you, Pavlovtsy. You had to do your duty!"

This company was marched to its barracks on the Field of Mars, near the British Embassy. The men had not had any food all day. When they were approaching their quarters they found another crowd barring the way. The officer ordered them to fire a volley. They did so. But the men aimed high, so that only a few people were wounded. Stopping to care for them, the company commander sent his men home, and at this moment was attacked and severely wounded by two men, apparently disguised, one as a student, the other as an officer. The assailants jumped into a sleigh and vanished, and at the same time shots rang out from the roofs and garrets of surrounding houses and from the adjoining Church of St. Saviour, erected on the site where Alexander II had been assassinated.



**"DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"**

And then followed the unexpected. As soon as the Pavlovtsy entered their barrack-yard, recriminations began among them. One of the men had recognized his own mother amid the slain. Another wanted to know who had fired from the housetops and killed one of their comrades. "It is the police," was the unanimous verdict. "They are provoking bloodshed. They have betrayed us." Revolutionary sympathizers fed the flame. The whole company decided not to obey orders, but to side with the people. General Habalov was immediately informed of what was transpiring, and loyal troops were sent to surround the mutineers. But the latter had their rifles and ammunition, and it was decided not to resort to extreme measures. The company remained within its quarters. Some of the men ventured out and were arrested. On the following day this company was to be joined by others and to play a part in the rapid success of the Revolution.

That Sunday afternoon Sir G. Buchanan returned from a few days' sojourn in Finland and heard the first news of trouble. Later, a number of our submarine reliefs came in from Archangel. The men could not understand what was happening in the city.

More blood was spilt some hours later around the Nicholas station. Enormous crowds debouched from the Nevsky and Ligovskaia, surging around the great equestrian statue of Alexander III. The station square was an important strategical point guarding railway communications with Moscow, and down the Nevsky, with all the important Ministries. Here Protopopov had installed hundreds of machine guns and policemen on the surrounding houses. A commissary of police who was in charge of the men below found himself jostled. He spoke rudely to an officer who happened to be in the crowd. An altercation ensued. The officer drew his sword and cut down the policeman. Immediately the

crowd seized the body and tore it to pieces. Then the secreted maxims sent forth a stream of bullets. Firing resounded on all sides. Soldiers directed their rifles at the housetops. Cossacks joined in. It was a veritable pandemonium. Scores of people and soldiers were killed, hundreds wounded. This proved to be the most sanguinary episode in the Revolution.

I had been an eye-witness of some acts in the Pavlovsky tragedy. I now tried to make my way to the Nicholas station. Firing could be heard in the Nevsky. Lines of soldiers were blazing away at each other, not knowing who was friend, who enemy. Later, I made another effort to pass. The street was quiet and deserted. Burly guardsmen held it from end to end with orders to let no one pass. The great thoroughfare was lit up by powerful searchlights from the Admiralty tower, street lamps having been smashed by the hail of bullets. It recalled the stormy days of 1905, when the whole city was plunged in darkness. Neither electric light nor water supply had been cut off, however. The Revolutionaries had learned a lesson then.

The Government now began to feel some resentment at the delay in rendering them efficient counsel and assistance from Tsarskoe or Headquarters. On Sunday evening they almost decided to resign, but Beliaev<sup>1</sup> had received a brief message from the Tsar, ordering him "to hold on," and informing him that troops were coming and that General Ivanov had been sent as Dictator. Later it was rumored that Protopopov had been dismissed and that the Tsar himself would arrive on Tuesday. As a result of the deliberations in the Duma on Saturday it had been decided to hasten an Emergency Food Bill, embodying the new scheme of Zemstvo organization to which the Government had agreed, and a Committee on this Bill was sitting at the Tauris Palace throughout


<sup>1</sup>The War Minister.

Sunday. All the Deputies who could reach the Duma were also assembled there. They brought lurid accounts of all that had been happening throughout the day. The impression in the lobbies was one of intense excitement. The workmen refused to resume their duties until bread could be procured in abundance. There was evidence of a growing conflict between the police and the garrison.

To add to this gloomy outlook, the Government was obviously indisposed to show confidence in the Duma. Voicing the feelings and anxieties of the Moderates in the House, President Rodzianko telegraphed an urgent and pressing appeal to the Tsar:

Condition serious, anarchy in the Capital. Government paralyzed. Transport of food and provisions has entirely broken down. General discontent is growing. Disorderly firing is proceeding in the streets. Sections of troops are firing on one another. It is necessary to summon quickly persons enjoying the confidence of the country to form a new Government. Delay is impossible. Every delay is fatal. I pray God that a share of the responsibility may not fall on the crowned head.

Afterwards I learned from a friend at General Headquarters that this message did not reach the Emperor. It was "intercepted" by the Palace Commandant, General Voyéïkov, who decided apparently that it was not worth while to bother the Tsar with fresh and impertinent demands for Responsible Government at a time when he was already much worried by events in Petrograd. To the courtier's mind Rodzianko, although a personage holding Court rank, was unconsciously lending himself to the designs of the Revolutionaries at a time when all loyal subjects should rally round the Throne. But the Tsar knew already that the situation was critical, although he did not realize how desperate it was. Anyhow, he could not answer the message, as he did not receive it. But all this was, of course, unknown to the Duma, and the Tsar's silence placed him in a bad light. Members



PLAN OF THE CITY OF PETROGRAD

decided to pass the night in the Tauris Palace against any emergency. So ended the first day of the Revolution, properly speaking.

On Monday morning Prince Golitsyn carried out the Government's decision to prorogue the Duma. It is said that he made a mistake in filling in the date of the Imperial ukaz, and that it was marked March 11th instead of March 12th. It was placarded on the doors of the Palace, and there the Deputies found it in the early hours of Monday. It intimated briefly that the sessions of both Houses were prorogued for a month, "unless important circumstances should intervene."

The impression produced thereby was one of stupor and indignation. How could the Government thus cut itself adrift from the accredited representatives of the people at a moment of intense popular crisis? It passed the wit of man to comprehend. Previous utterances in the House discrediting the Court confirmed the worse suspicions. M. Miliukov, the Cadet leader, had openly accused the Empress of promoting a separate peace with Germany. The Black Hundreds had urged that it was "better to compromise with the external foe rather than lose everything to the Revolutionaries."

The persistent refusal of the Tsar to accede to demands for the summoning of a "Government enjoying the confidence of the country"—a demand that had been endorsed by the Upper House and even by the Nobles' Congress—lent color to other suspicions, that the Court party was seeking to provoke a revolution in order to have an excuse for concluding a separate peace. This suspicion had been so prevalent throughout Russia that repeatedly my Russian friends had asked me: "Is it true that there is a secret clause in Russia's agreement with the Entente Powers by which she resumes her freedom of action in the event of internal troubles?" M. Miliukov called attention to the formidable military

preparations made by Protopopov. "We know now why he asked for \$25,000,000 in January. It was to proclaim war on the people!" he cried. All these accumulated feelings of distrust, however unwarranted they might have been by the real facts of the situation, aroused resentment of the intensest kind and prompted immediate action.

When the sun rose on these fateful events the Government still held most of the trump cards. Not a single regiment had mutinied yet, and the Old Regime had at its disposal enormous stores of arms and ammunition. It had the fortress and the arsenal, and commanded every important street and bridge with guns and maxims, and all the telegraphs and railways. The bridges were closed and the workmen cut off. But as the soldiers were "doubtful," Habalov lent himself to a "brilliant idea," emanating from the half-crazed Minister; to dress up the police as soldiers. In that way the police would be safe from the crowd and from the troops. They would fire all right. And so everybody would be impressed by the "loyalty" of the garrison, and there would not be any risk of a scandalous refusal on the part of the soldiers to do their duty. Policemen were hurriedly supplied with brown-gray instead of black overcoats, and gray sheepskin headgear, cartridge holsters, and army rifles. It was difficult to distinguish them from ordinary infantrymen. They sallied forth in the mill districts and did much execution, especially on the Vyborg side. The rattle of musketry and machine guns resounded thence all through the morning.

But Protopopov's ruse did not save the situation. (It was soon afterwards detected and led to wholesale extermination of the police.) The revolutionary spirit quickly spread among the units quartered around the Duma and on the Vyborg side. Here the 1st and 180th Reserve Regiments, largely recruited from the local population

had already shown evidence of disaffection in November, 1916. Some of them now joined their relations among the strikers. Armed parties captured the arsenal on the north side of the river, and having distributed rifles to the crowd, forced the Liteiny Bridge. There they easily took possession of the Artillery Department, looting it of stores and arms.

Meanwhile the Guards battalions <sup>1</sup> in the Kirochnaia, a street leading from the Liteiny Prospect to the Tauris Gardens behind the Duma, had mutinied, one after another, amid scenes of the greatest atrocity. Some of the men in the Litovsky Guards (which with the Volhynsky regiment formed one of the two Guards Brigades previously stationed in Warsaw) had agreed during the night to mutiny and to murder their officers. At early morning parade they turned out as usual and lined up in the barrack-yard. Men who were not on duty meanwhile took their rifles and ensconced themselves at the windows overlooking the parade ground. The officers came out, suspecting nothing. The C.O. approached his company and greeted them with the customary "Good health, my lads!" Dead silence in the ranks. According to disciplinary usage the men should have answered, "We wish good health to Your Honor!" The C.O. cried sharply, "Why don't you reply?" Then out of the ranks came several men with their rifles at the charge, and without a word spitted the C.O. on their bayonets, lifting him high in the air. Instantly the men at the windows opened fire on the other officers. Those whom they missed were hunted down and butchered. Very few escaped. One of the survivors told me this dreadful story afterwards. He had to hide for days before he could leave Petrograd, because the men searched every-

<sup>1</sup> All the Guards units in Petrograd were Reserve Battalions numbering as much as 5000 men each. The regiments, thirteen in all, had been at the front since August, 1914.

where to find and kill the survivors. And this particular officer had been severely wounded at the Front. (It is said that the officers of this battalion were particularly strict with their men.)

After satiating themselves with blood and slaughter, the Litovsky poured out into the street. There they heard that the Duma had been closed. Here was a convenient means of justifying their crime. They had slain their "oppressors." It was all in defense of the people. Now they would rally round the Duma. "To the Duma! To the Duma!" they cried. The neighboring Volhyntsy and some Preobrazhentsy turned out of their barracks and joined the movement. And so a crazy mob of disbanded guardsmen and civilians hurried to the Tauris Palace to defend the liberties of the people.

Hearing nothing from Mogilev, the Deputies were somewhat disconcerted by the appearance of these "reinforcements." They did not know their precise character nor the horrible circumstances under which they had originated, but it seemed quite clear that part of, and perhaps all, the garrison had gone over to the Revolution. So the sooner the Duma took action the better. They could not wait upon the pleasure of Nicholas II. Already, then, it was proposed to form a Provisional Government, and the Socialists talked about a Constituent Assembly. But President Rodzianko would not hear of it. He was a loyal subject of the Tsar, and he could not reconcile an act of open revolt with his feelings of loyalty. So he indited and dispatched a second and last message to Headquarters, telling Nicholas II: "The situation is becoming worse. Measures must be taken immediately, for to-morrow it may be too late. The last hour has arrived, when the fate of the country and the dynasty is being decided." (This telegram did reach its destination, but the Emperor was already "acting"—troops had been sent from the Front—and was preparing to

leave for Petrograd, so he did not reply.) As the Duma stood legally prorogued, no formal sitting could take place. The party leaders and other members met informally under the presidency of M. Rodzianko. For convenience' sake it was agreed that only the party leaders or "Elders" should deliberate. They represented the Progressive *bloc* and the Socialists. The Right would have no dealings with a Duma that had been prorogued by the Tsar, and all the members on that side withdrew.

The duties of this Board of Elders were confined to one object: to get into touch with the Army and with the Nation. President Rodzianko held—and rightly too—that whatever happened they would not be justified in taking any decisions without the knowledge of the Army at the Front, and, if possible, of the country at large. But on the latter point the views of the Progressive element in the Duma were sufficient. He did not wish to be led astray by the clamor of the multitude outside, composed of soldiers and civilians who were obviously under the influence of passion. Generals Alexeiev, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, Ruzsky, and Brusilov were acquainted by telegraph with the messages to the Tsar, and asked to support them.

All this did not suit the Socialist book. They had hoped for something much more fiery. The Duma was to be their stepping-stone to power. They wanted to get on with the Revolution. So they resigned from the Board. However, a few hours afterwards they thought better of it. M. Kerensky urged them to relent for "tactical reasons."

Events outside were proceeding with dramatic swiftness. Army lorries had been requisitioned by the Revolutionaries. Filled with a motley crowd of soldiers, students, Red Cross nurses, and youngsters bestrung with bandoliers improvised out of machine-gun belts, they careered back and forth along the quays and thorough-

fares bristling with rifles and maxims. They visited outlying barracks to stir up tardy units, and attempted to seize the telephone and telegraph offices. In this they did not then succeed. Elsewhere the victories of the revolutionary forces were rapid and decisive. Early in the morning the great Kresty prison on the Vyborg side had been captured and all the inmates, "politicals" and convicts alike, set free. Among them were the Labor delegates to the War Industrial Committee, whose arrest a month previously had constituted one of Protopopov's measures to prevent a revolution, also Khrustalev-Nosar,<sup>1</sup> President of the Council of Workmen's Delegates in 1905. The Law Courts (opposite the Artillery Department) and the adjoining prison were invaded and sacked. Among the prisoners here released was Stürmer's factotum, Manasevich-Manuilov, whom Miliukov had described as one of the Razputin "camarilla." Manuilov was under trial for extortion. A wild-eyed soldier burst open his cell, crying out, "Are you for the Revolution?" "Anything you like," replied Manuilov, and quickly appraising the situation, he fled hatless and coatless into the cold. Unlike most of his fellow inmates, he was captured later and exiled. Another captive Razputinite was the notorious Prince Andronikov, adventurer, informer, sycophant, who had frequently palmed himself off on unsuspecting foreigners as a "prominent" Russian.

Escaped convicts set fire to the Courts in order to remove records of their crime. Former agents of the *okhrana* sacked the Police Department to destroy evidence of their complicity. Enormous quantities of invaluable documents went to feed bonfires in the streets. All the notarial archives thus perished. Nobody in Petrograd had any title-deeds to their houses or property.

<sup>1</sup> Nosar soon became a Commissary (Governor), and proceeded to introduce Bolshevik methods according to the plan of his former chief, Lenin. He was thought to be insane, and was "removed" by the Provisional Government.

The Commandant's office was similarly ransacked in order to destroy the military service registers.

Early in the afternoon the Fortress of SS. Peter and Paul, situated on an island opposite to the British Embassy, fell into the insurgents' hands after a short fusillade. The headquarters of the revolutionary forces was established here. With the guns of the fortress the insurgents could command the whole city. Within its walls were the tombs of the Romanovs, the mint, and the political prison. None of the edifices suffered. The prisoners were of course released.<sup>1</sup> This acquisition practically settled the fate of the Government.

Constant firing was to be heard on all sides. Civilian insurgents all had, or were procuring, arms, stopping officers and taking away their swords and revolvers. The soldiers were, however, fairly respectful to officers. Everybody was practising with rifles or pistols.

No work was done that day at the munition and other factories. The men had been warned to report or be paid off. The Government still held the wires, the Admiralty, and most of the public offices. The censorship was working, but the newspapers had not appeared, because all printers and compositors had struck.

M. Shcheglovitov, the Reactionary President of the Upper House, had refused permission to the members to assemble informally after the ukaz of prorogation. He was apprehended and brought a prisoner to the Tauris Palace. Successively Archbishop Pitirim (the friend of Razputin), Stürmer, Prefect Balk, General Kurlov (one of the *okhrana* chiefs), and a number of lesser lights of the Old Regime were conveyed thither, also many quite innocent persons. Everybody who wore a General's

<sup>1</sup> Among them were some exceedingly dangerous German spies and a few mutineers of the Pavlovsky regiment. These had been sentenced to be shot on the following morning. Soon afterwards Protopopov, Stürmer, Goremykin, etc., took their places and were subjected to all the rigors of their own regime.

uniform was regarded as a "suspect." The crowds brutally maltreated some unfortunate veterans. All these persons were indiscriminately subjected to insults by a jeering populace surrounding the Tauris Palace. Particular joy burst forth at the appearance of any *okhrana* suspects or policemen, derisively nicknamed "Pharaohs" (Faraony). Regular hunts were proceeding in the garrets. Many policemen had been hurled from the roofs.

At midnight a tired-looking old man struggled into the Duma. "I have come to give myself up," he muttered. "I am Protopopov, the ex-Minister of the Interior. Take me away. I want to serve my country. You shall hear all I know." He collapsed on a sofa. It appeared he had sought refuge outside the city with a friend, the Tibetan "healer" Badmaiev, who was one of Razputin's intimates. But he could not rest. Conscience tormented him. He made his "confession" to Kerensky. It was an "old story." He had deserted his post, "resigned" it to Golitsyn, who himself announced his resignation some hours later to Rodzianko. An unknown General had been appointed Minister in Protopopov's place. And while I was sitting in Rodzianko's study this "Minister" rang up to ask what he was to do.

Meanwhile replies had come through the Duma telegraph office from several of the Army Chiefs, announcing that they on their side had remonstrated with the Tsar and were in sympathy with the Duma. Such was the tenor of messages from the Northern, Southwestern, and Caucasian Fronts. As the Tsar still maintained silence, and as the old Government showed no signs of existence, there was no longer any motive for further delay. President Rodzianko's scruples and anxieties were overcome when he heard that a large contingent of the Preobrazhensky Guards, with their officers, had come to the Duma ready to support a new Government. Discussion on this matter was actually in progress when a

summons came by telephone from the Marie Palace inviting Rodzianko to attend a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Guarded by soldiers lying along the mudguards of his car with loaded rifles pointed ahead, the President of the Duma, who had become the idol and hope of the people, traversed the whole city safely, escaping the gusts of flying bullets. He had suspended the sitting of the Board to hear what news the Ministers had to give. He hoped to learn from them that the Tsar had summoned a Duma Government. He found all the Ministers assembled, and also the Grand Duke Michael, only brother of the Tsar. But they had no news. Then M. Rodzianko apprised them of the Duma's intentions. It was going to constitute a Provisional Government, as there seemed to be no other way of re-establishing order in the Capital, of saving the country from anarchy, and of enabling Russia to continue the war to a successful end.

The majority of the Ministers signified their willingness to submit, and proposed that the Grand Duke Michael should become Regent. But General Beliaev declared that he could not thus violate his oath as a soldier, and that he would continue the struggle until he received contrary orders from the Tsar. M. Rodzianko returned to the Tauris Palace, and shortly afterwards it was unanimously resolved to elect a "Provisional Executive Committee" of twelve members, which should select a Provisional Government. At the same time orders were issued to arrest the members of the old Government; but when the emissaries of the Duma reached the Marie Palace the birds had flown. One old Minister, who had remained, hid himself under the table and was not detected. The others sought refuge in the Prefect's residence, opposite the Admiralty.

That night the refugees cleared all the archives out of the Prefecture, transferred them across the Alexander Gardens to the Admiralty, and there sought sanctuary.

Here they were besieged on the following morning (Tuesday). Some reserve battalions from Novgorod had been brought in during the night. They formed the garrison. Beliaev had posted machine-guns, and even some field-guns in the building, and wanted to "hold out" till further reinforcements arrived. The freshly imported troops thought they were fighting the Germans—at least, so they were told—and were believed to be reliable. But the Revolutionaries announced that if the Admiralty did not surrender by three o'clock they would open fire from the fortress. Admiral Grigorovich, the Minister of Marine, who, with the other Admiralty officials, resided in the building, was opposed to resistance. He pointed out that damage to the edifice might involve the loss of papers, plans, and technical appliances necessary for the conduct of naval operations. Beliaev reluctantly gave way, and himself, with Habalov and Balk, the Prefect, sought shelter in the Winter Palace. This he also wanted to "fortify," but was dissuaded from doing so on the ground that it would be easily wrecked by the fortress. He then disguised himself as a soldier and hid in the General Staff buildings opposite.

I lived in the house adjoining the Prefecture, and was able to follow all the stages of this closing act in the revolutionary conquest of Petrograd.

Throughout Monday night armored cars, manned by the Revolutionaries, tried to capture the telephone exchange in the Morskaja and the telegraph office in the Pochtamtkaia. The garret artillery raked them fore and aft, and when they attempted to cross the St. Isaac's Square they ran into a hot cross-fire, delivered from the roofs of the Marie Palace, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Cathedral of St. Isaac. The telephone office was guarded by a company of the Guards Rifles from Tsarskoe, who also held the Tsarskoe Selo (Vitebsk) and Nicholas railway stations, saving those buildings from utter destruc-

tion by fire at the hands of the Revolutionaries, bent that night on preventing any fresh troops from entering the city. The Semenovskiy and Izmailovskiy Guards battalions quartered in this neighborhood remained staunch to the last. Mixed companies of the Guards had also held the Winter Palace throughout Monday.

On visiting the telephone office at early dawn, during a momentary lull, I saw an armored car standing outside. The crew had carelessly opened the steel doors protecting the radiator, and a stream of machine-gun bullets had ripped it clean through; then, the fire becoming still more accurate, all the crew had been slain through the loopholes. The inside presented a tangled mass of human remains, blood, snow, and ammunition, all congealed by the sharp frost. The soldiers were chatting in the yard. Finally they went off hungry to Tsarskoe, feeling they had "done their bit."

Soon afterwards the contagion reached the sailors in the depot in the Moika. They had been exchanging salvos during Monday with the men of the Kexholm Guards, whose barracks were "across the way." Neither side seemed to know why. Then they decided to join the Duma. The sailors marched up the Morskaya with their band playing the "Marseillaise" and red flags flying. On crossing the Isaac Square they were greeted with volleys from the irrepresible police. Somebody shouted that the bullets had come from the Astoria, or Military Hotel, where many officers, including the Allied Missions, resided. Immediately the sailors opened out in skirmishing order and sent a hail of bullets into the hotel windows. Every young hooligan who had been cheering the sailors carried a rifle and began to use it. The police loosed off more cartridge-belts. The fusillade grew intense. As a matter of fact, not a shot had been fired from the hotel. Thinking they had vanquished resistance, the mob—sailors, soldiers, and civilians—

stormed the building, smashed the plate-glass windows, and rushed in to arrest the inmates. There is every reason to believe that the attack on the hotel had been decided beforehand. I was there late the previous evening and heard that one was expected. Many of the residents had even left early in the morning, fearing violence. Nothing could exceed the brutality or ferocity of the "revolutionary" horde. The coolness and pluck of British and French officers alone prevented wholesale murder of Russian Generals, ladies, and children. They promptly assembled everybody and formed a line of defense. The Allied uniforms inspired sufficient respect to contain the violence of the mob. Only one old General was killed. But the building was gutted, the cellars plundered, and the effects of the British officers stolen.

On the outbreak of war the crowds had wrecked the German Embassy on the opposite side of the square in a frenzy of patriotism; now soldiers and sailors were committing worse excesses against their own officers and innocent women and children. It did not promise well for the Revolution, which everybody had hailed at first with gladness. Finally, the sailors marched off with scores of unfortunate Generals to the Duma.

Only a few hours later a similar assault was delivered upon the town residence of Count Fredericks, a few doors from the telegraph office. Valuable works of art, wines, and money were plundered, the house set on fire, and the crippled wife and daughter of the Tsar's Minister of the Court dragged into the street and brutally beaten. The Kexholmers perpetrated this outrage. Count Fredericks was with the Emperor.

A little farther down the Moika the Litovsky prison for women, a historic pile built in the form of a castle, was stormed and burnt down by the crowd under fierce machine-gun fire directed from the roofs of the famous Marie Theater.

While agreeing ostensibly with the Duma resolution, the Socialists were preparing their own "Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates," which was to assemble next day at the Tauris Palace. This fact alone shows how well the revolutionary plans had been matured. They had issued a "manifesto" to the workmen and to the soldiers, calling upon them to send delegates to the Soviet (Council), one per thousand workmen and one per company of troops. This manifesto appeared in the first number of the *Bulletin*, published by the Duma journalists on Monday. The elections were, necessarily, hurried, and more or less perfunctory. Whoever spoke loudest considered himself elected. Many "delegates" came who represented nobody except themselves. All the jail-deliveries swarmed into the meeting on Tuesday. The Soviet had so little prestige that, for the time being, the Revolutionaries had perforce to recognize the authority of the Duma Committee and to use it for their purposes.

Many of these facts were not fully appreciated or estimated then. People were so carried away by feelings of intense joy over the prospective downfall of the Old Regime—the Revolutionaries by hope of an immediate Socialistic Millennium, the public at large by relief from the deadening influences of autocracy—that there was no recrimination. Many officers came to volunteer their services to the Duma. They formed the nucleus of the Military Committee, then organized, which took over such affairs as came within its purview. But already signs were not wanting of a coming clash with the rival revolutionary organizations.

The greatest confusion still prevailed among the bulk of the garrison as to the cause of the fighting. Many thought quite seriously that the Germans had invaded Petrograd. I remember, while passing the Winter Palace that Monday afternoon on my way from the Duma, witnessing a case of this kind. The Winter Palace and

the Admiralty and neighboring Ministries were still in the hands of the Government troops. They began firing wildly at the Foreign Office, although only a mere handful of people were then in the Square. I had just left Sir G. Buchanan walking to the Foreign Office to pay his daily visit to M. Pokrovsky, who was still unmolested. By good fortune neither of us came into the line of fire. On his walk homeward the people recognized and cheered him.

To most observers it would have seemed hopeless and futile to continue the struggle under such circumstances. The ignorant peasant troops were all too ready to change their allegiance, while the Labor element was dominated by Socialists. But the bulk of the soldiery still respected their officers, and there was no sign as yet of widespread indiscipline. The Soviet was soon able to change all that. Stubborn resistance was being shown, however, by the Military Colleges and by the Cyclist Battalions. These units, composed exclusively of real Russians of the educated class, showed by their behavior in this and subsequent conflicts between the forces of order and the forces of anarchy that the best elements in the country were stanch and reliable; that they might be swamped for a time by the tide of Revolution, but sooner or later would assert themselves. Some months afterwards many of these brave lads fought and fell, leading the troops at the Front.

I had seen one or two drunken men during the first days of the Revolution. Excitement enough was afforded by the novelty of the thing. Besides, liquor was unprocureable. The Monopoly shops, where methylated spirits had been dispensed, had closed. But after the sack of the Astoria and the Freedericks mansion drunken soldiers littered the sidewalks. The guard stationed at the telegraph office, whither I succeeded in penetrating, Tuesday night—thanks to a written permit from the Duma Committee—had imbibed so much that only one

man could stand on his legs.<sup>1</sup> Revolutionary soldiers entered flats and houses demanding food and drink, and in many cases helped themselves to valuables. Weapons of all kinds, ancient and modern, were of course "requisitioned."

Some days later I saw a whole company of guardsmen marching to the Post Office. Each man carried a heavy bundle under his arm—loot that they were sending home to their villages. To their simple minds the "ideals" of revolution had immediately assumed a "material" form. Later on the civilian "leaders" of the Revolution displayed tendencies of a kindred nature, and the revolutionary movement was marred by acts of robbery and spoliation. Socialists could be tender only for the foes of their country: "No indemnity; no annexation" where the Germans were concerned, but both the one and the other could be applied towards their own countrymen.

Although the Soviet had partly assembled on Tuesday night, and could not develop its organization till some days later, orders were being issued by mysterious persons in the Socialist camp throughout the incipient stages of the Revolution. And even while the Duma Elders acted in all good faith with the Socialists, the latter continued to "pull the strings" for their own purposes. The formation of the Duma Committee<sup>2</sup> with two Socialists (Kerensky and Chkheidze) produced no change in revolutionary tactics. Yet it was quite obvious to any except those who would not see that the institution of the Soviet was tantamount to preparing beforehand the overthrow of any Coalition Government. Herein lay the almost

<sup>1</sup> Revolutionary leaders invariably discouraged drunkenness for practical reasons: a drunken follower was both discreditable and dangerous. He lost sight of the "ideals" of revolution while under the spell of drink. I had noticed this indignation of Revolutionaries with drunken workmen in 1905.

<sup>2</sup> The members of the Provisional Executive Committee were MM. Rodsianko, Kerensky, Chkheidze, Shulgin, Miliukov, Karaulov, Dmitrinkov, Rzevsky, Shidlovsky, Nekrasov, Vladimir Lvov, and Colonel Engelhart.

utter hopelessness of the task that had been undertaken in all sincerity by the Moderate groups in the Duma.

By Tuesday night the city was entirely in the hands of the Revolutionaries and, nominally at least, under the control of the Duma. Moscow had joined the movement. The police and the representatives of the Old Regime had been dispossessed with little difficulty and practically no bloodshed. All the railways were working. Fires had been extinguished. Everybody was glad to get some respite and to enjoy the new-found "freedom." City "militia" (paid constables) had been enrolled. The Duma Committee issued a proclamation signed by Michael Rodzianko, President, defining its mission:

The Provisional Committee of members of the State Duma finds itself compelled, by the onerous circumstances of internal chaos, resulting from the courses pursued by the old Government, to take in hand the re-establishment of State and public order.

Fully appreciating the responsibility it has assumed, the Committee feels confident that the people and the Army will help it in the difficult task of creating a new Government capable of meeting the wishes of the nation and of meriting its confidence.

Another proclamation summoned all citizens to safeguard public property, and the lives and property of individuals.

It had been a beautiful day, bringing the first breath and fragrance of spring, which is loveliest in these gloomy northern climes. People were elated and happy. Few understood or thought about the ominous events that had occurred, and that were bound to bring untold misery in the near future. It was an inspiring sight to watch regiment after regiment marching to present its homage to the Duma. The men stepped out so boldly, so confidently, as free men should. Their officers looked proud to lead such a gallant array. Inside the Duma I witnessed a stirring spectacle. Hundreds of Preobrazhentsy were lined up inside the huge lobby and presented arms to President Rodzianko, who addressed them:

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"Soldiers of the True Faith! Let me, as an old soldier, greet you according to our custom. I wish you good health."

"We wish good health to your Excellency," came the thunderous response.

The President continued:

"I want to thank you for coming here to help the members of the State Duma to establish order and to safeguard the honor and glory of our country. Your comrades are fighting in the trenches for the might and majesty of Russia, and I am proud that my son has been serving since the beginning of the war in your gallant ranks. But in order that you should be able to advance the cause and interests which have been espoused by the Duma, you must remain a disciplined force. You know as well as I do that soldiers are helpless without their officers. I ask you to remain faithful to your officers and to have confidence in them, just as we have confidence in them. Return quietly to your barracks, and come here at the first call when you may be required."

"We are ready," they answered. "Show us the way."

"The old authority is incapable of leading Russia the right way," was the answer. "Our first task is to establish a new authority in which we may all believe and trust, and which will be able to save and magnify our Mother Russia."

A group of twenty-two elected members of the Upper House, including MM. Guchkov, Stakhovich, Vasiliev, Grimm, Vernadsky, and Prince Trubetskoy, addressed a telegram to the Tsar:

The maintenance of your old Government in office is tantamount to the complete overthrow of law and order, involving defeat on the battlefield, the end of the dynasty, and the greatest misfortunes for Russia.

We consider that the only means of salvation lies in a complete and final rupture with the past, the immediate convocation of Parliament, and the summoning of a person enjoying the confidence of the nation, who shall form a new Cabinet capable of governing the country in full accord with the representatives of the nation.

The partisans of Reform were still hoping to checkmate the forces of Revolution. But Time was against them. Already the men who were to direct Russia's destinies into anarchy had taken steps to shatter the very foundations of authority and discipline. President Rodzianko's words to the Preobrazhentsy reflected the deep anxiety he felt on this subject. He was not led astray by the plaudits of the crowd, because he knew what fell designs were being hatched in the Socialist conclaves.

But he left open a door of possible salvation. He would not form a Revolutionary Government while there was some hope of reform, but that could be assured only by the Tsar's summoning a new Government. On Thursday that hope vanished with the appearance of *prikaz* No. 1.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE SOVIET, "COALITION," AND BOLSHEVISM

The Soviet Proclaims Itself—*Prikas* No. 1—Determined Opposition to the Duma—Incitement against Officers—Origin of the Committee System—Soldiers Mystified and Misled—Pseudo-Jew Extremists—Kerensky and Coalition—Lvov Cabinet's Program—Surrender to the Soviet—Lenin's "Mission"—Bolshevists' "Coups" of May 2d and July 16th—Kerensky in the Toils—Bolshevism "Triumphant"—The Importation of Trotsky.

THIS chapter opens on events that had their origin in the long struggle between Autocracy and Reform. Worsted in the conflict, the Reform leaders had not the force or the authority requisite for coping with the advocates of revolution. These had been preparing and organizing the machinery of upheaval. Popular discontent had supplied them with the requisite motive power. Once started, no matter under what name or auspices, whether of a "Cadet"—Prince Lvov, or a Minimalist—Kerensky, or a Bolshevik—Lenin, the machinery would work unremittingly for the disruption of the social and political fabric.

Russia had wanted reform; she did not want revolution. But national desires and interests had no concern with the aims and purposes of the Soviet. This body had been called into existence by professional revolutionaries to carry out their specific plans. To unprejudiced observers its real character was clearly visible from the outset. On Wednesday (March 14th) I wrote to *The Times*:<sup>1</sup>

What the Emperor may decide to do on his arrival is unknown at the hour of telegraphing, but one thing is quite certain. Unless his Majesty immediately

<sup>1</sup> *The Times*, March 16, 1917.

complies with the wishes of the moderate element among his loyal subjects, the influence at present exercised by the Provisional Committee of the Duma will pass wholesale into the hands of the Socialists, who want to see a Republic established, but who are unable to institute any kind of orderly government and would inevitably precipitate the country into anarchy within and disaster without.

In the same message I referred to the issue by the Soviet of a seditious proclamation to the troops. That had prompted M. Rodzianko's warnings to the Preobrazhensky on the need of maintaining obedience to their officers. The Menshevist and Minimalist Soviet leaders (Kerensky, Chkheidze, and Tseretelli) repudiated foreknowledge of the act. Next day another and much more insidious appeal was issued, known as *prikaz* (order) No. 1, concocted at the instigation of a Bolshevik pseudo-Jew in the Soviet, Nahamkez by name, and immediately circulated among the troops of the garrison by "emissaries" of that faction. It called upon soldiers to disobey their officers and to take charge of arms and internal administration. Another *prikaz* ordered the formation of committees. These acts embodied the inward policy of Extremists in the Soviet, and were never countermanded by it, although some attempts were made afterwards by the Menshevist majority to explain that the "orders" did not apply to the whole Army, but only to the Petrograd garrison. But this was a mere quibble, for the seditious order, printed in official form, but unsigned, began to be scattered broadcast along the Front. Moreover, the "emissaries" of the Soviet hastened to Helsingfors to disseminate the doctrine of undiscipline and mutiny among the crews of the Baltic Fleet.

To the reader who has familiarized himself with the history of Russian revolutionary parties related in a preceding chapter, and is aware of the development of subsequent events, the appearance of *prikaz* No. 1 offers, indeed, no grounds for surprise. That "extremists" actually wrote, printed, or circulated it might also be

expected. They invariably "acted" while the other Socialists "talked." Besides, the summoning of soldier delegates to join the Soviet was in itself an indication of Socialist intentions.

The Socialists had agreed to work with the Duma Committee, which had already established its own military organization under Captain Karaulov, a Cossack Deputy, with the assistance of a large number of officers who had proclaimed themselves on the side of the Duma against the autocracy. What justifiable cause had the Socialists for doubting the sincerity of these men? Obviously none, except that the Cossacks would have nothing to do with the Soviet. Their delegates had attended its meetings, listened to the doctrines of anarchy and land spoliation, and had gone to report to their Congress, shortly afterwards assembled in Petrograd, that "it was no place for them." But could the Duma leaders be reasonably suspected of favoring a return to the Old Regime? Certainly not. Were they not capable of taking the necessary measures to re-establish order among the garrison? Most decidedly, yes. Then why was it necessary to bring the soldiers into the Soviet? The Socialists explained that their motives were good; that their plan would "restore confidence" among the men, and that they were "saving the situation," because, forsooth, without the "re-establishment" of "confidence," through the medium of the Soviet, the soldiers might "get out of hand," with "results too terrible to imagine." Similar arguments were advanced in justification of the system of company committees.

There was not, of course, the least atom of truth in these explanations, unless we deliberately agree to confuse cause with effect, for it was the "active" Socialists themselves who had taken the initiative in undermining "confidence" and sowing suspicion among the men towards their officers. At first the men did not under-

stand. Excepting a few battalions—a small percentage of the garrison—in which officers had been overstrict or revolutionary agitators had managed to exert a mutinous influence, the bulk of the garrison was loyal to its chiefs. Officers, it was well known, had harbored no love for the Old Regime. Razputinism had disgusted them with it forever. In the prolongation of a struggle for a Government that had discredited itself irrevocably in the eyes of the Army they foresaw useless effusion of blood, and, desiring above all to save the Duma and to avert anarchy, they had led their men to the conquest of civic freedom.

On the other hand, it might be argued that a Soviet without the soldiers would not have been possible. After all, the overthrow of the old Government had been accomplished by the garrison. Out of the 460 recorded casualties more than half had been soldiers. The workmen would never have "risen" had the troops not sided with them. To revive the 1905 Soviet with its doubtful memories did not agree with Socialist interests. To summon a Soviet without the soldiers would have led to an immediate estrangement between them and the workmen. But the swift downfall of the old Government was due to the co-operation of all classes, especially the officers. Needless to say, Extremists did not stop to consider niceties of justice and community of class feeling and solidarity. On the contrary, they wanted a war of classes. And, having been carried to victory on the shoulders of the garrison, they would henceforth use the soldier as their stalking-horse.

The invitation to send company delegates to the Soviet naturally flattered the troops. Every soldier who had fired a shot at a policeman, civilian, or a fellow-soldier in the wild pandemonium of Monday and Tuesday considered himself a "hero." All wanted to be delegates. But only one man per company was invited, and the

companies were at battalion strength. Even so the garrison contingent would exceed two hundred, and might swamp the Labor delegates, who were also to number one per thousand.<sup>1</sup> Loud complaints immediately arose. And, paradoxically enough, the men came with their grievances to M. Rodzianko. It only showed the artlessness of the soldiers. They believed in the Duma and in its President, and came to him for advice, all unconscious of the irony of their request, unsuspecting the Socialist snare that was soon to convert them into an armed rabble, harnessed to the Soviet chariot.

I was present in the Duma on Tuesday evening at a conversation of this kind between M. Rodzianko and several Preobrazhentsy, who had been refused admittance to the Hall of Sessions, where the Soviet first assembled. M. Rodzianko did his best to pacify the complainants. Their companies had elected two delegates each, and they were the extra ones. He promised to intercede for them. It was an unenviable position for the President of the Duma. He was waiting upon the unready autocrat to save the cause of Reform; he was the hope and idol of Petrograd and the whole Empire, yet betrayed by those who claimed to lead these people.

When he took a stroll in the crowded Shpalernaia the people thronged respectfully around him, walking in step with him, watching his countenance, hungering to hear the sound of his voice. His huge burly figure, massive rugged countenance, his homely comprehensible words of good cheer, his clarion voice—what comfort, what confidence they inspired in those delirious but awesome days! And this giant was sick—stricken in body and soul. Under an impassive exterior the pallor of his face betrayed the pain that gnawed his great heart. He was so weak that he ought to have been in his bed, not amidst these crowds. But he was ready to endure any suffering for

<sup>1</sup> Later the number of delegates exceeded 2000.

"Mother Russia." If only the reply that he awaited with such inexpressible longing did not come too late! That haunting fear had given him no rest day or night.

In summoning delegates from the men of the garrison, the Revolutionaries had, perhaps unconsciously, prompted another departure, viz., the election of officers. Once the companies had to elect delegates from their own midst, it was only natural that they should proceed to elect their C.O.'s and subalterns, just as they elected their *starosta* (elder) in the villages. There were always some unpopular officers. They could thus be eliminated. So, having chosen their delegates to the Soviet, the companies proceeded to "elect" their officers. In most cases this process affected the situation very slightly.

What happened in one Guard regiment may be taken as an example. The officers were at dinner in their Mess on Tuesday, when a N.C.O. came in to report that they had been "elected." They were not altogether surprised. The Soviet scheme had prepared them for some such departure. Going out to the men, they thanked them for this mark of confidence. Some hours later, an orderly-clerk having aroused the suspicions of the men regarding the quantity of food supplied to them, they resolved to arrest their Colonel—an officer of great distinction and above all reproach. He was politely requested to report himself at the Duma and remain there.

*Prikaz* No. 1 put an end to "amenities." The delegates had brought back from the Soviet enough of the spirit of anarchy to destroy all discipline, even had the *prikaz* been deferred. The orders contained in that document were immediately carried into effect. Officers who resisted the men in "taking possession of the arms" were arrested or murdered.

It may seem strange to us that such excesses should be committed, but not if we understand the Russian

character, which cannot brook injustice, real or fancied, and is always prone to violence in the assertion of its rights. For the same reason the Russians will go to the other extreme and allow themselves to be led by persons, good or evil, who happen to please them or gain their confidence.

The Soviet had taught the men that resistance on the part of the officers might be expected, and that it would argue intent to deprive them of "freedom"—that it was "counter-revolutionary." Within a few hours a large number of the officers of the garrison were "eliminated." Only those who combined the qualities of "general favorites" with absolute readiness to efface themselves before the men and avoid appearing too much in the streets were spared. Thus ensigns found themselves in "command" of battalions or regiments. But they were not safe from the men of other units. The "order" to "take possession of arms" was interpreted to the letter. It was taken to mean "all arms"—those of officers and even civilians also.

Here is the true story of a wounded guardsman who, unluckily for himself, returned that day from the Front. Driving to his regimental headquarters, he was stopped by men belonging to his reserve battalion. They roughly demanded his sword, and threatened him with their bayonets. "My sword!" he cried. "What do you mean, scoundrels! I won this sword in battle!" Before he could draw it in self-defense he was overpowered and the weapon—a sword of St. George—wrested from him. Weakened by his wound, the poor lad lost control over his feelings and burst into tears. He managed to reach his home, and there shot himself, unable to survive the shame that had been put upon him. These men belonged to the Grenadier regiment which afterwards deserted in face of the enemy.

Thenceforth officers left their sidearms at home, and

all who could do so hurried back to the armies in the field. There, at all events, they were safe—till the Soviet and Committees had extended their fatal influence.

Subversion had been carried out by a handful of pseudo-Jew Extremists in the Soviet,<sup>1</sup> but the Soviet was a party to the traitorous business. Most of the leaders—especially the pseudo-Jews—were a truculent pack, cowering behind the soldiery, intent upon realizing their revolutionary "ideals," but terrified by a possibility of failure and eventual reprisals. A Russian proverb truly says, "Fear hath big eyes." They egregiously magnified the danger of a "counter-revolution," and, just then, were in mortal fright of the Tsar's return to Petrograd. The whole garrison was on their side, or rather with the Duma, but, "Supposing the Tsar enter the city? Who knows, he may also proclaim himself for the Duma, and then the people and many, perhaps all, of the soldiers may revert to their allegiance under a

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards their numbers increased largely, and although they studiously concealed their identity under assumed Russian or Polish names, it became known that the principal ones were: Nahamkez-Steklov, Apfelbaum-Zinoviev, Rosenfeldt-Kamenev, Goldmann-Gorev, Goldberg-Mekowski, Zederbaum-Martov, Himmer-Sukhanov, Krachman-Zagoraki, Holländer-Mieszkowski, Lourier-Larin, Seffer-Bogdanov. Among the leaders of this gang—under Lenin—were: Trotsky, whose real name was Bronstein, and Feldmann, *alias* Chernov. Lenin's previous record has been given. He came to Russia in April, traveling from Switzerland and through Germany in a "sealed carriage" with Robert Grimm, Mme. Kolontay, etc., at the time when Austria, with Germany's approval, proposed "separate terms" to the Provisional Government. He had been amply provided with funds by a "wealthy lady" in Zurich. He "requisitioned" a ballet-dancer's villa opposite the fortress and preached the doctrines of Bolshevism. Having stirred up a revolt in July to defeat Kerenky's "offensive," he was permitted to go into seclusion. It is said he went to Germany. He came back to carry out the final "victory" of Bolshevism with the aid of Bronstein-Trotsky, who had been a refugee after the troubles of 1905, Trotsky had then been Vice-President of the Labor Soviet. He had been expelled from France for anti-war agitation and before the Revolution went to America. His detention at Halifax aroused the greatest fury in the Soviet against the British Government, and as "Minister for Foreign Affairs" in the Lenin "Cabinet" he gave full vent to his feelings of revenge for his detention.

Constitutional Monarchy!" It was too dreadful to contemplate. Hence the feverish haste they had displayed in summoning the soldiers to the Soviet and in issuing *prikaz* No. 1. And in these counsels of cowardice the Socialist leaders were unanimous and united.

The situation had become so critical on the Wednesday that it was no longer possible to defer the formation of a Provisional Government. Only one representative of the Soviet agreed to enter it. That was Kerensky. The others preferred to wait, or to carry on their revolutionary intrigue outside.

It was too late to pass over the Soviet. The Duma Committee negotiated through Chkheidze and Kerensky the terms upon which the Soviet agreed to support the new Government. But while the negotiations were proceeding the soldiers had been "stampeded" again by rumors purposely spread among them that they would be drafted to the Front. The pseudo-Jews were afraid of the Army, and mistrusted Chkheidze, their Menshevist president. He wielded great authority among the workmen, and was extraordinarily skilful in manipulating the unwieldy assembly of delegates. Who could tell what the Provisional Government might do, should a new garrison come into Petrograd, especially soldiers from the Front! So the soldiers were "panicked" into demanding that they, the "heroes" of the Revolution, should be absolved from fighting for their country, now that they had won such a victory for freedom. They required little prompting. To the usual demands of Constituent Assembly and political amnesty was added this other preposterous demand.

The Provisional Government was finally constituted on Thursday, March 15th, as follows:

Prince George Lvov (Cadet).....	Prime Minister and Interior
M. Miliukov (Cadet).....	Foreign Affairs
M. Guchkov (Octobrist).....	War and Marine

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M. Tereschchenko (Progressivist).....	Finance
M. Manuilov (Cadet).....	Education
M. Shingarev (Cadet).....	Agriculture
M. Nekrasov (Cadet).....	Railways
M. Konovalov (Octobrist).....	Commerce and Industry
M. Kerensky (Socialist).....	Justice
Vladimir Lvov (Center).....	Holy Synod
M. Godney (Cadet).....	Comptroller-General

There were only three "strong" men among them: Guchkov, Miliukov, and Kerensky. The new Minister of War had seen service as a volunteer on the Boer side in the South African War and with the Slavs in the Balkan Campaign. He had "managed" the Red Cross in Manchuria, and had been closely associated with Red Cross and munition work during the present war. He had been President of the Duma and was leader of the Octobrist party—essentially a politician and a man of action. Professor Miliukov had been for twenty years a leading Liberal, a well-known Bulgarophil, one of the founders of the Constitutional Democratic party, of which he was the recognized leader, foreign editor of the *Rech*, and a specialist on foreign affairs—essentially a man of words, and nicknamed by Doroshevich (editor of the *Russkoe Slovo*) the "god of untactfulness." Kerensky was a struggling lawyer, who specialized in political trials. He had proposed a resolution to the Bar of Petrograd denouncing the old Government for the Beyliss case. For this and for his association with the Socialist-Revolutionary party he had been "under suspicion," and had even been arrested—a bold and fiery orator, without any experience whatever of affairs of Government.

That night Kerensky addressed a mass meeting in the Duma. "Comrades," he cried, "Regenerated Russia will not resort to the shameful means utilized by the Old Regime. Soldiers! I ask your co-operation. Do not listen to the promptings of the agents of the Old Regime.

Listen to your officers." So, according to Kerensky it was the *okhrana* that had issued *prikaz* No. 1. And Chkheidze<sup>1</sup> was still more emphatic. He attributed the "launching of vile proclamations inciting the soldiers to murder their officers" to "provocative efforts of the secret police."

In the light of subsequent events it reads like a mockery. The Soviet leaders knew that their hearers would swallow any dish served up with this sauce. But it was such concoctions as this that were destined for many months to go down with the gullible public at home and the ignorant people abroad. In the gentle art of prevarication, and still more in the negation and dishonor of "Free Russia"—their vaunted watchword—they far outdistanced the agents of the Old Regime. Much talk was then dispensed about "dark forces" and *okhrana* agents disguised as soldiers trying to encourage *pogroms* and desertion in order to "discredit" the Revolution. But all this talk turned out to be largely nonsense. Of course, the wretched police, who had been garbed in military uniforms by Protopopov, made their escape to the Army whenever that was possible. Naturally enough they could not feel safe in Petrograd. And even if they tried to instil notions of discipline and duty among the troops (which, of course, rendered them suspect of "counter-revolutionary" designs), who shall blame them? The *pogrom* theory has been sufficiently accounted for in a previous chapter. The Jews were all in a state of terror and dreamt of nothing but *pogroms*.

On Thursday the Tsar had abdicated and appointed Prince Lvov Prime Minister. This appointment was

<sup>1</sup> Chkheidze was the son of a Georgian peasant—one of the serf-retainers of the Dadianis, former sovereigns of Mingrelia, a small mediatised State in the Caucasus. His associate, Tseretelli, was a "noble" retainer of the Dadianis. Chkheidze was the "bellwether," Tseretelli the "nightingale" of Menshevist Sovietdom.



**SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' "DELEGATES" IN THE DUMA**

Their Committee (including some "officers") installed in the Speaker's Chair. A young orator in the Rostrum addressing the "House," filled with Delegates, to insist upon a larger number of their representatives being admitted to the Soviet. March 23, 1917. The Tsar's Portrait has been removed from its frame.



signed some hours before the Provisional Government was finally constituted, but the fact had not come to the knowledge of the Duma. Had the abdication taken place two days earlier, things might have been different. On the Friday morning the Provisional Government issued the following appeal to all the inhabitants of Russia:

Citizens, the Provisional Executive Committee of the Duma, with the aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its inhabitants, has now triumphed over the noxious forces of the Old Regime in such a measure as to enable it to proceed to the more stable organization of the executive power. With this object the Provisional Committee has appointed as Ministers of the first National Cabinet men whose past political and public activity assures them the confidence of the country.

The new Cabinet will adopt the following principles as the bases of its policy:

1. An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts, military revolts, and agrarian crimes.
2. Freedom of speech, of the Press, of association and labor organization, and the freedom to strike, with an extension of these liberties to civilians and soldiers in so far as military and technical conditions permit.
3. The abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions.
4. Immediate preparations for the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, which, with universal suffrage as a basis, shall establish the Governmental regime and the Constitution of the country.
5. The substitution for the police of a national militia, with elective heads and subject to the self-government bodies.
6. Elections to be carried out on the basis of universal suffrage.
7. The troops that have taken part in the revolutionary movement shall not be disarmed, and they are not to leave Petrograd.
8. While severe military discipline must be maintained on active service, all restrictions upon soldiers in the enjoyment of social rights granted to other citizens are to be abolished.
9. The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no intention of taking advantage of the existence of war conditions to delay the realization of the above-mentioned measures of reform.

Even a casual perusal of these "principles" will satisfy the reader that the new Cabinet had bound itself hand and foot to Revolution. But they could no longer help themselves. They accepted the doctrine that "soldiers" should have the same right as ordinary working-men "to go on strike," that the Petrograd troops should not

leave the city, that no restrictions should be placed upon soldiers when off duty. What else could they do? Ten thousand machine-gunners with one thousand maxims and several millions of cartridges had come in from Oranienbaum and quartered themselves in the People's Palace. They had killed or driven away their officers, and were ready to shoot indiscriminately. The Soviet knew its own strength and made its own terms. It was easy to criticize M. Rodzianko "for waiting so long" and Prince Lvov "for accepting such a program of government"—as the Moscow wiseacres did afterwards—it was a very different thing to have acted otherwise, placed as they had been.

The city had resumed something of its normal appearance—restaurants were opened after three days devoid of food for those who had no domestic resources. Provision shops had been open at intervals but were still ill-provided, and the queues were enormous. Some of the mills had resumed work. Were they, the Duma Committee, to run the risk of another and a worse upheaval? There was danger of this if they refused the Soviet's terms. And these would become still more sweeping.

The mob in Petrograd went wild on learning of the abdication. They proceeded to remove and destroy all the emblems of Tsardom on palaces and private houses. This spirit of wanton destruction had been Russia's bane. It caused an infinity of harm during the war, and still more during the Revolution and its resultant anarchy. But after a while the mob became calmer. General Kornilov, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the garrison, managed to restore a semblance of order among the troops, and life in the Capital became tolerable. The armies had adhered to the new Government, and it was hoped that they would not heed the Bolshevist agitation.

One of the largest cartridge works in Petrograd had

been the scene of a characteristic episode at this time. The soldiers employed in the clerical staff decided to form a committee to run the works. They drove out the management and "elected" two unknown officers, friends of the ringleaders. For several days the management and the funds were in their hands. Then they quarreled among themselves and betrayed each other. The two "officers" turned out to be "liberated" convicts. They had murdered a couple of officers in the street and donned their uniforms.

The Russian General Staff had positive information, which was published later in the Press,<sup>1</sup> that Lenin had returned to Petrograd with a German mission to propagate pacifism in Russia, to undermine the Provisional Government, and to use all and any means to drive out Ministers who were opposed to a separate peace. Two meetings of Socialists took place in Berne, whereat Ioltuhowski, the Ukrainian agitator, and Lenin were present. Lenin was an intimate of Ioltuhowski, and often stayed at his house. With Lenin came a Swiss Socialist, named Robert Grimm, who helped him to propagate the Bolshevik doctrine. Grimm delivered speeches in Petrograd, in Kronstadt, and other places, not scrupling to address the people in German. During this time Grimm was in communication with the Germans through Federal Councilor Hofmann at Berne, sending and receiving cable messages in the Swiss cipher through the Petrograd Legation.<sup>2</sup> With them worked an ex-society woman named Kolontay, who had left her family and friends to follow Lenin. She afterwards became People's Commissary for Education, and one day disappeared with the Crown Jewels in company with a common sailor who was Minister of Marine under the the Bolsheviki.

<sup>1</sup> *Russkoe Slovo*, September 2, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> "The Times History of the War," Part 163: Swiss Neutrality.

Lenin's first move was undertaken soon after his arrival. It is described in detail in another chapter. It had the desired effect of "eliminating" Miliukov, the "pet bugbear" of Berlin. On July 16th the Bolsheviki organized a still stronger onslaught upon their opponents. This time their stroke was directed not only against the Provisional Government, but also against the Soviet majority. The reason for this may be easily explained. In May they had the Soviet with them. The immediate Bolshevik objective was to get rid of Miliukov and of war aims based on "decisive victory" over the Germans. The Soviet and Kerensky were already committed to doctrines that could not be reconciled with the Miliukov program of out-and-out loyalty to the Allies. An "arrangement" with the Bolsheviki was, therefore, readily accepted on the basis of a "democratic peace," with "no annexation and no indemnity."

In July, contrary to German hopes and expectations, the Russian Army began an offensive. With all its faults, the Old Regime had managed with the assistance of the Allies to provide the armies on the field with guns, munitions, etc., on a lavish scale. There was a superabundance of men. The offensive should and would have brought a decisive victory in Galicia, which was to have been followed up by an invasion of Turkey. But the Bolsheviki wanted, not victory, but defeat, and the Provisional Government had not a clear mind on the subject.

On July 16th several regiments of the Petrograd garrison obeyed orders from the Bolshevik "staff," and came out into the streets armed. The "Red Guard," a Bolshevik band of armed workmen, also mustered. The soldiers did not know what they had to do. They simply "took possession" of the streets. Kerensky being at the Front, Prince Lvov and the Soviet appealed to the Cossacks. A *sotnia* went out to restore order. They did

not use their rifles. The Bolshevist troops ambushed them and killed several. Then the Cossacks took drastic measures. Next day Bolshevist reinforcements arrived from Kronstadt. The Cossacks repulsed them, inflicting heavy losses. There was as much bloodshed during these two days as during the two worst days of the Revolution.

The Bolshevist regiments then went over to the Soviet, and a temporary blight fell upon the Leninite propaganda in Petrograd, though, as we shall see in another chapter, it had been disastrously successful in checking the offensive movement of the Russian armies. Lenin had served the Germans well.

I was absent from Petrograd, having gone to the Front. My friends in the Capital afterwards related to me what had happened. One of them was at the Tauris Palace, where the Soviet still had its headquarters.<sup>1</sup> He related that the building was full of Jews—reporters and others—who were in terror of being captured by the partisans of the Bolshevist-Jews. Frantic appeals were being sent over the telephone to "loyal" troops for help. A regular panic occurred when an armored car rattled up. To their intense relief, the Jewish "garrison" were told that the crew of the armored car were on the side of the Provisional Government. Equal dismay was felt when, on looking out of the windows, the "garrison" saw the crew talking to a group of workmen. Some of the bolder spirits ventured to go out and begged the crew to come inside the Palace. They feared that the workmen might seduce them from their allegiance. "Save us!" the piteous cry resounded upon the ears of the armored-car warriors. "Don't listen to those workmen!" "Save us

<sup>1</sup> Soon afterwards the Soviet transferred its headquarters to the Smolny Institute, a huge building outside the city, where noblemen's daughters had received their education. It offered a great advantage. It could be more easily fortified. The Tauris Palace was plundered by members of the Soviet before they left it.

and you save Russia!" "*Toóárishchi*, we implore you, we appeal to your sense of revolutionary solidarity!" "The fate of free Russia and of the great ideals of the Revolution, Land and Freedom, are in your hands!" While these objurgations were being launched at the astounded soldiers, cigarettes, buns, and glasses of tea were thrust into their hands, even into their mouths. They could not utter a word, but as they took the proffered *douceurs* the anxiety of their hosts quickly subsided.

Then began a tragi-comedy of another sort. The "guilty" Bolsheviki had to be "punished." Writs were issued against Lenin and the ringleaders—Trotsky, Kolontay, etc. (Grimm had already left). General Polovtsov, who had succeeded General Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief, was instructed to take "stern measures." But the Soviet and Kerensky (the latter in Petrograd by this time) were not inclined for reprisals. They were bound by party ties with the Bolsheviki and committed to "freedom." It was "dangerous" for the Revolution—and for themselves—to proclaim open war against these "misguided" but "well-intentioned" persons. After all, they were "revolutionaries." It was necessary to "step warily." So the "stern measures" came to nothing. Lenin was able to "evade" arrest. When General Polovtsov came to apprehend two of the Bolshevik ringleaders, including Trotsky, he found Kerensky at their quarters, and from him received orders to leave them alone. When General Polovtsov proceeded to disarm the Red Guard, he was forbidden to do so by orders from Prince Lvov, "in compliance with the wishes of the Soviet." The peaceful majority of the workmen had themselves come to General Polovtsov offering to disclose the secret stores of arms, but both they and the Soviet were in terror of the Bolsheviki. General Polovtsov sallied forth with Cossacks and armored-cars to repress a Bolshevik mutiny in one of the rifle factories outside

Petrograd. The "mutineers" were "sniping" the loyal garrison of a neighboring fort. But the Soviet forbade him to disarm them. He thereupon resigned.

M. Kerensky and the Soviet had been saved from the Bolsheviki in July by a few Cossack regiments stationed in Petrograd. But at the Moscow Conference he assumed the airs of an autocrat. Previously he had claimed dictatorial powers to suppress an alleged conspiracy to re-establish the Old Regime, and had arrested General Gurko without any just cause. (Some months later he had to release him, and asked the British Embassy to facilitate General Gurko's journey abroad.) At Moscow he announced that all attempts to upset the Revolutionary Government would be suppressed "with blood and iron." He would brook no dictation from General Kornilov or General Kaledin, both of whom demanded instant and energetic measures to put down anarchy in the Army and in the country. M. Kerensky remained blind and obdurate. He forgot that he had still to reckon with the Bolsheviki, who were stronger than ever in the Soviet.

A crash was bound to come. The Bolsheviki challenged him once more, and once more he had to appeal to Kaledin's Cossacks and to General Kornilov. The latter had been preparing to take drastic measures. He sent cavalry to the aid of Kerensky, but Kerensky then realized that the Soviet, now entirely Bolshevik, held him in its power. So, taking its side, he betrayed Kornilov and the troops that were coming to aid the Government.

Another conference was summoned, this time exclusively "democratic," another name for "Socialist." On September 28th Kerensky, in a speech, declared that "anarchy was growing irresistibly, and spreading in enormous waves throughout the State." Russian troops were helping the Finnish Diet to defy the Government.

The Ukraina had already proclaimed a semi-independence with Kerensky's own connivance. The German Fleet and Army were advancing.

Coalition had suffered shipwreck because the Cadets could not agree to the autonomy of Ukraina under auspices that were notoriously inspired from Vienna and Berlin. Now the "sham" was again enacted. Constitutional and revolutionary elements once more joined the Ministry. The earliest promoter of the sham, M. Kerensky, informed the world that all the trouble had been caused by General Kornilov, who, it was alleged, had done incalculable harm to the Army. A semi-Bolshevist War Minister named Verkhovsky, who had never seen any fighting, undertook to "cleanse" the Army of Kornilovists. Upwards of ten thousand Generals and officers—the pick of the Army—were dismissed, and one-third of the reserves were immediately disbanded.

But still the Bolsheviki were not satisfied. How could they be? They had wanted certain things from the outset: peace, and the destruction of property and of the whole social fabric. To these schemes the sham Coalition had unconsciously lent itself, but, knowing that the country at large would not accept open repudiation of national interests and obligations, had cloaked its subserviency to the Extremists with smooth words. Again the Bolsheviki proceeded to juxtapose oratory with action. This time there was no Kornilov, no Kaledin to serve as rescuer or catspaw, and the sham was killed. Anarchy reigned supreme.

## CHAPTER XIII

### ABDICATION AND AFTER

Nicholas II goes to Pskov—The Last Hours of the Autocracy—Touching Farewells to the Army—the Manifesto—"I cannot part with My Son"—General Ivanov's "Forlorn Hope"—Renunciation of the Grand Duke Michael—Kerensky and Alexis—At Tsarskoe Selo—Light at Last—Alexis Adopts the Revolutionary Badge—In Exile—The Other Romanovs—Confiscation of Estates—The Tsar a "Poor Man."

WE left the Emperor at Mogilev on Monday, March 12th, leisurely preparing for his return to Petrograd. When he finally departed with the usual precautions and accessories—two trains proceeding at half-an-hour's interval—he and his suite, including Count Freedericks and General Voyéikov, knew that matters were serious, but they did not know how serious. They did not realize that the Revolution was to triumph on the morrow. The telephone wires with Tsarskoe had been cut. As the Vitebsk line, a single track, had been much shaken by heavy traffic, the Imperial trains usually went by a circuitous route to the Moscow line, and thence via Petrograd to Tsarskoe Selo. Thus they traveled on this occasion. At Bologoe junction news came warning the Tsar not to attempt to approach the Capital. The Revolutionaries were in control of the stations. So the trains were switched on to the Pskov line, with a view to rejoining the Vitebsk railway at Dno, and thence proceeding to Tsarskoe direct. Nicholas was very anxious about his family. The children were ill, and that was why the Csarevich had been removed from Headquarters. At

And the news became still worse, so it was decided to go on to Pskov and consult with General Ruzsky. Here they arrived on Wednesday. Hearing of this, the Duma Committee decided to send two of its members, MM. Guchkov and Shulgin, thither. They were instructed to secure a Writ of Abdication in favor of Alexis, with the Grand Duke Michael as Regent.

M. Guchkov related to me afterwards the circumstances of the journey. The two commissioners were very nearly intercepted by a telegram from the Soviet to the railway employees at Luga, on the Warsaw line, who had joined the Revolution and deposed the gendarmerie, but they managed to get through, traveling all night, and reaching Pskov, weary and unkempt, after four days' ceaseless vigil in Petrograd and on the road.

Nicholas II had been fully informed by General Ruzsky of events in Petrograd. Moreover, it transpired that General Alexeiev, at Headquarters, had been for three days (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday) in communication with the Tsar, urging him to abstain from sending more troops to Petrograd,<sup>1</sup> and to comply with the wishes of the Duma and even to abdicate. These facts, hitherto little known, had prepared the Tsar for his ordeal. The Tsar received his old enemy (Guchkov) and M. Shulgin, the Conservative member for Kiev, in the saloon of his railway carriage. It was a bleak winter's day. In the dim light Nicholas II looked pale, as usual, and careworn, but was perfectly calm and self-possessed.

Addressing Guchkov, he said: "Tell me the whole truth."

"We come to tell your Majesty that all the troops in

<sup>1</sup> Acting on General Voyéikov's advice, the Tsar had ordered a brigade of cavalry and infantry to leave the Front. It is said that General Alexeiev implored him with tears, on bended knee, to refrain from weakening the Front even by a few regiments. During the journey there had been some conversation among the suite about opening the Central Front "to save the autocracy."

Petrograd are on our side." And, with slow emphasis: "Even your own Bodyguard!"

This was news to the unhappy Sovereign. He quivered under the blow. "They also," he murmured.

"Yes," went on Guchkov pitilessly. "It is useless to send more regiments. They will go over as soon as they reach the station."

"I know it," replied the Tsar. "The order has already been given to them to return to the Front." Then, after a slight pause, the Tsar asked: "What do you want me to do?"

"Your Majesty must abdicate in favor of the Heir-Apparent, under the Regency of the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Such is the will of the new Government which we are forming under Prince Lvov."

"I had already decided to do so," the Tsar said, glancing at General Ruzsky, who was a silent participant in the interview. "But I have changed my mind." And he added with emotion: "I cannot part with my boy. I shall hand the Throne to my brother. You understand my motives."

This was a surprise to the commissioners. They had no instructions to agree to such an arrangement, but they could not but be sensible to the motives invoked by the Tsar, and after some demur they agreed.

Then began the drafting of the last Imperial Manifesto to the Russian people. General Alexeiev had already drawn up and telegraphed a suggested text on the lines proposed by the Duma. It had to be amended and typed afresh in two copies. Moreover, the Tsar could not forget his beloved Army. In a touching farewell he commanded his faithful soldiers to obey the new Government. When all these papers had been typewritten, the Tsar sat down and signed a ukaz appointing Prince Lvov Prime Minister, and another ukaz appointing the Grand Duke Nicholas generalissimo, and his last Order of the Day to

the Army. (It was intercepted by the Soviet, and never reached its destination.) Then, without a trace of emotion, he appended his signature to the Manifesto for the last time as Tsar of All the Russias. It was couched in lofty and impressive language:

By the Grace of God, We, Nicholas II, Emperor of All the Russias, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., to all our faithful subjects be it known:

In the days of great struggle with a foreign foe, who has been endeavoring for three years to enslave our land, it has pleased God to send Russia another grievous trial.

Internal troubles threaten to mar the further progress of our obstinate struggle. The destinies of Russia, the honor of her heroic Army, the happiness of the people, and the whole future of our beloved country demand that the war should be conducted at all costs to a victorious end.

The cruel enemy is making his last efforts, and the moment is nigh when our valiant Army, in concert with our gallant Allies, will finally overthrow him.

In these days of Russia's ordeal we consider ourselves beholden to our people to assure close union and organization of all their resources for speedy victory: therefore, in agreement with the State Duma, we have recognized that it is for the good of the country that we should abdicate the Crown of the Russian State and lay aside the Supreme Power.

Not wishing to separate ourselves from our beloved son, we bequeath our heritage to our brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, with our blessing for the future of the Throne of Russia.

We bequeath it to our brother to govern in full union with the national representatives sitting in the Legislative Institutions, and to take his inviolable oath to them in the name of our well-beloved country.

We call upon all faithful sons of our native land to fulfil their sacred and patriotic duty in obeying the Tsar at this sad hour of national trial and to aid him, in union with the representatives of the nation, to conduct the Russian Realm in the path of prosperity and glory.

May God save Russia!

In great distress about his wife and children, the Tsar had, before leaving Mogilev, ordered one of his oldest and most trusted soldiers, General N. I. Ivanov, to proceed with a small force to their rescue. While Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, General Ivanov had prompted the Council of the Military Order to confer upon Nicholas II the Order of St. George, and he was now given command of the St. George's Battalion, com-

posed of men who had won the coveted cross. Having accomplished this mission, General Ivanov was to act as Dictator. From my knowledge of General Ivanov, I should say that he was quite incapable of "counter-revolutionary" designs. Himself a son of the people, he had preserved throughout his great military career a simple, homely demeanor that had earned for him the affectionate sobriquet *diedushka* (grandfather). His men, also, were not inclined to engage in civil war. The battalion returned to Mogilev without having accomplished its mission. General Ivanov fell into the hands of the Revolutionaries, but was able to prove his entire innocence and good faith, and was released. He was killed a year later in Kiev when the Bolshevik troops stormed the sacred Lavra and slaughtered the Prior and 10,000 of its defenders.

After his abdication, Nicholas II, still without direct news from Tsarskoe, was advised to return to Headquarters. He would be safe there under the watchful and trusted care of General Alexeiev. He returned to Mogilev, and took up his residence as usual in the Governor's Palace, motored, walked, and saw General Alexeiev and the few people with whom he was intimate. He was treated with every mark of respect and deference, but he had nothing to do with the business of the Staff. Some of the Grand Dukes were also there. He received a visit from his mother. He made plans to go into retirement in the Crimea, to live as "a private gentleman." Learning that his son and the other children were mending rapidly, he only waited for them to come and join him before they all started for the South. His dreams were not realized. They clashed with the plans of the Soviet.

The Grand Duke Nicholas had been making all expedition to reach Mogilev in order to assume the Supreme Command. Telegrams were sent at the instigation of the Soviet to stop him at all costs, but they did not reach

him. On arrival at Headquarters the troops and the people gave him an enthusiastic reception. He found a message from the Provisional Government urging him not to assume charge. It was a bitter humiliation. He bore it stoically, like a soldier, and hurried back to the Caucasus. The people and the troops who had cheered him were respectful in their farewells, and evidently disappointed at his going.

M. Miliukov, as leader of the Constitutional-Democrats, who held six out of the eleven Ministerial posts in the Provisional Coalition Government, proceeded immediately after its formation to set forth its views of the situation in a statement to the Press. He believed that "recent events would increase popular enthusiasm for the war and enable Russia to win." He went on: "During the last few days the Duma has attracted the attention of the whole country and acquired great moral influence. And now, with the Army at its side, it becomes a great material force." Like most people outside the Socialist ranks, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs counted upon the Army—not the troops in Petrograd so much as those at the Front, who had not yet been subjected to the Soviet and Committee influence. He confidently added:

"The new Government considers it to be indispensable that the abdication of the Emperor should be official, and that the Regency should be temporarily entrusted to the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Such is our decision. We consider it impossible to alter it." On the following day (March 16th) he modified this statement, declaring that what he had said about the Regency was his own personal opinion.

The Socialists had been very angry. They did not like references to "war enthusiasm," though, for the moment, they thought it best not to say so, but they were furious at the mention of a Regency. Their aim was a "Democratic Republic," which to them meant a

Socialist regime, and for this purpose they had insisted upon a Constituent, intending to inveigle the people in the meanwhile by methods of agitation that were familiar to them. M. Kerensky was accused by his colleagues in the Soviet of having betrayed the revolutionary cause. A stormy scene followed, as a result of which M. Miliukov had to retract his words.

When MM. Guchkov and Shulgin returned with the text of the abdication, the Socialists were still more aroused. It made no difference to them whether the Grand Duke Michael was designated as Tsar or as Regent: they had not wanted the Tsar to abdicate; they had intended to depose him. The Provisional Government had been formed with their consent. It was a "revolutionary organization." To them the ukaz appointing Prince Lvov was equally unpalatable. Altogether it looked as if the Executive Committee of the Duma had been juggling with them. Had the extreme wing in the Soviet been as strong then as it was destined to become later, an open rupture would have occurred. M. Kerensky pacified them by inducing the Grand Duke Michael to renounce his rights, until he should be duly elected. It would be futile for me to speculate on the possible advantages of a Regency, but I think perhaps M. Kerensky would have had a more difficult task had the original plan proposed to Nicholas II in behalf of the Duma been followed. To overcome Soviet suspicion, M. Kerensky dictated a clause in the Grand Duke's renunciation, stipulating for a Constituent.

His "Declaration from the Throne" was signed by the Grand Duke Michael late on Friday, March 16th, after a lengthy consultation at his Palace with the members of the Provisional Government:

A heavy task has been entrusted to me by the will of my brother, who has given me the Imperial Throne at a time of unprecedented war and of domestic strife. Animated by the same feeling as the entire nation—namely,

that the welfare of the country overshadows all other interests—I am firmly resolved to accept the Supreme Power only if this should be the desire of our great people, who must, by means of a plebiscite, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish the form of government and the new fundamental laws of the Russian State.

Invoking God's blessing, I, therefore, request all citizens of Russia to obey the Provisional Government, set up on the initiative of the Duma and invested with plenary power, until, within as short a time as possible, the Constituent Assembly, elected on a basis of universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage, shall express the will of the nation regarding the form of government to be adopted.

M. Kerensky had been the principal spokesman, and after the document—which he himself inspired—had been signed, he warmly thanked the Grand Duke. The Soviet was so pleased with its "revolutionary" clauses that it quite forgot about the obligations imposed by the Grand Duke's renunciation—"to obey the Provisional Government" until "the Constituent should express the will of the people." The Soviet never did "obey," and M. Kerensky himself afterwards violated the "Constituent" pledge and his oath as a member of the Provisional Government by proclaiming a Republic. M. Kerensky deposited the Acts of Abdication and Renunciation with the Senate (Supreme Court of Judicature), whence they were afterwards abstracted by burglarious Revolutionaries, together with other historical documents and relics.

Six days later (March 22d) the ex-Tsar was conveyed as plain Colonel Nicholas Alexandrovich Romanov to Tsarskoe Selo and taken to the Imperial villa, where his wife and children—the latter recovering from their attack of measles—had already been placed under arrest. All remained captives there until August, when Kerensky, as Prime Minister, ordered them to be transferred to the bleak Siberian town of Tobolsk, capital of the province where Razputin had lived. Later they were taken by the Bolsheviki to Ekaterinburg, where Nicholas II, his son and others were murdered.

Only two or three faithful followers remained with



#### THE GARDEN OF CAPTIVITY

On March 26, 1917, Nicholas II was still the Absolute Master of all the Russians. One week later he was a poor captive in his own Garden at Tsarskoe Selo, guarded by simple soldiers who only a few days earlier would have fallen down and worshiped him, had he had the strength of mind not to heed his wife's evil counsels and had listened to the warnings and appeals of his faithful people. He is much changed in appearance, his form is bent, his hands are listless. He calmly awaits his fate. He still wears his Colonel's uniform and his Cross of St. George. He is plain Nicholas Alexandrovich Romanov and the soldiers address him as "Mr. Colonel."



the family after the ex-Tsar's arrest at Mogilev, among these few being Count Benckendorff, Marshal of the Court and brother of the late Ambassador in London, and the Empress's bosom friend, Mme. Vyubova, Razputin's firm adherent. Count Fredericks and General Voyéïkov had both been arrested while traveling from Mogilev. The latter was on his way to his estates, where he had a large artificial mineral-water business. The sale of this beverage had been greatly promoted by the Temperance Edict, and it was alleged that railway transport was always available for the Voyéïkov table-water, even when there were not sufficient trucks to carry bread and fuel.

While at Tsarskoe the captives did not suffer from ill-treatment. A sum of four roubles (about \$2) was allowed for the daily food of each person. The Tsar was not allowed to see his wife. Several hours each day all had the right to take exercise in the garden. They were, however, under constant guard by the troops of the garrison, and through the garden palings they could be seen and were stared at by curious sightseers. The Tsar spent all his time in the garden. As the spring and summer advanced he seemed to have quite adapted himself to captivity. He was "so fond of flowers." Bending over his flower-beds, he forgot his troubles.

Repeatedly the Extremists tried to force Kerensky to bring the ex-Tsar to the fortress in Petrograd, or send him to the dungeons of Kronstadt. Kerensky defeated these schemes—he knew that the Bolsheviki wanted simply to secure a "hostage" and to use the fallen monarch for their own purposes.

M. Kerensky had paid occasional visits of inspection to the Imperial villa. On one occasion young Alexis approached him, saluted, and gravely asked: "Are you a lawyer?" "Yes," was the reply. "Can you tell me me what I want to know?" "I shall try," answered

the Minister of Justice. "Well, please explain one thing: had father the right to abdicate for me? Could he renounce my rights?" It was a ticklish question to answer offhand. The Minister hesitated a few moments. The grave, boyish face looked so appealing. "Tell me the truth," Alexis urged. "I think that as your father he had not the right," answered Kerensky. "But as the Emperor he had the right." The boy looked puzzled for a moment, then he seemed to understand the legal view of the case. He was disappointed, and the tone of his voice as he said "Thank you" showed it. Who had stirred the lad's imagination with these matters?

His question augured ill for his peace of mind, and bore out the current gossip that family differences had cast a deeper gloom upon the fallen household. The boy had previously shown distaste for his mother's society, and, since he had lived at Headquarters, he had conceived a violent hatred and disgust for Razputin. Was the ex-Empress setting the boy against his father, blaming him for abdicating, and still more for disinheriting his boy? The last refuge of parental affection, his renunciation in behalf of his son because he could not bear "to part with him"—was even this to be denied to the hapless autocrat? During the earlier days of his captivity Nicholas II had attributed the responsibility for all that had happened to incompetent subordinates. He told a Staff officer, who had been sent to him by the Provisional Government: "You were to blame. I always said that those Petrograd reservists would betray me. Yet the Staff allowed them to serve in the city." In his solitary walks in the garden the ex-autocrat had gained a clearer vision of the past. Later he came to realize that his wife's influence had been his bane.

While the fallen Sovereigns and their children were being secretly conveyed to Tobolsk, another quaint thing

happened. The boy donned a red ribbon and one of the little medals that had been struck to commemorate the Revolution. These badges he wore demonstratively, as if he wished everybody to know that he had severed himself from his past. It was suggested, however, that he had been persuaded to adopt the red color. Marie Antoinette and the Dauphin had donned the *bonnet rouge* when the fish wives came to Versailles. In this, as in other points of comparison between the French and Russian Revolutions, there was a difference—a very considerable difference, due to the complete disparity between national character and temperament. As nobody knew who the boy was, and as no constraint was exercised upon him in this matter, he probably acted on the motives I ascribe. The train conveying the family stopped only at unfrequented stations, or in the open country, for the passengers to take some exercise during the long journey of three thousand miles. And not even the engine-drivers, who were frequently changed, knew who was traveling.

After the Revolution all the Romanovs were excluded from the Army and other services. Many were arrested. All suffered privations because their properties and fortunes were confiscated. Many sustained bad treatment, though none were actually killed. Whenever it was possible for them to do so, they migrated to Finland. The majority had taken refuge in the Crimea and in the Caucasus. The Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich received scant recognition for having renounced his rights. He was allowed to reside at his palace in Gutchina, but suffered arrest afterwards. The Grand Duke Cyril and his wife went to Finland. He had brought the Guards' Naval Brigade, of which he was Commander, to the Tauris Palace in the early days of upheaval. But this did not save him from obloquy and distress. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich was a prisoner in the

Crimea.<sup>1</sup> So was the Grand Duchess Vladimir. Fortunately for himself, the Grand Duke Dmitry was in Persia. There he remained. His father, the Grand Duke Paul, was imprisoned but afterwards released. The Yusupov family enjoyed complete immunity for several months. Then the young Prince Felix, who with the Grand Duke Dmitry had figured in the affair of Ruzhkov's death, fell under suspicion and was arrested. Some of the Romanovs took advantage of the Revolution to contract marriages that had formerly been forbidden by the law of their House. The Grand Duchess Olga, sister of the fallen monarch, solaced herself by marrying an officer. The Grand Duke Andrew had married Mlle. Ksheshinskaia, the famous ballerina, whose mansion was "annexed" by Lenin and afterwards plundered.

The worst sufferer was the unhappy Empress Marie, who had always been opposed to her son's reactionary tendencies and to the evil influence exercised upon him by his wife. Deprived of her revenues and possessions, she had been permitted to live in one of the Crimean residences on an allowance of £1200 a year. Here she was rudely awakened at night by mutinous seamen of the Black Sea Fleet, who had been incited thereto by Soviet agitators on the pretext that she was in treasonable correspondence with the "counter-revolution." They pulled her out of bed in order to search for documents, and insulted and ill-treated her. Her health was severely affected by this ill-usage.

But all that has been said in this chapter about the treatment of the Romanovs pales into insignificance besides the barbarism of the Lenin regime.

All the property of the Romanov family was confis-

<sup>1</sup> The former Generalissimo fell into the hands of the Germans when the Crimea was occupied by them in the spring of 1918. They took him to Kiev and tried to persuade him to assume the Crown under their protection. He refused to have anything to do with the enemies of his country.

cated during the Revolution, and their private fortunes "sequestered." The Tsar's Civil List, about \$7,500,000, did not suffice for the upkeep of his innumerable palaces in and around Petrograd, Moscow, and Warsaw, his villas at Tsarskoe, Peterhof, etc., his shooting seats at Spala (in Poland) and Bieloviezh<sup>1</sup> (in Lithuania), and his stately abode, Livadia, in the Crimea. The huge sums required for the Court came mostly from "His Majesty's Cabinet," which owned and exploited vast possessions in Siberia (the gold mines of the Altai, the quicksilver mines of Nerchinsk, etc.). The Tsar threw open large tracts of fertile land in the Altai valleys to colonization during Stolypin's agrarian reform movement. In spite of all his wealth he was a poor man.

To provide for the numerous members of the Romanov family, which at the present time comprises about seventy Grand Dukes, Grand Duchesses, etc., a certain portion of Crown lands (quite distinct from State lands, which include all the boundless forests of Northern Russia and most of the land in Siberia) was set apart a century ago under the name of Imperial Appanages and administered as a separate department (*Udiélnoie viédomstvo*) of the Ministry of the Court. The appanages produced and dealt in wine, raised in the Crimea and Caucasus, timber, etc. Each member of the Romanov family received a certain endowment (averaging about \$35,000 per annum) from the day of birth, which accumulated till his or her majority. The Emperor, as head of the family, could dispose of the available appanage funds and revenues to provide marriage portions or special grants to his kinsmen.

Many of the wealthiest among his titled subjects owed their fortunes to the bounty of earlier sovereigns. Cath-

<sup>1</sup>The *púschcha* (dense forest) of Bieloviezh was renowned for its herds of forest bison (*súbry*), commonly known as aurochs, and large preserves of elk and deer, which were mostly destroyed by the German troops during the war.

erine the Great was particularly liberal in gifts of land and "souls" (serfs) to her favorites: Potemkin (who built the Tauris Palace), Zubov, and others. Peter the Great had "Possessioned" or "fiefed" vast tracts in the Urals to the Stroganovs, who, like the Sheremetevs, Demidovs, etc., were slowly developing the incalculable mineral wealth of that favored region.

Comparatively few of the Romanovs were really well off. The Constantinovichi were the wealthiest, the Vladimirovichi the poorest. Enormous fortunes were locked up in art collections. The Rembrandts in the Hermitage, and the arms, jewels, and old English plate in the adjoining Winter Palace—not to speak of the regalia in the Kremlin—were of priceless value, and the same may be said of the Constantine Palace at Pavlovsk, near Tsarskoe Selo. Much of this heritage of art had been collected during the Revolutions in England and France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were destined to "disappear," destroyed or plundered, during the Russian Revolution.

## CHAPTER XIV

### MUTINY OF THE SAILORS

**Bolsheviki at Helsingfors—A Delayed Manifesto—Finnish and Swedish Socialists—Murder of Officers—How Admirals met their Death—Maximov Elected—Death-blow to Discipline—Committees and British Submarines—A “Watery” Reception—At Kronstadt—Admiral Viren Tortured—The Black Sea Fleet—Admiral Kochak “Dismissed”—Further Bolshevist Agitation—Admiral Verderevsky and “Admiral” Lebedev—Shipbuilding Suspended.**

AN appalling tragedy had been enacted at Helsingfors and Kronstadt. Soviet agitators went thither on Thursday, March 15th, to subvert the sailors. On the following day the Manifesto was wirelessly to the Fleet, but the transmission stopped midway and a service message insisted that the Manifesto must on no account be communicated to the crews. We know the reason: the Soviet had objected to it, and Kerensky had undertaken to obtain the Grand Duke's renunciation. They were afraid that the Army and Navy might straightway accept the new Tsar. At Mogilev the Staff was also nonplused, but the Army knew nothing, whereas at Kronstadt and Helsingfors the garrison and crews learned from the wireless operators that the Tsar had abdicated and that the Manifesto had been “recalled.” It was midnight on Friday when the Grand Duke's renunciation became available for transmission. M. Kerensky and the Soviet doubtless had no idea what serious misapprehension was being caused by delaying the Manifesto.

During those hours of uncertainty the Bolsheviki at Helsingfors and Kronstadt spread a tale to the effect

that the "counter-revolution had restored Tsarism and destroyed the new-found liberties." Such is the true cause and explanation of the atrocities that followed. The men were deliberately misled into the belief that they were being betrayed by their officers, and proceeded to murder them wholesale. When the Acts of Abdication and Renunciation did come through, the harm had already been done. From that awful butchery the fleet did not recover, and Kronstadt remained a Bolshevist plague-spot.

The fleet was at anchor in winter quarters, grouped in squadrons off Helsingfors. The Gulf of Finland being icebound, they were in no danger from the enemy. A few hundred yards of stout ice separated the vessels from the city. Many thousands of seamen and hundreds of officers lived on board. About a thousand marines and some of the officers were quartered in town. There, also, resided about a thousand artificers employed on munitions. Trouble broke out first among the men on shore, they having received the earliest news about events in Petrograd from the Soviet's emissaries. Discipline was well maintained in the fleet. The seamen had permission to visit the town within prescribed hours. Through them the crews also obtained their information. They were exhilarated by the news and anxious to enjoy all the extraordinary "liberties" that had been secured by the Petrograd garrison.

When the whisper went round that they were to be "done out" of them by their officers "in league with the counter-revolution," the shore men mutinied and sent deputations to the ships' crews inviting them to join. However, they were not permitted to approach the battleships, but succeeded in gaining access to some of the smaller vessels and smuggling themselves among the crew, unnoticed by the officers on watch duty. It was late in the night. The officers of one of the gunboats were in their wardroom, talking about the mysterious

“wireless,” when a seaman entered without permission, declaring that he came as a delegate from the crew. For this breach of discipline he was ordered to be placed under arrest. Some provocator on deck thereupon fired his rifle. Immediately from the other gunboats came answering shots. In a frenzy of rage the crews began shooting their officers, who defended themselves with desperation. A regular fusillade ensued. Many unfortunate officers were dragged out and thrust alive under the ice.

Admiral Nepenin, whose flag of Commander-in-Chief had been flown on board a gunboat anchored near the battleships, signaled to ascertain the cause of the firing. He received no answer. The battleships remained quiet, but the shooting from the gunboats continued. Officers sent thither with orders to enforce discipline were shot before they could cross the gangways leading to the ice.

In this manner Admiral Nebolsin was killed. He had just arrived from Petrograd. Having reached the Capital in the very thick of the upheaval, he had made haste to rejoin his squadron. No trains were leaving the Finland station because the northern outskirts of the Metropolis were unsafe. Here the gallant Cyclist Corps was holding out against the Revolutionaries. So the Admiral walked along the permanent way, amid a hail of bullets, some twenty miles to Beloostrov, the frontier station, whence he managed to get a train to Helsingfors. Beloved by all the men, he was warned on arrival by some of the sailors “not to cross the ice.” But learning that there was trouble in the fleet, he hastened all the more to join his flagship. On his way he heard firing from the gunboats and went to ascertain the cause. And as he ascended the gangway of one small vessel the men shot him dead.

When the full text of the Manifesto and Act of Renunciation came through, Admiral Nepenin made his arrangements to explain the tragic misunderstanding. But by

that time the mutineers were ashore, many of them drunk, fraternizing with the local Russian and Finnish workmen and crowding the square in front of the station. Many carried rifles, but at first there was no shooting. Here it was decided to elect a new Commander-in-Chief. Finnish and Swedish Socialists were helping the Soviet emissaries. At their instigation it was proposed that Admiral Nepenin should be superseded by Admiral Maximov, a junior flag-officer of pro-Finnish sympathies. A number of officers from the battleships had pluckily come ashore to try to bring the mutineers back to duty. They were standing in the square, and had the courage to address the crowd and to remonstrate against such an act.

One of them said: "Maximov is not as good a chief as Nepenin, and you all know it. You are being misled by traitors." Thereupon the agitators prompted some of the drunken seamen to threaten the speaker with their rifles. The meeting cheered uproariously for Maximov. Some officers were then shot down. One who was present and escaped told me afterwards that he had seen a Swedish Socialist go up to a sailor and offer him five marks (about \$1) if he would kill an officer.

A deputation was chosen to proceed to the flagship. Everybody understood what was going to happen. A sleigh was brought and left at the quayside. The deputation came with soft words. They requested Admiral Nepenin and his Staff to come ashore in order to explain matters. He consented readily enough, but asked that two of his Staff should remain in charge of secret plans and papers, which might be abstracted by agents and sympathizers of Germany, who were very numerous in Finland. This was agreed to.

Directly the Commander-in-Chief had ascended the quay, he saw the sleigh waiting and knew that his end was nigh. A seaman rushed at him, uttering foul words, spat in his face, and shot him through the head. The

body was flung into the sleigh and taken to the mortuary. There it remained for three days, an object of derision and infamous insult, used as a target for bullets and worse.

Admiral Maximov assumed so-called command. He treated the men like long-suffering martyrs who had been imposed upon by his predecessor—"anti-revolutionary," as he called him. He allowed his sentry the use of an armchair and invited him to breakfast.

The incident of the Manifesto was forgotten. Committees had to be elected, and there was no more cause, real or fancied, for suspecting officers. But drunkenness and rowdyism ashore continued. The widows and children of those who had been butchered or drowned came seeking their lost ones. They were insulted and illtreated by the mutineers.

Order and discipline had been almost unbroken on board the larger ships. The "casualties" in the other ships were heavy. Forty officers had been killed, many more wounded. It was a serious loss. But the survivors did not quail. They adapted themselves as best they could to the committee system, knowing full well that the men could not handle the ships without them, but realizing also that any failure to carry out the wishes of the Committee would entail instant death.

Admiral Verderevsky came from Petrograd to take up the duties of Chief of Staff. M. Guchkov had selected this competent officer with a view to his eventually assuming chief command. But before the change came into effect fresh trouble arose. The seamen had been permeated with "anti-militant" doctrines. They resolved to doff shoulder-straps and other badges. In Petrograd the soldiers had done so, and had torn off shoulder-straps from officers. To avoid a repetition of excesses and to preserve appearances of discipline, the captains mustered their crews, "ordered" them to have shoulder-straps removed, and then had their own taken

off, renouncing epaulettes and adopting sleeve-badges of rank. One of the "reasons" for this outbreak may be ascribed to the fact that Admirals carried a double-headed eagle embroidered on their shoulders, which was held to be a Reactionary badge.

Subsequent events in the Baltic Fleet are too well known to call for detailed description. Bolshevik elements obtained a complete mastery in some vessels. Two Dreadnoughts and a cruiser proceeded to Kronstadt in July to support the Lenin uprising.<sup>1</sup> M. Kerensky ordered Admiral Verderevsky to torpedo them, but the order was read by the Committees, and to avoid another mutiny he had to promise the men not to take action. For this he was dismissed and was to be court-martialed, when suddenly M. Kerensky appointed him Minister of Marine. Later he again fell into disgrace.

Our submarine crews were constantly interfered with by the Committees. Russian seamen manned the mother-ship of the flotilla. They sent emissaries who spoke English to persuade the British sailors to imitate their example. I need hardly say that they met with a chilly, and even a "watery," reception.

The subsequent failure of the Baltic Fleet to repulse a German landing in the Gulf of Riga was to be expected, although it was beyond any doubt that the Russian ships were more numerous than those produced by the enemy. In modern Dreadnoughts, as well as in lesser craft, the Russians wielded a substantial superiority.

More fortunately situated, the Black Sea Fleet long

<sup>1</sup> M. Kerensky issued the following Order of the Day on this subject (July 21st): "The detachments of Kronstadt and the battleships *Petropavlovsk*, *Republic*, and *Slava*, the names of which have been disgraced by the actions of the counter-revolutionaries, shall arrest within twenty-four hours the ringleaders and send them to Petrograd for trial. I hereby notify the Kronstadt detachments and the crews of these ships that if this order is not carried out they will be branded as traitors to the country and the Revolution, and the most rigorous measures will be taken against them."

escaped the contagion. But in the end it also came under Bolshevist influences. Admiral Kolchak, its gallant commander, was "dismissed" by the Committees. Under Lenin, German agents organized a massacre of Admirals and officers.

In Kronstadt the huge naval depots had been convulsed by revolutionary agitation. Many officers were following special courses during the winter months, and had no connection with the depots. How many officers were killed will perhaps never be known. The bodies were slipped under the ice. Admiral Viren, the Commander-in-Chief, was butchered in a most atrocious manner. He is said to have been burnt alive, fastened naked to a stake, in the presence of his distracted daughter. Scenes of the wildest debauchery continued for many days. Over two hundred officers had been cast into dungeons "so that they should have a taste of incarceration." Admirals and captains were forcibly compelled to carry out repulsive menial duties. These unfortunate captives were detained for many months while the "Revolutionary Tribunal" was inquiring whether any of them had sat in courts-martial on the mutineers of 1905. The garrison gunners had kept aloof and preserved the fortress from harm. But soon, under the influence of agitators, they partly adhered to the Bolshevist cause. Thenceforward Kronstadt became a stronghold of Bolshevism, the headquarters of Lenin and his crew. The sailors and the ships sallied thence to support every succeeding disturbance in Petrograd, twenty miles up the Neva, and finally shelled the Winter Palace, thereby putting an end to Kerensky's rule. (November, 1917.)

As Minister of Marine figured at one time a revolutionary adventurer named Lebedev. He had enlisted in the French Legion and risen to the rank of lieutenant. Returning to Russia—with or without leave from his superiors, I cannot say—he ingratiated himself with

Kerensky and was promptly raised to this high post. He, of course, knew nothing about naval affairs, but could make revolutionary speeches to the sailors. He always wore his French uniform. Under Bolshevik rule he was succeeded by a common seaman, named Dybenko. He claimed to have recognized Kerensky disguised as a sister of mercy. This was the man who eloped with the Bolshevik heroine Kolontay and the Crown Jewels.

Shipbuilding during the Revolution came almost to a standstill. The dockyard hands were too busy with politics. Besides, the new "Ministers" had Bolshevik "ideas," which have no concern with national defense, and "sailors" were more useful on land for "lynching" Commanders-in-Chief who wished to fight the Germans.

## CHAPTER XV

### "NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY"

**Early Days of "Fraternization"—Army Displays Tendency to Revive—  
New Theory Invented—Credulity of Allies—All Incentive Killed—  
Miliukov Excluded—Tereahchenko the Tool of the Soviet—Alexeiev  
and Other Generals Resign.**

GENERAL KORNILOV had given up the hopeless task of "commanding" the Petrograd garrison, which obeyed only the Soviet, and had gone to the Eighth Army (in April). All who understood what was passing behind the scenes saw clearly that Russia's hope lay in the soldiers at the Front. I accompanied M. Guchkov on several tours of inspection, visiting the Twelfth, Fifth, and Second Armies, then stationed along the Dvina and southward. As the train left Petrograd (March 24th), I was told by the Minister that probably we should be stopped by the Soviet. However, it seems the order came too late. We found the Committee system rapidly developing, but the men still keen to fight. They were on good terms with their officers and gave the civilian Minister a rousing reception. German attacks at Riga had met a stout resistance. The enemy was concentrating forces in the rear, making ready to take advantage of the Revolution. Aeroplanes dropped proclamations explaining, in bad Russian, that "the English were to blame." They had deposed the "God-given Tsar" because he would not continue the war "in the interests of England," etc.

Soon, however, the Germans altered their tactics. Realizing that military action would only stimulate

the Russian troops, they proceeded to "fraternize." Officers came under a flag of truce to General Dragomirov at Dvinsk offering an armistice, "so that the troops might exchange ideas." For this purpose the Germans had organized "kissing commandos," composed of men who spoke Russian. "Fraternization" was destined to succeed for a time. Meanwhile, desertion was taking place wholesale. The soldiers wanted to go home, because the Soviet had promised to distribute lands. The artillery shelled fraternizers, whereupon the infantry charged them with the bayonet. Then the gunners proceeded to enclose themselves with barbed wire. Finally the Germans gave up "fraternization," having obtained much valuable information about the Russian defenses and fearing lest their men might become "contaminated."

At Headquarters, General Alexeiev watched events with the deepest misgiving. He had been placed in supreme command, and refused to take the responsibility of permitting agitators in the Army. The Soviet insisted that he should issue the requisite permits to any of its members. An open rupture was avoided at the time by M. Kerensky's efforts. We know that the Soviet finally succeeded. As soon as the field had been opened for the agitators, they quickly gained control of the Committees and destroyed the last hopes of discipline and fighting efficiency.

The abolition of the death penalty (March 20th) by M. Kerensky had lent an additional impetus to agitation in the Army. Many hundreds of thousands of deserters, demoralized by the cry of "land and freedom," were wandering about the war zone and blocking railway traffic, seriously aggravating the difficulties of transport.

In conformity with the doctrine enunciated in the Duma two weeks before the Revolution by M. Kerensky, the Soviet proceeded to make overtures for peace. On



**ONE OF THE " ARMY COMMITTEES "**

Two officers (the first and the third figures, counting from left to right), a sergeant, wearing the Cross of St. George, and a private who has abjured shoulder-straps as badges of servitude, are discussing military questions. Note the helpless expressions of the N.C.O. and private.



March 27th it issued a pacifist Manifesto to the democracies of all countries, and more particularly to the "German brothers of the proletariat," whom it called upon to "cast off a despotic yoke, as the people of Russia had thrown off the autocracy of Tsardom." War was to be considered as an outcome of "Imperialistic aspirations" and "capitalistic policy," inasmuch as the interests of workers of all nations were "identical." Meanwhile "democratic Russia" would not "yield to the bayonets of a conqueror." Chkheidze had introduced this saving clause. As he explained to the Soviet, "So long as the German people refuse to overthrow Wilhelm our bayonets will be turned against Germany"—and therein lay the difference between Chkheidze and the Extremists—adding, "Long live the Army, whose discipline is based on the mutual good understanding of soldiers and officers!" This last phrase was intended as "eye-wash" for the *bourgeoisie*.

That same day I had found in the train which was conveying me to Riga a whole cargo of incendiary literature emanating from the Soviet. The conductors had orders to drop batches at every station. I took up one paper at random. It was the *Pravda* ("Truth"), organ of the Bolsheviks, wherein soldiers were bidden to lay down their arms, make peace with the German "brothers," and return to the villages, where "land and freedom" would be their portion. "Why do you distribute such stuff?" I asked the conductor. "Don't you see it helps the Germans?" "Yes," he replied. "It is bad for us, I know. But what can I do? I have my orders." And he showed me the inscription on one of the bundles: "By order of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates." I told M. Guchkov about it. He shrugged his shoulders. "We are lucky to be allowed to travel ourselves," was his mournful comment.

Within a few days of the Soviet's formation we knew

that the Extremists were doing what they pleased, although in open session Chkheidze was able to impose resolutions that suggested a "favorable complexion," representing the majority to be imbued with "good intentions." However, we knew that the Bolsheviki had issued *prikaz* No. 1, and that nothing had been done by the Menshevist majority to counteract their fell designs. Moreover, the Press, almost entirely in Jewish hands, had gone over to the Soviet, and Moderate organs that would not publish the Soviet proclamations glorifying spoliation and promoting Anarchy had been summarily "expropriated" on behalf of newly founded Socialist publications. The revolutionary pseudo-Jews were thus destroying Russia's hopes of a national revival and dragging the country into disaster. Young and old, these zealots intensified revolutionary passions. Through the Press they already wielded enormous power and were capturing other channels of control, the Committees and the militia (police).

I called attention at the time to both these dangers.<sup>1</sup> On April 8th I reported on the Soviet's plans "to bring about the defeat of the Russian armies and a dishonorable peace." Pacifist members of the House of Commons raised a great outcry, and M. Miliukov, who was attempting the impossible task of reconciling the Soviet's program with sober dictates of Allied policy, indirectly supported the "Allied" Pacifists. On March 26th I reported from Riga on the pernicious influence of Jewish Extremists. But this appeal to moderation was wilfully distorted by the Jewish Press. Facts cited by me on the best authority were "proved" to be non-existent, and a campaign of slander and intimidation followed. Later on M. Vinaver, the eminent Jewish Deputy, admitted in conversation with me that Nahamkez and his ilk were a greater danger to the Jews than to the Russians. I

<sup>1</sup> *The Times*, March 28 and April 11, 1917.

felt that I had done my duty in calling attention to the ominous feature of the situation, and refer to these incidents here simply to show how impossible it was then to speak the truth about Russia. The Soviet regime was far worse than the *okhrana*. I know that on one occasion, at least, the *okhrana* had contemplated my expulsion for writing too freely about the Old Regime. Now, I was threatened with nothing less than murder. Under the dispensation of "freedom" applied by the Soviet, the truth had become unpalatable and dangerous in Petrograd and unacceptable in London.

Behind the veil thus dropped by the Soviet and its pseudo-Jewish supporters, British and French pacifists worked unremittingly for the success of the Soviet plan. The respective Governments encouraged Socialist deputations to come and "convert" the Russian Revolutionaries, who knew infinitely more about revolution than did these "innocents." It was even rumored in Petrograd that Mr. Arthur Henderson would succeed Sir George Buchanan. The French experiment with M. Albert Thomas had not, however, proved a success. The Allies dallied with the proposal to hold an international Congress in Stockholm, initiated by the Soviet in furtherance of its schemes. Oceans of ink were expended on this subject before the real motives of the Soviet were understood. Meanwhile some of the "missionaries" had themselves been "converted."

Another lamentable feature of the revolutionary period was the constant passage of Russian and pseudo-Jew revolutionaries from Allied countries. Every shipload that came from America, England, or France gave trouble. The exiles would go straight from the train to the Field of Mars and "stir up" the revolutionary pot. Whether "martyrs of Tsarism" or merely German spies, they all considered themselves to be entitled to a share in the spoils, and had to be provided with "fat

places" in the Food, Agrarian, and other Committees. To these shipments we owed the advent of Bronstein-Trotsky and other Bolsheviki.

The well-intentioned sophistries of M. Chkheidze could not long stave off a conflict between M. Miliukov and the Soviet. On April 10th the Provisional Government had issued a proclamation explaining its war policy. It repudiated aims of "domination" or "conquest," enunciated "its object to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny," called for "the defense, cost what it may, of our national patrimony and the deliverance of the country from the enemy who invades our borders" as "the capital and vital problem before our soldiers, who are defending the liberty of the people in close union with our Allies."

The Soviet, under the benign influence of MM. Chkheidze and Tseretelli, accepted this statement of the case. But M. Slobelev, a Labor demagogue who had assumed control of the Soviet's news service and "Department of International Relations," was acting separately. So were all the Bolsheviki. Their joint activities had given rise to rumors that a separate peace was being secretly negotiated. As a matter of fact, after Russia had proclaimed her war aims the Austrians made a separate offer of a "declaration of conformity of aims," without specifying terms of peace. This offer had been preceded by a conference of the two Kaisers at Homburg and interviews between Russian and German Socialists at Stockholm.

M. Miliukov thereupon addressed (May 1st) a Note to the Allied Governments attributing these "absurd reports" to "our enemies." He contrasted the "nation's" determination as "a free democracy" "to bring the World War to a decisive victory" with the failure of the Old Regime "to appreciate and share the ideas" of her Allies "and of the great oversea Republic." He reaffirmed his

statement that "our country will maintain strict regard for the engagements entered into with the Allies of Russia," and was "firmly convinced of a victorious issue to the present war . . . assuring a firm basis of a lasting peace," and the establishment "by the Allied democracies of guarantees and penalties necessary to prevent any recourse to a sanguinary war in the future." All the sober and stable elements in the country were thoroughly in accord with the tenor and substance of this Note. Moreover, it was substantially in agreement with the proclamation of April 10th, which had been accepted by the Soviet.

But the words "decisive victory" could not be glozed over by the rhetoric of the Georgian orators. The storm broke as soon as the Note appeared in the papers, some days after its dispatch. It had not been "previously submitted." Kerensky denied all knowledge of it. Miliukov's premature pronouncement about the Regency was recalled, and the "free democracy" in the Soviet was particularly incensed that the Note should bear the date of the annual Labor festival. That was, so to speak, "the last straw." A grand palaver was arranged at the Marie Palace. The Bolsheviki sent orders through their "Chief of Staff," a certain Linde, to "concentrate" regiments in the square in front of the Palace. They intended to seize Miliukov and the other Cadet Ministers. Half a dozen regiments responded to the call, not knowing in the least what they had to do, but shouting vociferously "Down with Miliukov!" This looked so much like treachery on the part of the Soviet that Kerensky and others for shame's sake persuaded the men to go to their homes, assuring them that the Soviet had never issued or countenanced the orders that had been given to them in its name.

The outcome of this conference was the much-vaunted doctrine of "no annexation and no indemnity." M.

Miliukov had to endorse it with the best grace possible in a further Note, which called upon the Allies to respond thereto. They did so readily enough, but France had, of course, to make certain necessary reservations in regard to Alsace-Lorraine, which had been French territory. All the same M. Miliukov had to go and the Allies remained in disfavor. The Cadet leader was succeeded by young and fascinating M. Tereshchenko, a millionaire sugar-refiner who had coquetted with the workmen in Kiev and espoused their cause in the local War Industrial Committee. Under the Old Regime he had served as an official in the Imperial ballet. His only qualification for the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs was an intimate knowledge of foreign languages and Allied capitals. But he was ready to please the Soviet, and was willing to accept as his "assistant" an emissary of that body known as Avksentiev, who had been an "emigrant" in Paris, a writer on economics, and an inveterate supporter of the Socialist-Revolutionary party. (He was afterwards chosen President of the Peasants' Soviet, and later became Minister of the Interior.) Under these amiable auspices Russia's relations with her Allies continued till the Bolsheviks swept the sham paraphernalia away (in November, 1917).

M. Guchkov had grown tired of constant interference from the Soviet. He had hoped to "head off" the Extremists by anticipating their wishes. It was a hopeless undertaking. M. Kerensky succeeded him, and tried an equally impossible task: to substitute rhetoric for discipline.

General Alexeiev was requested by the Soviet to leave for having spoken slightly about the "no annexation, no indemnity" clause. He considered it had been obviously invented to kill any lingering inclination on the part of the troops to fight. What, indeed, should they fight about if the Soviet could drive out the invader

with mere words? One regiment on the Central Front actually concluded peace with the enemy, agreeing to "surrender" Vilna and Kovno. "Free" Russia had promised to give freedom to the Poles, but why should the soldiers fight about it, if all the nations were to have the right to settle their own destinies? General Ruzsky was dismissed for "lack of courtesy" to Soviet agitators. General Lechitsky resigned because he could not stand the Committee nonsense. Generals Gurko, Dragomirov, and others followed suit. They saw the Army perishing under the Committee system, and could not agree to look on.

## CHAPTER XVI

### ANARCHY

“Rights” for “Democrats” and “Duties” only for *Bourgeois*—Workmen’s “Wages”—Plunder by Soviets—Decline of Morals—Revelry in Winter Palace—Soldiers’ “Joy Rides”—“Jacqueries”—Cossacks Restore some Order—Financial Ruin—Revolution “Costs” over \$20,000,000 a Day—Soldiers Require a Thousand Millions Sterling—Filching the Gold Reserve—Art Treasures Lost.

Two revolutionary lights came in to illuminate the mournful shadows of Coalition. The fire-eating Skobelev (nominally a Menshevik), as Minister of Labor, quickly stirred the workers up to a sense of their “rights.” There was one charming feature about the Russian Revolution that much simplified all social and political questions: the partisans of Revolution had rights, the other people had only duties. M. Skobelev told the workers that all the profits of the mills should be theirs, and all the working expenses should be paid by the capitalist owners. The bland Chernov, *alias* Feldmann (a hybrid Socialist-Revolutionary with Bolshevist leanings and pro-German tendencies), as Minister of Agriculture, secretly incited the peasants to “take possession,” while he ostensibly professed adherence to the recognized understanding that the land question could be settled only by the Constituent Assembly. “Meanwhile, why should they wait? All the same it would be theirs.”

Both these “Socialists” were well off, and Feldmann-Chernov was reputed to hold large estates in the Caucasus, where they would be safe. Protection was also accorded to M. Tereshchenko’s estates. A neighbor of his told me:



**EARLY IDEALS OF THE REVOLUTION**

Scene at the Funeral of the Victims (April, 1917). The banner carried by soldiers bears the inscription "In Eternal Memory of those who have Fought for Freedom—Long live the Democratic Republic." The girl's wreath made out of broken manacles is inscribed with the words "Oppression has crumbled and our chains have been broken."



"We have no trouble, I am thankful to say. The Minister had troops sent to guard his property, and the whole neighborhood is quiet."

We have seen that the Cadets failed miserably in their Coalition venture. Miliukov had been hounded out. Shingarev, a country doctor who had made a name in party and later in Duma dialectics, specializing in financial questions, had tried to tackle the food problem at the Ministry of Agriculture. Then he had succeeded M. Tereshchenko at the Ministry of Finance. M. Nekrasov, a Siberian railway expert, had seceded from the party in order to remain in the Cabinet with the Socialists. He went from Communications to Finance. As the Soviet grew stronger it cast off most of the non-Socialist Ministers. Later, the Revolution, like Saturn, devoured many of its children.

Anarchy in the Government was magnified a hundred-fold in the country. The workmen simply did not know how much to ask in wages and emoluments. At one great rubber factory they brought a number of sacks with a request that they should be filled with money—"the war profits of three years"—or they would "put the directors into the sacks and drown them." As nearly all the products of industry were being purchased by the Government for war purposes, the State had to pay higher prices. Private enterprise was completely crippled. All the smaller establishments had to close. The larger ones continued, losing money. But things looked so bad that they would surely have to improve, some time. They did not, and finally the Bolsheviki proclaimed the confiscation of all industries for the workmen.

But money could be freely made. Russia was spending fifty millions of rubles a day. This huge "dole" had to go into somebody's pockets. The Soviet absorbed its "share." Its members rolled about in expensive motor-cars. Kerensky, a humble lawyer, was no excep-

tion to the rule. He lived in the Winter Palace, used the Emperor's carriages and motors, drank his champagne, and fed lusciously out of his gold plate.

The morals of "Free" Russia corresponded with the general absence of restraint among the Revolutionaries. "Ideals" had been swamped in the general scramble for material enjoyment. Kerensky set the example. There had not been so much rollicking gayety in the Winter Palace since the day it was built. Who could talk about Razputin now, while all this merriment was going on? Revolutionary Ministers were too much occupied with marrying and giving in marriage. They used the Imperial Crowns for the nuptial ceremony. They lodged their mistresses in grand-ducal abodes. *Après nous le déluge.*

While the domestic servants in Petrograd were disputing as to the respective merits of the eight- and the nine-hour day, under the belief that the one began at eight and the other at nine o'clock, their peasant relations were trying to live up to the general tone. Mansions pillaged, farmsteads destroyed, cattle maimed, landowners, small and great, murdered or fugitive—such was the common report. Even the prisoners of war took a hand in the game.

The whole apparatus of local government had been swept away. Half the Zemstvos were no more. They had been "replaced" by "committees" or "republics," governed by local hooligans, escaped convicts, and a sprinkling here and there of the Third Element. But most of its members were away at the Front.

Few taxes were paid; the local treasuries were empty and had to obtain funds from Petrograd. The State Bank could not cope with the demand for notes, and increased the denominations to two thousand rubles. Previously the highest note had been five hundred rubles. Only the luckless manufacturers paid taxes, and they

had been assessed by the Soviet economists at 97 per cent on the gross profits. Soviet agitators constantly clamored for a "compulsory expropriation" of the banks, thinking they could find money there galore. The soldiers' pay had been increased tenfold. They gambled, drank, and danced. The barracks resembled houses of ill-fame. Things were not much worse when Lenin "governed" in name as well as in deed.

Living had cost fivefold its normal level when the Revolution broke out. It steadily increased. Everybody who could go left Petrograd. The Crimea and Caucasus were choked up with fugitives. Huge fortunes had been made. They were squandered in riotous living and gambling in the cities and in entertainments of unprecedented extravagance in the favorite Crimean resorts. The cities "beyond the pale" were overrun by the Children of Israel. At last they had taken possession of the "promised land." The soldiers in Petrograd traveled daily to Finland—without tickets, of course—to smuggle cigarettes, which they sold at a big profit, while their worthy comrades at Vyborg competed with them in the business. It would require a whole volume to describe all the abuses, corruption, and scoundrelism that went on in Russia during the reign of the Soviet. Never had a country suffered as much from the most ruthless invader.

Earlier in his career, Kerensky had compared his countrymen with "mutinous slaves." But his own theories were largely responsible for the degradation, and he himself succumbed to it. The ideals of the Revolution were fine enough, if somewhat crude. Everybody became *tovarishch* (companion, comrade). The word appealed to the simple, democratic ideas of the people. Private soldiers addressed their officers in this way. They called Kerensky "Tovarishch Minister." It sounded well enough from the lips of some old peasant-reservist, who in his village was accustomed to address everybody—his superiors as

well as his equals—in the familiar second person singular. Under the banner of "class warfare" it became a mockery, a sign of contempt.

Election urns were brought to the bedsides of wounded soldiers so that all should vote on municipal affairs with which they had absolutely no concern, simply because the soldier vote would go to the Socialists, and preferably to the Bolsheviki. The schools were invaded by Soviet delegates, who terrorized the pupils and deprived them of food. Sons of "counter-revolutionaries" were driven out of the military colleges. Red Cross hospitals were also "revolutionized." The soldier orderlies formed committees, which decided what food and what medical or surgical treatment was to be applied, and forbade any rations to nurses or doctors other than the "ordinary" of the peasant-soldier.

Here are some observations that I was able to make in the course of my travels within and without the war zone. In Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, and other large cities, the demoralized and undisciplined soldiery monopolized the tramcars, brutally flinging off women and children, and overcrowding them so that fatal accidents were of daily occurrence. Much worse was the condition of the railway service. Soldiers invaded every train, occupied all the carriages and compartments, corridors, lavatories, and even the footboards and roofs. Suburban traffic was impracticable. Summer resort residents had a bad time, and officers "perched" on the steps while the men reveled on the cushions of first-class compartments. The revolutionary troops were "visiting" or "prospecting," which meant expropriation of palaces and villas, private, Imperial, or grand-ducal, contraband "trade" in cigarettes, etc. Others were going home to "grab" land, others again "toured" the country. One soldier related to me that his free "joy ride" on the trains had extended to Archangel and Vladivostock. These "tourists" were

acquiring first-hand knowledge of Greater Russia. Anarchy was not altogether an unmixed evil so far as they were concerned.

Foreigners traveling through Siberia were not molested, at first, although Russian passengers were unceremoniously bundled out of their compartments. But station-masters were often compelled to turn back a train because the soldiers wanted to go in that direction. Refreshment-rooms were plundered and wrecked. Restaurant cars had to be abandoned because the men invaded them and ate up all the provisions—without payment, of course.

On the Moscow and Vitebsk lines, and all the railways leading from the Front, pandemonium reigned. Here no regard was shown to foreigners or Allied officers. One unfortunate British subaltern, nearing Petrograd, was thrown out of his compartment by the troops at Tsarskoe Selo, beaten, and imprisoned. Allied military representatives going to Headquarters met with brutality equally egregious. One General of my acquaintance had to sleep on the floor, while the revolutionary "heroes" crowded into his bed. Even the Commander-in-Chief, proceeding to visit the armies, had his carriage invaded and narrowly escaped being "marooned." Fortunately he had a small armed guard, and when the train was in the open country it was stopped, and the invaders had to jump off or be shot. I could multiply instances of this kind without end. The men who climbed on to the roofs in the cold of winter stamped their feet to keep themselves warm, and often broke through and fell on their comrades below. At night-time they frequently slipped off in their sleep, or were knocked off when the train passed under bridges or tunnels. Hence they came to be called *létchiki* (flyers).

Whatever they touched they stole or destroyed. Window-curtains were torn off for all sorts of sumptuary purposes, for footgear or clothing. All the fittings dis-

appeared. Benches were demolished for fuel. The inside of a railway carriage after being thus "appropriated" was an appalling sight. Moreover, in their mad rush for seats, many would try to anticipate those who were entering by the doors, which in Russian trains are always at either end of the carriage, by flinging themselves through the windows, first smashing them with the heavy sacks wherein they carried "loot." I have huddled in a first-class compartment, the only passenger with a ticket, pell-mell with soldiers, nurses, and wounded men, and seen these sacks landing in our midst, preceded by fragments of glass and followed by the owners. Moreover, food and goods trains were being systematically plundered by the deserters.

For weeks and months this abomination continued. The so-called "Government" was powerless, the Committees had no authority, and the railway staff were cowed and terrorized. Then the Cossacks took charge, and soon matters improved for a time. For the Cossacks would stand no nonsense. By that time also the cavalry began to round up deserters and to guard the main railway junctions. Everybody had to produce a document of some sort. But the deserters easily procured them. Whenever a man had made up his mind to leave his regiment, he simply notified the Committee and was furnished with a pass, or he terrorized the surgeon into issuing a certificate. (Lenin revived railway anarchy.)

Meanwhile the transport crisis had been growing daily more acute from other causes. Cars and locomotives were in need of repair. The rolling stock had not been properly overhauled for several years, owing to pressing need of transport. It was thoroughly worn out, and almost every train had to "drop" a car or two on account of minor breakages. But the men in the railway workshops were too busy with politics and committees. Thousands of engines were standing idle because these men had

other matters to occupy their time. And, not satisfied with idling, they forcibly took over the management of several lines. At Tsaritsyn, an important food junction, they even proclaimed a separate Republic.

Financial and administrative anarchy may be characterized by the situation as observed by me in one of the administrative divisions of the province of Petrograd soon after the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> This district contains agricultural, timber, and textile industries. The local assessment amounted to about \$175,000, which covered expenditure on roads, schools, hospitals, and police. Most of this money was expended for the people, but only \$12,500 came from the peasants and working-men—the rest was paid by land, forest, and mill-owners. The local administration had been in the hands of the district Zemstvos, composed of elected tax-payers, who worked in the public cause gratuitously. Under the Soviet regime the Zemstvos and police were driven out and the district was split up into seventeen separate republics, each under a committee composed of workmen or peasants, ruled by a carpet-bag politician. They enrolled their own militia. The seventeen committees established a pay-roll for themselves and their agents aggregating over \$500,000, or three times the amount of the local revenue. They impounded and divided whatever money came into the local treasury office, levying contributions from the land and mill-owners to make up the difference. Private houses were annexed whenever they suited the convenience of the committees; parks and gardens were invaded; land was appropriated, and trees were felled and stolen by the peasants, but the owner had no right to dispose of his property. Open violence was not of frequent occurrence, because no one ventured to offer any resistance to the committees.


Here are some incidents of rural life during the Revolution. A certain aged landowner who had enough

<sup>1</sup> *The Times*, September 22, 1917.

money to satisfy modest requirements decided to make a present of his broad acres to the peasants, rather than be troubled by agrarian disorders. Summoning the villagers, he said: "I am leaving after to-morrow to end my days in town. Take my land; divide it among you; it is yours." The peasants were grateful. Immediately they began to discuss the momentous question how to divide the property. It was a difficult matter to adjust. The argument became so fierce that half a dozen of them died before nightfall. By the following sundown the deaths had doubled in number. When the proprietor reached his town residence he was followed by a deputation of the peasants. "Take back your land," they implored him: "if you do not, we shall all be dead." Another landowner offered one-third of his acreage to the peasants. Then one village rose against another, each claiming the preference, and, rather than agree to a compromise or fight out their quarrel, they each set a watch upon the other. The property was thus exceedingly well guarded.

Another case is worth citing. The local committee had, as usual, fixed a minimum wage for farm labor. Formerly the pay did not exceed fifty cents a day. The committee decided that nobody must work for less than \$5. Now, the peasants knew quite well that the landlord could not afford such remuneration. They were willing to work for much less, but they feared the bad men on the committee, who would not scruple to burn their houses and crops if they disobeyed. They sought a way out of the difficulty, and found it. "We sign a receipt for ten rubles (\$5) a day, and you give us one ruble and a half (75c.)." A secret compact was thus concluded between the farmer and his laborers, and a few thousand acres remained under cultivation that otherwise would have lain fallow.

In another place the peasants, carried away by M. Chernov's wild scheme of land spoliation, "grabbed"



**FREE JOY RIDES FOR REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS**

This picture gives some idea of the delights of railway traveling in Russia under the Régime of the Soviet. The roof passengers were called "litchiki" (flyers), from their tendency to "fly off" while asleep.



a landowner's property, plowed and sowed the fields, neglecting their own allotments. Then they began to divide up the stolen acres, and came to blows and murder. Finally they sent word to the owner: "Take back what belongs to you. We want nothing for our work, nothing for our seeds: we want only to remain alive."

These incidents, culled "behind the scenes," afford some explanation of the surprising fact that amid the anarchy and terror spread broadcast over the land by Soviet agencies the instincts of a national conservatism had not altogether left the minds of the masses.<sup>1</sup>

To deal with the land question, "agrarian committees" had been established under the auspices of the Chernov administration. They were filled by revolutionary adventurers, and their pay-roll aggregated \$70,000,000 per annum.

At the Moscow Conference, convoked by M. Kerensky at the end of August, 1917, astonishing figures were given by Ministers regarding the economic crisis. In the hope of grappling with the food problem, the Government had introduced a monopoly on grain stuffs. This method had been applied in other countries with success. But it required an efficient machinery of purchase, control, and distribution. None of these requisites were available amid the prevailing anarchy. Local "food committees" were instituted under the direction of a central board in Petrograd. One may easily picture the result. All these bodies were filled with adventurers or scoundrels who had no qualification except the profession of "revolutionary sentiments." Plunder and profiteering became a thousandfold more prevalent than had ever been known in pre-revolutionary times. Besides, these new "organ-

<sup>1</sup>The Bolshevist "Government," soon after its usurpation of power in Petrograd (November, 1917), ordained the confiscation of all lands except those belonging to peasants, and all industrial property, for the benefit of the workers.

izations" involved an outlay of colossal sums, amounting to \$250,000,000.

The peasants were still disinclined to sell their grain, in spite of high prices, because they could not purchase necessities of life with the money. Boots cost ten times as much as formerly, but even at this price were difficult to procure. The leather trade had been disorganized. Textiles were worth their weight in gold and difficult to obtain. Owing to labor anarchy the mill production had fallen so tremendously that the total visible supply of cotton goods amounted in August, 1917, to 29,000,000 yards for a population of over 180,000,000, or less than seven inches of material per capita. There were large quantities of food in the country and huge stores of grain in Siberia, but they were immobilized by lack of transport and inefficient or corrupt organization. And the Revolution had intensified the difficulties of coping with the problem.

Measures for increasing transport capacity were proposed by the American Railway Commission, which had been sent to Russia in order to help the new regime. These measures would have increased goods traffic by 40 or 50 per cent. But the prevailing anarchy rendered any improvement impossible.

Within a few months of the outbreak of revolution the Treasury was completely emptied in order to supply colossal sums for revolutionary organizations (the Agrarian and Food Committees, the Soviet and its affiliations) and for supplementary pay and allowances to the troops. Later, under the Kerensky administration and Soviet rule, this item increased to such an extent that the "supplementary requirements" of the Army called for an outlay of \$5,500,000,000 (eleven milliards of rubles) per annum, representing an additional expenditure of about \$450 per man, of which \$50 were for pay and \$400

for food and other allowances. The "revolutionary" soldier was to be well cared for.

Russia had spent \$24,500,000,000 on the war,<sup>1</sup> and against this outlay had raised \$17,500,000,000 on loans and notes;<sup>2</sup> the surplus of Ordinary Budgets provided about \$900,000,000, leaving a deficit in unpaid bills amounting to \$6,100,000,000 (figures for July, 1917). The rate of increase of expenditure before and after the Revolution may be estimated approximately by the issue of paper money. During the war months of 1914 the issue of banknotes averaged \$109,500,000 per month; in 1915 it had risen very slightly to \$111,500,000, and in 1916 to \$145,000,000. But during the revolutionary months (March to August, 1917), the averages leapt to \$416,000,000. Reckoning the difference between the last two averages, the Revolution had thus cost Russia, in actual Treasury disbursements in the form of paper currency, the colossal sum of \$1,890,000,000 in seven months. This, of course, gives but a faint idea of losses sustained by industry and agriculture and the wanton destruction of State and private property, besides art treasures and historical relics of priceless value.

<sup>1</sup> According to a statement published in the Petrograd official *Trade and Industrial Gazette* (September 26, 1917), the total war expenditure, in actual disbursements by the Treasury, was given at Rs.41,392,700,000, of which Rs.30,944,600,000 were for the Army and Rs.2,057,900 for the Navy. Also included in the general total were immense sums, running altogether into milliards of rubles, assigned for other needs created by the war. Thus, up to September 14, 1917, were expended Ra. 3,264,100,000 on allowances to the families of soldiers; for the construction of new railways for military purposes, Rs. 369,300,000, and for developing those already in existence, Rs.1,172,700,000; on orders for railway engines and rolling-stock, Rs.617,600,000; on constructing and improving ports, Rs.115,200,000; further, on roads and waterways, Rs.79,700,000; on the development of the post and telegraph services, Rs.122,400,000; and so on. Finally, a very large sum, amounting to Rs.569,500,000, was used in giving assistance to refugees. The par value of the ruble was about fifty cents.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet had constantly impeded the raising of War Loans, and at one time threatened to boycott the so-called "Liberty" Loan.

M. Nekrasov, then Minister of Finance, declared that never had the Tsar's government been so prodigal as "revolutionary Russia." What calamitous consequences had already been brought about by revolutionary excesses and anarchy? He pointed out that during the first three months after the Revolution the State revenue had declined in the following proportions, as compared with 1916: Land tax by 32 per cent, town real estate tax by 41 per cent, lodging tax by 43 per cent, war tax by 29 per cent, industrial tax by 19 per cent, insurance tax by 27 per cent, and outstanding land redemption dues by 65 per cent. This decline had been far greater in the following months. He warned his hearers that any measures of confiscation or expropriation of capital or real estate would only lead to a complete disappearance of the revenue, and would react upon the people at large, as their savings had been deposited in the State and private banks.<sup>1</sup> What has been shown above sufficed to render the continuation of war a financial impossibility. Lenin had been "behind the scenes"; he did "better" still when he himself appeared "on the boards."

Having no funds wherewith to carry out the extravagant "bribes" promised to the soldiers, M. Kerensky's Government was compelled subsequently to disband a large portion of the Army. But the Committees and Soviets continued to draw their emoluments so long as the printing presses at the State Banks could provide

<sup>1</sup> On September 1, 1917, the State Bank held 1,297,932,927 rubles in gold in its vaults and 2,308,006,718 rubles in gold in foreign banks—altogether about \$1,600,000,000 in gold. The issue of notes had then reached the sum of 14,676,172,052 rubles. During the preceding week it had issued 245,000,000 rubles in paper, and the available paper currency at the Bank did not exceed 138,827,948 rubles. The deposits at the State Savings Banks had risen enormously prior to the Revolution, amounting in October, 1916, to 3,453,200,000 rubles in cash and 1,119,900,000 rubles in securities. The Bolsheviks in November, 1916, "captured" \$300,000,000 in gold at the Moscow branch of the State Bank.

enough paper money. When Lenin took possession the state of the Treasury was already hopeless. To carry on, he sought a loan of \$5,000,000 from the State Bank, and tried to get the money by subterfuge, which failed; then the banks were "expropriated." The Bolsheviki repudiated Russia's State loans, ignoring the claims of the people whose savings they thereby sacrificed.

At the end of 1917 Russia's debts, unsecured by any assets, exceeded the colossal figure of *fifteen milliards of rubles* (\$7,500,000,000). Such were the net results of the Revolution. It had "cost" over \$20,000,000 a day. Its cost in 1918 cannot be estimated in figures.



**PART III**  
**RUSSIA AT WAR**

**CHAPTER XVII**

**THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES**

Second Humiliation Repulsed—Pourtales and Sazonov—A Forgotten Document—Wilhelm's Ruse to Gain Time—Pledged his "Word of Honor"—Sukhomlinov's Boast—Russia "Ready"—Popular Enthusiasm—Success of the Mobilization—Hopes of Reform—The Grand Duke and Yanushkevich—Efficient Generals "Shelved."

**RUSSIA** opened the struggle with Austro-Germany under the happiest auspices. The people were unanimous. They had had enough of German influence and domination. Already in 1909, when Austria tried to force the Balkan issue on the backs of the Serbs, all the educated classes understood that she was merely a skirmisher for the German hosts, then preparing to hurl themselves at the Empire of the Tsars; and the humiliation inflicted upon Russia in the person of M. Sazonov by the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, was felt and resented by them. The masses and the classes, workmen and peasants, nobles and burgesses, rich and poor, without distinction of race or religion, hailed the call to arms. The Winter Palace was thronged with hundreds of thousands of loyal subjects, who acclaimed the Sovereigns on their appearance on the balcony. The troops inside the Palace mingled their prayers with those of the autocrat. Vociferous cheers resounded in honor of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich as he drove away from this memo-

rable function flying the black and yellow pennant of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Russia's armies.

Even to the "man in the street," unversed in the secrets of diplomacy or military plans, it was quite clear that the Germans were out to fight; that Russia and her Allies and friends were in for a *querelle d'allemand*<sup>1</sup>—as the French so adequately express it—a quarrel which the Teutons were picking simply and solely because they felt themselves strong enough to win against all possible odds, and had determined to crush opposition to their dreams of world-power and oppression.

The Russians had been developing their strength in industry and commerce during the decade of semi-constitutional existence. They believed that their Army was well equipped. The Minister of War, in an inspired article published by the Press, had announced "We are ready." So they would stand no more humiliations.


<sup>1</sup>Germany in 1909 compelled Russia, under threat of war, to exercise pressure upon the Serbs in a quarrel which had the sympathy and approval of Russia and other countries. And in 1914 Count Pourtales was confident that the Russians would also not fight. The author met him in the drawing-room of the Foreign Office at Petrograd almost daily during the week that preceded hostilities. The German Ambassador went out of his way to persuade the author, whom he "knew to be influential among prominent Russians," to "warn his Russian friends not to be led astray by the clamor of the Press"—meaning the *Novoe Vremya*, the leading anti-German organ—"into imagining that the country would support them in going to war about a trumpety affair like the Serbian question." He (Pourtales) was "well informed" about the feeling of the country. The author tried in vain to persuade him that he was mistaken. Pourtales then oracularly declared that the existing attitude of certain elements in Petrograd was "extremely dangerous"—clearly indicating that Germany had made up her mind to fight. When the mobilization of the Russian armies was publicly announced, Germany sent an ultimatum demanding that Russia should "recall" or "cancel" the mobilization within twelve hours. Even then Pourtales was confident that the Tsar's Government would give in. He came to Sazonov with two *notes verbales* written on a sheet of paper: the one to be read in case of Russia's consent, the other in the improbable case (as Pourtales imagined it) of her refusal. When Sazonov calmly announced that Russia had already given her answer, Pourtales lost countenance, burst into tears, and departed, forgetting the telltale document in his hurry and confusion.



*Photo taken by the Author in July, 1916.*

#### **RUSSIA'S FIGHTING GENERALS**

General Irmanov, of the famous Third Caucasian Corps, showing his diamond-hilted sword—the highest reward for leadership—to General Abram Dragomirov, of the Ninth Army Corps. General Irmanov resigned his rank during the Revolution and enlisted as a private soldier. He was then hale and hearty, though over 70 years old. General Dragomirov was afterwards Commander-in-Chief of one of the Fronts, and resigned in protest against Bolshevism. Their Chiefs of Staff, General Rosanov and Colonel Iskritsky, stand beside them.



Since the Germans wanted a "preventive war," let them have it. "God is on our side!"

Never had the Tsar been so popular as at that moment. He had proclaimed war against drunkenness—the great national evil—and now he had proclaimed war on the Germans, the nation's foes. People readily overlooked the appointment of Goremykin as Prime Minister; they even forgot the absurd notion that had inspired the Imperial rescript on March 19, 1914, wherein it was set forth, in blind disregard of the teachings of history and common sense, that "futile aspirations"—meaning constitutional reform—were irreconcilable with "the welfare of the people."

In proclaiming war, the Tsar said from the Throne:

At present we have not only to succor a kindred land which has been unjustly wronged, but to safeguard the honor, dignity, and integrity of Russia as a Great Power. We firmly believe that in the defense of their country all our true subjects will rise united in a spirit of self-sacrifice. At this great hour of trial may all internal differences be forgotten; may the union of the Tsar and his people become closer and stronger.

Russians believed that the Tsar, in summoning his people to embark upon a national war, had abjured his superannuated notions, and in this spirit they understood the Tsar's Manifesto.

Having lived in Russia during the days of the war with Turkey (1877-8) and the war with Japan (1904-5), I can confidently say that nothing like the same enthusiasm was observable at the outbreak of either of those two conflicts; yet the former had been essentially a popular and a patriotic enterprise.

Anxiety prevailed only on one point: would the British nation join in the struggle? During the few days that elapsed between the proclamation of war by Russia and the announcement that England had become her Ally, many prominent Russians appealed to me, among them being MM. Krivoshein and Sazonov. My reply

was: "I stake my head on it. The Germans will force us to fight, even should we still wish to stand aloof." Extraordinary scenes of enthusiasm were witnessed by me in the Duma after the news came that Great Britain had espoused the cause of injured nations. Allied representatives received tremendous ovations, such as the Duma had never known.

In view of the facts that have been adduced regarding Germany's scheme of a "preventive war," it is interesting to cite some interesting revelations made by General Yanushkevich, the Chief of Staff, and General Sukhomlinov, the former Minister of War, on his trial before the Supreme Court in Petrograd last September. They throw a curious light upon the circumstances of the outbreak of hostilities. Germany, be it noted, had planned to overwhelm France, and, having soon crushed her, to launch all her legions upon Russia. It was, therefore, of the highest importance to the General Staff in Berlin that the mobilization of the Russian Army should be delayed; every day gained at the outset of war would be of priceless value. We shall see how vital was this consideration when we treat of the first invasion of East Prussia.

The Germans subsequently asserted that their mobilization began "officially" only after Russia had commenced mobilization. The argument does not bear criticism. The Germans knew that Russia would require three weeks to mobilize her Army, whereas they could place all their war effectives in the field within half that space of time, thanks principally to their great superiority in railways. Moreover, the machinery of mobilization could be started in Germany—and was so started—before an official announcement was made, whereas in Russia it could not begin without an Imperial ukaz promulgated by the Senate.

When, in response to British appeals, Wilhelm ostensibly agreed to "restrain" Austria-Hungary and pledged

his "word of honor" to the Tsar (July 30th) not to mobilize the German Army if Russia abstained from a general mobilization, the German troops on the French border were already being concentrated for their dash into Belgium, and on this point the Allied Staffs had precise information. Wilhelm was thus making use of British peace efforts to hoodwink the Tsar and to gain time. It was a *ruse de guerre* of a kind which the Germans persistently resorted to before and during the war.

General Yanushkevich deposed as follows: "On July 29th we had decided to mobilize. The Emperor instructed me to convey assurances to Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador, that in proclaiming a mobilization Russia intended no hostile act towards Germany. I informed Sazonov; the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a poor opinion of Pourtales. He said that Pourtales would construe my words in his own way, and advised me to have a talk with the German Military Attaché, who was more competent in such matters. Major — answered my summons at the General Staff. He had usually come in uniform, and punctually at the time appointed, and spoken in Russian. On this occasion he kept me waiting a whole hour, appeared in plain clothes, and spoke only in French. I pointed out that Russia had no aggressive intentions towards Germany. The Major replied that, unfortunately, Russia had already begun to mobilize. I assured him that the mobilization had not begun. He then declared with *aplomb* that on this point he had more precise information. I gave him my word of honor as Chief of the General Staff that, at that precise moment, 3 P.M., July 29th, the mobilization had not yet been proclaimed. He still remained incredulous. I then offered to give him a written pledge. He politely declined it. At that moment the Russian mobilization had not commenced, although the ukaz ordering the mobilization was in my pocket.

"From the Attaché's behavior," continued the witness, "I understood that Germany had decided beforehand to have war with us, and that no power on earth could avert war. I understood, and afterwards I definitely ascertained, that at that moment Germany had already mobilized, but had managed to do so in secret, although the German Press asserted that at that moment Germany had not mobilized and that Russia had begun to mobilize. I categorically affirm that the first day of mobilization in Russia was the 30th of July."

Proceeding with his account of what transpired on the 29th and 30th July, General Yanushkevich deposed: "It was first decided to order a partial mobilization, affecting only the southwestern military districts, in order to frighten Austria-Hungary. Then this matter was reconsidered, and on July 30th, after I had made a report to the Emperor, the ukaz to the Senate, ordering a general mobilization, was signed. In urging a general mobilization, I had pointed out to the Tsar the necessity of defining our attitude quite clearly, not only towards Austria, but also towards Germany, who stood behind Austria's back. We knew quite well that Germany desired war, that, indeed, she was incapable of deferring a conflict because she was aware that our enlarged program would be ready in 1918, and that she must needs use her opportunities before the program was completed. From Peterhof I came straight to the Council of Ministers, then sitting, and read out to them the ukaz that had been signed by the Emperor.

"But, late that same day (July 30th), about 11 p.m., I was summoned to the telephone by the Emperor. He asked me what was the position of the mobilization. I answered that it was already in progress. Another question was then put to me: 'Would it not be possible to substitute a partial for a general mobilization, so that only Austria-Hungary should be affected?' I replied

that it would be exceedingly difficult, that such a course would entail a veritable catastrophe, that mobilization had already begun, that 400,000 reservists had been summoned. . . . Then it was explained to me by the Emperor that he had received a telegram from Wilhelm, in which Wilhelm pledged his word of honor that if a general mobilization were not proclaimed by us the relations between Germany and Russia would remain 'as hitherto,' friendly.

"After the conversation with the Tsar," continued General Yanushkevich, "I hastened to Sazonov, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and convinced him that it was not possible at that hour to recall the general mobilization. I implored him to give his support. He promised me to report to the Emperor in the morning. He did so, and at half-past four in the afternoon of July 31st a conference was held at the Palace, at which Sazonov, Sukhomlinov, and myself were present. In ten minutes we had decided that it was impossible to withhold a general mobilization, as such a course would be fatal to Russia. Sazonov had reported to the Emperor in this sense. At 5 P.M. the question was definitely settled in favor of the general mobilization."

But it transpired afterwards that General Yanushkevich's telephone conversations during those days with the Tsar and other personages were immediately reported to the German General Staff, which knew precisely the day, the hour, and the substance of every such conversation. General Yanushkevich noticed the ominous click which betrays the "tapping" of a "through" call, and immediately gave orders to put up a direct wire to Peterhof.

Resuming his account of the earlier conversation with the Tsar, General Yanushkevich added: "I ventured to retort that I had no faith in Wilhelm's word of honor, because I knew definitely that Germany had already

mobilized. And, as a matter of fact, I had received sufficiently reliable information at that time to show that Germany had mobilized. There is a difference between Russian and German methods. In Germany the mobilization is carried out by orders from the Minister of War, but with us it has to be preceded by the promulgation of a ukaz through the Senate."

This narrative was borne out by the statements of General Sukhomlinov. He deposed as follows: "On the night of July 30th I was rung up by the Emperor and told to cancel the mobilization." (The ex-Minister of War, in his further deposition, showed—as General Yanushkevich had explained—that the Tsar wanted to revert to a partial mobilization.) "It was a direct order, not admitting rejoinder. I was overcome, knowing that it was impossible to cancel the mobilization for technical reasons, and also because it would provoke frightful confusion in the country. . . . Half an hour later General Yanushkevich telephoned. The Emperor had told him to suspend the mobilization. He replied that it was technically impossible to do so. Then the Tsar had said: 'All the same, suspend it.' General Yanushkevich asked me what was he to do. I replied: 'Do nothing.' I heard General Yanushkevich utter a sigh of relief, saying 'Thank God!'

"Next morning I lied to the Emperor—I told him that the mobilization was proceeding *partially, only in the southwest*, although I knew that the mobilization was a general one and that it was impossible to stop it. Fortunately the Emperor changed his mind that day, and I was thanked instead of being censured."

While the mobilization was in progress General Sukhomlinov obtained the Emperor's permission to set aside half the Winter Palace for the convenience of G.O.C.'s, who there consulted together before joining their armies at the Front. But jealousy of the Minister's

influence led to a peremptory order to stop these consultations. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich had never forgiven General Sukhomlinov for abolishing the Supreme Council of State Defense, of which he had been President. He now suspected the Minister of designing to take control of strategy during the campaign, as he had monopolized the direction of Army affairs before the war. He had all the more grounds for this apprehension because Sukhomlinov had been the Tsar's tutor in strategy. These bickerings led to a complete estrangement between the War Office and Headquarters during the war, so long as Sukhomlinov and the Grand Duke remained at their posts.

Some surprise had been felt in military spheres over the appointment of the Grand Duke to the Supreme Command. The Emperor had made this choice ostensibly because "for general reasons" he did not then "think fit to assume" these duties himself, and it was to be inferred that he had substituted one of his kinsmen merely on account of his kinship. There were good reasons for selecting a member of the Imperial family. He could enforce obedience with greater authority. Purely military considerations of fitness to command had not played a decisive part in the matter, for there were many other Generals in the Tsar's Army who had far greater claims to leadership, chief among them being Alexeiev. But he and consummate strategists like Ruzsky were kept in the background.

The selection of General Yanushkevich to be Chief of Staff was even less comprehensible. He had terminated his Army career after commanding a battalion for four months, without seeing any active service. Later he had served in the juridical section of the War Office, and obtained a readership at the Staff College. Thence, by a series of lucky promotions, he had risen to be Chief of the College and Chief of the General Staff, by General

Sukhomlinov's favor and protection, the all-powerful Minister not wishing to have a man of strong and independent personality in occupation of this high post. Thence he had passed "automatically" to the highest military function that had ever been filled by a living Russian, that of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with a host of many millions of men under his orders. General Yanushkevich had no experience whatever of war, and, what is still more extraordinary, he had only the vaguest knowledge of the supply of munitions available. He declared at the Sukhomlinov trial: "We had no information till November (1914) as to the quantity of munitions that could be supplied to us." Yet he had left the General Staff only three or four months previously, and must, or should, have known what quantity of munitions had already been used up, what remained, and also what were the available means of producing more in the meantime.

Was it surprising under these circumstances that the Russian Army showed a lamentable deficiency in leadership? Army Group Commanders apparently did what they thought fit, without co-ordination between munitionment and strategy. The appointment of General Zhilinsky to command the northern group, apparently because he had been Chief of the General Staff and was Governor-General of Warsaw, was on a footing with the other selections. The disasters in East Prussia and in Galicia were inevitable.

Meanwhile the nation was working like one man to carry out the mobilization. General Lukomsky at the War Office and General Dobrorolsky at the General Staff directed the complex machinery with great skill and entire self-abnegation. I saw the latter several times in the sanctum whence he exchanged telegrams with all the four corners of the Empire. Unkempt, unshaven, begrimed by toil, he had rested neither by



THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS, WHEN GENERALISSIMO, CONVERSING WITH AN ARMY CHAPLAIN



night nor by day for a whole week. But he was in high spirits: "It is going splendidly. I can take a little sleep now. We are well within our schedule, and I expect we shall be several days ahead of it." He was right. The mobilization was complete on the sixteenth day, or five days earlier than could be foreseen. At the General Staff in Petrograd we all expected to reach Berlin before the end of the year.

General Lukomsky was rewarded by the Tsar in a unique manner. He was given the black and yellow ribbon of St. George to wear with his order of St. Vladimir. The statutes of the order of St. George did not admit of its bestowal except for service in the field. The Emperor had invented this device to show how great was his appreciation of his work.

But no organization, however skilful, could have accomplished the task with such amazing rapidity unless the people themselves had put their heart and soul into it. And that was precisely what the Russian nation had done. Reservists flocked to the colors. The village wives and maidens did not wail, as the Russian peasant women do on parting with their menfolk—there were no lamentations such as we heard later in the war, when disaster had overtaken the armies and the toll of casualties had grown long. The railwaymen were splendid. They did not have to go to the trenches then or later, but, throughout the war, and even during the Revolution, guards and engine-drivers bore themselves like true men. Whoever saw the mobilization of 1914 can never forget it. The memory of those early days of the war hovers over me as I write, and sheds its fragrance over the bitterness of ensuing years, over the horrors of war, and the still greater horrors and shame of revolution and anarchy.

On the railway lines leading westward came train-loads bearing an armed multitude out of the depths of All the Russias. On the Moscow-Brest-Warsaw line the

trains moved all one way on both tracks, day and night, in endless procession. It was like a double-ribbon of cheering, exulting humanity stretching out in endless miles, eagerly hastening to have done once and for all with the hated *Niemtsy* (Germans). The cities on the way hailed them and brought food. The village women cheered them on. The boys smuggled themselves into the trucks and went off to fight. Many girls donned the simple field dress and came disguised. Soon it became necessary to place a guard at the stations, lest all the schoolboys in Russia should join the armies.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### POOR ARMAMENTS; SPLENDID ARMY

Credits Unused—Undeveloped Industry—Red-tape in Artillery Department—Krupp & Co.—Sukhomlinov in Control—Woeful Lack of Shells—Russia's Armaments and German Plans—Miasoiedov—New Army Formations—Enormous Effectives—Swarms of Cavalry—Few Guns—The Siberian Troops—Military Colonization—The Caucasians and Finland Troops.

PEOPLE were not aware, however, of the true state of affairs in the War Ministry, and more particularly in the Artillery Department. The Army was "ready" to fight, but not sufficiently equipped for modern war. The Duma had repeatedly called attention to official neglect of the country's defenses. In 1907 a Supreme Council of State Defense had been instituted by the Tsar, under the Presidency of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich. He summoned Kokovtsov and said: "It is awful! There are no shells, no rifles, no cartridges." Kokovtsov replied that he had never been given an opportunity to consider the question. Together they drafted the estimates for an immediate expenditure on armaments of \$146,500,000. Some months later the "grand program" was passed by the Duma. They refused, however, to vote a lump sum because they had "no confidence" in the War Minister on account of his proximity to the Court. The money was to be voted yearly. They wanted to maintain a hold upon the Government. They did not intend to be parsimonious. Far from it. (But events have proved that they were mistaken. They had not sufficiently taken into account the industrial question, and had unconsciously lent themselves to

bureaucratic dilatoriness and red-tape.) During the seven years (1908-14) the Treasury assigned a total of \$231,850,000 to the War Departments, but only \$70,000,000 had been expended, leaving \$161,850,000 unutilized.<sup>1</sup>

The Army programs were to be completed by 1918. The Germans knew this, and, doubtless, the fact played a leading part in their consideration of a "preventive"<sup>2</sup> war in 1914. Probably they also knew—but the Russian nation did not know—that the program was not being carried out in regard to armaments and munitions. It had failed almost completely in this vital point—as shown by the huge amount of unused credits—for two reasons of unequal importance.

The first and lesser reason was to be sought in purely departmental technicalities—the red-tape prevailing in the Artillery Department—and in a prolonged personal conflict between the Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovich as Head of the Ordnance and General Sukhomlinov as Minister of War.

The second and major reason emanated from the still undeveloped condition of home industries. When German Staff plans for a war against France and Russia assumed concrete form in 1908—after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907—it was decided not to place any more orders for guns and munitions in Germany. It seemed to be obvious that the one thing to do was to manufacture them at home, or, if possible, in allied or friendly countries. But the Artillery Department could not change its routine ideas and methods.

<sup>1</sup> Count Kokovtsov. The Sukhomlinov trial.

<sup>2</sup> France, "degenerate and broken by political strife"—as the Germans then pictured her—had dared to increase her army by restoring the three years' service system; England was "England, the unready," and would not intervene—so the Germans imagined; the Kiel Canal had been widened for the passage of German Dreadnoughts. Last, but not least, the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand's death had to be avenged in the interests of absolutism.

They had always gone to Krupp. Krupp's agent in Petrograd (M. Wachter) was an important personage who held the rank of Actual Councillor of State in the Russian hierarchy (an equivalent of *Gewirkliche Staatsrat*). They had always done business with him. He was a courtly gentleman. No suspicion could ever attach to him, or to them, of collusion or bribery. Goodness knows what might be thought if they commenced negotiations with "strangers." Besides, the available Russian firms were also mostly German, so it would come to the same thing in the end. Give the order to Krupp in Germany, or to Tillmans,<sup>1</sup> or to Siemens & Halske, or to the Russian branch of the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft—was it not the same thing? In one way, certainly. Because the German firms in Russia could not be expected to refuse information to the General Staff in Berlin any more than could Krupp. And the Miasoiedov espionage case subsequently demonstrated the fact that one, at least, of these firms had free access to fortress plans and other military "secrets." In another way it did not. Krupp might hold up or lay an embargo on supplies at a crucial moment. The German firms in Russia could not.

Admiral Grigorovich, the Minister of Marine, had to work under the same unpleasant auspices. But he palliated the danger by inviting representatives of reputable British firms to superintend the construction of machinery for the ships under construction. But Admiral Grigorovich was not opposed to the Duma, and his credits were not doled out.

No proper appeal was made to Russian industries by

<sup>1</sup>The notorious Miasoiedov was an intimate friend of the senior partner in this firm, and through him was invited to attend the Imperial "shoots" at Rominten. Miasoiedov was then Colonel of Gendarmerie at Vierzholowo. He was discovered to be using a car with a double bottom wherein he smuggled goods from Germany, and for this cause had been dismissed. During the war he was reappointed to active service. Before the war Sukhomlinov had employed him to spy on officers till Suvorin and Guchkov denounced him as a spy.

the Artillery Department, and, moreover, it would not have been successful without guarantees that could not be given—guarantees of a political as well as of a financial character. The *okhrana* would have interfered—as it did constantly interfere—with any development of labor problems.

Besides, the Artillery Department was very busy experimenting with shell-fuses. It wanted to be quite sure that it had an ideal fuse<sup>1</sup> before proceeding to spend an urgent grant of \$5,000,000 voted for munitions by the Duma. Moreover, the earlier program had been based on the experience of the Japanese War, which appeared to call for a reserve of 350 rounds per gun. Later this figure was raised to a thousand. The Department had two shell factories in the country. In 1914 they were producing fifty thousand shells per month. The Department expected to accumulate by the middle of 1915 something like four million shells, which was considered to be amply sufficient for a war of three or four months. That was the maximum period that any war could last, in the opinion of the experts. Heavy guns—anything above three inches—had been little used in the Japanese War, and were almost entirely neglected. The total reserve of shells above three-inch caliber did not exceed fifteen thousand. The Artillery Department had not made good the depletion of munition stores on the western frontier, which had been resorted to for the requirements of the army in Manchuria; it did not even know where these stores were situated.

Proportionately speaking, the Russian Army was not so well prepared for war in 1914 as it had been in 1904.<sup>2</sup> Eleven artillery brigades on mobilization were found to be without guns.

<sup>1</sup> A mania for super-excellence has ever been the Russian's bane. In revolution as well as in fuses they wanted to "improve" on other countries.

<sup>2</sup> General Vernander. The Sukhomlinov trial.

M. Timashev, Minister of Commerce and Industry, during the period of increased armament, was kept in complete ignorance of the munition difficulty. Army affairs were never discussed before civilian members of the Cabinet. He and his civilian colleagues knew no more than did the public up to the very outbreak of war. They saw the article "We are ready" in the papers, and that was all the information they had. Even after the Galician reverses had brought home to people's minds that there were no shells, he was not approached by the War Office. He, himself, called a meeting of manufacturers, who were treated to a patriotic appeal by the Minister of War.

In 1910 "we began to do something," as General Polivanov expressed himself in giving his evidence. The program was being "realized," but "our industries could not cope with it, and the Artillery Department was holding up designs." However, "up to that time all our military preparations, such as they were, had provided only for another war with Japan, our struggle with that country having completely exhausted our means of defense."

The Germans were not in ignorance of this change in the venue, as a little incident which occurred on February 20, 1910, clearly shows. A war game was to be played in the Winter Palace under the direction of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich. Many leading Generals of the Russian Army had assembled there to undergo a test of their fitness for high command. They waited in vain. A telephone message came from Tsarskoe Selo dismissing the assembly, on the pretext that the Grand Duke "had not had time to prepare himself," but intimating that no more "war games" would be held "lest umbrage be taken by certain Powers."

Meanwhile the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, who was notoriously anti-German, had been relieved of

his office by the abolition of the Supreme Council. Previously he and the Chiefs of War Departments, including the Chief of the General Staff, reported independently to the Emperor. General Sukhomlinov urged that this method only created confusion, and to a certain extent he was right.<sup>1</sup> But now everything was concentrated in his hands, and the Tsar saw Army affairs through his eyes only. This was a fatal mistake, because General Sukhomlinov, being a courtier, represented matters invariably in a favorable light for himself. He was unable, however, to assert his authority over the Artillery Department, and could not get rid of the Grand Duke Sergius, whose position at Court was too strong.


Guchkov and a number of Deputies and officers formed a sort of informal club to discuss matters of State defense. General Gurko took a leading part in the work. But it displeased the Court. They were dubbed the "Young Turk Party" and placed under a ban.

Sukhomlinov was now master of the situation as regards the *personnel*, if not so much the *matériel*, of the Army, and, without challenging, or in any way reflecting upon the finding of the Court that tried him in August-September, 1917, impartial critics will be disposed to

<sup>1</sup> On this subject the author recalls a conversation with General Sukhomlinov which has an anecdotal interest. Relating the arguments he had used, he said: "I reminded His Majesty that even Napoleon declined to receive more than five ministerial reports in the course of a week. And here was the Tsar having to pass upon the reports of twelve Ministers and of half a dozen separate heads of departments connected with the War Office. The Tsar replied that the Kaiser managed to do it, so the Grand Duke had pointed out. To this I rejoined: 'Yes, your Majesty, that may be so. But you are not the Kaiser. He is older and more experienced. Just think yourself what will happen when each of the departmental reports run counter to the other, as they often do. You will have to make the decision, and it will be beyond your capacity!'" It must be remembered that Sukhomlinov had been the Tsar's tutor. What he said about the multiplicity of ministerial and departmental reports was perfectly true, and experience had shown that the utmost confusion often resulted from conflicting decisions endorsed by the unhappy autocrat.



CAUCASIAN NATIVE HORSE DIVISION IN THE CARPATHIANS



admit that he accomplished not a little for the better organization of Russia's man-power, although he was found guilty of delinquency in providing armaments.

In 1908 the standing Army was composed of Field and Reserve formations. The former represented sixty-three divisions of infantry, twenty-eight divisions of cavalry, and thirty-one brigades of field artillery, all grouped in thirty-one army corps, altogether about 528,000 bayonets, 70,000 sabers, and 3700 guns. The Reserve formations represented equivalents of a little over six corps, comprising about 500,000 men. This brought up the total peace strength in infantry to 1,280,000 men. On mobilization the Reserve battalions expanded into regiments of three-battalion strength, giving about eighteen additional Reserve corps, or 540,000 bayonets, while the two-battalion line regiments (not counting the Guards) on mobilization expanded to four-battalion strength, giving 480,000 additional bayonets. Thus, on mobilization the Army received over one million additional effectives, and represented a total fighting strength of 2,300,000 bayonets.

In 1910 the Reserve formations were abolished. They had not stood the test of war in the Japanese campaign. They lacked *esprit de corps* and efficiency. They were transformed into field units. The Duma had voted in secret session (1909) an increase of the annual contingent to nearly 460,000 men. The new organization, based on a three years' service with the colors, took approximately the following form: seventy-five guards and line divisions, each of sixteen battalions (with some minor exceptions), and as many field batteries, grouped in thirty-seven army corps, containing altogether 1,200,000 bayonets and 6000 guns. So far, the difference in bayonets was slightly in favor of the old scheme, and the increase in guns was "on paper." But in quality of fighting material the new organization gave better promise. On mobiliza-

tion this superiority was also to be implied. Every one of the regiments in the seventy army divisions "budded off" a second-line regiment, regular cadres of young and efficient officers and men being provided to form the second-line units, while the parent-regiment "filled up" with the pick of the men who had just been released from active service. By this method Russia had 1,200,000 first-class, and over 1,100,000 second-class fighting men available on mobilization.

At a conference summoned by the Tsar at Tsarskoe Selo, on March 23, 1913, it was decided to further increase the peace footing of the Army by 400,000 men, for which purpose it was proposed to assign \$111,500,000 in a lump sum, or \$45,500,000 annually. M. Kokovtsov agreed. This enlarged program had been necessitated by the clear and positive information received from the Russian military representatives in Berlin, and the evidence afforded by the secret intelligence service of German designs to seek a decision on the battlefield. This information showed that in 1908, as soon as Russia had begun to think about repairing her armed defenses, the Germans planned a war for 1909, and then, having humiliated Russia, they again decided in 1910, as soon as they had information about the first program, to force a war in 1913. But once more they could find no favorable opportunity. Then, having learned of the enlarged program which was to be completed by 1918, they resolved finally and irrevocably to defeat Russia's plans of independence.

The basis of the seven years' program was not affected by the enlarged scheme. In fact the mobilization of 1914 was carried out according to the plan laid down in 1910, which was then somewhat superannuated.

It should be added that artillery brigades on mobilization contained six-gun instead of eight-gun batteries, whereby the difficulty of arming the second-line brigades was partially overcome. Thus the strength of the active

Army in field guns at the outbreak of war was nominally about 5200. An artillery park (40,000 rounds) was attached to each army corps.

The cavalry was little affected by the new scheme. Cossack second- and third-line formations provided on mobilization a total of over twenty divisions. Another regular cavalry division was raised in the Caucasus, besides a volunteer Native Horse Division (afterwards nicknamed "The Savages"), bringing up the total to fifty cavalry divisions, or 120,000 sabers, the largest force of trained horsemen that modern warfare had known. Each regular cavalry division was composed of a Hussar, a Lancer, a Dragoon, and a Cossack regiment, and was ordinarily attached to an army corps. Alexander III had converted all the line cavalry regiments into dragoons and ordained very unbecoming uniforms. Sukhomlinov, himself a hussar, restored all the glories of the olden time. It had cost some money, but looked decidedly effective on parade and at Court.

In medium and heavy guns the Army was woefully ill-provided. There were altogether twenty-two mortar divisions of 4.7 Krupp howitzers attached to army corps, and twenty-one batteries of heavy artillery. In aeroplanes and wireless there was tremendous deficiency.

Another lamentable defect was the paucity of machine guns. There were only four per regiment, and even this number could not be rendered immediately available, because harness and cartridge-belts had not been prepared in sufficient quantity. Also there was a deficiency of rifles. The Ordnance Department had "miscalculated," and besides, 150,000 rifles had been given to Serbia before the war.

General Sukhomlinov was responsible for another important change in the Russian defense system. He abolished the fortresses in Poland, and moved four army corps eastward to the Volga, constituting a new military

district at Kazan. He claimed that the fortress "idea" was superannuated, that it weakened initiative among commanders in the field, etc. The General Staff in Paris was somewhat disconcerted, and an exchange of views took place, which apparently satisfied the Allies. Sukhomlinov argued that his scheme of army reorganization and the distribution of the new corps (one in the Caucasus, two in Siberia, and three in European Russia) left the position on the western border unweakened, while it brought the new formations nearer to their supplies and reserves and more easy of mobilization. But the question of the fortresses gave rise to much controversy. When the war broke out the dismantling of the great strongholds of Novo-Georgievsk, Warsaw, and Ivangorod had been substantially carried into effect. But the services rendered by Ivangorod, hastily re-equipped, and more particularly by Ossowiec, did not bear out Sukhomlinov's theory.

Never in the history of the world had there been such an army as the one that assembled on the Austro-German frontiers by the end of August, 1914. As fighting material the Russian infantryman was unrivaled. He could fight and march, and suffer all the privations of campaigning, on a modicum of food and comfort that only a primitive rustic population could endure. Moreover, the first-line regiments were splendidly disciplined and well led, and they alone represented an army of nigh upon 1,500,000 bayonets. As for the 50,000 Guards, I do not think they had their equals in any other armies in numbers and physique, if not in courage. They were the pick and flower of a hundred million men of one race, language, and creed. These giants looked upon Austrian troops with the supremest contempt, and at first insisted upon attacking them bolt upright, scorning to take cover.

More particularly interesting had been the history of the Siberian troops, which deserves some attention as

a record of military colonization. At the time when the Great War began, the Siberian troops consisted of five army corps, or ten divisions, in all about 160,000 bayonets. Some of the earliest units from which this splendid force had developed had gone to the Far East in the middle of the nineteenth century to safeguard the borders, stretching for thousands of miles eastward from the Urals to the very shores of the Pacific Ocean, the Cossacks being too few for this vast zone. For service in desert and in wild and uninhabited places, the Government decided not to send newly conscripted recruits, but officers and men drafted from active units.

At that time people knew so little about Siberia that few were desirous of proceeding thither for service. Lots were drawn by officers, and only the healthiest were selected, while the men were detailed at the rate of ten per company, soldiers able to read and write, healthy, and of irreproachable behavior.<sup>1</sup>

Preparations for the long journey were protracted and complicated. Horses and conveyances had to be prepared, and equipment obtained of a character more suitable to the distant region. The officers and some of the men traveled with their families, taking with them domestic cattle and all their household effects, prepared to sever their ties with Europe. As far as the Urals the earlier travelers proceeded by steamers and railways, but from Ekaterinburg or Cheliabinsk the entire distance to the Russo-Chinese frontier, six hundred miles, had to be traversed on foot. To the Trans-Amur region the last part of the journey was made by water. In front of the battalions marched two companies in line; then came the transport wagons with provisions, uniforms, equipment, cartridges; then another company, and the transport conveying officers' and soldiers' families.

In Western Siberia, where the route of the battalions

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Smolianinov. *The Times* Russian Supplement. Jan. 1915.

passed over the Great Siberian track, halts were made in the villages, prosperous and thrifty, like all villages in Siberia. Here the tired travelers rested a day or two, and then continued their journey. But the farther they proceeded towards the east the more difficult it was to advance. The "taiga," or Siberian jungle, began, with its narrow paths winding in and out, obstructed by the thick-spreading tree-roots which protruded from the swampy, uneven ground.

Thousands of mosquitoes and horse-flies hovered in clouds over the column, depriving human beings and horses of all peace, and when the battalion stopped for the night a thick cordon of sentries with loaded rifles was drawn round the sleepers, as no one could be sure that somewhere near there was not prowling a bear, quick to detect the scent of abundant fresh meat. Thus they went on for weeks, passing towns, villages, and detached *zaimki*, as the farms of well-to-do peasants (often exiles originally) are called in Siberia, until they reached the town of Srietensk, on the Shilka. Here began loading on shallow-draught barges and rafts, and the column transformed itself into a huge river transport, slowly moving eastward, avoiding the inshore shallows. This voyage was a long-awaited rest. Sitting in the barges, the soldiers cleaned and dried themselves and mended their overcoats, uniforms, and boots, which had been ripped and torn in the forests. At sunset the entire caravan made fast to the bank, and the passengers landed and cooked supper.

With the arrival of the travelers at the appointed spot, their privations were not yet ended. Many battalions, on getting as far as Khabarovsk and receiving instructions as to their post, encountered impenetrable forest and continuous masses of graystone. Here their work began, and, where till then the foot of man had never trod, rang out the sound of ax and saw. By autumn, when

terrible rains and wind from the sea begin, had arisen a barrack settlement, seething with life. Thus arose and were created almost all the towns and settlements of the Far East—Khabarovsk, Novokievsk, Possiet, Iman, Shkotovo, Barabash, De Castries.

The strategic importance of De Castries was enormous. The sea at this spot forms a splendid harbor, of sufficient depth and well protected, which could readily be utilized for a hostile landing. Troops landed here, by making use of Lake Kesi, could easily debouch on the Amur, and without difficulty establish themselves in the middle of its lower reaches, thus flanking the fortress of Nikolaevsk, which closes ingress to the Amur from the Tatar Straits. To-day De Castries is a fortified place. But about five years ago there was nothing there save a lighthouse and barracks for a company of infantry. It is difficult to imagine the gigantic work accomplished by these companies engaged in preparing De Castries for conversion into a fortress.

Years passed, and the battalions grew more and more accustomed to the new conditions, which became easier for every succeeding contingent of recruits. Every soldier who joined the Siberian Rifles, irrespective of what he was before conscription, passed through a severe and laborious military school. During the first four months of duty, on them devolved all the heavy work of building, of felling trees, floating them down the rivers, uprooting stumps. In the following year they entered the hunting detachments formed from time to time in every company for stalking bear, tiger, or deer. They spent whole weeks in the jungle, so among the Siberian riflemen there were a large number of first-class hunters and exceptional shots. Work and hunting in the jungle did not cease even in the winter, although the frosts reach 40 deg. to 49 deg. Fahr. A *polushúbka* (short fur coat), a shaggy black fur cap (*papakha*), felt boots, and a pair

of broad plain skis—these were the only things that distinguished winter from summer equipment.

Four years of such service so inured the men to the new regime, unfamiliar to natives of Central European Russia, that a good fourth of them felt no desire to return home, and settled in the Far East, working as laborers, artisans, and farmers, creating there a new vigorous and prosperous Russia, differing from the poor Russian peasantry in Europe.

During the last ten or fifteen years many of the conditions of life had improved. Siberia and the Far East was being energetically colonized and linked up with civilization. But in the Siberian units before the war might still be found a large cadre of officers who had undergone all that has been described above. Every day one of the companies of the regiment, in full marching order, with the necessary transport, tents, and camp kitchens, left barracks to go into the field or the jungle for training, winter and summer alike.

Straight from the cars these Siberian columns were hurled into the fight near Warsaw. And here, under strange conditions, with an unfamiliar opponent, who had at his disposal every technical appliance for slaughter and destruction, they fought in accordance with the rules of their Siberian school. Taught by experience to rely upon their own efforts and not to look back for the approach of reinforcements, one brigade fought two days with two corps of Germans, sustaining the shock against the Polish capital. Only on the third day did reinforcements arrive, when a fierce conflict raged along the whole line, terminating in the rout of the Germans. In this struggle only a handful of the survivors of the Siberian Rifles took part; the remainder had fallen, honorably vindicating their wonderful traditions. Later, at Augustovo, the Third Siberian Corps marched thirty miles and then charged Hindenburg's men with the bayonet and drove them back to East Prussia.



**THE SAVAGES IN THE CARPATHIANS**

**The Grand Duke Michael and his staff crossing a river during the advance against the Austrian armies.**



The three army corps from the Caucasus were picked troops, with traditions older and more glorious than those of the Siberians. They had long been recruited from the hardy Russian settlers on the Caucasian borderland, men of splendid physique, reared in a sunny land of mountains and plains, inured to hardship, to burning heat and searching cold, imbued with traditions that were as inspiring as those of their near relations, the Cossacks. At Ivangorod the Third Caucasian Corps, under General Irmanov, performed prodigies of valor. One division, commanded by General Ivanov, held out for nine days on the left bank of the Vistula in marshlands, with water up to their waists and necks, till the Guards came up, and then, together, they drove the enemy helter-skelter to the very doors of Cracow.

The Finland Rifles represented a younger but not less seasoned force. They had been raised when, the Finns declining to serve in the Russian Army, it became necessary to assure the northern borderlands against hostile invasion. All the officers and N.C.O.'s were picked men. Service in Finland was much sought after, owing to the greater comfort and cheapness of living in the Grand Duchy, and vacancies were readily filled up. The Finland Corps (the XXIIId) had been brought up to a high standard of efficiency. Summer and winter the men were constantly on campaign service. Like the Siberians and Caucasians they had their hunting companies, which used to travel on skis hundreds of miles into the forests around Ladoga and Onega after bear and elk in winter and lesser game in summer and autumn. These men fought splendidly at Augustovo. One company was surrounded by the Germans, held its trenches for fourteen days, and then, having expended the last cartridge and biscuit, fought its way back to the Niemen, losing four-fifths of its strength in killed and wounded.

## CHAPTER XIX

### SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER

Russian Offensive—Distribution of Armies—Pressure Diverted from Allies—Hindenburg Intervenes—Strategy Upset—A Decisive Battle—Incompetent Generals—Ruzsky's Recovery—Galician Campaign—No Munitions—Japan's Offer—Ivanov Left in Ignorance—No Boots, no Rifles—The Great Retreat—Alexeiev—The Tsar as Generalissimo—Excessive Mobilization—Lack of Unity and Modern Methods—Allies Help—Sacrifices in Vain—Russia's Losses—The Navy.

It would be a work of supererogation to retrace all the vicissitudes of the Russian campaign during the two and a half years of war under the Old Regime. But some of its outstanding features have still to be more clearly elucidated. Russia took the offensive at the outset for two reasons: firstly, because her Army had been strengthened sufficiently to warrant this course, and the advantages of offensive strategy were obvious; secondly, because "Russia had to support her Allies. According to the plan jointly agreed upon, it fell to her share to divert the attention of Germany from France."<sup>1</sup>

A general offensive against the Austro-German coalition necessitated the clearing of Russia's flanks in Poland, so that the huge armies assembled behind the Niemen, the Vistula, and the Dnieper could freely utilize the Polish salient as a *place d'armes* whence they could launch themselves into Silesia, cut off the Austrians, and menace Berlin. Such was the problem set before the High Command at the Headquarters near Baranovichi in August, 1914.

On August 16th the mobilization and concentration

<sup>1</sup> General Yanushkevich (l.c.).

of the armies was completed. General N. I. Ivanov commanded the Southern or Kiev group; General Zhilinsky the Vilna or Northern group. Their forces were about equal. Each had about 1,200,000 bayonets, over 2000 guns, and huge masses of cavalry. Each launched his main attack on the same day, August 17th, after preliminary reconnaissances and skirmishes by the horsemen. In both cases enemy territory was invaded.

The difference between the respective merits of the Staff work soon became apparent. General Alexeiev, directing the operations in the south, never faltered or made a mistake, and, thanks to his remarkable talents, the men under the leadership of Generals Ruzsky, Brusilov, and Radko-Dmitriev scored an almost uninterrupted series of brilliant victories, successively capturing positions of great strength at Zaleshchiki, Halich, Tarnopol, and Bzhezany, "rushing" Lemberg (September 2, 1914), reducing the great fortress of Pshemysl (March 21, 1915), and, earlier, crossing the Carpathians, threatened the plain of Hungary and came within a few miles of Cracow.<sup>1</sup>

They were superior in numbers to the enemy, but, on the other hand, they had to overcome tremendous obstacles and almost throughout these operations they were short of munitions.

In the north, Zhilinsky had an overwhelming superiority over the Germans. Only five corps had been left to guard the Prussian frontier while the bulk of Wilhelm's hosts were hurled against France. In East Prussia the Germans had two active corps and some reserve formations and garrison troops equivalent in number to about two corps. Against this force Generals Rennenkampf and Samsonov each wielded an army of five army corps of first-line troops.

<sup>1</sup> Many of the Slav soldiers of Austria-Hungary, forming a large portion of the Army, went over to the Russians, thereby greatly facilitating the Russian advance. Subsequently, the Czechs and Slovaks entered the Russian service.

Rennenkampf's cavalry, including the Guards (many of whose officers were of the Baltic-German nobility), simply romped into East Prussia. Eydtkuhnen was occupied August 6th; two days later, the Chevalier and Horse Guards rode down German batteries; on August 17th the Prussian forces were smashed at Stallupönen; Insterburg fell August 24th; the Russian right was near Königsberg, their outposts as far west as Bartenstein, and the whole of the northeastern corner of "Junkerland" was in their power.

Samsonov's army having concentrated behind the Narew, he proceeded to direct his main thrust from Soldau, in the southwest corner of the province, towards Allenstein, and, having turned the "impregnable" defenses of Mazuria, with its lakes and swamps, to join hands with Rennenkampf and sweep East Prussia clear of the enemy. His troops crossed the frontier and took Soldau, Neudenburg, and Allenstein; then, after a ten days' fierce engagement captured Frankenau (August 24th and 25th).

The position was now (August 24th) as follows: Rennenkampf held the line Friedland-Gerdauen-Nordenburg-Angerburg, facing southwest. Samsonov occupied the triangle Soldau-Alenstein-Frankenau, facing northwest. And the interval between the armies was being scoured by Russian cavalry, who had almost met.<sup>1</sup> But in both armies there was lack of direction and management. Neither General used his opportunities for capturing important lines of road and railway, with which the province had been richly endowed for strategic purposes.

Rennenkampf had wasted his time in amenities with the Brandenburgers, seeking to impress them by the humane and kindly disposition of the Russian troops, which was repaid at every opportunity by the sniping of Russian soldiers. His Staff appear to have broken

<sup>1</sup> A distance of only sixteen miles separated the armies.

down at the crucial moment. Instead of hastening to join Samsonov, they issued orders and counter-orders, so that the bewildered commanders did not know what to do. Meanwhile the Staff had made no arrangements whatever for a possible retreat.

Samsonov, recently commanding in Turkestan, had joined his army when its advance had already begun. He had been detained, it seems, by General Zhilinsky at Vilna. So he was unable to personally supervise the initial arrangements of his move into enemy territory. To this fact must be ascribed the astounding neglect of assuring the safety of his left flank, which soon gave the enemy his chance, and of providing food and ammunition for some of his corps. The food and ammunition had been "delayed." He had three divisions of cavalry and should have been able to secure himself from surprise. But the cavalry had all been sent on in front.

The Germans had been doing their best to hamper the advance of the invaders, but wisely contented themselves with delaying battles. The situation on August 23d was wellnigh desperate. Refugees were flocking into Berlin, and it looked as if nothing could prevent the occupation of East Prussia. Heeding the clamor of Junkerland, the German Headquarters Staff finally gave orders to send troops from the West. They were seen entraining in Belgium on Friday night, August 28th. But on the 23d Hindenburg had assumed charge, and immediately took advantage of the mistakes committed by the Russians.<sup>1</sup> Assembling what troops he could, the remnants of two corps from Königsberg and the scrapings from Thorn and other fortress garrisons, he struck at Samsonov's left, cutting off supplies from the Russian 1st Army Corps under General Artomonov, which it seems had no ammunition, and, as a consequence

<sup>1</sup> It is said that the Russian wireless messages interchanged by the armies were not even coded, and this greatly helped the German counter-move.

thereof, Artomonov retired, exposing the whole of Samsonov's left flank. He then struck at Soldau, Samsonov's main line of retreat. Soldau fell on the 26th. Samsonov tried desperately on the following day to recapture it. He had to fall back upon Neudenburg, whence he had no way of escape. Meanwhile Hindenburg's scratch army, skilfully handled, was driving the loosely strung out Russian forces into the Mazurian swamps. They fought desperately for six days; then 90,000 surrendered and the remainder escaped into the woods, leaving 30,000 of their comrades killed, wounded, or drowned, and, finally, straggled into Poland. Nearly 100,000 men subsequently rejoined the colors, but the tales they brought back with them inflicted a tremendous blow upon the prestige of their commanders.

A British officer had joined Samsonov in the woods near Neudenburg some hours before the disaster had become irreparable. Urging him to immediately return lest the enemy's cavalry should have already closed all avenues of escape, Samsonov said: "My right flank (the VIth and XIIIth Corps) is crushed, my left (the Ith Corps) does not exist. I cannot go back. I am going forward," and pointing northwestward, he shook hands and resumed his study of the maps spread out by the roadside. Soon afterwards he and his Staff were fugitives, and, unable to survive the loss of his army, he shot himself.

Hindenburg lost no time in following up his success. Again he struck northeastward to intercept Rennenkampf's line of retreat. A disaster of equal magnitude to that of Samsonov's army was averted solely by the cavalry. A whole corps under General Khan of Nakhichevan, including a division commanded by General Gurko, swept across the line of the German advance and enabled the army to recross the frontier with the loss of some 30,000 prisoners. The retreat was indeed a

terrible one, several corps retiring simultaneously along one road, under the fire of German artillery, who unlimbered their guns in the open within a few hundred yards of the highway. And every window in every town or village traversed by the Russians was belching missiles, old guns, horse-pistols, and blunderbusses having been mobilized to speed the parting "guests."

The whole of Samsonov's artillery and much of Rennenkampf's had been lost. Also some 400,000 rounds of shell—a terrible sacrifice, for a shortage of munitions had already begun to make itself felt.

Hindenburg unwarily pursued the Russians to the Niemen. General Ruzsky, the victor of Lemberg, having taken command in the north, soon turned the tables on the invaders at Augustovo, and again punished them in February, when, aided by Colonel Miasoiedov, their secret agent on the Staff of General Siever's corps (the Xth), the Germans turned its flank and nearly crumpled up the whole of the Niemen front.

Meanwhile, Hindenburg had gone to other and more important scenes. He had destroyed the Russian plan of a combined offensive. He now proceeded to deprive them of their strategical position in Poland, whereby he hoped at one stroke to drive their northern group beyond the Vistula and check the advance of the southern armies on Cracow. Twice he struck and twice he failed. But on each occasion the Austrians secured a respite, General Ivanov's troops having to send aid. In these onslaughts Hindenburg had the help of troops brought from the West in response to the call of Brandenburg.

Russia had thus fulfilled her appointed task. She had diverted some of the German legions from sadly harassed France. But, owing to mismanagement and inefficiency on the part of her Generals, she had done so with incalculable prejudice to the future success of her own and Allied plans. The Battle of Soldau, or Tannenberg,

as the Germans quite arbitrarily named it for purposes of their own,<sup>1</sup> was one of the few great decisive battles in history. From its effects Russian strategy was not destined to recover, and for this reason I have described the East Prussian campaign somewhat in detail, utilizing the information I had been able to obtain from independent—not official—sources, from the lips of officers and soldiers who had been engaged therein. The whole subsequent record of the struggle between Russia and the Central Powers bears the imprint of this disaster. Not in vain did the Germans idolize Hindenburg, although I have shown that Hindenburg's task was unhappily not a very difficult one.

The final and crowning disaster of the great retreat was due to causes similar to those that had brought about Hindenburg's victory—lack of organization and co-ordination. The scarcity of shells was noticeable in the early days of the war. As a matter of fact, on August 21, 1914, the Artillery Department had received a telegram from the Northern Front asking for "more munitions." Experience of the first days of war had shattered all the calculations that had been based upon the lessons of the Japanese campaign. From that time onward the cry for munitions never ceased. In February, 1915, the requirements of all the armies were estimated at 60 parks (2,400,000 rounds) per month. Instead of that they received 8 parks (480,000 rounds).<sup>2</sup> Why, it may be asked, was the Southern Army group thrust forward in reckless fashion when there was no prospect of supplying it


<sup>1</sup> At Tannenberg, a village some distance from Soldau, a great battle was fought July 15, 1410, between the Teutonic Knights and a Slav army composed of Poles, Russians, and Lithuanians, in which the Germans were completely routed. By attributing the same name to the Battle of Soldau, the descendants of the vanquished Teutons flattered their own pride and revenged themselves for the historical ignominy which they had sustained at the hands of the despised Slav races.

<sup>2</sup> General G. Danilov, D.M.O. at G.H.Q. The Sukhomlinov trial.



(From a photograph published by the "Russkoe Slovo")  
"MEETING STRATEGY"

As a result of Bolshevist agitation the Armies of the Southwestern Front would not follow up their successes against the Austro-Germans, and when the Russian lines were opened (July 19, 1917) 12 divisions one after the other declined to close in on the enemy, although it was known that there were only 2 German and 1 Austro-Hungarian Divisions advancing (on Tarnopol). The picture represents the colonel of a regiment—hat in hand—explaining the situation to his men and imploring them to fight. Every battalion or company had erected hustings for the Bolshevist propaganda purposes. The inscription on the banner is "Liberty and Equality."



with shells? The answer is to be found in the complete estrangement that existed between Headquarters and the War Departments. General Sukhomlinov was making promises which could not be fulfilled and Headquarters was blaming him for not doing the impossible.

General Ivanov was kept in ignorance of the real state of affairs, and allowed to do what he pleased. General Ivanov undertook the campaign in the Carpathians at his own risk and peril, hoping that shells would be supplied to him. He did not consider it possible to remain inactive, because inactivity in the field is fatal.<sup>1</sup>

General Vernander, Assistant Minister of War, had summoned representatives of twenty-two firms and asked them to help. But "they demanded such huge subsidies that we could do nothing." Besides, his department was "arranging technical conditions." In the early days of January, 1915, designs and specifications were handed to agents of American firms and Sukhomlinov expected to obtain deliveries in April. These munitions did begin to arrive in April, but in April, 1916.

The Army also lacked rifles, boots, and clothing. President Rodzianko related in Court that he had been to the Stavka (General Headquarters) in October, 1914, to discuss these matters. The Grand Duke asked him to intercede with the Emperor. M. Rodzianko recommended wide recourse to the Zemstvos, for which purpose he proposed to summon a Zemstvo Congress. The Minister of the Interior (M. Maklakov) retorted: "I know what you want—to prepare a revolution."

In January, 1915, the Duma took up the question. Sukhomlinov promised his assistance, but nothing was done. Then, in March, M. Rodzianko again visited the Stavka. The Grand Duke said: "The Army cannot go on fighting without rifles or boots." M. Rodzianko went to Galicia "to see for himself," as the Grand Duke

<sup>1</sup> General Yanushkevich (l.c.).

had suggested. He was with the Third Army (General Radko-Dmitriev) and witnessed enemy attacks when the Russian artillery had only three rounds per gun. He saw soldiers armed with sticks. Radko wept: He said "I cannot hold out unless I have arms.<sup>1</sup> We shall have to surrender all that we have won." M. Rodzianko saw General Kornilov at the place which he managed to hold till he was wounded and taken prisoner. After that M. Rodzianko went back to the Stavka. "You see, I was right," exclaimed the Grand Duke. Then M. Rodzianko asked leave to bring the whole matter before the Tsar and, on behalf of the Duma, to insist upon energetic measures being taken. The Tsar agreed to appoint a Special Conference. Evidence of departmental chaos and intrigue and of personal rivalry between General Sukhomlinov and the Grand Duke Sergius was so overwhelming that General Sukhomlinov was dismissed. But the Artillery Department still continued its obstructive methods. Thereupon M. Rodzianko went to the Grand Duke Sergius and said to him: "Unless you resign I shall have you exposed in the Duma." The Grand Duke was then appointed to another post: Inspector General of Ordnance.

In April, 1915, the Special Conference drew up a comprehensive scheme of mobilizing industries for immediate munition production. This scheme was laid by till August "to wait for the Duma Committee," as General Yanushkevich afterwards stated. An offer of 1,000,000 rifles from Japan was declined because they were of a different caliber from the Russian rifle. Viscount Motono, the Japanese Ambassador in Petrograd, had suggested to General Sukhomlinov in the early months of the war

<sup>1</sup> The wastage of rifles during the early months of the war had been very great, as it necessarily must be in field warfare, especially going over enormous distances, as the Russian Army had done. Moreover, there was no organization then to collect the rifles of wounded men or to utilize captured rifles.

that Japanese industries could supply munitions, and had pointed out that, during their own war with Russia, the Japanese had suffered greatly from shortage of munitions till they had mobilized their industries. The offer and the advice were both disregarded till long afterwards.

On May 2, 1915, General Mackensen, having stiffened the Austrian ranks with picked German troops, opened a bombardment such as the Russian Army had never known. Something like 700,000 shells burst upon the shallow Russian trenches.<sup>1</sup> The much-vaunted "phalanx" pierced Radko-Dmitriev's single line; the Russians had no ammunition. The enemy mustered twenty-four army corps against the Russian fourteen, and the Russians had to retreat. They fought stubbornly, heroically. Who can describe all the tragedy of that retreat! It will live for many a year in the minds of those who came through it alive. It left an aftermath of bitterness and disappointment which did much to strengthen the ferment of revolution.

Warsaw fell August 5, 1915. Novo-Georgievsk capitulated—through treachery, it is said—August 19th, uncovering the Russian flank. Brest-Litovsk, the great Lithuanian border stronghold, fell August 25th. Worst of all, Kovno had fallen a week earlier, also through treachery, deserted by its Commandant, who fled inland and was arrested—a raving lunatic. Kovno was immensely strong, yet it did not resist more than seven days. This catastrophe threatened to close the main avenue of escape for the tortured armies. The road eastward through the Pripiat marshes was already overthrown by countless fugitives.<sup>2</sup> Artillery could

<sup>1</sup> The Russian troops had not been trained to trench warfare and were constitutionally averse to "digging in." This was noticeable during the first year of the war, and, to a lesser degree, afterwards.

<sup>2</sup> More than 3,000,000 Poles, Lithuanians, Galicians, and Jews fled eastward into Russia during the great retreat. The population of Petrograd and Moscow increased by nearly 1,000,000.

not pass through this concourse without throwing carts with their human freight into the morass on either side. Many thousands thus perished and many more thousands died on the way.

At this appalling conjuncture of disasters the Tsar decided to assume the High Command (September 5, 1915). He alleged a chivalrous motive: he did not desire to wrest anyone's laurels, so he came in when things looked gloomiest. But he himself did not realize that he was acting as a puppet in the hands of Razputin, who had taken this opportunity to settle old scores with the Grand Duke. He appointed General Alexeiev his Chief of Staff. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich went to take command in the Caucasus, where General Yudenich secured for him afterwards a series of brilliant victories against the Turks, resulting in the capture of Erzerum, Erzingian, and Trebizond. It is interesting to note that before his departure the Grand Duke said to a friend: "If I had had my choice I should also have selected General Alexeiev, but I took the man that was given to me. He was in favor then. He is in disfavor now. I am not going to desert him when he is down." And General Yanushkevich went with him as his assistant, but he never again had anything to do with armies in the field.

General Alexeiev succeeded in an apparently hopeless task. He extricated all the northern armies from the jaws of the trap that was closing upon them. The Guards had set their back against Vilna and held open one of the jaws. A daring German cavalry raid to Molodechno was countered, and finally, when the order to evacuate Vilna came (September 18th), the weary, war-stained armies marched across country along the route that had carried Napoleon's invader's in 1812.

Modestly, General Alexeiev told me afterwards: "It

was our men's endurance on the march that saved us." He was only partly right.

The armies in the field had been under the undivided control of their commanders. There had been no interference from Petrograd or Tsarskoe Selo. The reserve formations in the rear had, on the other hand, no connection except with the War Office. And here, again utter chaos and inefficiency had prevailed. The reserves, hurried up during the retreat, were often raw peasants who had never handled a rifle, who had not the rudiments of military training or discipline, and were armed only with sticks. In tens and in hundreds of thousands they fell prisoners into the hands of the Germans, adding only to the confusion of the retreat. General Alexeiev set himself to remedy this evil. He wanted a substantial support for future operations. The War Office had an efficient chief in General Polivanov, who, however, did not long remain there because he was not liked at Court, and General Shuvaiev, a commissariat expert, took his place. The War Department now went to the other extreme, from excess of zeal towards the Tsar, now Generalissimo. Too many men were called out—millions and millions in excess of efficient requirements, needlessly irritating the villagers, reducing agricultural labor and the production of foodstuffs.

Russia's armies scored many a gallant victory in the several offensives afterwards undertaken by General Brusilov, wherein such leaders as Kaledin, Lechitsky, Sakharov, Shcherbacher, Lesh, Count Keller, and others distinguished themselves. The Dvinsk and Riga held their positions stanchly, and even drove back the enemy. (Platonovka, November, 1915.)

Munitions and heavy guns had increased very largely. Russia's Allies helped her, but she herself produced over 80 per cent of all her own requirements. The wastage of rifles had so diminished in trench warfare

that now there was a fair sufficiency. But in technical improvements, in modern applications of trench artillery, etc., the War Department still continued its old methods. While I was at the Southwestern Front in December, 1915, thousands of soldiers' lives were wasted because no trench mortars were available. The Artillery Department had been "experimenting" to "improve" French and British models. Later, General Lukomsky, leaving the War Office to take command of a division, was able with the use of trench mortars to score easy successes in the Carpathians without much loss of life.

Under the influence of the Old Regime persistent unwillingness had always been shown to any direct contact between the Russian and Allied Armies. Officers applying for temporary service in France in order to acquaint themselves with the latest methods were not encouraged.

Of the Siberian, Caucasian, and Finland, as well of the first and even the second line regiments that fought so gallantly in 1914 and 1915 little remained save the name. They had been filled and refilled. The losses during the war were heavy, if prisoners be counted in. Casualties in killed and wounded of course affected chiefly the fighting units, and more particularly the infantry. By the end of 1915 the fighting units had lost 200 and even 300 per cent of their effectives.<sup>1</sup> One colonel told me that he had nearly 25,000 men on the strength of the regiment, of whom less than 3000 were then in the ranks; the remainder had been killed, wounded, or incapacitated for further service.

<sup>1</sup> Losses in the artillery averaged about 30 per cent; in the cavalry about 25 per cent. Officers of these arms were not strangers to their men; hence these men remained disciplined long after the infantry had become "revolutionized." Moreover, the younger infantrymen, who were better educated, had been replaced by older men, who were mostly illiterate.

On a rough estimate the total losses at the beginning of the Revolution may be stated at 4,500,000, including 500,000 killed, nearly 2,000,000 wounded or invalided, and over 2,000,000 prisoners. At the end of 1915 the men on service numbered 6,000,000. Something like 16,000,000 men had been "called up" by the end of 1916, or nearly 10 per cent of the population. Approximately 8,000,000 men were then distributed in the various towns and cities, undergoing instruction, more or less appropriate, and guarding communications, etc.

It was said soon after the war began that the shortage of officers had reached an enormous figure—30,000 to 50,000. Training corps, established in various parts of the country, provided a contingent of *práporshchiki* (ensigns, or the equivalent of our temporary second-lieutenants) whose loyalty and patriotism could not compensate for their lack of efficiency, whence the prestige of officers was sadly diminished in the eyes of their men.

The depreciation in the fighting value of old first-line units owing to losses was counterbalanced by noticeable improvement in quality of the new second line. General Alexeiev considered them equal to the new first line. Russia's Regular Army of over 2,000,000 was replaced in 1916 by a serviceable host of 4,000,000 combatants, resembling a militia rather than a regular army. But the Germans did not possess material of a much higher quality, while the Austrians were distinctly inferior.

Munition supply had increased very largely in 1916. During the summer of that year I was present at the operations near Baranovichi. General Ewert made an effort to break the German line towards Vilna and so force the enemy back from the Dvinsk and Riga Fronts. The artillery preparation and the attack proceeded under my eyes. The Russian guns were su-

perior in numbers, in caliber, and in range. There was no lack of munitions. Three lines of trenches fell before the attacking waves of infantry, including strong points which the enemy had been preparing since September of the preceding year. But the operation failed. And I have no hesitation in saying that the failure was due to errors of organization, training, and leadership much more than to other causes. The losses were very heavy, chiefly because infantry attack and artillery preparation and support were not properly combined. I then appealed to Headquarters to send officers to the Allied Armies and invite instruction. But nothing came of it; and, I may add—through no fault of General Alexeiev.

I have not spoken of the Navy in connection with program or fighting, but in both respects it had compared very well with the record of the land services. Admiral Grigorovich had done what he could to bring ships and men to a high standard of strength and efficiency. Shipbuilding had given the Baltic Fleet two squadrons of super-Dreadnoughts and two modern units of the largest type to the Black Sea. The Baltic Fleet could not, of course, hope to deal with the combined strength of Germany's battleships. But once Great Britain was in the war, the Russians could feel more or less secure. When Admiral Beatty came with his Battle Cruiser squadron to Reval and Kronstadt in the summer of 1914, he and his officers and men received an enthusiastic welcome from the Russian sailors. That visit encouraged hopes in Russian breasts that they would not be left to fight the Germans alone. And, some weeks later, a French squadron came, bringing M. Poincaré on his last visit to the Russian Government.

The Baltic Fleet was then under the command of Admiral Essen, an eminently capable leader, who was succeeded on his untimely decease by Admiral Kanin.



**GENERAL L. G. KORNILOV**

Who led his army to victory and then saved the whole Southwestern Front from disaster by stern measures of discipline. He was betrayed by Kerensky and the Bolsheviki. The son of a simple Siberian Cossack and a Buriat mother he rose by his own unaided exertions, by sheer force of genius and valor, to be Russia's greatest military leader. He was then aged only 47.



**GENERAL MICHAEL VASILIEVICH ALEXEIEV**



Admiral (then Captain) Kedrov had greatly improved gunnery in the fleet. Our submarines entered the Baltic soon after the war began and rendered very substantial assistance, sallying forth even from ice-locked harbors. The Russian Naval Intelligence was excellent. Little, however, could be done to prevent the Germans from taking Libau. On the other hand, all attempts to enter the Gulf of Riga were successfully defeated till the Revolution had undermined discipline and enabled the Germans to seize the waters and the islands of the Gulf.

In the Black Sea, Russian sailors quickly asserted their mastery over the German raider and submarine menace. Russian submarines constantly intercepted the transport of coal from Asia Minor to Constantinople and maintained a ceaseless and silent vigil on and around the Bosphorus, remaining deeply submerged during the long hours of daylight to avoid German aeroplane bombs. These submarines twice torpedoed the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, necessitating prolonged repairs to those scourges.

Under Kerensky the twelve Russian Dreadnoughts in the Baltic failed to challenge a numerically inferior German force, and the Fleet Committee sided with Lenin in demanding a "democratic" peace. In November they joined Lenin. Two months later some of the Black Sea units took part in a Bolshevik plot instigated by German agents, and the sailors murdered four Admirals and sixty officers. In 1918 the Black Sea warships, cut off from their bases by the German occupation of the littoral, had to surrender. The Germans also captured a whole fleet of warships and transports that had been built at Nikolaiev for an invasion of Turkey. The Revolution disabled Russia at a time when combined land and sea operations against Germany and her allies would have assured a decisive victory.

## CHAPTER XX

### "THE HUN WITHIN THE GATES"

Prisoners of War—Dependence on German Goods—Peasants in Rags—German "Capture" of Industries and Coal Supply—Northern Trade Routes Undeveloped—The Archangel Explosion.

It was not the actual losses in the war that depressed the Army and the nation, but the apparent hopelessness of the struggle. The enemy had taken 2,000,000 prisoners, mostly untrained reserves, but the Russians had captured a larger number (nearly 2,000,000 Austrians and about 200,000 Germans). The Austrian prisoners were working in the villages. Many of them belonged to Slav races, Galicians, Czechs, Slovaks, etc., or Rumanes, who could be trusted. The Germans were sent farther North and East. They afterwards helped the Bolsheviks in Eastern Russia and Siberia.

Owing to the lack of co-ordination between the War Departments, skilled labor had been recklessly conscribed at the outbreak of war for service in the trenches, and the mobilization of industries thus became still more difficult. From the same cause the output of the Donetz coal mines fell considerably. This affected the great steel and iron works in the South, and still more the munition works in Petrograd,<sup>1</sup> which had formerly

<sup>1</sup> The Putilov works, with a trebled staff of over 50,000 hands, was able in 1916 to produce more munitions in one month than could be received from the Allies in a whole year. The shortage of coal prevented a further increase of output. The transfer of these works to the coal and iron regions in the South was repeatedly urged, but the Government would not take a decision. Many of the important rubber and munition works at Riga were "evacuated" into the interior during 1915-16.

圖

俄國北極海交通線



RUSSIA'S NORTHERN COMMUNICATIONS IN 1917.

obtained their supplies from Great Britain. Before the war, Westphalian coal was fast ousting British fuel, thanks to the monopoly that German exporters (for secret military reasons) were introducing under the superintendence of Herr Hugo Stinnes.

The Germans already held a virtual monopoly on scores of imported goods, from upholsterer's nails to steam-hammers, practically all chemical and pharmaceutical products and electrical fittings and machinery. The war deprived Russia of most of the appurtenances of modern life and comfort. British firms had not sufficiently cultivated the Russian market, and, moreover, owing to the severance of communications, it was exceedingly difficult for them to remedy the neglect. According to the statement made before the Moscow Conference in August, 1917, by the Minister of Supplies, Russia was then receiving only 16 per cent of her munitions from abroad, but the proportion of goods obtained for the open market was too trifling to bear any comparison. Imports from Germany had not been forbidden during the war: they were penalized by increased customs duties; but all that was imported through the frontier station at Tornea in the North of Finland in the form of German, Swedish and Danish, goods could not even begin to satisfy Russia's requirements. Unfortunately, champagne was "smuggled" to the detriment of necessaries, the price per bottle in Petrograd having risen to 150 rubles (nominally \$75) during the Revolution.

None of the great Allied or enemy nations were suffering from the effects of the war to an extent that could be compared with the privations of the Russian people, more particularly the middle class and the peasants. The former were underfed and ill-clad. Boots, shoes, and goloshes were almost unobtainable. I have seen thousands of people waiting all night in the hope of buying a pair of boots, glad to pay any sum (\$25

and even \$50 for footgear that used to be sold for \$5). An ordinary overcoat which formerly cost \$10 or \$15 was selling for \$60 or \$100. (Under the Bolshevist regime these prices rose tenfold.) The earnings of a whole month went to pay for a pair of shoes, and nothing remained for food, which had increased in price tenfold. The peasants had food, but no clothing. How far would seven inches of cotton goods suffice to cover the nakedness of man or woman? They went about in their old cotton rags. Cloth was, of course, out of the question. It had all been monopolized for the Army. Already, at the end of 1916, it was extremely difficult to obtain common woolen garments in Petrograd. In the villages they had long ago been unprocurable. The peasants had only their sheepskin coats and what homespun material they could still weave. And even this source of supply had been greatly reduced by the wholesale slaughter of sheep for the foodless market.

In order to strengthen their hold upon the Russian consumer and to circumvent protective duties the Germans had opened many large industrial enterprises in the country, and, more particularly in the chemical, electrical, and engineering branches. These works were taken over by the Russian Government after war had broken out, and helped very much to increase the output<sup>1</sup> of munitions. But the Germans had cunningly

<sup>1</sup> Many of the German manufacturers and merchants were exiled to the northern provinces, to the Urals and to Siberia, as enemy subjects. There they laid their plans and made their arrangements for the future development of their economic conquest of Russia. The German prisoners of war, and more particularly the officers, were studying Russian (books for this purpose were actually imported from Leipzig during the war), and preparing themselves to take part in a "peaceful" invasion of the country after the war. Another instance of German "forethought" may be cited here. During the Revolution it became known from statements made by German prisoners that many mobilised industries had been reconverted to peace production in view of imminent separate peace with Russia and the enormous requirements of the Russian markets. Germany's terms to Lenin provided for duty-free entry of German goods and fifteen years' monopoly of the Russian grain trade.

contrived their equipment in such a manner that some essential process had to be carried out in Germany. To remedy the deficiency in war-time was difficult. However, it was done—often with the help of German tools and machinery supplied through the “disinterested” medium of Swedish agents.

Much of the burden and stress of war might have been obviated by Russia had the Government taken the most elementary precautions to assure communications with Allied or friendly countries in the event of a conflict with Germany. The General Staff knew positively in 1908 that Germany meant to fight, yet nothing was done to repair the deficiency. A railway to the Murman coast had been talked about twenty-five years ago. The scheme was revived twenty years later to develop the fisheries on the newly discovered Kanin banks, whence British trawlers were drawing a fabulous harvest. Still nothing was done. It did not suit the watchful Germans that anything should be done; their agents in Petrograd knew how to clog the bureaucratic cog-wheels. When the war-cloud burst, Russia had a single-track narrow-gage line between Vologda and Archangel and no other communication with her arctic seaboard except the fitful waterway of the Northern Dvina, frozen or shallowed for eight months in the year.

Months and years of war passed before the railway to the Murman was begun and completed and the Archangel gage widened. By the autumn of 1917 both were in fairly good working order. Prior to that time enormous difficulties had been encountered in the transport of armaments and other war material—difficulties that were due to blundering and red tape, and largely to German machinations in the Petrograd chanceries, which were far more harmful than German mimes dropped by innocent-looking “neutrals” in the White Sea.

I shall cite one example. It will help us to under-

stand how true had been the saying that "Russia had to fight the German within, as well as the German without, her gates." By the end of July, 1916, an imposing accumulation of stores was spread along the shore at Archangel awaiting transport to the interior. The narrow-gage railway had been quite incapable of handling such traffic. Now things began to look more hopeful. The wide gage was in operation. Train upon train had been loaded and on the point of being dispatched, when, suddenly, orders came from Petrograd to suspend all southward freight "because large and urgent consignments were coming north." The traffic manager remonstrated. He pointed out that war material had to take preference, and explained that if many train-loads of goods were sent to Archangel they would completely "bottle-up" the sidings and paralyze all traffic southward. His expostulations were unheeded. He received fresh and peremptory orders. By this time the "urgent consignments" were already arriving. They consisted of huge quantities of "*vodka* for the American market." The traffic manager's warnings had not overstated the position; "blockage" was complete and irreparable. However, "salvation" came in an unexpected manner. A terrific explosion occurred, destroying the "cork" and incidentally much of the war material. Whatever the cause of the explosion may have been, whether accident or malicious design on the part of German or other agents, it enabled the traffic manager to resume work on the railway.

At Vladivostok matters were not much better. All travelers who passed that way during the years 1916-17 reported seeing vast quantities of goods lying on shore. The distance that had to be traversed in order to bring them to European Russia had involved too great a strain upon the railway. But much of the delay was due to bad management and, during the Revolution,

to interference from the Committees and Soviets. At Tomsk the Workmen's Committees passed a resolution insisting that not more than two trains should be allowed to pass daily, "because the engines also required a rest."

## CHAPTER XXI

### NATIONALITY PROBLEMS

Poland as a "Buffer State"—The Polish Army—German Temptation to Poles—The Little Russians—"Ukraina" Movement—Austro-German Intrigue—Ioltuhowaki's "Mission" Fails—Blue and Yellow Replaces Red Flag—Siberia and Caucasia "Separate" from Anarchy—"Constitutions" in Khiva and Bokhara—Russia Deserted by the Finns—Enlistment in German Army—Bolshevist Aid.

THE war had entailed national and political problems that called for the application of tact and statesmanship which often ran counter to the prejudice and customs of the Old Regime. Foremost among these problems stood the Polish question. Reference thereto has already been made in previous chapters, but it will be useful to summarize certain aspects which more immediately concerned the war. "United Poland" would be at once a "buffer" State between Russia and Germany and a powerful antidote to Germanic world-power. By reiterated pledges Russia bound herself to restore this unity. The Grand Duke Nicholas, as Commander-in-Chief of the Tsar's armies, at the commencement of the Great War solemnly proclaimed this purpose; it had been reaffirmed and extended by a Declaration of the Premier before the Duma after the Russian retreat in 1915, when the words "Polish autonomy" were first uttered by a Russian Minister; it was still further developed by the Revolutionary Government in its announcement to the people and to the Allied nations that it would "liberate Poland."

But Austro-German policy during the war tended

to discount all the possibilities of an Allied vindication of the Polish cause. The Poles in Galicia had long been the spoilt children of the Hapsburg Monarchy. In Posen and Silesia they, on the contrary, had had to contend with an agrarian and cultural campaign of Prussification against which they had presented a united and unbreakable front, comparing well with the resistance offered by their countrymen in the Vistula provinces to Russifying tendencies manifested shortsightedly by Tsardom. In this respect the administrators deputed by Nicholas II continued to play the German game. Almost on the eve of war, General Zhilinsky, on taking charge of the Warsaw Governor-Generalship, proclaimed his unconditional adherence to the policy of Russification that had been followed with varying intensity by his predecessors. This attitude revealed an utter incapacity to estimate the causes and consequences of German aggression. But the Poles themselves, taught in the school of bitter experience, knew how to differentiate between the hard, calculating domination of the Germans and the imitative but comparatively innocuous rule of the Russian bureaucracy; they also realized that a genuine solution of their national hopes could be assured only by the Powers of the Entente. Later they were to be sorely tempted to make terms with their German masters, but they—or at least a majority of them—held out in the face of almost desperate provocation and distress, remaining stanch in their belief that the Allies alone were capable of assuring to them a free and independent existence.

Early in the war the Poles had intimated to the Russian High Command their desire to form themselves into units for the defense of their country. A similar movement had been initiated in Galicia. Pan Pilsudski,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards "Dictator" of Poland during the period following the defeat of Germany (November, 1918).

a representative of the so-called Austrian Orientation, had raised a small force of Polish *Sokoly* to fight against the Russians, believing that the liberation of Poland could never be acceptable to the autocracy. Later, when the Austro-Germans were in possession and a tame Council of State (*Rada Panstwa*) had been instituted at Warsaw to encourage Polish hopes of independence, this same Pilsudski gradually lost his belief in the possibility of salvation under Germanic auspices, resigned from the Council, and declined to use his legion on the Russian Front. Meanwhile, the Grand Duke, domineered by the Court and the bureaucracy, had had to discourage the Polish volunteer movement. There were over half a million Poles serving under the Russian colors, and they, like their countrymen in the German and Austro-Hungarian units, were unconsciously shedding each other's blood, not knowing when their bullets or bayonets were being directed against Polish breasts.

Had Russia then accepted and encouraged the idea of a Polish Army, which was to reach the incipient stage of realization three years later,<sup>1</sup> the course of the Great War might have been much modified. When Polish units did finally make their appearance on Russia's side, they were too small to make the desired impression. Moreover, the Germanic control over Polish lands had asserted itself in such a fashion, and the Revolution had so weakened the Russian army, that the prospects of Russia being able to exert an influence over the destinies of Poland had become more remote. On the other hand, all the provinces conquered by the Austro-

<sup>1</sup> A Congress of Polish soldiers, assembled in Petrograd (May, 1917), decided in favor of the formation of a Polish Army. But the movement encountered some opposition in their own ranks, and was approved half-heartedly by the Provisional Government. This Congress elected General Pilsudski honorary Commander-in-Chief of the new Army, a proceeding which afterwards afforded the Germans a pretext for ordering his arrest. See Appendix.

Germans had been endowed with an appearance of self-government, and there was much German talk of a revival of United Poland, of course without Posen and without a sea-port at Dantzig.

It was notorious, however, that the produce of Polish lands had been diverted for German use and profit. As an offset to this system of spoliation, which entailed famine to the urban population, the conquerors had everywhere—for selfish purposes—safeguarded and developed rural property. Farming was carried on with the aid of improved German implements and machinery. and half the profits handed over to the owner of the land or deposited to his credit at the banks if he had sought refuge in Russia, the other half being taken over by the Germanic treasuries. While the Russian armies in their retreat had destroyed Polish farms and estates, the Germans were taking every care of them and even paying the owners a share of the revenue. This was a clever move on their part. It had an undoubted influence upon the many thousands of Poles who had been driven from their homes, to flee before the German invasion.

Mistakes on the part of Russian officials, and to a lesser degree lack of discipline and restraint on the part of the Russian troops, had also been noticed in Galicia. When the victorious hosts of Russia swept westward to Cracow during the first year of the Great War, they were met with open arms by the natives, who had been ignorant, or were oblivious, of the treatment that had been meted out to their co-religionaries in Kholm and Lublin.<sup>1</sup> Very soon, however, they were disillusioned. In the wake of the Russian legions came trainloads of the Orthodox clergy and administrators, imbued with the hope of unifying the Galician Ruthenes under the Russian scepter by means of "spiritual conversion."

<sup>1</sup> The Ruthenes of Kholm and Lublin had been ruthlessly "dragooned" into the Greek Orthodox Church by "Russifiers."

The experiment ended in failure, for the Ruthenes were an obstinate race, with the proverbial obstinacy of their Little Russian kinsmen; nothing could shake their allegiance to their priests, to the Greek-Catholic Church and to the Pope. The missionaries went away disappointed.

But the attempt to hustle Galicians into unity with Russian ways and beliefs left an aftermath of bitterness, which grew during the winter and the spring of 1915 and killed any inclination on the part of the natives to seek Russia's protection. They hailed with joy the return of the Austrian and even the German armies. A short taste of Russian rule had more than sufficed. Even gratitude for \$150,000,000 expended by the Russians on relief work and seeding their fields was forgotten.

On the southwestern borders separatist designs had long been brewing. Fostered by Austrian and German agents, the so-called Ukrainian (Borderland) movement eventually tended to shake off alien trammels. In August, 1914, the Austrian Government promoted a *Union for the Liberation of the Ukrainia* with the help of Russian subjects, notably Skoropis-Ioltuhowski, Melenewski and V. Doroshenko. Later the Germans took over this organization. Von Bergen and Trautman, of the Berlin Foreign Office, were in charge of its operations, and spent large sums of money on propaganda and on the dispatch of agents to Russia. The President of the Union, Ioltuhowski, who was working in conjunction with Lenin, received large allowances every month for his expenses. His associates received 1200 marks monthly; those who were chosen by the Union to agitate in prison camps received 600 marks monthly; and those who were sent into Russia received a lump sum of 1000 rubles. Independently of this, the German Government also spent a considerable sum of money upon organizing

volunteers amongst the "Ukrainian" prisoners of war in order to fight against Russia.

All these facts are confirmed by documentary evidence in the possession of the Russian military authorities.<sup>1</sup> Besides these details the following may be added. After the occupation of Kholm by the German armies, the Union sent a telegram of congratulation to Wilhelm. This telegram was printed in the *Viestnik Soiuza* and signed by Doroshenko and Melenewski. In the year 1915 the Union published a pamphlet in Munich calling upon Germany to liberate the Ukraina from the Russian yoke. In August, 1914, the Union appealed to Sweden and Bulgaria, calling upon them to join with the Ukraina against Muscovite barbarism. The appeal to the Bulgarian people was printed in the Sofia paper *Utro* with the help of the Austrian Legation. At the end of 1914 Melenewski went to Constantinople to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talaat Bey, to ask him to help the Ukraina in its desire to separate from Russia. The latter promised to give his help. Propaganda was also carried on by Biberovich and Stephankowski, who edited newspapers in Vienna and Lausanne.

"Ukrainian" separatism appealed to a small group of literary men among the Little Russians. They alleged that in language, in customs, and in character the Little and Great Russians had drifted somewhat apart during the centuries since the country had been devastated by the Tatars. Ukraina had then been recolonized by Russians under the auspices of Polish, Russian, and Lithuanian magnates. There existed another incentive to Ukrainian separatism—the economic and cultural questions. People of one race and one language (the Little Russians and the Galician Ruthenes) had naturally sought a development of commercial and intellectual relations. These had been, however, much hampered

<sup>1</sup> *Russkoe Slovo*, September 2, 1917.

by Russian and Austrian custom-house duties and police restrictions. Moreover, on the Russian side the Ukrainians saw with envy their kinsfolk beyond the border enjoying certain cultural rights which were denied to them—the right of tuition in their native tongue and its official status. And, although a closer inspection would have revealed the hollowness of the Ruthene liberties, dominated as the people were in their daily lives by Jewish officials and land-agents and even by Poles, the poverty of the Ruthene peasants, bedecked under the gay colors of their national dress, and the speciousness of their religious freedom under a Church adopting the Greek rites but recognizing the authority of Rome and its Hapsburg supporters—although there was no sound motive for envy, especially after the overthrow of the autocratic regime—the catchword “Ukraina for the Ukrainians” was successfully promulgated by the aforesaid group of literary men, backed by the Austro-German propaganda.

The errors of the Old Regime had involved needless harrying of the Ruthenes inhabiting the districts of Kholm and Lublin and professing the Greek-Catholic or United faith. Russification had there taken the form of forcible conversion to Orthodoxy and later to a separation of these districts from the kingdom of Poland as defined by international treaty. But Russian Neo-Slavophilism had dictated a conciliatory attitude towards the Ruthenes of Galicia. Indeed, its leaders, while accepting in principle a reconciliation with the Poles, persistently reproached them for “oppressing the Galicians.”

So, while the consolidation of the German occupation of Courland and the virtual separation of Finland were undermining the edifice built by Peter the Great on the shores of the Baltic, and threatening to close his “window into Europe,” a similar movement in the Ukraina

threatened the integrity of the dominions acquired to the south of Muscovy by the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich and on the Black Sea by Catherine the Great. The blue and yellow flag of Ukraina had been substituted for the red flag of Revolution, symbolizing thereby a tendency to break away from Revolutionary Russia. Germany wanted to break up the "Empire" of the Tsars, but she had more urgent need of food. Hence she took particular care to confine Bolshevism to other parts of Russia.

Professor Hrushevsky (formerly of Lemberg University), the leader of the movement, had declared in written and oral utterances that nothing less than the whole of Southern Russia, including Siedlce and Voronezh, Kursk and Novorosiysk, with all the Euxine seaboard and Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, were under his plan to be evolved into a separate State, with a population of 37,000,000 souls. Hrushevsky was propagating this idea before the war. The name Ukraina (Borderland) was to be given to the new State. His "national" ideals were utilized by Austria and Germany in a conspiracy to weaken Russia.

The Ukrainian "leaders" formed a so-called Central Rada or Council in Kiev soon after the Revolution broke out in Petrograd. In April the Rada announced its intention to call a Constituent to decide the future form of government for Ukraina. Soon a Congress of Ukrainian "representatives" proclaimed itself for "autonomy in a federal Russian Republic." The movement was extended to Poltava, Kharkov, and Odessa. A series of Ukrainian demonstrations began in Kiev, often developing into street conflicts with the Jews and the Russian Revolutionaries. Sermons were preached in the churches for the first time in the native dialect. The soldiers enrolled themselves into separate Ukrainian regiments.

The arrival of Count Szeptycki, the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Lemberg, gave rise to fresh manifestations. He had been imprisoned under the Old Regime for alleged conspiracy against the Russians in Galicia. His visit led to a revival of Romish tendencies, buried since the days of Catherine. At the end of May, M. Kerensky came to Kiev, visited the Rada, and light-heartedly promised the fulfilment of their wishes by the Russian Constituent Assembly. But the Ukrainian "leaders" were not disposed to wait. Negotiations were carried to Petrograd, where a special commission reported in favor of local self-government, not venturing to use the word "autonomy." Finally, to save the Ukraina from anarchy, the Rada drew up a Manifesto called the "Universal," in which, after censuring the Provisional Government "for refusing to comply with Ukrainian demands," it announced that "the Ukrainian people would proceed to manage their own affairs." Soldiers were dispatched to various cities to read and explain this document, and incidentally to levy a land tax of a penny per acre for the Rada's expenses. The promulgation of the Universal in Kiev was attended by a grand open-air meeting, amid the ringing of church and cathedral bells (June 26th). Prince Lvov issued a counter manifesto on the danger of changing the form of administration in the country and in the Army in war-time. His arguments were two-edged; they fell unheeded upon the Rada. Within a few days the new Ukrainian Government had been formed under the modest name of General Secretariat.

This body proceeded to address the population of Ukraina as the responsible Government of an autonomous State. The writ of the Provisional Government was no longer recognized in Ukraina. Its administrative prerogatives were suspended. M. Kerensky and his associates, MM. Tseretelli (a Georgian) and Tereshchenko

(a Little Russian), came to Kiev on July 11th to confer with the members of the General Secretariat and with the local Soviet. The Military Secretary had ordered a parade of Ukrainian soldiers in honor of the occasion. The Commander-in-Chief of the district forbade it. Nevertheless the parade was held. MM. Hrushevsky, Petlura, and other Ukrainian "Ministers" went out to take the salute, while Kerensky and his Ministers discreetly abstained from appearing. That two rival authorities—the Russian and the Ukrainian—were in open conflict became self-evident.

An agreement was concluded with the Rada by MM. Tseretelli and Tereshchenko (July 14th) without the previous assent or knowledge of non-Socialist Ministers in Petrograd. This led to a serious Cabinet crisis on the eve of the Bolshevik uprising in July, 1917. During the Bolshevik usurpation the Germans occupied Ukraina and set up their Hetman (the Russian General Skoropadski) who continued to rule nominally until the German overthrow (Nov., 1918) when the whole paraphernalia of mock Ukrainian government disappeared.

Other "autonomies" and "republics" arose within the confines of the Empire. The Caucasians and the Siberians each "separated" themselves from Bolshevik anarchy. The Lithuanians, the Letts (their kinsmen), and the Esthonian Finns successively displayed similar tendencies whenever they escaped the heavy hand of the Teuton invader. Bokhara and Khiva, the semi-independent Khanates of Central Asia, did not escape the contagion.

The Revolution had aroused interest in the peoples inhabiting the Caucasus and Turkestan that stood in the path of German designs and ambitions not less than did the Ukrainians and the Cossacks. The atrocities in the Black Sea Fleet (January, 1918) betrayed the hand of Germany. Through Bolshevik agents she was

even preparing the way for combined land and sea operations from Constantinople and Constanza against the Black Sea littoral, her objectives being Odessa, Rostov, and Tiflis.

Having turned the Russian flank in the Baltic with the aid of the Bolsheviki and feeling herself secure there under the auspices of the Lenin-Trotsky regime and the new Finnish Republic, Germany planned a vast flanking operation in the South. If permanently successful, it would have turned the British position in Mesopotamia, encompassed the Cossacks, Ukrainians, and Rumanians, and opened the road for German influence and commerce, under subservient Ottoman auspices, into the heart of Asia.

Already she held all the trump cards after her invasion of the Ukraina, the capture of the Black Sea Fleet, and a foothold on the Caspian; but her own military collapse and the national rally in Russia have ruined her dream of Asiatic conquest.

Let us briefly review the elements that held sway in this field of conflict. The Cossacks and the Ukrainians are dealt with elsewhere.

On the southern slopes of the great Caucasian mountain chain the Georgians, Armenians, and Tatars, each in fairly equal proportions (total population about six millions), have not lived in perfect harmony.

The Georgians, numerically the strongest, inhabit a solid strip extending from the sea-coast eastward beyond Tiflis, which lies within their country. The Armenians live on the border of Asia Minor, the Tatars along the Caspian. Baku is their center, but it also contains a large Armenian population.

The Georgians are nearly all Christians. They have proclaimed their Church autocephalous. They are essentially a fighting race. The Armenians and the Baku Tatars are wealthy and mercantile. The Trans-Caucasian Tatars, like their more numerous kinsmen in Kazan, are not warlike. In this respect they differ entirely from the Moslem hill-tribes in Cis-Caucasia and the Turcomans.

Extraneous factors lend a still more complex character to the position. The Baku Tatars are the most enlightened and the wealthiest among the twenty million followers of Islam that inhabit Russia, and, given certain conditions and incentives originating from the German-led Committee of Union

and Progress, might have been tempted into an Islamic combination. On the other hand, the natural wealth of Trans-Caucasia—oil and cotton—predicate a maintenance of close ties with the industries of Russia. The same may be said of Turkestan. Nothing short of the permanent conquest of the Caucasus by the Germans with the aid of Turkish troops could have overcome these considerations.

Central Asia has been the scene of strange events during the Revolution. "Democratic" Governments have been set up within the palaces of the Emir of Bokhara and the Khan of Khiva, apparently with the assent of these potentates. Much discussion has been engendered regarding a so-called Turanian Movement, uniting the Russian Tatars.

The Russian framework embraces a number of separate Moslem groups. There is "Mawara-en-Nahr," the country "beyond (i.e., northeast of) the River" Oxus, which is an integral part of the civilized Eastern world, with ancient centers of Islamic culture in its cities, a peasant population in the oases and irrigated riverine tracts, and nomads in the steppes between. The total population is about five and a half millions, and about 83 per cent of them speak the Turkish dialect called Chagatai. Mawara-en-Nahr is as un-European as India. It is cut off from Russia by deserts as India is from England by the sea, and under the Tsardom it was divided, on the Indian system, between protected native States and Russian-administered provinces.

Between Mawara-en-Nahr and European Russia lies Kirghizistan, a vast steppe-land which no civilized State before Russia, whether Moslem or Christian, has ever ruled. The native Kirghiz—from four to five millions in number—speak the same Chagatai dialect as the Moslems of Mawara-en-Nahr, but differ from them in their economic life and culture. The Kirghiz are nomads, threatened with extinction by the immigration of an agricultural peasantry from the overcrowded parts of Russia in Europe.

North and west of the steppes lies European Russia, a settled country of fields and towns; and here, in the Urals and along the Volga, there is another Moslem population, about four millions strong, entirely surrounded by Russians, but holding their own against them, and not inferior to them in civilization. These Moslems, whose center is Kazan, speak the Tatar<sup>1</sup> dialect of Turkish, but are Europeans in spite of their language and creed. They have not only a peasantry but an urban class—shopkeepers, merchants, an *intelligentsia*, a Press.

Lastly, there are the Moslems of the Caucasus and Crimea, four and a half millions in all, but divided (for the Caucasus is another Balkan Peninsula) by differences of religion, civilization and speech. There are Shi'as and Sunnis, townsmen and peasants, and untamed mountaineers. Turkish-speakers and Persian-speakers and speakers of innumerable indigenous tongues.

Under the Tsardom these various Moslem groups had few links with one another beyond their common inclusion in the Russian Empire; but since the Revolution there has been a spontaneous movement among them to make their aggregate weight of numbers tell by democratic organization. Realising

<sup>1</sup> The Tatars are incidentally the "old clothes" dealers and waiters in restaurants.

that they are behind most other Russian populations in education and economic development, they seek to compensate for this weakness by organizing on the largest scale, and they do not shrink from the problems this involves. They have taken in hand the reconciliation of Sunni and Shia, and they build consistently on the Islamic basis, in preference to the Turanian. In view of the fact that over 80 per cent of the Russian Moslems are Turkish-speakers, this is a noteworthy choice of policy; but the Turanian basis is less practicable than the percentage makes it appear, for Chagatai, Tatar, and Azerbaijani are not so much dialects as independent languages, and when the first All-Russian Moslem Congress met at Moscow last May, Russian was adopted as the medium of discussion, because no other language, whether of the Turkish family or not, was equally familiar to all the delegates.

During the Revolution the Caucasus and the Crimea have afforded a refuge to countless numbers of Russians, and much wealth has accrued thereby to the inhabitants. But the anarchy of Bolshevism has reacted heavily upon the industries of these countries as well as of Turkestan, and has therefore aroused a strong anti-Bolshevist current. Therein lies their prospects of revival.

Among Russia's many races the people of the Grand Duchy of Finland occupied a special place. The Duchy had been conquered from Sweden a century ago, but its people had never been enslaved. And the Finns should have been the first to volunteer for service in the Great War. But all that they did—and not willingly either—was to pay a small annual grant to the Imperial Exchequer. They did not otherwise feel or assume the burden of war. The Finland rifle regiments were Russian—as explained elsewhere. The Finns had refused to serve in the Russian Army, as they wanted to form an army of their own. For a century they had enjoyed a privileged position within the Empire, yet in the hour of its need they did not provide a single soldier. On the contrary, when the war began, some 3000 Finnish students deserted to Germany and were trained by the Germans to form the nucleus of a Finnish army organization whenever the moment was favorable for

an armed uprising of the Grand Duchy. Stories of oppression by Russia had long formed the theme of pro-Finnish constitutional quibblers. True, Nicholas II needlessly irritated his Finnish subjects. But that and the blundering of incompetent bureaucrats filling high posts on the borders, where tact and judgment were particularly requisite, served merely to cloak the latent disloyalty of the Finns themselves and their hatred of all things Russian.

Finnish and Swedish Socialists played an ugly part in the disorganization of the Russian troops in the Grand Duchy, or, as the Socialists afterwards proclaimed it, the "Finnish Republic." Finnish workmen employed in the munition factories in Petrograd lent themselves readily to pro-German propaganda and had a great deal to do with the excesses committed in the early days of the Revolution. In return for this cooperation their people were supported by the Bolshevist army and navy committees in Helsingfors, which openly espoused the cause of the Diet in its defiance of the Provisional Government writ of dissolution. It was with the aid and support of Bolshevist soldiers and sailors that Svinhuvud and his associates in the Senate (Ministry) of the Grand Duchy proclaimed a Republic. And having in this manner declared their "independence," they hastened to appeal to the Entente Powers for official recognition. Later the Finnish "Reds" came into conflict with the Swedo-Finnish "Whites." During the spring and summer of 1918 the country was torn by civil war. Germany sent an army corps and tried to instal a Monarchy. The Teutonic host endeavored to seize the Murman railway. Finland was encouraged to drive out the Allies from the Arctic ports.

The Finns are an honest, thrifty, and hardworking people, but their ingratitude to Russia and their pro-German sympathies should not be underestimated.

Thence partly arise some of the reasons why they have suffered from a shortage of food supplies during the war. Russian wheat used to come to them through Germany.

## CHAPTER XXII

### SHORT-LIVED VICTORY

**The July Offensive—Bolshevist Interference—General Gutor's Mistakes—Superiority of Russian Armies—Austro-German Reserves used up—Kornilov's Success—Disaffection.**

I HAD lived through the alternating hopes and failures of the war and shared the joys of deliverance from the long nightmare of intrigue, inefficiency, and corruption of the Old Regime. With my Russian friends I had fondly thought that the advent of New Russia might be saved from the perils of revolution and anarchy, that the war which had swept away the Old might strengthen and pacify the New dispensation. And so it would have been, had the great cause of the nations and of freedom not been subverted by ruthless hands to serve interests that were neither Russian nor free.

Mob-rule and mob-law were the inevitable accompaniment of the Soviet and its satellites, the Committees. The masses and the soldiery had grown tired of a struggle that all had long felt was being misdirected, and were easily misled by visionaries or traitors to believe it was fruitless and unnecessary, while on the other hand they were seduced by promises of "land and freedom." Not step by step, but with the swiftness of an avalanche, Anarchy was rushing upon the edifice of State and society. Soon it would crash them into the abyss. In vain generals and statesmen warned the people: "You are on the very edge!" In vain Kerensky, in his better moments, had hurled insulting epithets at the mob:



**AMAZONS AT PRAYERS**

Girls of the "Death Battalion" recruited in Petrograd. They volunteered from all classes—gentle and working folk, but had to pass an educational test. The battalion fought well at Molodechno.



"You are not free men, but mutinous slaves." The avalanche, once started by Kerensky's own friends, rushed on, sweeping the "ideals" of the Revolution before it.

But ere Bolshevism had achieved its ultimate ends we still had some hope—a very faint one—that the Army might save the situation. If the soldiers at the Front, the pick and flower of the nation, could only detach themselves from its mass, the avalanche might perhaps be stilled, or, at least, its devastating effects lessened.

All thinking Russia gladly hearkened to the promise of an offensive which resounded in June, 1917. That the spirit of the nation had not entirely succumbed to the deadening influence of effete ness and the alluring poison of Anarchy had been shown by the formation of numerous battalions of volunteers who variously styled themselves "Battalions of Death," "Kornilovsty" (after the popular General), "Death or Freedom Boys," etc. Then the women came forward. They must needs fight if the men would not. And they also formed a "Battalion of Death," and fought right well.


The Provisional Government adopted the idea of a general offensive. But a conference at Mogilev between Ministers and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Brusilov, who had been transferred from the Southwestern Front to succeed General Alexeiev, did not yield so much promise. It was ascertained that a simultaneous offensive on all the fronts would necessitate indefinite delay. The Northern Front had suffered such ravages from the proximity of Petrograd and its demoralizing influences, that scarcely any hope could be entertained of its reviving before the season had matured too much for effective operations. The Western or Central Front, recently commanded by General Gurko, was better off, as the Bolshevik strongholds, Petrograd

and Kronstadt, were farther away. But it was badly infected, and nothing could be done much before the end of July. The Southwestern Front looked more promising. With careful nursing it might be counted upon to deliver a blow some time in June.

In Rumania things were less cheerful. The Rumanian Army had revived marvelously under French auspices. It was splendidly led, well disciplined and equipped. Its officers and men were inspired by patriotism and eager to drive the invaders beyond their borders. Not so the Russian armies under the King's nominal command. The fact that Russian troops were serving under royalty had attracted the fiercest propaganda of revolutionary agitators. Whatever hope there could be of success in this theater lay almost entirely with the Rumanians themselves, but would they be able to draw the Russian armies with them? No one could venture to give an assurance on this point.

It was finally decided to deliver the first and most important blow in Galicia and Bukovina, following up this offensive with a second one in the direction of Vilna and a third in Rumania, as soon as the respective fronts could move. This plan was carried out with some modifications. General Gutor's attack (Southwestern Front) was twice postponed, because of delays in the concentration of reserves and artillery, due to disorganization of the railways, and also largely because agitators were constantly getting at the troops. Then the Southwestern offensive had to be delivered in two phases—Bzhezany-Zlochow and Stanislawow, instead of simultaneously—a circumstance which greatly added to the difficulties of the enterprise.

There seems to be no doubt that the Army Committees and the Commissaries representing the Government tried to counteract pacifist propaganda. Although the Committee system was destined to break down utterly as



THE RUSSIAN BATTLE-LINE.

The black line shows the position of the Russian Armies on July 19th, when the Southwestern Front attained its furthest advance towards Lemberg. The arrows indicate the abortive offensives on the Western or Central Front, at Smorgon and Lake Naroch (July 20th), and on the Rumanian Front, some days later.

Commencing at Babesay on July 1st, the Russian offensive attained its fullest development further south at Kalusz (July 12th). The front was treacherously opened (July 19th), and the enemy was able to drive a wedge southeastward to Trembowla and Husiatyn (July 28th). The Russians retreated 100 miles in ten days, to the positions defined by the dotted line.

a substitute for discipline based upon the undivided authority of the officers—just as the Soviet system had failed to afford a substitute for the undivided authority of Government—the goodwill and patriotism of individuals must be recognized and appreciated. Committeemen, some of whom were officers, some privates, went about stimulating their comrades before the attack, and were foremost in the fight, and many of these devoted men fell at the head of the attacking waves of infantry. But these bright examples only served to emphasize the hopeless absurdity of the Committees as a system of army management.

General Gutor had been an excellent corps commander. He was not of the caliber that is required from the leader of a group of armies. The strategy and tactics adopted by him bear witness to his deficiencies. Had he borne in mind the peculiar conditions of the case he would have, above all, avoided frontal attacks against positions of exceptional strength and difficulty; he would have shunned forest sectors, wherein a loosely disciplined force would be easily shaken and dispersed. Yet this was precisely what he failed to do. In one respect his dispositions were well taken; he singled out Austro-Hungarian divisions as the main objects of attention, rightly appreciating their inferior stability. But he seems to have been guided in the selection of one of the main points of his offensive by the fact that his old corps was stationed in the vicinity.

The plan was briefly as follows:

*First.* The Eleventh Army, General Erdelli (west of Tarnopol), was to operate along an eleven-mile front—Presowce (opposite Zborow) to Byshki (opposite Tseniow)—and strike northwestward, attacking the 32nd and 19th Austro-Hungarian divisions. Objectives: Zlochow and Gliniany, along the railway to Lemberg. The left flank, on reaching Pomozhany, was to push towards Bzhezany, around the woods, and make for the

other railway leading thence to Lemberg, getting into immediate touch with the right flank of the Seventh Army.

*Second.* The Seventh Army, General Belkovich (southwest of Tarnopol), was to operate along a ten-mile front—Kuropatniki (1½ miles south of Byshki) to Miechychow (situated southwestward)—get well astride of the Zlota Lipa and strike also northwestward, attacking the 54th and 55th Austro-Hungarian Divisions and part of the 20th Turkish Division. Objectives: Bzhezany—Bobrka—Lemberg. The right flank was to get into touch with the corps on Erdelli's left; the left flank was to make a strong diversion against Ottoman troops and endeavor to reach Rohatyn, flanking the railway.

*Third.* The Eighth Army, General Kornilov (east of Stanislawow), was to operate along a twelve-mile front—Jezupol—Stanislawow—Lysiec—west and northward, attacking the 15th Austro-Hungarian and the 2nd Austro-Hungarian cavalry divisions. Objectives: the Stanislawow—Dolina—Bolidow railway. It was to exert strong pressure northward, to reach the Halich—Lemberg railway.

*General.* A combined enveloping movement was to be carried out by the Seventh and Eighth Armies against the 19th and 20th Turkish, 38th Austro-Hungarian, 24th German, 75th German Reserve, 55th German, and 34th Landwehr Divisions, and two German regiments (241 and 242), all of which were to be strongly held by energetic demonstrations of three corps belonging to the Seventh Army.

General Kornilov carried out his appointed task in more than the full measure. Had his army been entrusted with a more important mission, and had suitable reserves been forthcoming, he might easily have reached Rohatyn from Halich, turned the strong Bzhezany position, and, following up his successes at Kalush, reached Dolina, south of Lemberg, thereby severing the enemy's communications and isolating some of his forces.

The topography of the battle region was such that a succession of ridges and deep river valleys, formed by some of the northern tributaries of the Dneister, and the dense forests around Bzhezany rendered the central section of the Russian thrust (athwart the Zlota Lipa and its affluents) a particularly difficult one to negotiate; whereas if General Gutor had disposed his group so as to throw its weight on the flanks (Halich and Zlochov), he would have obviated at once the danger of frontal attacks (Bzhezany and Koniuchy), which were bound to suffer delay, if not disaster, before strongly fortified woods, and have secured the advantage of operating in fairly open country (the Dneister and its tributaries, the Gnila Lipa and the Strypas). And although in the light of subsequent information it became evident that the Russian Army could not be counted upon for a sustained offensive, it may have been reasonably assumed that a successful and rapid advance, without too heavy losses, would have so heartened the men that Bolshevik appeals to desertion might have been less heeded, and perhaps the shameful opening of the front, with consequent panic and disaster, would have been avoided.

Criticism of General Gutor's strategy was freely indulged in by Russian experts at the time. There could be no motive for passing it over in this review of the Galician operations of 1917. On the other hand, the considerations just cited afford a necessary explanation of the heavy losses that were sustained in the Russian attacks, notably at Bzhezany, which certainly contributed to the disastrous success of Bolshevik propaganda. These criticisms were sanctioned by the dismissal of General Gutor before the final disaster.<sup>1</sup> It may be

<sup>1</sup>The immediate cause of General Gutor's removal was ascribed to the explosion of a huge ammunition dump near Bzhezany by the enemy's shell fire (see map, p. 278).

added that he was a brave and gallant soldier who had never sought a higher command and accepted his promotion obediently, with much personal misgiving. The difficulties encountered at Bzhezany were, moreover, visited upon General Belkovich, commanding the Seventh Army. He was succeeded on the eve of the retreat by General Selivachëv, whose corps, including a Czechoslovak brigade that bore the main brunt of the fighting, had done well in the offensive on the right flank, opposite Zborow. There appeared to be no sound reason for this change in the high command. General Belkovich could not be held responsible either for the defective strategy of his superior or for the loss of discipline among his men.

Never had the Russian Army been so well equipped. Artillery of all calibers, trench mortars, machine guns had been provided in abundance, with plenty of ammunition. There were armored cars, including British and Belgian contingents, posted with every active corps. The roads and railways—a heritage of Austrian dominion—ensured easy and rapid intercommunication. The Russians had repaired them, and had laid down field railways to their heavy batteries. As regards numbers, the Russians had a superiority of nearly two to one. Only in aeroplanes were they deficient. A good many British and French machines had been provided, but they were not sufficient to cope with the Germans. However, what they lacked in numbers they made up in daring. Splendid work was done by the Russian airmen, and they were exceedingly well supplemented by balloon observers in large numbers, who ran hourly risk of death from the constant onslaughts of enemy aircraft. The positions of hostile batteries were almost invariably detected and counter-battery work organized in approved style. But, however well they were equipped and however well they handled their guns, the Russian artillery

could do little with the enemy's strong points in the wooded areas. This was an additional reason why a plan of attack in the open should have been adopted.

The enemy lines were thinly held—about one division per seven miles, not counting reserves. Confronting the Eleventh and Seventh Armies—a stretch of 100 miles—stood altogether about 30 divisions (14 German, 13½ Austro-Hungarians, and 2 Turkish). Of this total, 14 were in the first line, 16 in reserve. The Russians had assembled 54 divisions, of which 37 were in the first line and 17 in reserve. Prince Leopold of Bavaria was in general command of the enemy forces under the directions of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, while the northern group, comprising the Bug Army,<sup>1</sup> IV Austro-Hungarian (von Krobotin), and II Austro-Hungarian (Boehm-Ermolli), was under the orders of General von Linsingen. The *ordre de bataille* of the enemy's divisions at the time the Russian offensive began was approximately as follows:

Opposite the XI (General Erdelli's) Army (counting from north to south) were the 4th Austro-Hungarian, 27th Austro-Hungarian, 12th German Landwehr, 33rd Austro-Hungarian, 197th German, 32nd and 19th Austro-Hungarian, seven divisions in all, with 12½ divisions in reserve. Opposite the VII (General Belkovich's) Army was the German Southern Army (von Bothmer), represented by 54th and 55th Austro-Hungarian, 20th and 19th Ottoman, 24th German, 75th German Reserve, 38th Austro-Hungarian (Honved) Divisions, in all seven divisions with three in reserve.

From this distribution of their reserves it is evident that the German Staff had prepared for a movement directed principally on the northern sector (Zlochow), and that General Gutor's preference for the Bzhezany direction was unexpected by them, as indeed it might

<sup>1</sup> The Bug Army (von Bernhardt) faced the Russian Special Army, north of Brody (see map on p. 387).

have been, for the tactical considerations set forth above. It is interesting also as an indication that Field-Marshal von Hindenburg did really believe in the possibility of a Russian offensive, and that, notwithstanding "fraternization," German propaganda, and the cheap bluster of the German Press, the enemy's High Command had not made up its mind to regard Russia as a negligible quantity. Moreover, with the help of their excellent railway system the enemy could easily transfer their reserves from one sector to another.

Opposite the VIII (General Kornilov's) Army, which included only about eight divisions, stood the 58th German, a German brigade, 34th German (Grenadier), 2nd Austro-Hungarian Cavalry, 15th and 36th Austro-Hungarian, 42nd Austro-Hungarian (Honved), in all five infantry and one cavalry divisions, the III Austro-Hungarian Army (Tersztyansky von Nadas), with no reserves to speak of. The Archduke Josef, in command of the group which, farther south, included the VII (von Kőwess) and the I (von Rohr) Austro-Hungarian Armies, apparently felt the utmost confidence in the inability of the Russians to dislodge him from the Dneister valley.

The tremendous havoc wrought in the enemy's ranks by the Russian offensive, which promptly led to wholesale surrender of Austro-Hungarian regiments, evidently caused the utmost confusion among the enemy Staffs. Divisions, hurriedly brought up from reserve, were as hurriedly flung about from one sector to another. For instance, the hapless 15th German Reserve Division was battered at Bzhezany and then smashed by Kornilov's troops. More than five German and one Austrian divisions (the 53rd Reserve, 24th Reserve, 15th Reserve, 241st New, 4th Ersatz, and a Bavarian Landwehr brigade and also the 11th Austro-Hungarian) were brought up to Bzhezany to take the place of German and Austrian

divisions that had been wiped out or surrendered. On the Stanislawow sector, also, five German and one Austrian divisions (the 83rd, 20th, 15th Reserve, 8th Bavarian Reserve, Jaeger Guards, and the 16th and 5th Austro-Hungarian) came into first line. Out of the total of fifteen divisions known to be in reserve along this front the enemy had thus used up twelve. They had only three divisions to draw upon on a front of 100 miles.

These facts and figures are sufficiently eloquent. The Russian Army had done well. True, it had a superiority in numbers, but this superiority was partly discounted by the above-mentioned errors of strategy and tactics, and, above all, by the demoralizing influence of indiscipline and unceasing propaganda. Sufficient has been said to justify the assumption that, had the Russian High Command been in a position to take the necessary measures for enforcing discipline, the Austro-German hosts would have sustained a signal defeat and Lemberg would soon have been in Russian hands. A Russian victory then would have altered the whole subsequent course of events on all the Allied fronts. It must ever remain a blot upon the Revolutionary Democracy of Russia that it should have deprived the High Command of the necessary power to put an end to the activity of Extremists; that it should have espoused doctrines which enabled traitors to subvert the Army and have done nothing itself to checkmate their devices.

The Russian offensive began at nine o'clock on the morning of Sunday, July 1st. After fierce bombardment and under cover of their barrage, the infantry attacked according to plan, as above indicated. The Russian barrage was so well handled that the enemy were quite helpless to resist the oncoming waves. One Russian division, taking the offensive at the point where I was observing the attack, rushed three lines of trenches within twenty-five minutes, and I counted the battalions and

regiments which surrendered to them wholesale—there were 5000 Austrians with their officers. (General Kornilov's movement was started a week later.)

I was an eye-witness of the main events, but most of my messages to *The Times* were intercepted by the Soviet censor in Petrograd, although they had been approved by the Army censorship. Much heart-burning had been endured by the Russian Commanders before the advance. Individual units were constantly developing sporadic weakness. Several mutinies broke out. The Bolsheviki were extremely busy. Loyal committeemen had no rest day or night, scouring the front in motor-cars to enliven the low-spirited or to talk over the cowards. The gunners did their utmost during the artillery preparations to inflict visible ravages upon the enemy's trenches so as to hearten the infantry for the assault. One of the Corps Commanders prayed silently during the fateful minutes preceding the appointed time. Would his men go over the top? He hoped so, but could not feel sure. When, punctually at 9 A.M., the troops swarmed over and the attacking waves rolled onward, this General devoutly crossed himself.

German official *communiqués* had announced the commencement of the attack a day before it began, near Koniuchy, between the Zlota Lipa and the Strypa, and had prematurely boasted of its failure. The offensive was, of course, ascribed to "increasing pressure of the other Entente Powers." Later the Germans recorded "a strong destructive Russian fire over our positions from the Lemberg-Brody railway as far as the heights south of Bzhezany," and an increase of "firing activity to the north and northwest of Lutsk," but repeated the claim that "all attacks had been repulsed." These versions were so obviously "doctored" that neither the German nor the Austrian *communiqués* could afford any idea of what was really happening.

Much heavy fighting lay before the Russians before they could hope to take Bzhezany. This place, situated fifty miles from Lemberg—the nearest Russian position to the Galician capital—was protected by a lake, the deep defiles of the Zlota Lipa, and the high hills, reaching an elevation of 1300 feet, on the east and south. When Count Bothmer fell back there in the summer of 1916, after his stubborn defense of the Strypa line, he established himself on all the higher ground, where he could command the Russian positions. At Koniuchy the Russians still had many of these higher positions before them before they could reach the Zlota Lipa, which is itself a formidable barrier, as the stream is in a deep cleft of the hills, like most of the tributaries of the Dniester in this part of Galicia. After the Austrian breakdown in 1916 the Germans reconstituted their armies in Galicia, and entrusted these key positions largely to their own troops and to the Turks, who had held them since. Almost the last success of General Brusilov's great offensive was won at this point, before events in Rumania turned attention to new battles in another field.

On July 2nd, about three o'clock in the afternoon, after a severe and stubborn battle, the Zaraisky Regiment occupied the village of Presowce, while the gallant troops of the 4th Finland Division and of the Czecho-Slovak Brigade occupied the strongly fortified enemy positions at Mogila, on the heights to the west and southwest of the village of Zborow, and the fortified village of Kozhylow. Three lines of enemy trenches were penetrated. The enemy then retired across the Little Strypa. The Czecho-Slovak Brigade captured 62 officers and 3150 soldiers, 15 guns, and many machine guns. Many of the captured guns were turned against the enemy. Enemy positions to the west of Josefowka (north of Koniuchy) were also taken. Altogether in the battle

of July 2nd, in the neighborhood of Zlochow, the Russians took 6300 prisoners (officers and soldiers), 21 guns, 16 machine guns, and several bomb-throwers.

To the southeast of Bzhezany the battle continued with less intensity. In the battle of July 1st in this region the Russians had taken 53 officers and 2200 soldiers, mostly Germans.

The success at Koniuchy had been compromised by an untoward incident. In their precipitate flight or surrender the enemy had left much store of wine and spirits behind them. The Russian soldiers, disobeying their officers, plundered these stores. The men of a whole division which had fought bravely became drunk, and might have fallen an easy prey had the enemy counter-attacked. Another division was sent forward, but was checked by the German machine guns placed in the trees of the adjacent forest.

Meanwhile the gallant fighting at Bzhezany had been marred by indiscipline and even mutiny on the part of some units. The key to this position lay in the triangle formed by the confluence of the Zlota and the Tseniow. Its slopes descended precipitously, clothed on the northern side of Bzhezany and Lysona woods. This triangle was known as the Flat-Iron (*Utiúg*). Here many thousands of Russians fell, and in helping them with Maxims, Hotchkiss, and armored cars, five British soldiers were killed. Here also whole regiments of Austrians and Germans were wiped out. The plan of attack consisted in a flanking movement over the western slope of the ridge, so as to turn the woods. Unfortunately, the right flank advanced too rapidly and was caught in a cross-fire from the heights, and when orders were given to a division posted in reserve to relieve the pressure on their comrades, they flatly refused to budge, alleging that they had not agreed to fight on the first day of the offensive. The advantage that might have

been gained on the first day could not be recovered. Several lines of enemy trenches were taken, literally filled with their dead. Some of these lines remained in the hands of the Russians till the day of panic and disaster.

During the fighting of July 1st and 2nd the total number of prisoners had risen to 300 officers, 18,000 men, 29 guns, 33 machine guns.

Instead of improving, the men were growing daily less reliable. Divisions refused to remain more than twenty-four hours in the front line, and that only on the condition that they would be strictly on the defensive. The Corps of Guards, oblivious of its glorious traditions, was no exception to this degrading rule. One of the regiments (the Grenadiers) had elected a Bolshevik officer named Dzevaltovsky, and would take no orders. M. Kerensky himself tried to persuade them, but they threatened violence and he had to leave. Finally this regiment was surrounded by cavalry, armored cars, and artillery. It then surrendered Dzevaltovsky,<sup>1</sup> who was removed for trial—not involving the death penalty. Half the men were distributed in other units, where they spread the Bolshevik contagion. Some of the Guards divisions after that did some fighting. One of them, on being sent (July 5th) to relieve a line division near Dzike Lany, which had been the scene of gallant fighting by a Siberian corps, was misdirected in the dark into the enemy's trenches—a piece of almost incredible treachery. The astonishing part of this adventure was that the guardsmen took the trench and then went on to capture the next enemy's position. Everything pointed to a coming crisis which the gallantry of individual units could not forestall.

On July 7th, General Cheremisov's corps (Kornuov's army) after a brilliant advance from Stanislawow, crossed the Lomnica and advanced slightly on its left flank

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards "honorably" acquitted by a Bolshevik court.

(Bohorodczany-Solotwina). On a wide front General Kornilov's army was now in movement south of the Dniester. The Russians were retracing their steps taken in the retreat of 1915, when General von Linsingen's cavalry swept forward across the country south of the Dniester to Halich, and thereby turned the main Russian front north of the river. In three days the Russians had gone forward fifteen miles west of Stanislawow, they had at two points crossed the Lomnica, had taken Halich, to which the enemy had retired, and were pushing on westward along the road to Dolina and Stry. The country before them was less adapted to defense than that north of the Dniester, where the deep-cut channels of the tributaries flowing south to that river were a formidable obstacle to an advancing army.

Halich, by reason of its bridgehead position, was a place of the first strategic importance, and both combatants had made strenuous efforts for its capture since the war began. General Brusilov reached the river bank opposite the town in the summer of 1916, and seemed about to take it, when the Rumanian campaign, which had just begun, diverted Russian efforts elsewhere.

The remarkable success of General Kornilov's movement had brought a tardy recognition of the value of the Halich-Dolina direction. A neighboring corps was added to his right flank and reinforcements hurried up. But they came too late to do much good. The two flanking corps on the right and left of General Cheremisov advanced very slowly owing to the difficulties of the *terrain*, but his troops continued their progress, and during the night of July 11th and 12th they forced their way into Kalush. Here, as at Koniuchy, scenes of debauchery were enacted, and the drunken soldiery committed nameless acts of violence. A Cossack cavalry regiment came up in time to repulse a German counter-attack. I was in Kalush on the morning after its cap-

ture. On all sides there was evidence of the precipitate flight of the Headquarters of the Third Austrian Army, situated in the suburbs on the banks of the Lomnica.



MAP SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL PLACES MENTIONED IN THE ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS IN THE DIRECTIONS OF BZHEZANY AND ZLOCHOW (JULY, 1917).

General Tersztyansky had evidently considered himself safe from attack.

During the day we strengthened and extended our position on the west bank of the Lomnica in preparation

for the arrival of the enemy's reserves. That evening heavy rain set in, necessitating the suspension of the advance. The Lomnica was transformed into a boiling torrent and all the bridges were swept away. The Germans brought up six batteries and shelled our communications, but the following day our guns silenced them and covered our positions across the river. Rain continuing, it became necessary to withdraw the bulk of our forces, a move which was safely carried out on the night of July 15th.

Meanwhile we had extended our lines in the valley of the Lomnica, for the eventual resumption of the offensive.

According to the statements of prisoners the enemy had transferred hither the Jäger Reserve Division from Vilna, the remnants of the German 75th Reserve Division from Bzhezany, and the Austrian 5th Division from the Carpathians. During our attacks on July 8th, 9th, and 10th, the Austrian 15th Division lost 80 per cent, the German 33rd Division 40 per cent, the Austrian 16th Division 50 per cent, and the Austrian 36th Division 30 per cent, while the Austrian 2nd Cavalry Division lost little. The enemy had altogether 44 battalions with 32,000 bayonets, of which they lost over 16,000, including 12,000 prisoners. Our losses were about one-third. We had taken over 100 guns.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL

Failure of the Committee System—Lenin and German Plans—The Front Opened—"Military Strategy"—A Narrative of Disaster—Horrors of the Retreat—Kornilov's "Death to Traitors"—The Armies Saved—Brave Women—Rumania's Peril—Boastful German Accounts—Our Dead at Kshywe—Story of the British Armored Cars—Valentine's Burial—Censored Telegrams.

"OUR further successes will depend on the measures that may be taken to restore a proper spirit of subordination among the men at the front and the reserves. This question is bound up with the whole political situation of Russia. The Army has done better than was expected, but the present Committee system has failed."

The warning note struck in the concluding paragraph of this message sent by me to *The Times* just after the success of Kornilov's offensive was almost immediately justified by events. All unknown to the brave "Kornilovtsy" (bearing the name of their leader on their sleeves, inscribed on a blue shield surmounted by a white skull and cross-bones) and the "shock battalions," who had won victory west of Stanislawow, a dread catastrophe was being enacted in General Erdelli's Army. It was not altogether unexpected. In the following laconic sentences the Russian Headquarters Staff recorded the defection of its troops:

After strong artillery preparation, the enemy persistently attacked our detachments on the Pieniaki-Harbusow front (on both sides of the headwaters

of the Sereth and twenty miles south of Brody). At first all these attacks were repelled.

At ten o'clock, July 19th, the 607th Mlynoff Regiment, situated between Batkow and Manajow (in the same region), left their trenches voluntarily and retired,<sup>1</sup> with the result that the neighboring units had to retire also. This gave the enemy the opportunity for developing his success.

Our failure is explained to a considerable degree by the fact that under the influence of the Extremists (*Bolsheviki*) several detachments, having received the command to support the attacked detachments, *held meetings and discussed the advisability of obeying the order, whereupon some of the regiments refused to obey the military command.* The efforts of the Commanders and Committees to arouse the men to the fulfilment of their duty were fruitless.

### On July 26th I telegraphed as follows:

From the words of an officer captured near Bzhezany a fortnight ago, we understood that the Germans were preparing an artful stroke in conjunction with their agents in Petrograd and in our armies. "You will see that your troops will run away when the time comes, and we shall have a walk over," he declared. Events have fully borne out this prophecy. Lenin and his crew have well earned their pay. The disturbances in Petrograd, organized on the 16th and 17th inst., were obviously directed from Berlin so as to coincide with the German plan. The thunderbolt fell almost on the day when the High Command on this front changed hands, and the harvest in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina had nearly been gathered.

A whole day before the news of the crisis in Petrograd reached us, Lenin's agents were acquainted with it *through traitors in the wireless service.* They spread a report among the troops that the *Bolsheviki were in control* of the Government, and that *the war was at an end.* The execution of the German plan became ridiculously easy.

The enemy entered at our most sensitive point near Zborow, and advanced in the direction of Trembowla. The wedge thus driven in would sever the Tarnopol-Buchach railway and the highways, disuniting the Eleventh and Seventh Armies and exposing the right flank of the latter to serious peril.

Our line was opened on the morning of the 19th inst. north of Zborow. On the 18th General Brusilov, who had come to Tarnopol, summoned General Kornilov and ordered him to take over the command from General Gutor. The rupture was represented to be a slight affair, as we had eight divisions in reserve. The Staffs of the neighboring armies were not even informed of it. General Kornilov, however, realized that the danger was great, and gave the necessary orders. But he had to go to Stanislawow in order to transfer his command of the Eighth Army to General Cheremisov. Much precious time had to be wasted in journeys.

<sup>1</sup>The survivors afterwards declared that they had not sufficient artillery support.

My gallant colleague Lembich, the war correspondent of the *Russkoe Slovo*, wrote simultaneously from another part of the Front:

The line had been ruptured on a comparatively small section, and the harm done might have been easily retrieved by steadiness and discipline on the part of the troops. The High Command at once gave orders to move perfectly adequate forces to the place where the breach had been made, with the design of getting the Germans, who, it appears, were rushing forward, in a vise, and to cut them off from retreat on two sides. But then it was that took place that horrible thing that has now been given in the Army the name of "*Meeting strategy*." The majority of the troops ordered to the breach either did not leave their quarters or began to assemble meetings to decide the question whether they should go to the positions indicated or not by means of voting. Two regiments, which had been given a more responsible task than others, considered the question until late at night, and the men, not being able to come to a decision, separated. During this time the Germans, not encountering any serious resistance, penetrated eight miles to the rear of our lines, began to capture batteries and a number of prisoners, and to outflank Jesierna, the Headquarters of the Staff.

In the evening of this unhappy day panic began to spread in the Army, deliberately encouraged by certain suspicious characters, Bolsheviki in uniform, who flooded the Army in the days of the Revolution. The rumor was circulated that the Germans had pierced our front at two points and that the line of retreat to Tarnopol had been cut off. One after the other the divisions sent to encounter the Germans refused to attack, or, on the first encounter with the enemy, began to desert, breaking up in disorder, creating great uproar and confusion. The cavalry and artillery alone rose to the height of their duty, and with the greatest steadfastness supported the few heroic units of infantry who covered the retreat. Yesterday one valiant Cossack regiment saved the position in an exceptional way, and, in horse and foot formation, repelled the violent attacks of the Germans.

Resuming my own narrative of events, I note that, being in Stanislawow on the 21st (the Moslem festival of Bairam), I had gone to sup with my Caucasian friends of the Ingush Native Horse, who had been fighting continuously throughout our offensive; and while we were at table discussing some delicious *plof* (slices of toasted mutton with rice) to the sound of native pipes, and admiring the skill of the tribal dancers, the Colonel received the startling news that Tarnopol was in dire peril and that next morning early the regiment would

go with all speed to the rescue. My message to *The Times* continues:

Having rejoined the British Armored Car Headquarters on the 17th inst., I left again for Stanialawow on the afternoon of the 20th inst. Nothing was then known of the rupture of the front at a point only twenty-five miles distant on the previous morning, and the first report of it reached Commander Locker-Lampson late on the 20th. At Stanialawow "rumors" began to circulate during the afternoon of the 22nd that Tarnopol was for some mysterious reason "in danger," but nothing whatever was known at the Staff.

General Cheremisov assumed command of the Eighth Army that morning. I saw him at noon. He was disquieted by the defections among his own men, but said not a word of the rupture in the front of the Eleventh Army. On the morning of the 23rd the Staff had information that left no doubt as to the magnitude of the catastrophe.

My first thought was to rejoin the British section, whose position I judged to be an extremely perilous one. Abandoning all impedimenta (which was lost, together with the photographs I had taken), I jumped into the first car going to Buchach in the hope of meeting the British contingent as it fell back through Podhajce.

At Buchach I came across our transport and Colonel Valentine,<sup>1</sup> of the British Air Service. From them I heard the full story of the disaster. The R.F.C. officers had safely removed the aeroplanes and the aeronautical stores from the zone of the Eleventh Army under the full blast of the Russian panic and the German advance.

We were destined to witness some strange scenes on the road from Buchach eastward, although the enemy was still thirty miles distant. A man on a white horse dashed through the town yelling: "German cavalry are behind: save yourselves." He was afterwards arrested, and proved to be a German spy. Indescribable confusion ensued. A multitude of deserters and transport cars, lorries, and ambulances headed eastward at top speed. The roadway was littered with impedimenta. Through this inferno, through burning dust, and under a scorching sun, we literally fought our way, using our sticks and fists, and brandishing revolvers at the deserters, who repeatedly tried to storm our cars, until we had got ahead of the rout. Then, placing our lorries across the road, we dammed the tide of panic.

Leaving Buchach at 5 P.M., we reached Proskurow (in Russia) only at eight o'clock the following morning.

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel James Valentine, R.F.C., D.S.O., died soon afterwards in Kiev of heart failure, brought on by the hardships he had endured during the retreat. He was only twenty-nine years old. He had been one of the foremost competitors in aviation contests in England, and had served during the war in France. For the best part of a year he had been in Russia, in charge of instruction in British aeroplanes. For his signal gallantry during the retreat he was recommended by General Kornilov for the Order of St. George.

The following telegram appeared in the *Russkoe Slovo*:

Active Army, July 21. Two regiments were disbanded at night. An armed force was employed in the work of disbanding. The revolted regiments, which were in reserve, were surrounded by Cossacks and two batteries. When it finally became clear that the regiments would not voluntarily give up their arms and their leaders, they were told to settle the question in the space of three bugle calls. The first was played, then the second, then the third. After this Kalinin, Commissary of the Front, gave the order to open artillery fire on the insubordinate regiments. About a hundred projectiles were fired. The firing did its work and the regiments laid down their arms.

The Germans and Hungarians were attacking with insignificant forces. The Russian disaster was the work of only two German and one Austro-Hungarian divisions. Twelve divisions were ordered to oppose them, but the attempt failed through the behavior of the soldiers. An attempt to attack the enemy's salient from the flanks was made, but the troops did not choose to obey orders. Use had to be made of machine-gun fire to restrain marauders and deserters, who threatened the houses and shops of peaceful inhabitants. There was no time for the evacuation of Kozowa, an important strategical base for supplies of food and ammunition. It was occupied by the Austrians on July 23rd. The Russians had left there more than 600 railway wagons, a sanitary train, railway engines, and an immense quantity of ammunition and other stores. The road to Tarnopol was crowded with thousands of carriages and carts and motor-carts, moving eastward in clouds of dust. Deserters pillaged the shops of the town. Officers were unable to preserve order among the troops there, and many killed themselves in despair. Tarnopol was occupied by the enemy on July 22nd. A Battalion of Death, composed of cadets, reduced the rioting soldiers in Tarnopol to order, not hesitating to shoot them when necessary, superintended the work of evacuation, and set fire to stores that it was not possible to remove. After the cadets had left, soldiers began a *pogrom*, which

was stopped by shooting fourteen of the men who were caught red-handed. Fleeing bands of marauders sacked houses on their way. There were cases of families being bayoneted and women and children violated.

Kerensky had abolished the death penalty. General Kornilov took the law into his own hands, and sent the following telegram to Army Commanders:

I consider the voluntary retreat of units from their positions as equivalent to treason and treachery. Therefore I categorically require that all commanders in such cases should, without hesitation, turn the fire of machine guns and artillery against the traitors. I take all responsibility for the victims on myself. Inaction and hesitation on the part of the commanders I shall count as neglect of duty, and such officers I shall at once deprive of their command and commit to trial.

A formal ukaz, signed by Kerensky, by Efremov, Minister of Justice, and by General Yakubovich, restoring the death penalty in the Army during the war, was issued on July 25th. In this ukaz the military crimes involving the death penalty were set forth, and the composition of the military-revolutionary courts to deal with the most serious offenses was laid down. They were to consist of three officers and three soldiers chosen by lot. The verdict was to be decided by a majority of votes; if the voting were equal, the verdict was to be in favor of the prisoner.


Between Krewo and Smorgon the central group of armies began its offensive on July 20th. They took some positions and 1000 prisoners; then they declined to do any more fighting, except the woman's battalion, which lost heavily but never faltered. Farther north, at Lake Naroch, the attempt to advance was even less effective. The troops of the Central and Northern Fronts were more subject to Bolshevist influences than their comrades in the South.

In Rumania the forward movement began still later, and at first, thanks to the ardor and the dash of the

Rumanian Army, it yielded substantial results in captured positions, guns, and prisoners; but soon, owing to the defection of the Russians, the tide of battle turned in favor of the enemy, and some of the forces under the command of the King and of General Shcherbachev found themselves hemmed in, and were extricated with great difficulty.

Tarnopol fell July 22nd, Stanislawow was evacuated on July 25th, Kolomea (recently General Kornilov's headquarters) on July 27th. Czernowic, the capital of the Bukovina, had to be abandoned a day or so later. Kamieniets was prepared for evacuation. But, thanks to General Kornilov's firmness and skill, the Russian armies made a stand on the Zbruch. The Germans could not secure a footing across the river.

The Austro-German accounts of their "victory" in Galicia and Bukovina afforded cheerful reading for their unenlightened public at home. Counter-attacks on the Russian flanks (at Zwyzyn, on the upper reaches of the Dniester, and at Nowica, southeast of Kalush), which had prefaced but had not caused the rupture of the Russian front, were represented in the light of manifestations of German skill and superior valor. Thenceforward, the course of the Russian retreat was persistently depicted as being a succession of hard-won battles. For the first time in history an enemy's war bulletins were magnifying the courage and valor of a panic-stricken foe. The motive was easy to understand. It was less flattering to German vanity to appraise the foe at his just value; moreover, the Germans did not want the Russians to think that their armies needed re-forming, and there was also an abiding hope that by impressing them with the idea that Russian troops had fought well the covert scheme of a separate peace on "honorable" terms might be furthered. But while German military critics indulged in dithyrambics about the invincible



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE AND RETREAT IN GALICIA (JULY, 1917).

prowess of the Austro-German forces in Galicia and Bukovina and the stanch resistance offered to them by the Russians, the German General Staff prudently deferred publishing the usual official summary of the operations or from stating the number of prisoners taken. (Later it was given as 40,000.)

General Kornilov had proved himself to be a great leader of men—I may say, one of the greatest military commanders of his time—as well as a clear-sighted statesman, capable of quickly grasping a situation and of acting upon it. I saw him frequently during the anxious week when he was marshaling his broken line to safety, at all hours of the day and of the night, and I never noticed any hesitating or faltering. One of his army chiefs, in despair at the wild retreat of his men, telegraphed: “I cannot hold my line. Only 12,000 troops out of my army remain; the rest have fled. You are asking impossibilities.” But Kornilov knew—and his subordinate did not know—that unless the 12,000 held out, two whole armies would be unable to retire in safety. He answered: “You have my orders.” And the “impossible” was accomplished. It is true that the cavalry (including the gallant Polish Lancers), the heroic cyclist battalion, a handful of “Death or Victory” volunteers, and last, but not least, the British armored cars, had flung themselves into the breach.

I had the honor of conveying a message from him to my countrymen and a number of crosses of St. George to be bestowed upon those who had more particularly distinguished themselves. It was all the more pleasing to me because I had been amongst these men in good and evil fortune, and knew how well they had deserved recognition from the Commander-in-Chief.

On the first day of the offensive at Bzhezany they had gone into action, in cars and in trenches. Five had been killed. They lay buried near Kzhywe (southeast of

Bzhezany) in ground that was soon, alas! to fall into enemy hands. Over the grave where they rested together a plain wooden cross had been planted with the following inscription:

HERE LIE FIVE ENGLISHMEN

C.P.O. J. MACFARLANE

C.P.O. E. VIANE

C.P.O. W. J. LOCKE

P.O. W. G. PEARSON

P.O. W. L. MITCHELL

THEY DIED FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM IN A FOREIGN LAND.  
FEAR GOD AND FEAR NOUGHT.

I wrote a detailed report of the work done by the British armored cars during the retreat, and telegraphed it, August 1st, from the Headquarters of the Seventh Army to *The Times*. It was sadly curtailed and mutilated in transmission, and I think it only right to reproduce it here in full, for in the opinion of the Russian commanders the Allied co-operation had contributed greatly towards extricating their armies from a plight that at first appeared to be hopeless.

Commander Locker-Lampson, whose headquarters were at Kozowa, near Bzhezany, learned on the evening of July 20th that Jezierna had fallen. He was summoned to the Corps Staff and asked to withdraw the whole of his force from their positions and hold the right flank. The enemy had advanced, forming a salient, and the Staff hoped to be able to attack along the line Kuropatniki-Taurow-Jezierna and to use our cars to turn them back.

All our armored cars were collected at Kozowa that night, and none of us had any sleep, as we were sent early next day to be attached to a Cossack regiment. Three squadrons of our cars, operating together, were spread fanwise across the front from Kuropatniki to the Tarnopol road. Rumors had already spread that the Russians were deserting their trenches and fleeing, and certainly their *morale* was bad on our arrival. We reported ourselves to the headquarters of a Cossack division, but nobody there could give any detailed instructions. The Corps Commander believed that our force might keep the infantry from running away.

Lieutenant-Commander Smiles took the right-hand sector north of the Tarnopol road, and dashed ahead through the villages of Halenkov and Olesin

(due north of Kosowa) very successfully. The cars outdistanced the Russian infantry by many hundred yards. The cars under his command got within close range of the advancing Germans and Austrians. They delayed the advance for several hours, fighting incessantly, then fell back as the German and Austrian artillery came up.

The Russians remained in their trenches as long as the armored cars stayed with them, but as the Austrians advanced and the Germans were crying out "Hurrah!" the Russians of their own accord flung down their rifles and ran for their lives. Despite this shocking defection we attempted to keep the enemy back, in order to stem the retreat, but it was impossible. We had to give way, and the fleeing Russians crowded our cars, breaking them down so that we lost three, which we had to abandon.

An exactly similar state of affairs occurred with the other squadrons which checked the Austrians and managed to keep the advancing infantry back until their artillery arrived, rendering further resistance impossible. The Russian retreat became a rout, and though we went into action time and again during the day, the effect produced was only local. A panic ensued at Kosowa. Everybody ran away. We did our best to stop the runaways.

All our stores were removed the following night. The enemy began shelling Kosowa; some of our men were wounded by shrapnel, and the Staff ordered us to retire. Great craters filled the road from Kosowa to Kshywe, impeding the retreat to Podhajce, where we arrived safely. The only regiment that did good work that day was one of the Finland Division. The cars covered our retreat. Every car that went into action fired over 3000 rounds.

By the evening of the 22nd our force was transferred to an aerodrome some miles from Podhajce on the road to Monastshyaka. The doctor and the English nurses, who had been doing splendid work in the hospital at Podhajce, left with our column.

The same day the Staff of the corps to which our force was attached had been transferred to Bialokernica, a few miles east of Podhajce. We were ordered to reconnoiter and destroy any remaining stores. One heavy car reached Teliacze without sighting the enemy. It found that the stores had been destroyed by Russian gunners. Kosowa was burning, but was apparently unoccupied. *The Austrian advance was incredibly slow*, and both these places, within a few miles of the enemy's original lines, were still unoccupied on July 22nd. Other cars went north along the road to Kshywe, also without meeting the enemy. We had been delayed near Podhajce by a shocking panic among the troops and transport. On the afternoon of the 22nd our transport column and damaged cars proceeded south to Buchach, which was also in a state of panic.

The next day our cars were transferred to another corps belonging to the same army and ordered to operate along the Buchach-Tarnopol road. A section went into action with four cars. The situation was desperate. There were great gaps in the front corps, caused by flight of whole divisions. *The Corps Commander had no information of the whereabouts of the enemy or of his own troops.* Our cars were able to give him invaluable information, and besides, they kept the enemy at bay. The hottest fighting occurred at the villages of

Pantalicha and Darachow, about ten miles west of Trembowla. At Darachow we ambushed the enemy in the houses and courtyards, destroying them wholesale. During that night, thanks to the respite which we had been able to afford them, the Russians rallied, entrenched themselves, and even drove out the enemy from some of their positions.

On the 24th our cars operated on the high road from Darachow to Buchach. At four o'clock that morning the Corps Commander summoned Commander Locker-Lampson to the village of Laskowce and told him that two divisions had bolted, leaving a *gap of fifteen miles* north of Laskowce as far as Trembowla. Our cars were entrusted with the task of protecting this huge space.

Working along the road between Chmielow and Darachow, they did great execution among the advancing infantry, mainly Austrians. Lieutenant-Commander Smiles came up later with two cars which had been repaired. Commander Locker-Lampson himself went into action. One of our officers spotted an Austrian standing on a knoll, drove his car in that direction, and came plump into a large force of the enemy at a range of fifty yards. Opening fire, he mowed them down and got out safe. The cars eventually left Chmielow owing to severe shell fire. The enemy did not venture to make a direct attack on Chmielow, but, making a *détour* over fields where the cars were unable to operate, tried to surround the village. The attempt was unsuccessful.

Our cars were invincible on the road, and fought a series of rearguard actions the whole of the rest of the day, frequently under a fierce fire from the enemy's field guns. One car had its engine completely blown out by a direct hit and had to be abandoned. The crew removed the guns and material and withdrew in safety. Another car was struck by a shell which smashed a plate, wounding all the crew, including Sub-Lieutenant Wallace. Driver Swan, although badly wounded, drove the car out of action. Another car got on fire, but was safely removed. A car with Commander Locker-Lampson had its dynamo damaged by a splinter. All the squadrons re-formed that evening at Buchach.

The whole of the 25th was given to patrol work within the triangle Buchach-Chortkow-Trembowla.

On the 26th, at the village of Kobylowloki, half-way between Chortkow and Trembowla, the cars got into action for the first time with German cavalry, which all immediately decamped.

Some of our men were for *twenty hours in their seats* in the armored cars. The Corps Commander said we had given him a *respite of twenty-one hours* by filling a gap which otherwise would have offered the enemy's cavalry, motors, and mounted infantry a chance to cut our line of retreat. The extraordinary feature about these operations was that the British Armored Car Division practically held up the Germans on a whole army front. This exploit was rendered possible by excellent judgment in selecting such a splendid road for operations as the highway between Buchach and Tarnopol. Our cars were repeatedly under artillery fire at a range not exceeding 2000 yards.

On July 27th, Lieutenant-Commander Smiles, with two light and one heavy car, held the German cavalry for a considerable time on the Trembowla road, north of Husiatyn. The village of Shivkowce had to be evacuated at 4 P.M., and rearguard actions were fought by our armored cars, permitting the infantry


to retire. An alarm compelled a further retirement during the night, wherein one car was lost. On the 28th, continuous rearguard actions by Smiles were fought with the same squadron along the road to Suchadol from early morning to 2.30 P.M. In Husiatyn the Russian infantry had thrown down their rifles and machine guns, and a *provocateur* who had spread panic *had been killed and crucified*. By three o'clock all the troops had crossed the River Zbruch, and our cars were the last things on wheels to cross. Five minutes later the bridge was blown up, and fifteen minutes later some German cavalry reached the bridge by another route. Soldiers and villagers on this side of the river at Husiatyn cheered the armored cars as they went past.

The 29th was a day of rest for the cars, as the enemy had not crossed the river. Pillaging went on. Three of our officers attacked with their fists three hundred pillagers and put them to flight. Some German prisoners who had been brought to our base got into conversation with one of our men. One of them spoke English. He stated that the British armored cars *seemed to be everywhere along the front*, and one day alone had killed over six hundred.

On the 30th, Lieutenant-Commander Wells-Hood and his cars were continuously in action on the outskirts of Husiatyn. Very good work was done by Sub-Lieutenant Benson in a heavy armored car with a three-pounder gun. The enemy had mounted maxims on the church standing on a ridge east of Husiatyn, and in the absence of Russian artillery these could not be dislodged. Our car destroyed the emplacements in the belfry after fifteen minutes' firing at a distance of 2000 yards. Four times consecutively during the morning our cars went into action. The Russian Divisional Commander was loud in their praise. The best targets so far secured in the war were obtained against German infantry on this occasion. In the evening, using a Lewis gun, Petty Officer Rogers, in one of Lieutenant-Commander Wells-Hood's cars brought down an enemy aeroplane which was sniping our reserves. On the 31st, Lieutenant-Commander Ruston and his cars were in action against the enemy continuously throughout the day. Sub-Lieutenant Southam, who already had had one car blown up under him, took great risks, as opportunities for advancing against the enemy were small in view of their heavy artillery, which had been brought up and was pounding the road. Our casualties in wounded represented 20 per cent of the fighting force.

Ten days later, at Kiev, on my way north, we buried Valentine. The city was in an uproar. Ukrainian regiments were exchanging volleys with the Russian cavalry at the railway station. The garrison was torn by Bolshevik factions. An octogenarian professor-colonel who was in "command" had been trying to apply his theories of a "democratic republic" among the troops, with the result that he had twice had to make a hurried escape from his headquarters. He plaintively informed me that

he could not count upon his men to bury a "bourgeois monarchist" Englishman. But a Cossack *sotnia* effect-



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN 1916.

ally prevented any nonsense. The company of territorialists who rendered the last honors was not interfered with. And we knew that the Russian troops, if left

alone, would never display feelings other than those of affectionate loyalty and respect for a fallen ally. It was the Cossacks who bore Valentine's coffin from the cathedral to the gun-carriage, and, after a four hours' march in the dust and heat of an August morning, carried him through the military cemetery to his last resting-place. As we drew nigh to the grave the horsemen lined the pathway, and we passed under a double row of drawn Cossack sabers.

There had been some uncertainty about the arrangements for the funeral, so I telegraphed two days beforehand to our military mission at the Stavka requesting instructions from General Kornilov. This telegram reached its destination a week later, when I had already reached Mogilev. It bore the mark of the Petrograd telegraph office. Apparently all messages for Headquarters were being transmitted for "censorship." It showed clearly enough that the Soviet regime did not trust the Army. This incident has its importance, for at that time the relations between Kornilov and Kerensky were not even "strained."

As a commentary on the difference between the spirit of the Russian armies in 1916 and 1917, this map shows the remarkable achievements of the troops on the Southwestern Front some months before the Revolution and its attendant breakdown of discipline. It speaks for itself. I may add that these same troops were better armed and munitioned in 1917 and had a greater superiority in numbers over the enemy. But they lost all that had been won in 1916, and thus forever discredited the Revolution.

**PART IV**  
**KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS**

**CHAPTER XXIV**

**THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM**

**Attempts to Restore Discipline—Savinkov Supports Kornilov—Kerensky Vacillates—Failure of the Moscow Conference—A "Socialist Autocrat"—Collision with Kornilov and Kaledin—The Truth about the Military Dictatorship—Another Bolshevik Move—Kerensky Parleys—The Democratic Conference—Lenin Reappears—The "Red Guard"—Kerensky's Overtures to Kornilov—Intrigues with Bolsheviks—Circumstances of the Cavalry Expedition—Kornilov Dismissed—Alexeiev to the Rescue—Kornilov's Intercepted Orders of the Day—Alexeiev Resigns—The Lvov "Misunderstanding"—Bolsheviks Turn against Kerensky—The Lenin Government and Armistice.**

**BOLSHEVISM** had snatched victory from our grasp, but all hope was not yet lost. The men had rallied under General Kornilov's stern measures of discipline. Behind them was the nation, largely composed of sound elements that awaited the signal of some strong man backed by an organized force to revolt against the terror of the Soviet. The heart of the nation was still sound. Its sturdier portions, the inhabitants of the borderlands—the Cossacks, the Caucasians, and the Siberians—had done their best in the offensive and were ready to unite together and to save the country at the eleventh hour from anarchy, from collapse, and from shameful surrender to German intrigue, with its prospect of complete subjection of new-found liberties to the domination of the Huns.

Here is an evidence of self-sacrificing loyalty shown by the Russian settlers in Western Siberia. Already in April they had formed three "death" battalions of volunteers, which hurried up to take part in the offensive. One of them, the 2nd Orenburg Battalion, reached the Front when our line had been opened and the disgraceful retreat was in full blast. They had no transport and no iron rations. Forcing their way through the fugitives, they rushed forward and engaged the enemy. Three days and nights they were continuously in action without receiving any food. Then they were relieved. I saw them at P—, our base, whither they had come to refit and refill. Out of 1000 men only 500 remained. Three companies of reserve men were paraded and invited to join the volunteers. The reserves had come from Bolshevik towns. They were a poor lot, untrained and undisciplined. After conferring with their "Committees" these "soldiers" declined to join the battalion.

Having restored some semblance of discipline at the Front by the simple method of reviving the death penalty for deserters and succeeded thereby in arresting the further advance of the enemy, General Kornilov boldly urged upon the Provisional Government the adoption of similar methods among the troops in the country and the workmen employed on the railways. He had forbidden political meetings and had restricted the Committees to their normal domestic functions. He demanded similar measures among the reserve troops. It was quite obvious that to continue the war with any prospect of victory necessitated an immediate compliance with his demands. The Chief Commissary of the Government with the southwestern armies had entirely endorsed General Kornilov's energetic program. This commissary was M. Savinkov, a well-known revolutionary and writer. He was one of the few Russians who had

played an active part among the Maximalists in 1905 and later. It was said that he had been privy <sup>1</sup> to several political assassinations. Being clear-sighted and patriotic, however, he had now subordinated party aims and ideals to the stern necessities of the hour. Proceeding to Petrograd, he boldly and energetically canvassed General Kornilov's plan, and partly as a result of his intervention General Kornilov was appointed to the Supreme Command.

I shall now briefly outline the events that followed. M. Kerensky himself had been at the Front and knew how complete was the failure of the Committee system as a military organization. He had himself been hooted and jeered at by soldiers who were being "revolutionized" by Bolshevik agitators behind the backs of their Committees. His own perfervid oratory had failed to remedy the evil. He had just scored heavily against the Bolsheviks of Petrograd and Kronstadt—thanks to the help of the Cossacks. What could the country expect of him at this juncture? He was Minister-President by this time, it should be mentioned, and claimed to have absolute powers. I ask, what should he have done at this critical juncture? And I say unhesitatingly—and all men of common sense and common patriotism agree—he should have proclaimed himself openly for General Kornilov, as his fellow-Socialist M. Savinkov had done.

But this "bold, fearless" orator, who had made people believe in him and follow him, was at heart only a revolutionary—a tool of the Soviet, as he had been from the beginning. He boasted later on that he would "save Russia" if it cost him his "soul"—in other words, that he would sacrifice his political "ideals" to the "interests" of his country. And that was precisely

<sup>1</sup> While reproving Terrorism, one cannot withhold a certain measure of respect from men who, like Savinkov, risked their own lives in support of "ideals," however misguided.

what he lacked the courage to do. I have related elsewhere how he proceeded to play a game of "fast and loose" with the avowed traitors who had disrupted the Army—with Lenin, with Trotsky and the other pseudo-Jews who were acting in the interests of Germany. In the same way he now played with Kornilov and even with his own successor at the War Office, Savinkov.

General Kornilov's drastic measures had been applied without previous sanction from Petrograd, but they could not be upset by the Soviet just then. The shame inflicted upon Russia by its associates was too palpable. Besides, the Soviet had not recovered from the fright inflicted upon it by Lenin and Company. But even before they could rally themselves Kerensky had taken his stand against Kornilov. Messages to the Stavka—even those that were addressed to Allied missions—from any part of the country were passing "by order" into Kerensky's hands. He was treating Kornilov as if he were an enemy. General Kornilov's record precluded suspicion of partiality for the Old Regime. A son of the people, he had been systematically "shelved" throughout his previous military career. But General Kornilov was becoming too popular, and might, if he were allowed to restore discipline among the 8,000,000 reserve troops, become too powerful and turn the country against the Revolutionaries. Then good-bye to the sweets of sham government and the delights of the Winter Palace. Under no circumstances must the Kornilov program be applied without "guarantees."

Waiting impatiently for an answer, because he had evidence that the Germans would soon make their move on Riga, General Kornilov at length obtained an invitation from M. Savinkov to come to Petrograd and make a report to the Council of Ministers. It appears that M. Kerensky did not know of this invitation. His astonishment and ill-suppressed fury quickly found

vent against the Minister of War. A few hours afterwards M. Savinkov was curtly requested to resign. But General Kornilov would not be refused a hearing, and M. Kerensky listened with the best grace possible. The Generalissimo unfolded his anxieties to the Ministers and hinted that a "counter-move" might be advisable in order to check the German advance. Thereupon M. Savinkov slipped a note into his hand telling him to beware of discussing plans, because certain persons—indicating M. Chernov—were not reliable. The Council agreed "to consider" the Kornilov program.

But M. Kerensky had other views. He hastened the assembling of a Popular Conference at Moscow, hoping thereby to strengthen his own position. Representatives of all four Dumas, of the Zemstvos and Municipalities, of the Co-operatives, the Soviets, the Committees, military and social organizations, were invited. The revolutionary element was, of course, to be largely represented, but there were also to be delegates from the manufacturers, the landowners, the officers, the Knights of St. George, and the Cossacks. The Conference met in August, 1917. Never had the Grand Theater at Moscow witnessed such a gathering.

Kerensky had signified to Headquarters that General Kornilov would probably be "too busy." He did not want him to come, but General Kornilov had made up his mind to come, in order to have an opportunity of telling the country that his recommendations were still in abeyance, although the danger of invasion was more than ever pressing. On the eve of the great day he arrived, accompanied by a faithful bodyguard of Turcomans. Moscow gave him an enthusiastic welcome, as he traversed the streets on his way to the Iberian chapel. Kerensky was coming out of the Imperial apartments in the Kremlin to go for a drive in one of the Emperor's motor-cars when he heard the cheers of the multitude.

He immediately gave orders to drive in the opposite direction. The great day was to be on the morrow. That evening I was having tea with some of the gorgeously attired Turcoman princes in Kornilov's saloon carriage when Kerensky summoned him to the telephone and "requested" the Generalissimo not to speak at the Conference. He replied that he did not intend to discuss politics, but only the affairs of the Army. Surely he had the right and the duty to do so. Kerensky could not find a convenient rejoinder. But Kornilov felt that relations were becoming "strained," and, for the first time, showed some signs of nervousness. His entourage determined to redouble their precautions, fearing lest some attempt should be made to arrest him, as Kerensky had arrested Gurko—on a trumped-up charge.

From the very outset of the proceedings it was apparent that the Conference was a "sham." The Bolsheviks were "in command," although they showed few signs of their presence. As usual, they trusted not to oratory, except for appealing to the mob and to the ignorant soldiery. This audience of *bourgeois* and *Mensheviki* was not in their line. But they gave us all a taste of their power by calling a general strike of trams and restaurants. Fortunately a large supply of sandwiches and refreshments had been laid in at the Grand Theater. The Bolsheviks were also too busy organizing their next "coup" in Petrograd. As usual, they preferred "to act" rather than "to talk."

I cannot say whether Kerensky was consciously blind, or whether he had succumbed to mental derangement. Certainly he acted and spoke like a person who was afflicted by a mania of *grandeurs*. He adopted the manner and tone of an autocrat. Two hapless A.D.C.'s were left standing "at attention" behind his chair for several hours. Still wearing the khaki tunic, breeches, and

gaiters which he had affected when he became Minister of War, he delivered a long and violent harangue, the sum and substance of which was that he (Kerensky) was the Supreme Power, that anybody who dared to wrest the "scepter"—he used the Imperial formula "our scepter"—from his grasp would be crushed, that he would ruthlessly suppress all attempts against "our power" with "blood and iron." At the same time he announced that the country and the Revolution were in deadly peril and that everybody must help him; but that he, and he alone, would save the country and the Revolution, adding, "even if I lose my own soul in the attempt." The impression produced upon me by nearly an hour of hysterical "talk" of this description left no doubt in my mind that we were on the eve of another crisis.

Then General Kornilov appeared in the rostrum. The contrast between the two men was overwhelming. Here was calm, sober sense. Without a superfluous word or gesture, without even raising his voice, Kornilov told the plain, unvarnished tale of Russia's agony, of the men who had wanted to save their land from thralldom, of the sapping of discipline, of the officers who had been foully murdered or shot in the back, and of the specter of hunger in the ranks. The foe was even then beginning to knock at the gates of Riga. By dealing out death to traitors the Army had saved the southern provinces. Would they not take the lesson to heart? Would they wait till the Germans were in Riga and in Petrograd, before they understood? By leaving a few traitors alive, countless victims, unspeakable misery and shame, would be involved.

The audience was divided into two fairly equal portions, one for Kerensky, the other for Kornilov. The same division was noticeable when General Kaledin proclaimed the Cossack veto on further delay and Gen-

eral Alexeiev pilloried the doctrinaires of indiscipline. Kerensky had jumped up in a fury of rebuke to the Cossack chieftain. "We have invited you to state your opinions. We do not permit you to proffer advice or dictation," he cried.

Speeches, parliamentary or revolutionary, followed in endless succession. They were not pertinent to the issue. The Conference had been summoned to declare itself for or against Kerensky. It did neither, although it seemed to do both. It should have declared itself for Kornilov, but its revolutionary taint was too strong. The events that followed were even then visible to all who had eyes to see, but even those who were most clear-sighted did not realize that Kerensky was capable of the maddest compromise to maintain himself in office, and would bring his country to the lowest depths of national humiliation and despair.

General Kornilov had returned to the Stavka immediately after his speech. General Kaledin hastened back to his Cossacks. All their friends and supporters made arrangements to evade Kerensky's spies, who were ceaselessly shadowing them.

There was no "conspiracy," of course, unless one could apply that term to the outspoken wish of every thinking Russian who had not succumbed to revolutionary dogma or interest. In Kornilov all their hopes were centered. Kornilov and Kaledin, with the Cossacks behind them, would save the country. Let Kornilov be Dictator! Such was the unanimous cry outside the revolutionary camp. A great popular organ like the *Russkoe Slovo* was openly supporting him. Was that a "conspiracy"? No, but it was gall and wormwood to the man who had arrogated dictatorial power to himself and who was far gone in madness. We can understand now all that was soon to happen.

The Kornilovites knew quite well that another Bol-



**STAMPEDED BY THE BOLSHEVIK**

The precipitate flight from Kosowa (July 21, 1917). Soldiers running away, leaving their arms. The enemy was still at Bshesany, 12 miles distant, and entered Kosowa, unopposed, two days later.



shevist rising was imminent and that Kerensky would either have to join Kornilov or be swept away. But Kerensky was blind and rash. He did everything to upset the arrangements that were being made with a view to checking Bolshevik designs. He helped the Bolshevik game. It was not the first time.

However, Kornilov still did not quite despair of the acceptance of his program by the Kerensky Government. His supporter, M. Savinkov, had been taken back into favor, with the erratic inconsequence that characterized many of Kerensky's acts.

On his return to Petrograd, Kerensky was apparently under the delusion that he had scored a definite triumph in Moscow, and adopted a somewhat haughty tone towards the Soviet. Then, suddenly, the Bolshevik menace assumed concrete form. Positive information reached the Stavka that another uprising was imminent. And Kerensky authorized M. Vladimir Lvov, who had been his associate in the first Coalition Government, to convey certain proposals to General Kornilov, which were accepted. Then M. Lvov was suddenly arrested. Some days earlier, General Kornilov had been asked to send troops to help the Government. But, as the Bolsheviks, evidently informed about it, became aggressive, M. Kerensky parleyed with them, carefully concealing the fact that he was already negotiating with General Kornilov and also that Savinkov had talked him round to accepting in part the Kornilov program.

An authoritative version of the events that occurred after the Moscow Conference was given by General Kornilov in an Order of the Day to the Army (September 10th, No. 897):

The Galician disaster sustained by the armies of the Southwestern Front clearly showed to what an extent the disintegration of our Army had gone.

As Commander-in-Chief of that front I considered it my duty to present a demand for the introduction of the death penalty for traitors and cowards.

My demand was granted, but not to the full extent, as the grant did not apply to the rear, which was the most infected by criminal propaganda.

Assuming the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I submitted to the Provisional Government the conditions which I regarded as indispensable for the salvation of the Army and for its regeneration. Among these measures was the introduction of the death penalty in the rear.

The Provisional Government approved my proposals in principle, and I reaffirmed them on August 27th at the State Conference in Moscow.

Time was precious; every day lost threatened us with dire consequences, yet the Provisional Government could not decide, on the one hand, to carry my proposals into effect, and on the other hand permitted them to be subjected to criticism by the newspapers and by various organizations. Simultaneously, with a view to achieve the final disruption of the Army, a campaign was begun against the representatives of the High Command.

According to authentic information, preparations were being made at that time for an armed uprising of the Bolsheviki in Petrograd. There were clear indications that they intended to seize the Government, if only for a few days, in order to proclaim an armistice and to take decisive and irrevocable steps towards the conclusion of a shameful separate peace, and therefore to destroy Russia.

Seeing the weakness of the Provisional Government and their lack of decision to take energetic measures against persons and organizations who were clearly leading Russia to her destruction, and desiring to forestall a catastrophe, I decided to concentrate four cavalry divisions upon Petrograd, so that, should the Bolshevik uprising take place, it might be crushed in the most decisive and prompt manner. It was necessary to make an end once for all of the criminal activity of traitors in the rear.

In taking this decision I was not following any plans of personal ambition, and did not seek to take upon myself all the burden of undivided responsibility for the Government of the country. My intention was to work in harmony with persons enjoying the public confidence and with numerous public organizations who were endeavoring to save Russia. I hoped, with the help of these prominent public men, to endow our country with a strong Government capable of saving it from shame and ruin. I merely considered it necessary that I, as the Supreme Generalissimo, should be a member of the new Government.

The Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd was intended for September 10th or 11th. By September 6th three cavalry divisions were already concentrated at Pskov, Velikie Luki, and Dno station.

On September 6th, M. Savinkov, Director of the Ministry of War, came to the Stavka and brought me a draft of the proposed measures to be taken by the Provisional Government, based upon the demands I had presented, and informed me that although these measures were to be introduced within a few days, the Provisional Government strongly apprehended that this might call forth an uprising in Petrograd and severe opposition on the part of irresponsible organizations. At the same time M. Savinkov told me that the Provisional Government, apprehensive of a Bolshevik uprising, did not feel sure about its own forces, and wanted me to place at its disposal a corps of cavalry, which it

wished to be moved towards Petrograd. It was, he added, the intention of the Government, as soon as it was informed of the concentration of such a corps, immediately to proclaim martial law in Petrograd.

The wishes of the Provisional Government as transmitted to me by M. Savinkov entirely corresponded with the decision I had already taken, and, therefore, that same day I gave the necessary orders for putting down a possible rising in Petrograd.

On September 7th came to me at the Stavka M. Vladimir Lvov, member of the State Duma, former Procurator of the Holy Synod, and, speaking on behalf and in the name of M. Kerensky, the Minister-President, asked me to state my views regarding three various methods of organising a new Government, suggested by M. Kerensky himself: (1) The withdrawal of Kerensky from all part in the Government; (2) the participation of Kerensky in the Government; and (3) a proposal to me to assume the dictatorship which was to be proclaimed by the existing Provisional Government.

I replied that I considered the only solution lay in the establishment of a dictatorship and the proclamation of martial law throughout the country.

Under the dictatorship I understood not a one-man dictatorship, inasmuch as I had pointed out the necessity of participation in the Government by Kerensky and Savinkov.

Let it be known to all that in taking this decision I considered and still consider, any return to the Old Regime to be an utter impossibility, and the task of the New Government should be exclusively devoted to saving the country and the civic liberties won by the Revolution of March 12th last.

On the evening of September 8th I exchanged telegrams with the Minister-President, Kerensky, who asked me if I would confirm what I had said to Lvov.

As I could not entertain the idea that the emissary sent to me by the Provisional Government could distort the sense of my conversation with him, I replied that I did confirm my words fully, and again invited Kerensky and Savinkov to come to the Stavka, as I could not answer for their safety if they remained in Petrograd.<sup>1</sup>

In reply to this the Minister-President stated that he could not leave for the Stavka on the 8th, but that he was starting on the 9th.

It is evident from the foregoing that up to the evening of the 8th my actions and decisions were proceeding in full accord with the Provisional Government, and I had every reason to consider that the Minister-President and the Director of the Ministry of War were not playing a double game.

The morning of the 9th showed the contrary. I received a telegram from the Minister-President intimating that I must immediately hand over the office of Supreme Commander-in-Chief to my Chief of Staff and myself immediately leave for Petrograd.

The Chief of Staff declined to take over the post. I likewise considered it impossible to hand it over until the situation had been fully cleared up. Through-

<sup>1</sup> M. Tereshchenko left Petrograd for Mogilev on the evening of September 8th to attend a conference of public men summoned by General Kornilov. He was recalled by a telegram from M. Kerensky when he was half-way.

out the whole of September 9th I conferred by telegraph with the Director of the Ministry of War, Savinkov, and from these conversations it appeared that the Minister-President and Savinkov himself not only repudiated the proposals that had been made to me, but even disavowed the fact of their having made them.

Considering that under the existing circumstances further hesitation presented fatal dangers, and that, moreover, the measures already ordered could no longer be countermanded, I decided, with a full appreciation of the weight of my responsibility, not to hand over the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that thereby I might save my country from imminent disaster and the Russian people from German slavery.

In this, my decision, I was supported by the Commanders-in-Chief of the various fronts, and I am convinced that I shall have with me all the honest defenders of our much-suffering country.

What had happened was simply this, that on the evening of September 8th Kerensky realized that the Bolsheviki were very strong. On the other hand, his prejudice against Kornilov impelled him to go on treating with them and to represent Kornilov as their enemy. He thus enlisted their support. Trying to palliate this act, he afterwards explained that circumstances had compelled him, because the Bolsheviki had assembled enormous quantities of explosives and threatened to blow up the Winter Palace and the bridges. Moreover, he permitted the arming of the Bolshevik workmen who formed the "Red Guard," and received deputations from the Kronstadt garrison. Simultaneously he was consulting M. Miliukov (who advised, as usual, the formation of another Coalition Cabinet), and later General Alexeiev.

By that time the Kornilov cavalry was approaching Petrograd. Under joint Kerensky-Bolshevist auspices the garrison set forth to meet them. The Bolsheviki had taken up the rails behind the Kornilov contingent and severed the wires. But all were in deadly fear of the cavalry. M. Chernov, of agrarian disfame, organized a novel form of skirmishers. Singly and in groups they stole up to the Caucasian regiments, bringing procla-

mations signed by Kerensky wherein it was stated that Kornilov was a traitor and that he had been superseded and arrested. The emissaries further added that Kornilov had shot himself. Bereft of all means of communication and completely mystified and misled, the cavalry stayed their march. Had Kornilov been with them, he could have taken Petrograd almost unresisted. But he was directing very critical operations from Headquarters, and he had not counted upon treachery. Kerensky had imposed upon the credulity of Savinkov, who was also now against Kornilov. Later, Savinkov recanted and left the Ministry to enlist as a private soldier, vowing that, sooner or later, he would have Kerensky's blood.

General Alexeiev now sacrificed himself. None of the Generals at the Front would take Kornilov's place. Kerensky pledged himself not to arrest Kornilov or any of his supporters, and, on that understanding, General Alexeiev went to Mogilev "to save the situation." The following hitherto unpublished documents fully describe the position at that moment:

#### ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE ARMY.

MOGILEV, *September 11th*, No. 900:

I, General Kornilov, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, hereby explain to all the armies entrusted to me, to their Commanders and to the Commissaries and elected organisations, the significance of the events which have just occurred.

It was known to me from authentic written data, from the reports of our Secret Service, from intercepted telegrams and personal observation, that:

1. The explosion at Kazan, where over 1,000,000 shells and 12,000 machine guns were destroyed, was caused with the undoubted connivance of German agents;
2. Germany had spent millions of rubles to organize the destruction of mines and works in the Donets Basin and in the South of Russia;
3. Our Secret Service had reported:

(a) A simultaneous blow is being prepared on our whole front in order to break and rout our weakened Army.

- (b) An insurrection is being organized in Finland.
- (c) It is intended to blow up bridges over the Dnieper and Volga.
- (d) The organization of a Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd is being proceeded with.

4. On August 16th, during a sitting of the Council of Ministers in the Winter Palace, Kerenky and Savinkov personally requested me to be careful and not to talk about everything, because among the Ministers there were men who were unreliable and disloyal.

5. I had grounds for weighty suspicion of treason and treachery among the ranks of various irresponsible organizations who are in the pay of Germany, yet exercise an influence upon the work of the Government.

6. In view partly of what has been said above, and in full agreement with the Director of the Ministry of War, Savinkov, who came to the Stavka on September 6th, a whole series of measures were drafted and taken for the suppression of the Bolshevik movement in Petrograd.

7. On September 7th the Minister-President sent to me a member of the Duma, V. N. Lvov, and there then occurred a historical act of provocation.

There could not be the slightest doubt in my mind that irresponsible influences had got the upper hand in Petrograd and that our country was being led to the edge of her grave.

At such moments one cannot discuss, one must act. And I took the decision which you know of: to save my country, or to die at my post.

You are well acquainted with all my past life, and I declare that neither before nor at present was I moved by personal desires or personal aims or ambitions, but that only one purpose, one aim guided my life, and that was to serve my country, and to this I summon all, as I have summoned the whole nation and the Provisional Government.

No answer has yet come to me.

I did not surrender the office of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, nor could I have done so, because not one of the Generals would take it; and therefore I give this order to all the personnel of the Army and Navy, from the Commanders-in-Chief to the last soldier, to all Commissaries and to all elected organizations, to unite together at this fateful hour in the life of our country, to join their efforts without thinking of themselves in the cause of our country's salvation, and for this purpose to remain in all tranquillity at their posts, ready to repulse the imminent onslaught of the foe.

I pledge my word of honor as an officer and a soldier, and assure you once more that I, General Kornilov, the son of a simple Cossack peasant, have by my whole life and not in words only shown my unflinching devotion to my country and to freedom, that I am alien to any counter-revolutionary schemes whatsoever, and remain on guard over the liberties we have won, desiring only that the great Russian nation should continue to enjoy its independent existence.

(Signed) SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
GENERAL KORNILOV.

The following telegrams were sent to M. Kerensky, to General Kornilov, to the Minister of War, and to other military officials by the Commanders-in-Chief of the various Russian fronts:

FROM GENERAL KLEIMBOVSKY, C.-IN-C. NORTHERN FRONT,  
*September 10th. No. 574a.*

I have received a telegram from Supreme Commander-in-Chief notifying me that I have been appointed in his place. While ready to serve my country to the last drop of blood, I cannot, without failing in loyalty and love to her, accept this office, as I do not consider myself sufficiently strong or competent for such a responsible post during the difficult and troublous times through which we are now passing. I consider any change in the Supreme Command to be the most dangerous at a moment when the enemy threatens the integrity of our country and our freedom, and when measures are urgently needed to stimulate discipline and efficiency in the Army.

*(Signed)* KLEIMBOVSKY.

FROM GENERAL BALUIEV, C.-IN-C. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT,  
*September 10th. No. 10,459.*

In my telegram as Commander of the Eleventh Army, 12th (20th July) I stated my views regarding the conditions that were necessary to raise the fighting efficiency of the armies and thereby to save Russia. As regards the measures that should be taken, I am entirely in agreement with General Kornilov. I have just received a telegram that General Kornilov has been ordered to hand over the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I consider the departure of General Kornilov would be destructive to the Army and to Russia; firstly, because General Kornilov has always put his whole heart and soul into his work for the welfare of the country and that he is the only man in Russia who is capable by his iron will to restore order in the Army; and secondly, because his dismissal indicates that the measures rejected will not be carried out by the Government although the present situation in Russia insistently demands the carrying out of extraordinary measures. General Kornilov's retention at the head of the Army is urgently needed, regardless of any political complications.

*(Signed)* GENERAL BALUIEV.

FROM GENERAL SHECHERACHIEV, C.-IN-C. RUMANIAN FRONT,  
*September 10th. No. 493.*

I consider any change in the Supreme Command at the present difficult time through which Russia is passing to be extremely dangerous from a military point of view. Fully agreeing with the measures proposed by General Kornilov for restoring discipline and efficiency in the Army, I consider it my duty to

declare that the supersession of General Kornilov will inevitably exercise a fatal influence upon the Army and upon the defense of Russia. I appeal to your sense of patriotism, in the name of the salvation of our country, to avoid a rupture in our ranks.

JASST.

(Signed) SECHERBACHEV.

FROM GENERAL DENIKIN, C.-IN-C. WESTERN FRONT,  
September 9th. No. 145

I am a soldier and unaccustomed to play hide-and-seek. On July 29th, at a conference with the members of the Provisional Government, I declared that they had by a whole series of military enactments demoralized and disrupted the Army and trampled our battle-flags in the mire. By my retention as Commander-in-Chief the Provisional Government had to my mind recognized its weighty transgressions against the country and a desire to repair the evil that had been done. To-day I have received the news that General Kornilov, who had presented the well-known demands which could still save the country and the Army, is to be relieved of the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Taking this to mean the return of the Government to a course of studied destruction of the Army, and consequently to the ruin of our country, I consider it my duty to acquaint the Provisional Government that along this course I shall not travel with them.

(Signed) GENERAL DENIKIN.

The senders of these telegrams were subsequently dismissed and arrested, in some cases under circumstances of the utmost brutality.

But the Army never received these Orders of the Day. Bolshevist agents at Mogilev intercepted them. It had been difficult, for the same reason, to get them printed. On the other hand, Kerensky's foul and slanderous proclamations against Kornilov were scattered broadcast. The Bolsheviki stirred up the Committees, and immediately a series of abominable outrages were perpetrated upon officers who lay under the slightest suspicion of being pro-Kornilov. The Kerensky-Bolshevist "Coalition" set the example by arresting Kornilov, Lukomsky, (then Chief of Staff), and most of the officers at Mogilev. Thereupon General Alexeiev, after protesting in the strongest terms against Kerensky's violation of his pledges, left the Stavka, and eventually

General Dukhonin accepted the post of Commander-in-Chief. Noble-hearted Denikin had been brutally ill-treated by a Bolshevik rabble. Other high officers shared his fate. Many were murdered. One was "boiled."

The Kerensky "sham" government shed crocodile's tears over the dreadful harm that Kornilov had done to the Army. Things were improving, and he must needs spoil them, forsooth. When Riga fell and the Germans overran Oesel, it was, of course, Kornilov's fault. Much had been made of the Lvov "misunderstanding." He was also a "bad man." He had misconstrued M. Kerensky's "good intentions" and had induced General Kornilov "into error." The obvious discrepancy between these two versions did not worry such people as Kerensky and his friends.

After a short period of internment at Mogilev, General Kornilov was transferred to Bykhov,<sup>1</sup> a neighboring townlet, to be put on his trial for "high treason." A Committee of Inquiry went down "to investigate." Of the six members, three were pseudo-Jews of the Soviet. And yet, after the most searching examination, even this body could find no case against him except for "attempting to change the existing form of Government," i.e., the Soviet regime. His trial was, however, postponed, because already some of the General's depositions had got into print and enabled the public and the Army to obtain a glimmering of the truth.

It was damning for Kerensky, and completely spoilt his hopes of collaboration with the Bolsheviks. The Soviet also became "obstreperous." Then the madman lost all sense of realities. He "proclaimed war on the Soviet" and demonstratively withdrew from it, resigning his post of Vice-President of the Executive Committee.

<sup>1</sup> He escaped thence in December, the day before Dukhonin was murdered.

His acolytes, Chkheidze and Tseretelli, followed suit. The complaisant M. Tereshchenko informed the Allied representatives that all was well. "We shall soon dispose of the Soviet and of the Bolsheviki," he boasted.

At a "Democratic" Conference, convened by him in the early days of October, 1917, Kerensky managed to secure a half-hearted assent to the formation of another Coalition Government. The majority of the Socialists recognized the impossibility of eschewing *bourgeois* support; indeed, some of them now recognized the fact that the Revolution had been the work, not of the "democracy" alone, but also of the *bourgeoisie*, and that the very essence of the social upheaval was *bourgeois*, it being mainly concerned with the acquisition of property. None except blind fanatics could imagine that the peasants having once come into possession of lands would give them up.

The Bolsheviki argued from another point of view. They contended that the Revolution had hitherto been "usurped" by pseudo-Socialists in alliance with *bourgeois* to the detriment of the "democracy." The pacifism of demoralized soldiers and sailors, and wholesale *jacqueries* by the peasants, were, in their eyes, appeals for the advent of a Bolshevik Government. Such was the gist of arguments used by Lenin in printed and oral utterances at this time.

The War Office had been entrusted to a semi-Revolutionary semi-Bolshevist professor—a Colonel named Verkhovsky, who had been "commanding" the Moscow soldier-rabble. He proceeded to settle the food and the money problems and incidentally pave the way to a premature peace by wholesale demobilization of the reserves.

The propertied and non-Socialist classes had offered their support to Kerensky because, after the Kornilov affair, they saw no other alternative to a Bolshevik

regime. The new Coalition, including four Constitutional Democrats, was formed October 8th. Meanwhile Kerensky proclaimed Russia a Republic in order to pacify the Left. It was, moreover, decided to institute a sort of provisional parliament, with consultative powers, in the hope that it would obviate the persistent interference of Soviets and Committees.

This body was formed out of members of the Democratic Conference and nominees of the propertied classes, which were represented in a proportion of about 25 per cent. The Provisional Council of the Republic—as it was styled—met October 20th, a few days after the Germans had consolidated their conquest of the city and gulf of Riga by the occupation of Dago Island. In his inaugural address, Kerensky denounced the Bolsheviki—his recent allies against Kornilov—as traitors. Trotsky retorted by branding the Council as a counter-revolutionary organization.

Trotsky had “captured” the Petrograd Soviet some time earlier, and had been organizing a Military Revolutionary Committee to direct eventual Bolshevist operations in the Capital. The garrison and the populace being informed of Kerensky’s connection with the Kornilov “plot” and of the plan to send Petrograd troops to the Front, joined Trotsky, obeyed his orders, and turned their backs on Kerensky. The latter appealed to the Cossacks in his hour of need, but he had deceived, bullied, and slandered them and their beloved Ataman, Kaledin. They refused to act as his police. He then fled, vainly hoping to find support outside. Konovalov and the other members of the latest Coalition were left in the Winter Palace guarded by a handful of loyal officer-cadets and women. Subjected for hours to a merciless fusilade and shelled by warships, they could not resist. Lenin’s forces suppressed resistance ruthlessly in Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities. The Bolshevist *coup*

of November 7th, unlike the two preceding ventures, was a complete and immediate success.

And as General Kornilov had predicted, the Bolsheviks began their rule by negotiating an armistice, without even consulting the Allies. Like the various Coalitions they were also a "sham"—but "made in Germany."

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE HOPE OF RUSSIA

Origin of the Cossacks—Three Centuries of Loyal Service—Ermak—Searovers—Sténka Rásin—The “Siech”—Conquest of Siberia—Arctic Exploration—The Cossack Lands—Home of Agricultural and Mineral Resources—The Twelve Armies—Organization Past and Present—Fighting Record—Elective Offices—Conditions of Service—The Don “Outlanders”—Numbers in the Field—Fighting Peculiarities—General Kaledin—A Message to King George and the British Nation.

THROUGHOUT this narrative of Russia's past and present history, I have endeavored to speak in terms that may be comprehensible to those of my readers who do not know Russia or the Russians or have a superficial and often misleading acquaintance with Russian affairs. It is the truth and the whole truth that has been unfolded in these pages—a record of glorious possibilities alternately wasted by narrow conceptions of statehood under the autocracy and wrecked by extravagant dreams of Millennium under the Revolution; an autocracy and a Revolution that were dominated in turn by the *okhrana* and the Soviet—institutions that were “to wipe away all tears,” but, in fact, only constrained or terrorized the living forces of the nation.

The Russian people had been, so to speak, in swaddling clothes throughout the ages of Tatarism and autocracy; their best men had sought sanctuary from oppression in the border wildernesses, and later were drafted thither as prisoners or exiles. Like our Pilgrim Fathers, these early emigrants had gone forth to colonize new lands; like our bold seamen, they founded new states and em-

pires. While Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher were laying the foundations of our oversea dominion, Ermák Timoféievich, a Cossack (in Russian, *Kazák*—freebooter) with a handful of hardy adventurers, overran Western Siberia, and came to John the Terrible to lay the new realm at the autocrat's feet.

Our own Robin Hood had his counterpart in the Volga Ataman "Sténka"<sup>1</sup> Rázin. The exploits of this bold spirit live to this day in popular legend. Every peasant knows of his daring raids across the Caspian in open boats to the confines of Persia,<sup>2</sup> whence he was reported to have brought back a lovely princess as his bride. And still more do they appreciate Sténka's undying love of freedom, his "complaint" against oppression, which is so poetically rendered in one of the beautiful songs of the Volga—the "Song of Sténka Rázin."

In the dawn of Russian history exploits of equal audacity had been accomplished by forerunners of the Volga freebooters. Prince Oleg had "hung his shield" upon the gates of Byzantium. Legends describe how Oleg's men fixed wheels to their boats so that "they sailed over land and sea." Long after the Principalities of Little Russia had been overshadowed by the Dukedoms of Suzdal, Vladimir, Tver, and Moscow and the Republics of Novgorod and Pskov, which finally succumbed to the "ingathering" power of the Terrible One, the hardy free-rovers of the Dnieper continued to maintain their traditions. (The Crescent had triumphed over the Cross, and the avenues of commerce had been closed in this direction, wherefore it became necessary

<sup>1</sup> Diminutive of Stepan (Stephen).

<sup>2</sup> Thence, perhaps, originated the name "Cossack," derived from the Turkic word "robber." (The Persians later had their own "Cossack" brigade.) There also, perhaps, the Cossacks acquired their battle-cry "Urá!" which means "Kill!" (Our Hurrah!) But more probably these words, like many others used by the Cossacks, were introduced into Russia by the Tatar invaders.

to develop an outlet into Asiatic markets through the Volga. Muscovy owed its rise to this economic circumstance.)

Cossackdom asserted itself as a barrier against the infidel. The Free Republic of Zaporozhia (literally, the lands below the Dnieper Rapids), with its *Siech*, or "Slasher" army, survived even the Polish domination<sup>1</sup> and was dispersed under the Great Catherine. Who has not read the thrilling pages wherein Senkiwicz relates the long-drawn story of the Cossack struggle against Polish rule? Who has not heard of Tarás Bulbá, the Cossack hero of Gogol's immortal epic? Who does not remember the story of Mazeppa, a Cossack chieftain who was bound on the back of a wild horse for "treachery" to the "oppressors" of his land?

The "Cossack" name had been more particularly identified with the Little Russians, but we have seen that their brethren of Great Russia were not less entitled to it. All had been equally animated by a love of freedom and independence, all were fearless and stanch. And now the Great Russian Cossacks again showed their marvelous qualities as pioneers of their country and people. Going ever eastward through Siberia, they passed mighty rivers, overpowered the resistance of native tribes, till finally they reached the open sea. Little is known about the doings of these remarkable men. They were ignorant and unlearned and left no records. They simply notified their discoveries of boundless lands and islands. Thus Dézhnev, a Cossack, sailed the Arctic Ocean in an open boat (1647-54), rounding what was afterwards called Behring Strait after a Russian naval officer who came there a century and a half later. Dézhnev built a fort at Anadyr Bay. A Cossack *sotnia* under Volodimir Otlásov conquered Kamchatka. Later,

<sup>1</sup> A well-known picture by the great Russian painter, Ilya Repin, represents the warriors of the *Siech* writing an egregious epistle to the Khan.

in 1870, two Cossacks, Vaghin and Bermiakov, discovered the New Siberian Islands. It is asserted by Colonel Vandam, a well-known Russian writer, that some of Dézhnev's contemporaries crossed the Straits and skirted the coast of Alaska and southward to what is now San Francisco.

Meanwhile their brethren in Great Russia had grown and multiplied. Their services were in demand. Great tracts of land were bestowed upon them by successive sovereigns. The Don Cossacks were the most numerous, because thither had flocked all the hardy youth of the Great Russian plain. Here grew up a new nation of horsemen. The vast prairies of the South afforded ideal pasturage and the soil was exceedingly fertile. The Don Cossacks became noted riders and husbandmen, and in the still waters of their river they gathered a rich harvest of fish.

From the Volga, Cossacks radiated eastward, forming two separate hosts—the Orenburg and the Yáik or Ural Armies. The name Yáik was forbidden after the uprising of Pugachëv<sup>1</sup> (early in the eighteenth century), in which the Yáik Cossacks had taken part, and they were afterwards styled the Ural Cossacks, till the Revolution, when the old name was revived. A small group of Sténka Rázin's followers settled in the estuary of the Volga and were known as the Astrakhan Cossacks.

When Catherine the Great finally broke the resistance of the *Siech*, she arranged for the transfer of its warriors to the Cis-Caucasian border. The advantages of her plan were twofold. An unsubmissive element was eliminated from Little Russia and settled in a region where

<sup>1</sup> Hence the Russian word *Pugachëshchikina*, equivalent of *Jacquerie*, applied to agrarian troubles, reminiscent of the wholesale destruction of property that attended Pugachëv's uprising. Pushkin wrote a wonderful novel on the subject entitled "The Captain's Daughter" (*Kapitánskóia Doch*).



12 *Кубанец*  
*Кубанец - Кавказец*

**TYPE OF KUBAN COSSACK**

(Drawn by M. Kravchenko)



their inborn fighting spirit would safeguard the Empire from incursions. For the Caucasian tribes were then untamed and predatory, and might help the Turks or the Persians to invade Russia. This was the origin of the Kubán and the Térekk Cossacks.

The Cossack organizations had been originally based on the elective principle. Their Atamans, or head-men, and minor officers were chosen in common assembly. The *Siech* host had been divided into regiments, which in peace-time were styled *Kúren* (smoke), as they lived in one building and foregathered around one hearth. In time of peace the army obeyed the orders of a Camp Ataman, who was assisted by a *Pisar* (clerk). They fulfilled duties approximating those of a Minister of War and his Chief of Staff. Discipline was not very strict. The whole army voted on war or peace. As soon as war was decided upon, the authority of the Camp Ataman became subordinate to that of the Field Ataman,<sup>1</sup> specially elected for the occasion. He was handed a *bulava* (mace) of office, and from the moment he had taken it no man dare to question his authority under pain of instant death. So long as the campaign lasted discipline of the sternest, most uncompromising character was enforced. Any Zaporozhian who imbibed a drop of strong drink was instantly put to death. Needless to say, refusal or delay in complying with orders, or any discussion thereof, were punished with equal rigor. Cowardice or treachery was visited with dreadful punishments. The guilty were impaled or torn to pieces by their comrades. This penalty was heralded by cries of "*Na pohibell*" (To destruction!).

In their new home the Zaporozhians were "modernized" and placed under appointed officers. The scalp-

<sup>1</sup> During the early days of the Cossack revolt against the Soviet (August, 1917), it was proposed to elect General Kaledin "Army Ataman" and General Kornilov "Field Ataman."

locks which they and the Poles affected in imitation of their Tatar and Turkish foes disappeared. But some of their old privileges remained. And nothing could quench their inveterate love of freedom and independence.

Meanwhile the Great Russian Cossacks had also been subjected to more direct control and to abolition of many of their rights and privileges. This circumstance had indirectly fostered Pughachëv's movement, which was also, however, aided by a general feeling of revolt among the peasant-serfs against their owners. Pughachëv, an ignorant and drunken ruffian, had impersonated the dead Tsar and promised a "Golden Charter" (*Zolotaiia Gramota*), which he declared had been "withheld" by his Ministers. The Golden Charter was to bestow Land and Freedom. (Two centuries later the legend of the Tsar and the "Golden Charter" was revived by agitators, during the *jacquerie* of 1905. And the fact that similar yarns did not materialize in 1917 shows that the villagers had become more enlightened.)

The Cossacks had not so much to complain of, after all. They were still free men. Vast tracts of land and exclusive rights of fishery were granted to them in perpetuity. In return for these rights they had to render military aid to the State whenever they might be called upon to do so.

In Asia, geographical conditions had led to a gradual "budding-off." The Siberian Cossacks established in the region nearest to the Urals had been supplemented by the Enisey and Trans-Baikal, later by the Trans-Amur and the Ussuri Cossacks, and an offshoot into Central Asia had become the Semirechensk (Seven Rivers) Cossacks.

Platow's Cossacks rendered signal service during the invasion of 1812, fiercely harrying the retreat of Napoleon's broken legions, and, later, entered Paris. The

Cossacks figured in every succeeding war: in the Crimea, in the Caucasus, in Turkestan, in Manchuria. They were not, however, in particular favor with the Old Regime, which treated them somewhat contemptuously as Irregular Cavalry, suitable for repressing internal troubles rather than for warfare. However, all who had to travel in the wilds of Siberia appreciated the inestimable value of the ubiquitous Cossack.

The Cossack organization as it existed under the Old Regime was briefly as follows: All the above-mentioned groups (twelve in number) were designated as "armies," each under the command of a chief appointed by the Tsar (who was "Hetman" of all the Cossacks), and known as *Nakazný Atamán*. Under him was the civil and military administration of the "army" (*voisko*). The Cossack settlements, or *stanitsas*, were administered by elected "elders" under a central board,<sup>1</sup> which had charge of the lands, fisheries, etc., and funds of the *voisko*. In some cases the funds were very considerable, notably in the oil regions of the Kubán, which came within the Cossack lands. Every Cossack was entitled to an allotment out of the *voisko* land reserve, which the Socialists tried to "confiscate." No one could become a Cossack except by adoption by a *stanitsa*. The settlements sometimes bestowed upon a non-Cossack the privileges of a *pochétny starík* (honorable old man) for distinguished service. Russian Generals prized this honor exceedingly.

Cossack boys entered the ordinary Military Schools and, eventually, received commissions in the regular Army. Such a one was the poor Siberian Cossack lad,

<sup>1</sup>The Cossack armies and their headquarters were as follows: Don, Novo-cherkaak; Kubán, Ekaterinodar; Téreik, Vladikavkas; Yásk, Uralak; Orenburg, Orenburg; Astrakhan, Astrakhan; Semirechensk, Vierny; Siberian, Omsk; Enisey, Irkutak; Trans-Baikal, Chita; Trans-Amur, Blagoveshchensk; Ussuri, Vladivostok (see p. 330).

Laur Kornilov, afterwards Generalissimo of the Russian armies. Or they passed through the Cossack College in Petrograd and became Cossack officers. To this category belonged the Don Cossack Kaledin, afterwards elected Ataman of all the Cossacks. Officers had their own peculiar designations. Thus, a lieutenant was styled *horúnzhy* (bannerman), a captain was *esául* (Turkic for chief of an *aúl* or camp), and a colonel was *voiskovóy starshiná* (army elder).

Under the Old Regime non-Cossack officers were, however, frequently given high command in the Cossack armies. This created irritation and friction. What is more, they sometimes obtained as a reward for services, or by Court favor, large grants of land out of the Cossack reserves, and thereby virtually became Cossacks. Thus a Cossack gentry and nobility arose, owning large estates.

Every male Cossack was liable for service from the age of eighteen upwards. According to age he passed from one *óchered* (class) to another. He had to appear for service with his own horse, clothing, equipment, and side-arms. Rifle and ammunition and food and fodder were supplied by the State. All carry the lance. The Cossack infantry had been famous among the Zaporozhians, and we find its traditions reasserted by the Kubán army. When the males of the family were too numerous, or for other causes the Cossacks were unable to appear mounted, they formed what were known as *plastún* (creeper) battalions, this name having been used in the Zaporozhian days to designate their method of attack—they crept up to and then “rushed” the foe.

The Kubán and Téreke armies had adopted the “cherkesska,” or long tunic with ornamental breast cart-tridge-case, and the *bashlýk* (hood), *papákha* (sheepskin bonnet), and *búrka* (camel’s-hair cloak) of the Caucasians,

as being most suitable for their climate. Other Cossacks wore a plain buttonless long coat and trousers of the blue cavalry color and a broad strip down the leg, differing in hue in each army—red for the Don, blue for the Orenburg, yellow for the Ussuri, etc. During the war they, of course, adopted khaki and in winter the *papákha*. Unlike the Zaporozhians they wore their hair long on the crown—a mark of distinction which was emphasized by leaving a long curl to protrude from beneath their headgear, rakishly set over the ear. The Caucasian Cossacks shaved their heads in summer like the native tribesmen, but always retained the *papákha*, which was often stained a reddish hue with henna. This gave an excellent “protective” coloring.

In type they showed both their origin and their associations. Thus the Don Cossacks are blue-eyed, fair-haired, and rosy-cheeked—the true Great Russian type. The Kubán and Téreks armies had little foreign blood, having bred true to their original Slav ancestors—the auburn-haired, somewhat dusky Little Russians. Among the Orenburg and Yáik warriors Mongol blood made itself noticeable, and the admixture of native strains became more noticeable in the Asiatic armies. General Kornilov, for instance, was half Buriat. A Kalamuk type was often very pronounced. The faces in a *sotnia* made one think of the wild horsemen of Djenghiz Khan. The Orenburg Cossacks were not so long ago—about fifty years—engaged in constant warfare with the Khanates of Central Asia, often capturing their brides among the native tribes. Kubán and Terek Cossacks waged a relentless war with the Chechen, Ingush, and other warlike tribes of the Caucasus, but jealously avoided all admixture with them.

The Don Cossacks had in late years to contend with an invasion of land-hungry rustics from the North. Steel and iron industries sprang up in the Donetz coal basin,

which contains some of the finest ore and coal in the world, and in huge quantities. Moreover, the growth of Rostov-on-the-Don (almost adjoining the Don Cossack capital, Novocherkask), due to the great development of agriculture and the proximity of rich oilfields at Baku, Grozny, etc., brought a large influx of non-Cossack inhabitants. All these new-comers were styled *inogorodtsy* (other townsmen).<sup>1</sup> Their advent caused much trouble to the Army Board, because they were constantly clamoring for a share of the Cossack land. And this vexed question lay at the root of demands formulated in the Duma to introduce Zemstvos in the Don province, the effect of which would have been to give the *inogorodtsy* something like a preponderance in local affairs. Later, the Cossacks came to an amicable arrangement with them.

In point of numbers the Cossack armies may be roughly estimated at anything between 100,000 and 150,000. If all the male population were "called up," the figure would be several times larger. Ten divisions of Cossack cavalry, or 24,000 sabers, were with the colors when war broke out. The second and third *ócheredi* gave another twenty divisions, bringing up the total to 72,000. But other classes were also summoned, and the strength of the Cossack host mobilized during the war must have far exceeded 100,000. Two *plastun* brigades were also formed, equal to 12,000 bayonets. These figures do not include the Cossack artillery, which was numerous and excellent.

Before the end of 1915 the Cossacks had captured 73,000 prisoners and taken 143 guns and 143 machine guns. The Don Cossacks alone took 33,000 prisoners and 59 guns and the Kubán 15,000 prisoners and 38 guns. The Terek Cossacks took 11,000 prisoners and

<sup>1</sup> "Cossack-land" also attracted many British enterprises connected with mining and agriculture.

23 guns and the Orenburg 6800 prisoners and 19 guns. Thus they had shown their fitness for warfare under modern conditions, taking their turn in the trenches—a distasteful occupation for born horsemen. At the very beginning of the war many Cossack girls replaced their brothers in the ranks so that the farm-work should not suffer. It was nothing to them. They had bestridden horses since early infancy. Later the women had to bear almost the entire burden of farm-work, and well they acquitted themselves of the task. Nearly all the Army funds were exhausted during the war.

I had been with the Cossacks in the field and in the trenches before the Revolution and admired their adaptability and stanchness. In one place the Germans were on a high ridge beyond a broad, deep river. Every night the Cossacks would swim their horses across and, leaving them in the brushwood, steal up and capture German prisoners. The enemy caught one of the Cossacks, cut a strip of skin out of the sides of his legs, and crucified him on a high tree in full view of his comrades. From that day few Germans were brought in, but the Cossacks continued their successful nightly excursions.

A special form of mounted attack is peculiar to the Cossacks, known as the *lava*. Perhaps the horsemen of Tatar knew it, but certainly the Cossacks elaborated and made it their own, and although I have seen "crack" regulars going through the intricate evolutions, they never quite come up to the Cossack level. It is essentially a Cossack "trick." The idea is to confuse and surround the enemy.

Imagine a regiment of six *sotnias* launched against an opposing force of horse or foot in the open. When the signal for the *lava* has been given the six hundred gallop wildly without any semblance of order. Their commander has, however, remained behind, and they are watching him. With a movement of his saber he

directs exactly what each *sotnia* and each man has to do.

Suddenly the confused mass separates, dashing off in different directions, some even "bolting" backward. Then another wave of the sword, and lo! as if by magic the helter-skelter resolves itself into a combined onslaught upon the enemy's flank or rear. As the contest proceeds innumerable other "combinations" may be evolved. To use a homely simile, it is something like a charge of American footballers, with consequences even more fatal.

The Caucasian tribes are also great adepts at the *lava*. I have seen the "savages"—as the Native Horse Division was dubbed—work wonders in this way. For the astounding thing is that during the war Cossacks and regular cavalry often charged trenches filled with Austrians and captured them. They have even swum rivers to get to the enemy and sabered all before them—mother-naked.

I had also some experience of the *plastun* brigade. These Kubán infantrymen were the terror of the hapless Hungarians who sat in the opposing trenches. Barbed wire could not stop their incursions. And, when the order came to attack, *without artillery preparation*, the *plastun* companies flung their *burkas* over the wires and were on the enemy. *Batko* (Daddy) Gulyga, their commander, said that none of his men were ever taken alive. They died fighting. The man who fell into the enemy's hands would never find a bride among the girls of the Kubán.

The Revolution was hailed by the Cossacks as an augury of the revival of old and cherished independence in matters that concerned their internal organization. Immediately they began to assemble a *krúg* (circle) first in the Don and later in the other neighboring armies. M. Guchkov dispatched General Hagondokov, a noted




**MICHAEL VLADIMIROVICH RODZIANKO**  
President of the Duma.



**GENERAL KALEDIN**  
Hetman of all the Cossacks.



**LENIN (RIGHT) AND TROTSKY (LEFT), THE BOLSHEVIK LEADERS**



Cossack leader, to encourage the men and to prepare a pan-Cossack Congress. The movement soon embraced all Cossackdom, and, as stated above, General Kaledin was elected Ataman of all the Cossacks with headquarters at Novocherkask.

It was thanks to the Cossacks that Russia did not go to pieces in the first months of revolution; they alone restored a semblance of order on the railways and kept desertion in check; they held the country against the inroads of Bolshevism. But they were only 100,000 horsemen scattered over a front of over 1500 miles and many more miles of railway. They were willing and able to support the Government, but they could not save Russia single-handed against a coalition of Government and Soviet, both dallying with Bolshevism. Kerensky sought their aid when it pleased his fancy or suited his purpose. Then he turned on them—to “negotiate” with Lenin.

And many a Cossack had been fighting the enemy without as well as the enemy within. At Kalush the 3rd Caucasian Cossack Division went into action under my eyes. Who shall adequately describe that scene! Here was a garden city rushed at nightfall against a handful of Germans and shamelessly plundered by the Committee-led soldiers, who all night had drunken their fill and perpetrated nameless atrocities on the inhabitants. And there, beyond the hills, a large force of Germans was rapidly approaching. As I crossed the shell-swept valley of the Lomnitsa my car broke down and I got out to watch the Cossacks. Coolly they rode into the city; then, dashing forward, dismounted and drove the enemy back.

The Cossack Congress declared its unalterable will to recognize only the properly constituted Government of Russia, to continue the war in all loyalty to the Allies, and to maintain order in the country till the

Constituent could meet. I attended its proceedings and noted some isolated attempts at obstruction on the part of *inogorodnie*, who had surreptitiously entered the hall. There was complete unanimity among the Cossacks. Later a *Soyúz* (League) of all the Cossacks was formed, and a Council elected.

When the Soviet Press began to attack General Kornilov, the Cossack Council passed a resolution denouncing any attempt to displace him from the post of Generalissimo. M. Kerensky, thereupon, demanded a written retraction. The Cossacks replied with another resolution declaring their readiness to support Kornilov and Kerensky. But this did not satisfy the revolutionary autocrat. He still insisted on a retraction. They ignored the demand.

At the Moscow Conference, General Kaledin,<sup>1</sup> a great burly man who looked and spoke as if nothing could shake him from his purpose, voiced the views of Cossackdom. Amid shouts of rage from the Socialists and under violent rebuke from Kerensky he declared in the name of the twelve armies that the Cossacks, "who had never been slaves, and were not drunken with freedom," "who had never deserted or shirked their duty," "would not be false to their traditions"; "they would serve the country in the field of battle and in the fight with traitors at home." "They had saved Socialist Ministers from the Bolsheviki on July 16th, and would save Russia from anarchy and betrayal." He concluded: "The time for words has passed. Our patience is exhausted. It remains for us to accomplish the great work of salvation."

He had already realized the fact that his enemy was presiding at the Congress, but he did not, perhaps, anticipate that Kerensky was unconsciously playing into

<sup>1</sup> As Commander of the Eleventh Army he had pierced the German front on the Pripiat. A man of excellent parts as a leader.

the hands of Russia's most inveterate foes, the Bolshevik agents of Germany. Among Kerensky's other mad acts was an attempt to deprive the Cossacks of their elected Chiefs. He even tried to arrest Kaledin. The task before the Cossacks became still more difficult, but they were not the men to turn back.

When I had written my account of the Moscow conference to *The Times*, a few of my Cossack friends came to bid good-bye. Before hurrying off to Novochoerkask they wished to convey certain messages to the Allies. They anticipated a Bolshevik uprising and wanted the Allies to be prepared for it.

They hold a compact block of the richest territory<sup>1</sup> in Southeastern Russia, backed by Cis-Caucasian tribes with whom they had fought in the old days.<sup>2</sup> The Ingush and Chechen horsemen, the Cherkess and Tatar tribes, the natives of Kabarda and Daghestan rose during the war to espouse the common cause. Faithful and loyal to their salt, like all good Moslems, no treachery could affect them, and it was not their fault any more than it was the fault of the Cossacks that the cavalry sent to Petrograd under General Krymov in September 1917 was "nobbled." On learning how he had been betrayed the hapless Krymov shot himself.

But in Russia there remain other strong and stanch elements. The Old Believers, to whom most of the Cossacks belong, count many millions of hardy settlers, of thriving merchants, and prosperous manufacturers. Many of the greatest names in Moscow are borne by men of the Old Faith. Then there are the millions of small

<sup>1</sup> All the principal coal, iron, copper, oil, and gold-fields and the steel, cotton-growing, wheat-raising, and cattle-breeding industries of Russia in Europe and in Asia are within range of Cossack-land (see map).

<sup>2</sup> During the short-lived invasion of Bolshevism in Cis-Caucasia (early in 1918) these old feuds broke out afresh with dire results to the Cossacks and to the tribesmen. Much damage was incidentally caused to the oil fields. It was during these troubles that Gen. Kaledin in despair committed suicide.

landowners—peasants who have bought their holdings. These are elements of stability which cannot be swept away, no matter what harm revolutionary *jacquerie* may do. And behind and beneath all the destructive agencies that have been at work, the old edifice of local government still stands. Indeed, by the irony of fate, the *volost* or parish *zemstvos* are even now being born.

#### THE COSSACK POPULATION AND LANDS.

The numerical composition of the Cossack "armies" and the areas of land belonging to them may be roughly stated as follows:

Army of:	Population.	Land (Thousand Acres).	Per Capita (Acres).
1. Don.....	1,500,000	32,400	22
2. Kubán.....	1,350,000	18,000	14
3. Yáik (Ural).....	900,000	17,500	20
4. Orenburg.....	530,000	20,000	38
5. Térek.....	270,000	3,400	20
6. Trans-Baikal.....	270,000	27,000	100
7. Siberia.....	180,000	14,000	20
8. Trans-Amur.....	50,000	2,700	50
9. Semirechenak.....	45,000	1,900	40
10. Astrakhan.....	40,000	2,200	54
11. Ussuri.....	34,000	1,000	48
12. Enisey.....	30,000	900	30
Total.....	5,199,000	141,000	.....

It should be noted that the Kubán and Térek "armies" hold valuable oil-bearing lands, which if properly developed would offer certain countervailing advantages making up for the comparative smallness of the areas belonging to them. The Orenburg and Ural armies were never touched by Bolshevism.

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## CONCLUSION

### CHAPTER XXVI

#### THE NEW RUSSIA

IN the history of a great commonwealth like Russia the events of the past year are bound to leave their trace, but they cannot remove or even radically modify the fundamental conditions of Russia's existence. Those who seek to make us believe in the power of Bolshevism to undermine and overthrow all that has hitherto existed should first of all demonstrate the possibility of reversing social and economic laws. But we know that to be impossible, for in their operation these laws are fixed and immutable as the stars.

To superficial observers the "communism" of primitive muzhikdom falsely appeared in the guise of a preparatory stage to "socialism." Into such a confusion of elementary facts the Russian bureaucracy was misled by the Revolution of 1905, and its errors have been adopted by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and by their Bolshevist rivals. In reality the peasant commune was a survival of the crude conditions of serfdom. It was bound to disappear—and was fast vanishing in fact—before the spread of education and the development of a higher form of social activity, as exemplified in the enormous increase of small-holdings. The "communism" of the peasants was not a negation of the principle of individual property nor—still less—a conscious self-restriction of the rights of ownership, which forms the

very essence of modern socialism; it was simply an utter incomprehension of the idea of property in general. Hence the *muzhik* was prone to consider "lands, waters and all that therein lived or grew" as "nobody's" or—as he put it—as "God's." But between this primitive conception and the high-fangled notions of "State socialism" or "land nationalization" lies an ocean of ignorance, to traverse which is utterly beyond the educational standard of the average peasant. To him the idea that the land, etc., is "God's" afforded an argument for "helping himself" and not in the least for sharing what he could lay his hands on with "others" except his own particular friends, for he had and still has no conception of State or nationhood. To him the "Little Father" was the "State" and the Orthodox Church is the "nation." To this day a peasant does not address his countrymen as "Russians" but as *Pravoslávnyye* ("You of the orthodox faith").

Unless we understand these essential facts of peasant psychology we are bound to go astray in our estimation of the Russian problem. But having grasped them, we can understand the dishonesty of the peasant, his lack of "patriotism," the unseemly readiness with which he repudiated his "Little Father"—once the powers of the day, i.e., the Bolshevik agitators, could defy authority—and his tumultuous willingness to accept the doctrines of spoliation. And because the Russian peasant had no consciousness of "statehood" or even of "nationality," except as an expression of lay or ecclesiastical lordship, the flouting of all bonds of discipline found the Russian soldier and sailor—and also the mill-hand—a ready prey to the wildest excesses. He became a rudderless craft—the sport of wind and wave.

What has been said above applies with special force to the mass of ignorant peasants in European Russia who have lived exclusively by agriculture. They rep-

resent something like 60 per cent of the population, or in round numbers as many millions of souls. Among this section we find the influences of serfdom still dominant, for here the great landed estates were principally centered. Here also the population was and remains densest and the agrarian problem has become most acute, with the least prospect of a local solution even by an equal apportionment of all existing lands. Among them also the peasants had migrated annually seeking employment and the parasitic element in the commune attained its most formidable proportions. Under the influence of "socialistic" teachings—misapplied and misunderstood—one peasant here proceeded to despoil another peasant, causing widespread ruin.

Among this benighted element the process of reaction, which ever waits upon the excesses of revolution, involves perils that may serve the purpose of the dark forces presently arrayed against Russia's revival and progress.

But as I have indicated in Chapters II and IV, and more particularly in Chapter XXV, the Russian people are not all formed in this primitive mold. The riverine tradesmen and artificers and the Cossacks and, I may add, the Mussulman element—which alone numbers over 20,000,000—are not of the material that will suit the Bolshevik book. The descendants of the Siech warriors, of the Don and Volga freebooters, of the Novgorodian merchants or the Pomor fishermen each and all represent traditions of initiative and independence and have very clear and precise notions regarding the rights of property.

Such are the outstanding facts of the Russian situation as accounted for in the preceding chapters. Let us resume the data therein collected regarding the character and scope of the Revolution. The nation and the Army realized quite well when the war broke out that

the quarrel had been fastened upon them by Germany and they were unanimous in desiring to shake off Teutonic domination and aggressiveness. But they grew tired—with good reason—of seeing the conduct of the war hopelessly muddled, and the great problems of food and transport mismanaged, and of finding their offers to mend matters persistently ignored. The Revolutionaries took the opportunity to organize an uprising in Petrograd, and the autocracy, having outlived its day, found no supporters in the hour of need. It fell like a rotten pear.

Throughout the tumult of upheaval the Revolutionaries were marshaled by an old and experienced hand—an extremist who had formed a temporary alliance with the German propaganda and who came to Russia under German auspices, provided with German money. The whole course of the Revolution was directed by this man and his allies. They were infinitely superior in skill and daring to the Socialist doctrinaires or visionaries who claimed to represent the masses of the people.<sup>1</sup> Behind the backs of sham coalition Governments they carried out unhesitatingly and unflinching their program of disruption of Russia's armed forces and of her material and financial resources with a view to rendering it impossible for her to continue the struggle. The various phases of this conspiracy have been traced and their authorship established in this book. Their desig-

<sup>1</sup> On "assuming power," Lenin made the following characteristic statement to a representative of the *Matin* (November 10th): "You may be sure that whatever may be the variations of the struggle, we must always in the end prove the stronger, because boldness is on our side, whereas Kerensky"—here Lenin shrugged his shoulders disdainfully—"is nobody. He has always hesitated. He has never done anything and he is always vacillating. He was a partisan of Kornilov and had him arrested. He was an opponent of Trotsky and he allowed him his liberty. . . . and, as he has not dared to defend himself, I firmly believe he did not dare to attack us." He might have added, had he been quite truthful, that Kerensky had been of the greatest service to the Bolshevik cause.

nations are: *prikaz* No. 1, the Stockholm Conference, the doctrine of "no annexation and no indemnity," the opening of the Galician front, and the wholesale plunder of the Treasury. Bolshevism was most dangerous while it worked behind the screen of Democracy. When it came into the light of day with Lenin's usurpation of the Government in Petrograd, its troubles began. It had to conclude an immediate peace and feed and enrich the mob . . . or perish.

Obviously, Bolshevism is a destructive, not a constructive, agency. It has laid waste the country, agriculturally and industrially. It offers no practicable method of feeding and clothing the people. All who could leave the cities have fled home to their villages. The northern and central portions of European Russia are in the throes of famine, and it is unlikely that any surplus food will be available for export from European Russia for a long time to come. Thus from an economic point of view the continuance of the present regime is an impossibility. From a political standpoint it is equally absurd.

The only calculable effect of the Revolution upon Russian economic conditions is a certain hastening of the process of disintegration of large landed estates, which has been proceeding with varied degrees of intensity during the past fifty years—since the Emancipation. It is obviously ridiculous to suppose that the peasant freeholders of some 100,000,000 acres, whose numbers run into many millions, will accept confiscation under any guise.<sup>1</sup> It is equally improbable that the spoliation of the banks and the resultant prejudice to the savings of the people will be accepted without demur.

<sup>1</sup> Leninite usurpation was followed by confiscation of all property, but the Bolshheviks did not venture to confiscate Peasant and Cossack lands.

The workers in the mills will soon tire of village life. And how are they to return to their looms or lathes if industries remain the sport of socialistic experiments?

We may take it for granted that European Russia will lose a great deal of its previous capacity for exporting foodstuffs, both in the near and distant future. Farming has already suffered enormously and great agricultural enterprises, notably the sugar industry, are likely to sustain serious damage, the successful cultivation of beetroot requiring large areas.<sup>1</sup> But agriculture and industries will not disappear—far from it.

Siberia had only begun to figure as a producer of foodstuffs when the war broke out; she was already, however, regarded as a formidable rival to European Russia, so that the through freights on grain were deliberately increased west of Cheliabinsk, lest Siberian wheat should swamp the Russian export market. But her resources had then been barely tapped. Emigration is bound to resume in large proportions, for the purely agricultural surplus population of European Russia has no alternative outlet. It is, indeed, the only solution of the Russian agrarian problem. Enormous tracts of the richest loam lands are still untouched both to the north and to the south of the great Siberian main railway. Siberia will unquestionably be the greatest wheat-producing country of the near future. And her natural outlets are Archangel and Rostov-on-the-Don.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The productivity of Russian agriculture in 1900 was estimated at \$2,125,000,000. In 1910 it had risen to \$4,825,000,000. The total production of Russian mills and industries in 1910 had reached an estimated value of \$2,500,000,000. Russia was the greatest cereal producer and exporter in the world. The quantity of grain harvested averaged 60,000,000 tons, of which one-fourth (about 16,000,000 tons) was exported. The loss of this huge contribution to the world's import necessitated food saving and exports on an unprecedented scale from the United States and Canada and until Russia is restored the food requirements of Europe must be dependent almost entirely upon America.

<sup>2</sup> The play of economic forces will compel the various republics and autonomies of 1917 Russia to coalesce afresh.

I need only mention a few of the other natural products of the vast Russian Empire—the great forests of the north and east, the cotton and fruit of Turkestan and Caucasia, the furs of Siberia, the hides and tallow of Caspia, the fisheries of the Arctic and Pacific Oceans and the Caspian Sea—to recall so many items of commerce that Bolshevism can never control or destroy.

With all her industries going, Russia was unable to satisfy half the requirements of her market—the remainder had to come from abroad. The Germans were benefiting enormously by the growth of Russian consumption. It was, indeed, their craze for monopolizing this great Russian market that prompted them to go to war. They were afraid of Russia's growing independence and armaments and, judging others by themselves, concluded that Russia, becoming strong enough to protect her own interests, would shake off the German economic yoke. But we have seen from the narrative of her munition tragedy how sadly behindhand Russia was in her industrial development. And it is beyond any question that her industries must, in the future, attain a much greater extension than before. No combination of Lenins can stultify this growth for long. The textile regions of the Volga, Moscow, and Petrograd, the steel and iron industries of the South and of the Urals, the copper mines of the Urals and Siberia, the great coal and oil fields of Cis-Caucasia and Asiatic Russia will outlive Bolshevism and any other combination of "isms," for they are the very heart's blood of the country.

The war and the Revolution have been sad trials for Russia. Her people have had to suffer more than any other of the great belligerent nations. The Revolution has been worse than an invasion of the Tatars. Indeed, one may regard this latest ordeal as being another service rendered by the Russian people to humanity. We may learn from their bitter experience more about the dead-

liest foe of our civilization and more readily detect its secret workings. We may hope also that the modern Huns who have launched this visitation will have cause to regret their foul work as they already have deplored the application of poison gases.<sup>1</sup> The Russians survived Tatarism; they are a great multitude and have not all succumbed to the German Bolshevist poison. The Revolution has stirred up the dregs and muddied the current of national life. But its effects have not been altogether unsalutary, nor have its lessons been lost upon the best elements of the nation.

The war and the Revolution together provide a hard school for Russia's many millions. The bombardment of the Kremlin, the desecration of national shrines, the wholesale murder of officer-cadets, the "lynching" of General Dukhonin and all the "abomination of desolation" wrought by Bolshevism have forever discredited its teachings. But even if Bolshevism had not been stained by such acts, its attempts to conclude an armistice and a separate peace with the nation's enemies can never be forgiven.

Russia has been resolving itself into its constituent parts during the Revolution. This tendency is conservative rather than centrifugal. It is intrinsically a revolt against anarchy. It should not excite alarm but rather be hailed as a first step towards final crystallization of the new State. And whether that State will be a monarchy or a Republic, a federation or a single organism, is not pertinent to the main issue that concerns Russia's friends. The deadening and disastrous hegemony of Petrograd is coming to an end. A huge commonwealth like Russia cannot be governed from one essentially un-Russian center. Even London could not hope to govern the whole of our Overseas Dominions.

<sup>1</sup> This was written in December, 1917. The prediction has been realized.

Muscovy, Little Russia, Siberia, and the Caucasus are so many great communities, each having its own peculiar interests and requirements. Moscow, Kiev, Irkutsk, and Tiflis—not to speak of Rostov, Orenburg, Archangel, Omsk, Blagoveshchensk, and Vladivostok—will develop mightily in the future, and by this strengthening of its nerve-centers the whole country will be stimulated to healthy growth.

Local government has attained a full measure of expression in the establishment of the *Volost* Zemstvos. Therein lies an assurance of solidarity between all classes.

The time has come for Russians to cast off old ideas and old hatreds, to repudiate the doctrines of materialism, and to reassert their true spiritual leanings, to purify and refine their Church, which has regained her freedom and independence under a Patriarch, and to spread the blessings of education.

A new Russia is springing up amid the ruins of the old. The day of Lenin and destruction draws to a close. Do not believe outward aspects and appearances. Russia is not dead. Her agony, still upon her, is not the agony of death, but the agony of a living, breathing organism struggling to find expression, wrestling against the fiend of Bolshevism that has gripped her when she was at her weakest.

And to my readers who are saddened and disheartened by Russia's collapse, who see in it an evidence of disloyalty, a disinclination to share the common burden of our Great Cause, I would address an earnest appeal to read carefully the record of "Russia's Agony" and then to ask themselves, in all truth, justice, and equity, if the Russian people are not more sinned against than sinning. Let them take as their type and exemplar of true Russian ideals that perfect man and stainless knight Michael Vasilievich Alexeiev, who stands out unsullied amidst the intrigues of a pro-German Court

and the insane vagaries of disloyal demagogues. Let them pay due regard to the fearless genius of a Kornilov and the stanchness of a Kaledin. These are all men of the people. These and Rodzianko are the true Russians. Let them heed the promise of Cossackdom, the Dútovs and their kin—the “hope of Russia.”

Three centuries ago Russia was afflicted as she is now with a “time of confusion.” Then, Minin, a tradesman of Nizhni, aroused the people and Count Pozharsky led them. In a week they had driven the Polish invader out of Moscow. History repeats itself.

A few words must be said about ourselves. *If* Germany captures the Russian market, it will not matter much to her what she may lose in the West. She could then recoup herself for any such losses within a few years and be in a position to resume her campaign for world mastery with all the odds in her favor. It is by no means certain that she can succeed in capturing Russia, since her own overthrow—but she will certainly try to do so—unless the Russians surrender their birthright—an improbable event, as I have shown—and their Allies fail to make use of their opportunities. For this purpose we must cultivate the Russians—not exploit them as the Germans do—with a fair policy of give and take, and must develop a living contact with the people. Propaganda of the right sort is essential, but it will never be really effective so long as Russian newspapers have to depend upon German firms for their advertising revenue. We have too long forgotten and neglected the sea routes of the North and East.

Let us not underrate the dangers of which I speak but on the other hand let us not overrate or misunderstand them and jump to wrong conclusions. Bolshevism is an enemy that we have to deal with not only in Russia.

## APPENDIX I

### DECLARATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC

IN November, 1915, all the Moderate Parties in the Two Houses formed a "Progressive Bloc," which drew up and submitted to the Government an important "Declaration" embodying a program of policy and reform which, if it had been accepted, would have staved off, and perhaps prevented, the Revolution. Here is the text of the Declaration:

The undersigned representatives of parties and groups of the State Council and Duma, moved by the conviction that only a strong, firm, and active authority can lead the country to victory, and that such authority can only be one based upon popular trust and, as such, capable of organizing the active co-operation of all citizens, have come to the unanimous conclusion that the most important and urgent task of establishing such an authority cannot be realized without compliance with the following conditions:

The creation of a united Government composed of individuals enjoying the confidence of the country and union with the legislative bodies for carrying out a definite program at the earliest date.

Decisive change of methods of administration, which have hitherto been based upon distrust of public independent action,<sup>1</sup> in particular (a) strict introduction of the principle of law in administration; (b) abrogation of dual authority, military and civil, in questions that have no direct relation to the conduct of military operations; (c) extension of local government; (d) a wise and continuous policy directed towards the preservation of domestic peace and the removal of discord between nationalities and classes.

For the realization of such a policy the following measures must be adopted both in administrative and in legislative channels:

I. The cessation, by the Imperial prerogative of clemency, of actions raised in connection with purely political and religious offenses not associated with crimes of a general penal character; liberation from punishment and restoration to rights, including that of participation in elections for the State Duma, Zemstvo, and municipal institutions, of persons condemned for such offenses;

<sup>1</sup> The *Okhrana* is here alluded to.

and amelioration of the lot of others convicted for political and religious crimes, with the exception of spies and traitors.

II. The return of those exiled by administrative order for matters of a political and religious character.

III. Complete and decisive discontinuation of religious persecution under whatever pretext and abolition of circulars which have resulted in the limitation and distortion of the meaning of the Ukas of April 30, 1906.<sup>1</sup>

IV. Settlement of the Russo-Polish question, viz., abolition of restriction of rights of Poles<sup>2</sup> throughout Russia, the immediate drafting and introduction into the legislative institution of a Bill for the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, and the simultaneous revision of legislation concerning Polish land-ownership.

V. Entry upon the path of abolition of restriction of the rights of the Jews, in particular further steps towards the abrogation of the Pale, facilitation of access to educational establishments and abolition of hindrances to the choice of professions. Restoration of the Jewish Press.

VI. A conciliatory policy in the Finnish question, in particular changes in the composition of the administration and Senate, cessation of prosecution of functionaries.<sup>3</sup>

VII. Restoration of the Little Russian Press, immediate revision of the affairs of the inhabitants of Galicia who are kept under arrest and of those exiled, and liberation of those who have been wrongfully subjected to prosecution.

VIII. Restoration of the activity of professional unions and cessation of the persecution of the representatives of workmen on hospital boards on suspicion of belonging to non-legalized parties. Restoration of the labor Press.

IX. Agreement of the Government with the legislative institutions concerning the speedy introduction of the following:

(a) All Bills having immediate connection with national defense, the equipment of the army, security for the wounded, settlement of the lot of the refugees, and other questions indirectly connected with the war.

(b) Of the following program of legislative work directed to the organization of the country for co-operation for victory and for the support of domestic peace: Equalization of the peasants' rights with other classes; introduction of parish (*volost*) Zemstvos; amendment of the Zemstvo regulations of 1890, amendment of the municipal regulations of 1892, introduction of Zemstvo institutions into the outlying districts, i.e., Siberia, Archangel Province, the Don Province, the Caucasus, etc., a Bill concerning co-operative societies; rest for commercial employees, betterment of the situation of post-office and telegraph employees; ratification of temperance forever; Zemstvo and municipal con-

<sup>1</sup> Establishing freedom of conscience.

<sup>2</sup> Polish officers were excluded from the General Staff, etc.

<sup>3</sup> In the majority of cases these prosecutions were due to refusals to recognise Imperial legislation regarding equality of rights for Russian subjects in Finland, especially the right to carry on trade, which was restricted by the Finnish law to citizens of the Grand Duchy.

gress and unions; regulations concerning revision, introduction of Courts of the Peace in those provinces where their introduction had been stopped for financial considerations; realization of legislative measures which may be found necessary in the execution of the above-indicated program.

The foregoing declaration was signed by Count V. A. Bohrinsky for the progressive group of Nationalists; V. Lvov for the Center; I. I. Dmitriukov for the Octobrists; S. Shidlovsky for the group of the Union of October 17th; T. Efrenov for the Progressivists; P. Miliukov for the party of National Freedom (Cadets) in the Duma; D. D. Grimm for the Academic group; and V. Mellor-Zakomelsky for the group of the Center in the State Council.

Half a year later, at the reassembling of the Duma in April, 1916, these demands were reiterated with the warning "Time will not wait."

The whole record of the Revolution has tragically demonstrated the appositeness of every item in this Declaration.

## APPENDIX II

### THE "SOLDIERS' CHARTER"

THE "Soldiers' Charter" was issued by M. Kerensky as an Army Order. He boasted that he was conferring privileges on Russian soldiers such as were not enjoyed by any other armies in the world. It consisted of the following clauses:

1. All serving in the Army enjoy all the rights of citizens, but while on duty they must strictly conform their conduct to the demands of military service and military discipline.

2. Every person serving in the Army has the right to belong to any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organisation or society.

3. Every person serving in the Army has the right, when off duty, to utter freely and publicly, orally, or in writing, or in print, his political, religious, social, and other views.

4. All persons serving in the Army enjoy complete liberty of conscience, and no one can be prosecuted for his faith or be compelled to attend divine service or religious rites performed according to another religion. Attendance at common prayer is not obligatory.

5. All persons serving in the Army are subject, in respect of their correspondence, to the rules common to all citizens.

6. All publications, periodical and non-periodical, without exception, must be delivered, without let or hindrance, to the addressees.<sup>1</sup>

7. All persons serving in the Army have the right to wear civilian dress when off duty, but military uniform remains obligatory at all times for all persons serving in the Army in the military sectors and at the front. The right to wear civilian dress in certain large towns within the military zone may be granted to persons serving in the Army by Commanders of the armies at the Front, or of the Navy. A mixed form of dress is absolutely prohibited.<sup>2</sup>

8. The mutual relations of persons serving in the Army must be based on the strict observations of military discipline, and also on the sentiment of dignity of citizens of free Russia and on mutual trust, respect, and courtesy.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> None except Bolshevik organs reached the troops.

<sup>2</sup> This rule was constantly violated.

<sup>3</sup> As no penalties were implied, this clause had no meaning and no value. This applies also to Clause 12.

9. Such special phraseology which has hitherto been regarded as obligatory for individual soldiers is to be replaced by the ordinary forms of speech.

10. The appointment of common soldiers as orderlies is abolished, an exception being made for officers, army surgeons, army officials, and army clergy in the active Army and Navy, in fortress districts, in camps, on board ships, and on manœuvres, as well as in such places as offer no opportunity for hiring servants. In these cases one orderly is allowed on conditions and at a pay agreed upon mutually.

11. Orderlies who are used for personal service are not freed from active service.

12. The obligatory salute, both by individual soldiers and by units, is abolished, and is replaced for all persons serving in the Army by a voluntary and mutual salute. An exception is made for ceremonial occasions, for funerals, etc., when military honors are prescribed. The command "Attention" also remains in all cases provided by the rules.

13. In those military districts which are not included in the zone of military operations, all persons serving in the Army, when off duty, have the right to leave the barracks, or the vessel, as the case may be, after previously informing the competent authority and receiving a proper certificate of identity. In case of vessels in port, also that part of the crew is allowed to leave for shore which is not required in case the ship may have urgently to raise anchor.

14. No person serving in the Army may be punished or fined without a proper trial, but in face of the enemy a commander has the right, on his personal responsibility, to take all measures, including the use of armed force, against persons declining to obey his orders, such measures not being regarded as disciplinary punishments.

15. All punishments which are offensive to the honor and dignity of a person serving in the Army, as well as which inflict torture or cause damage to health, are not allowed.

16. The employment of punishments which are not mentioned in the disciplinary code is an offense against law, and persons guilty of committing them are to be placed before a court-martial. A commander striking his subordinate, whether in the line or outside it, is also to be placed before a court-martial.


17. No person serving in the Army may be subjected to corporal punishment. This exemption also affects those who are undergoing a term of punishment in military prisons.

18. The right of appointing to posts, and, in certain cases defined by law, of temporarily removing from command, belongs exclusively to the commanders, who alone have the right to issue orders affecting the fighting activity and efficiency of any unit, its training, its special work, as well as the work of inspection and administration. On the other hand, affairs concerning internal self-government, punishment, and control belong to the elected Army organizations, committees, and courts.

Parts of Clauses 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 14 and the second part of 18—consolidating the Committee system—are

obviously incompatible with military discipline. The main defect of this "Charter" lay in the fact that it conferred "rights" without defining "duties."

Under the Bolshevik regime the rank and pay of officers were abolished. Commanders of regiments and lesser units were elected. The Council of the People's Commissioners under Lenin appointed their nominees to the higher commands. Thus Krylenko, a demagogue who addressed students' meetings during the semi-Revolution of 1905, under the sobriquet of "Comrade Abram," became Generalissimo.



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## APPENDIX III

### FOREIGN TRADE OF RUSSIA

THE Foreign Trade of Russia in 1912 represented a value of over \$1,320,000,000. Of this sum exports represented approximately \$790,000,000, chiefly foodstuffs and raw materials, while the imports (manufactured goods) exceeded \$530,000,000. About 80 per cent of the exports went to Germany and over 40 per cent of the imports came from that country.

A comparison of the relative positions of German and British trade with Russia up to the outbreak of war is given in the following returns for the five half-years ended June, 1914:

	Imported from England.	Imported from Germany.
1910	\$58,050,000	\$106,850,000
1911	36,200,000	122,550,000
1912	32,250,000	123,300,000
1913	40,500,000	149,800,000
1914	49,750,000	186,350,000

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