


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THE NAZI ELITE

by Daniel Lerner

with the collaboration of
Ithiel de Sola Pool and George K. Schueller

Introduction by Franz L. Neumann



Hoover Institute Studies

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Nazi movement was in many ways a laboratory model of ominous forces which continue to appear in many parts of the world. Violent movements of reaction which challenge the values of our liberal heritage appear again and again in much the same form. It is therefore important to study, as Mr. Lerner has done, the dynamics of the strongest of such movements.

Who were the Nazi leaders? What was their relation to the established and respected elite of the old society? Were they upstart revolutionists or did they represent the vested interests? How did the propagandists, the policemen, the army, and the administrators get along together? It is to such questions that Mr. Lerner has addressed himself in this study of the Nazi elite.

HOOVER INSTITUTE STUDIES

Series B: Elite Studies, No. 3

August 1951

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The Hoover Institute and Library
on War, Revolution, and Peace
Stanford University

Stanford University Press

THE HOOVER INSTITUTE STUDIES

This series of studies undertakes to describe the world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy. These studies were conducted by the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace as part of its research project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR Project).

The studies and their publication were made possible by funds granted by Carnegie Corporation of New York. That Corporation is not, however, the author, owner, publisher, or proprietor of this publication, and it is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made or views expressed therein.

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STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

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Printed in the United States of America
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INTRODUCTION

The Fuehrerlexikon, The Nazi Who's Who of 1934, was an old stand-by during World War II for all those who had, in one way or another, to deal with Nazi Germany. On the whole, it proved a reliable guide to the Nazi Party elite. Its deficiencies were quite evident to every user: The Lexikon was clearly padded by the inclusion of certain Germans of high repute (particularly military and academic figures) who, while sympathetic to certain policies of the Nazi movement, could not then be considered Nazis; but it omitted equally important figures (particularly industrialists and bankers and high civil servants) who, while not having joined the Party, were quite indispensable to its victory. With these two limitations, the Lexikon proved, indeed, a reliable guide. The present study by Professor Daniel Lerner and his associates uses the biographical data of the Lexikon in order to analyze the Nazi Party leadership as a counter elite "specialized in the use of organization, propaganda, and violence to gain power."

It will be my task in this Introduction not so much to praise this study, which deserves it without qualification, but rather to indicate its relevance for the study of Nazism and for political science.

Some may infer from the study that an elite may seize power if it dedicates itself wholeheartedly to "organization, propaganda, and violence." Clearly, the study neither says nor implies this. Such would be the view of a school of thought which believes violence alone to be the lever of history and which thus considers the historical setting as totally irrelevant. The Babeuf, Blanqui, Bakunin school has its modern counterpart in the little book of Curzio Malaparte,* which found wide circulation in pre-1933 Germany. Malaparte, spreading the gospel of putschism, considered Mussolini's March to Rome the prototype, and ridiculed Hitler as the "would-be leader" because of his reliance on opportunist parliamentary methods. On this basis, Malaparte predicted that Hitler would never come to power. His analysis thereby reenforced the smugness of German Social Democracy, followed with the prediction, on the day that Hitler came to power, that National Socialism would be blocked by parliamentary legality.†

The opposite was indeed true. It was precisely Hitler's "legality" that made his victory possible, and it is here—precisely at this point—that the differences between the Nazi and the Bolshevik elites become clear. The Bolsheviks indeed came to power through a classical revolution; the Nazis did not. They did not because they could not, and they knew they could not.

Hitler had attempted his putsch in 1923. It had failed lamentably because he could not then gain support of the army, the high civil service, and the industrial and banking classes. To those groups, a putsch involved

*Coup d'Etat, the Technique of Revolution, translated by Sylvia Saunders (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1932).

†See my Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 32.

too great a risk. True, many already had sympathies with National Socialism, but they were far more afraid of the risks involved in openly siding with a coup d'état. It is precisely the experience of the Munich Putsch of 1923 that induced Hitler to change his strategy. This is what he said, on November 8, 1935, about the Munich Putsch: "Fate has meant well for us. It did not let an action succeed which, had it succeeded, must finally have foundered because of the inner immaturity of the movement and its faulty organizational and spiritual foundations. We know this today. Then, we acted with courage and manhood. Providence, however, acted with wisdom."*

Thus, the Nazi Party elite set out to make the Nazi Party an instrument of "legal" action. That involved:

1. The transformation of the Party into a mass organization.
2. The acquisition of support by the controllers of the instruments of production and of money.
3. The acquisition of tacit support by the controllers of coercion—army and police.
4. The acquisition of support by the controllers of the instruments of administration (bureaucracy).
5. The acquisition of support by the administrators of justice.

That Hitler succeeded in all five tasks is a matter of historical record.

Why did he succeed?

It is in the answering of this question that the study of the Nazi elite makes an important contribution. Very wisely, Dr. Lerner and his associates analyzed the pre-1934 and not the post-1934 elite. The Roehm Putsch of June 30, 1934, constitutes the decisive event in the history of Nazism prior to the outbreak of the war. Up to that date, there could be some doubt whether the Nazi government really wielded total power. One could still argue that the Reichswehr generals controlled an instrument of coercion far more significant than the total power of the Nazi movement. But the acquiescence of the Reichswehr leadership in the liquidation of Roehm and of his S.A.; of Generals Schleicher and Bredow; of the former Bavarian antagonist of Hitler, von Kahr; of Dr. Klausener, the leader of the Catholic Action; and of many others—these events made it abundantly clear that Nazism ruled totally.[†] Consequently an analysis of the post-1934 Nazi Party elite would help little in analyzing the reasons for Nazism's victory. After June, 1934 (and, of course, already after January, 1933), an ever increasing number of Germans in all walks of life joined the Nazi Party for many and varied reasons: to be with the "stronger battalions," to make profits from affiliation with the Nazi movement, to protect themselves and their families, etc.

Thus, only the analysis of the pre-1934 elite can shed light on the reasons for Nazism's victory. This decision of Dr. Lerner's is fully warranted.

*Behemoth, pp. 41-42.

[†]The significance of June 1934 is now gradually recognized by the more intelligent German officers. See Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit (Tuebingen und Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 19, 36.

The victory of Nazism is, of course, the result of the weakness of Germany's democratic forces and, thus, of the strength of anti-democratic (but not necessarily pro-Nazi) sentiments and attitudes. This study helps to make clear the intrinsic connection between social stratification and political attitudes—a key problem of political science, but a very much neglected one.

Germany's democratic movement is, to a wide extent, coterminous with Germany's labor movement (Social Democratic, Catholic, and Democratic). Why this movement failed is of no direct concern to this study. But one significant fact emerges from this painstaking analysis, namely, the absence of industrial labor from the Nazi Party elite.

Conversely, the study confirms the thesis that the Nazi movement was a middle-class and lower middle-class movement. Hitler's success is due to the fact that he made the Nazi movement the melting pot of the German middle classes, which hoped to satisfy their aspirations within and through it. It must be kept in mind that the category of the "Plebeians," from which the Nazi administrators mostly came, is not a working-class but a middle-class group with strong increments from the agrarian and non-industrial urban lower classes.

Roughly, the German middle classes (and middle classes in an industrial society in general) may be divided into old and new middle classes; the old, in turn, into rural and urban (or agrarian and non-agrarian) middle groups. Dr. Lerner prefers for the term "new middle classes" that of "middle-income skill groups." This term may be questioned because very frequently the new middle classes did not belong to the middle-income but to the lower-income groups, a fact which, as the study shows, helps to explain their political attitudes. Each of these strata presents peculiar problems, and their understanding greatly assists in the comprehension of National Socialism.

The understanding of the role of social stratification in politics suffers greatly from the fixation upon the attempt to validate or invalidate (according to preference) the Marxian predictions: that the middle classes will disappear, and society will become polarized; and that the proletariat, steadily increasing in numbers, will become pauperized and will, during this process, acquire class and revolutionary consciousness. Within and outside the European labor movement, these Marxian analyses were violently debated for decades. The revisionist school of German Social Democracy was among the first to insist upon the invalidity of the Marxian forecasts. Ever since, the problem of social stratification and politics has been put in Marxian terms. This, however, prevented the true problem from being discovered and it was only late in the 1930's that the real problems were properly formulated.

Clearly, the old middle classes (artisans, retailers, small businessmen) increased in number for several reasons. But they suffered a steady decline in social power since their economic functions became increasingly dependent upon the sufferance from big business. Choosing the way

of least resistance, they tended to follow the leadership of big business and to attribute their debilities not to the concentration and cartellization of business but rather to labor and particularly to trade unionism. Within this general trend the significance of three special phenomena must be understood: the inflation of 1922-23; the depression of 1930-33; and the so-called price-scissors in the agrarian sector.

The inflation destroyed the savings of the old middle classes; the depression destroyed their capital; the growing gap between stable industrial and falling agricultural prices undid the benefits that the peasants had derived from the inflation, which had wiped out their indebtedness.

Thus, the old middle classes were driven by fear into a movement which promised to them the restoration of their economic function and their social prestige. The plebeians came in part from uprooted middle classes who desperately tried to stage a comeback. This fact, which the study reveals for the pre-1933 period, is even more strikingly revealed in an analysis of the composition of the Nazi personnel in the administration of conquered and occupied territories in Hitler's New Order.

The New Middle Classes are, in terms of Marxist sociology, "proletarians" since they perform dependent labor without owning means of production. They are the engineers, technicians, foremen, and the white-collar salaried employees. * It is a well-known fact that in every industrial society the new middle classes increase much faster than the industrial workers. It is equally known (and already Eduard Bernstein perceived this without fully understanding the significance of this phenomenon) that the material compensations of the huge bulk of this group are below those of the industrial workers. Even a university-trained chemist (and Dr. Robert Ley belonged to that category) employed by a chemical plant earned as a rule less than the skilled industrial worker. Thus, we have a stratum, growing in numbers, economically below the skilled industrial worker but whose social aspirations are diametrically opposed to its economic status. It is this dichotomy between economic status and social prestige that provided the soil for Nazism. The bulk of the German salaried employees in commercial enterprises were always organized in an openly nationalistic and anti-semitic organization.

To these strata must be added considerable groups of marginal intellectuals, "alienated intellectuals" as Dr. Lerner rightly calls them. Here again, a word of explanation appears necessary. The position and social function of intellectuals changes greatly in modern society. Their ideal function (their Socratic role, one is inclined to say) is to be the critical conscience of society. While one cannot go along with Karl Mannheim† in asserting their need for independence of social classes and political movements, we must be aware that the intellectual ceases to be the conscience

*See the excellent analysis by Hans Speier in Social Research (1934), I, 118 ff.

†Ideology and Utopia, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), pp. 136-46.

of society if and when he becomes simply the spokesman of classes, groups, and parties. Yet, this is precisely what happens. The intelligentsia becomes a bureaucracy; the intellectual a functionary. But becoming this, he also tends to become expendable. Other functionaries (of the trade unions, the political parties, etc.) may easily fill the positions that he claims for himself. Thus, large strata of the intellectuals cease to have social functions and thus become alienated. The nihilistic attitudes which develop in this process are then merely the first steps in their embracing the philosophy of terrorism of a Fascist movement. The pauperized, resentful intellectual is, as this study shows, perhaps the single most important element in the Fascist elite.

But even the employed and earning intellectual functionary in Germany very often found his way into the Nazi movement, precisely because he became aware of his expendability. The trade unionist as police or district president, or as Landrat (rural councillor), became the hated and resented symbol of a trend which tended to destroy his monopolistic claim for high administrative positions.

The last social group which supplied some of the members of the Nazi Party elite is that of the structurally unemployed. This group may be subdivided into two: the groups of older men who were out of work for considerable periods; and the unemployed youth who never had employment and to whom, therefore, unemployment became, so to speak, their normal calling.

The former subgroup experienced unemployment as a social stigma. Work being the supreme social value of an industrial society, long periods of unemployment thus stigmatize them and frequently induce them to follow any movement that promises work.

The unemployed youth, however, presents a still more serious problem. Factory work is the greatest educational institution of modern society. It is the factory which trains the mass of the people in the virtues of solidarity on the one hand, and of discipline and obedience on the other hand. Lack of work thus paves the way to nihilism and, ultimately, to terrorism.

Seen in the light of a social theory of National Socialism and Fascism, this study of the Nazi Elite assumes considerable significance. It is the first attempt to quantify the more generalized statements on the social base of National Socialism and thus give it a scientific validity which it heretofore seemed to lack.

The second service rendered by Dr. Lerner and his associates is equally great. It consists in the correlation of the specific strata of the middle classes to the specific components of the Nazi Party elite. Here, the study speaks for itself.

Franz L. Neumann

Columbia University
August 1951

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I. PERSPECTIVE AND PROCEDURES

The Nazi rise to power ranks as a great triumph of mass organization, persuasion, and coercion, perhaps the most impressive victory in modern political history for the planned manipulation of men and symbols. Like their Bolshevik and Fascist precursors, the Nazis developed a tiny "lunatic fringe" into a monolithic party claiming—and receiving—a monopoly of state power. But the Nazis accomplished this in a great modern industrial nation, and in one decade of activity. From fugitive meetings in Munich beerhalls in 1923, they planned, talked, and punched their way into the Reich Chancellory by 1933.

The politics of parliament went down, in a decade of crisis, under the aggressive politics of the street. This distinctive feature of Nazi politics is explicitly recognized in the triumphant memoirs which Nazi leaders brought out to celebrate their victory—e.g., Auf den Strassen des Sieges, and Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei.¹ Both Dietrich and Goebbels were masters of the politics of the street—the organized use of voice and violence to gain power.

A study of the Nazi elite thus interests us as a way of clarifying the process of power-transference in one important historical situation. When we notice that successful revolutionary elites in such varied societies as Russia, Italy, and China reveal striking similarities to the Nazi elite, we may be on the track of some basic propositions about the "world revolution of our time." In a later study we shall document several such propositions through comparative data on the common characteristics of the main revolutionary elites of our time, and contrasting data on non-revolutionary elites. Some of the most pertinent data will be found in the forthcoming companion study of the German cabinets from 1890 to 1945 by Max Knight entitled The German Elite (Monograph No. 4 in this Series). Some of his findings for the later years reinforce the findings of this study, which is confined to the presentation of data on the members of the Nazi elite.

Purpose and Method of the Inquiry

The Fuehrerlexikon published in 1934 is a Who's Who of Nazism. It gives biographical sketches of about 1,600 persons, nominally those who most helped the Nazi movement to achieve total victory but also many who were prestigious figures without being particularly vigorous Nazis. From this population we drew a systematic random sample of 10 percent—i.e., drawing every tenth name as it occurred in the alphabetical listing of the Fuehrerlexikon. This procedure gave us an adequate sample (159 persons) to determine the salient biographical characteristics of this elite.

Next we drew three additional samples from this population—each exhausting a subcategory of the Nazi elite. One of these subclasses contains all the persons in the book who were classifiable as Nazi Propagandists (128); the second contains all the persons classifiable as Nazi Administrators (151); the third contains all the persons classifiable as Nazi Coercers (139). Indi-

vidual biographies were sorted into the categories on the basis of explicit criteria. Our criteria of classification are detailed in Appendix A, where they may be consulted by interested readers.

The purpose of drawing these independent subsamples (each approximately a tenth of the total population) was to accumulate data which would enable us to do the following things:

(1) To find the common characteristics of the four groups together. Since together they number 577 persons (or approximately 36 percent of the total population of the Fuehrerlexikon), from this sample we can gain reliable evidence on the characteristics of the Nazi elite as a whole.

(2) To find the variant characteristics of each subclass. From these data we can determine which, if any, sociopsychological characteristics differentiate Nazi Propagandists from Nazi Administrators and Nazi Coercers, and each of these three groups from the Nazi elite as a whole.

This second purpose requires further comment. A basic proposition concerning the "world revolution of our time"—elaborated notably in the works of H. D. Lasswell—asserts that it is being engineered by counter-elites specialized in the use of organization, propaganda, and violence to gain power. The Nazi Machtergreifung was a clear victory for a political strategy based on the organized use of voice and violence to gain power. This suggests the question: What are the distinctive characteristics of persons who successfully use these weapons for the achievement of power? An answer to this question would help to clarify the nature of the world revolution—which so many diverse observers agree is occurring—by distinguishing the special attributes of persons who activate, and profit from, this revolutionary process.

At several points it seemed useful to make two additional comparisons. The purpose of these was to enable us to answer the following questions:

(3) How does the Nazi elite compare with the Nazi Party membership—i. e., what attributes, besides those common to all Nazis, distinguish elite from mass within the movement?

(4) How does the Nazi movement compare with the German population as a whole—i. e., what attributes, besides those common to all Germans, distinguish Nazis (both elite and mass)?

To answer the third question we drew from Parteistatistik (1935) comparable data on the Nazi Party as a whole. To answer the fourth question we drew comparable data on the whole German population from the Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das deutsche Reich.

Finally, at several points we found ourselves interested in raising a fifth question:

(5) How does the Nazi elite compare with the traditional German elite—i. e., what attributes distinguish the top Nazis from the top power-groups of Imperial and Weimar Germany.

For this comparison we drew available data from the study mentioned above—the elite analysis of the German cabinet over forty years by Max

Knight. The technical difficulties of comparing our two samples suggested that a more complex and satisfactory answer to our fifth question might be obtained by drawing from the standard Wer Ist's a sample directly comparable to ours from the Fuehrerlexikon. This research we have left for the future.

Two technical points concerning the method of this paper should be noted here. First, we have applied to all the samples mentioned above a common check list of attributes, explicitly defined. Thus, the categories in which we have recorded data on age, education, and other attributes have been held constant throughout the analysis. Second, we have tried to keep our subsamples comparable both statistically (e.g., with respect to sample size) and functionally (e.g., with respect to social function). This is a rather complex problem, for social function does not yield easily to unidimensional definitions. The procedures used are described in Appendix A. Where we have had reason to believe that our data are not strictly comparable, we have indicated this in the text at appropriate places, with some explanation of the reasons for our belief.

The data are organized into five main parts, dealing in turn with the key propositions which these data are designed to test: (1) the middle-income skill groups as an independent operating force in modern politics, acquiring relatively high deference-values both in stable societies and in the counter-elites which revolutionize these societies; (2) the role of the alienated intellectuals who, having acquired their distinctive skills as symbol specialists through high status in the old elite, maintain their high positions by applying these skills in the service of the counter elite; (3) the rise of the plebian who vastly increases his status in the counter-elite when, becoming disaffected from his lowly role in the old scheme of things, he comes early into the revolutionary party and rises high through taking control of its administrative apparatus; (4) the special role of the coercers who, while exercising the top coercive function of the counter-elite as its valued specialists on violence, must subordinate themselves completely to its policy decisions made elsewhere (or, unless they can successfully defy their political rivals for policy control within the counter-elite, go down to ignominy in the attempt; (5) Marginality as the common attribute of the various types and groups which compose the revolutionary counter-elite. Before turning to these data, we briefly restate these propositions in a form suitable for testing.

The Key Propositions

Our data bear on five key propositions concerning the sociological character of the Nazi revolution. We designate them as "key" propositions because we expect that they will interpret not only our data on the Nazis, but also comparable data on other successful revolutionary elites of our time. We state these propositions initially in simple and general form; we will qualify them later as the data require. They are:

(1) The middle-income skill groups which acquired elite status in traditional business civilization (e.g., engineers, lawyers, managers) form a relatively independent force in the fluctuations of modern political life —and therefore they appear with relatively high frequency among the revolutionary elite.

(2) The political function, and hence the social role, of the “alienated intellectual” (e.g., teachers, journalists, artists) is greatly enhanced by revolutionary activities—and therefore they appear with relatively high frequency in the revolutionary elite.

II. THE MIDDLE-INCOME SKILL GROUPS

The middle-income groups include those persons whose incomes lie in the middle ranges of the over-all scale of income-distribution in any given society at any given time. For example, President Truman recently defined the minimum income for the middle ranges in 1950 America as \$6,000 per annum. Several years ago, President Roosevelt attempted to define, by implication, the maximum income for the middle ranges as \$25,000 per annum. While there would no doubt be disagreement about any precise figures used to codify legally the minima and maxima for the middle ranges, there would surely be large agreement among Americans today that the middle ranges do lie between approximately these limits in fact (without regard to whether they should be compelled to observe these limits in law).

The exact figures defining the middle-income group fluctuate, then, within any society from time to time and between different societies at the same time. A fair approximation, however, can be achieved for any given society at any given time by establishing ratios between "real income" and "cost of living" indexes. One fixes a lower limit on this continuum: above this point a substantial middle-income group can provide themselves with the same goods and services; below this point a substantial lower-income group cannot. The same procedure enables us, by fixing an upper cutting point, to distinguish the middle-income group from the high-income range on the same continuum.

We are interested in the middle-income group in contemporary societies because a number of major constructs about the "world revolution of our time" assign a crucial role to this class. Their roles differ, and sometimes are even contradictory, as between these constructs. The Jeffersonian construct, for example, which in various reformulations serves as an ideology for many Americans (and democrats elsewhere) today, postulates that the Good Society will be attained through a constant process of enlarging the middle-income group—i. e., by making it possible for an ever larger number of persons to provide themselves with the goods and services which are generally desired. The Marxian construct, in its current Leninist-Stalinist version, postulates the contrary, that the Good Society will be attained through elimination of the middle-income group (as well as the higher-income group).

The ultimate goal postulated as desirable by these two conflicting constructs obviously are compatible. In fact, this can be formulated as an identical goal: i. e., wider sharing of economic abundance. The crucial difference is the intervening postulate of what must be done with the present middle-income group in order to attain this ultimate goal. The Jeffersonian postulates the necessity of wider sharing of power among all the people who are to obtain for themselves wider shares of wealth. The Marxian (Stalinist) postulates the necessity of narrower concentration of power among the few people who are to direct the wider distribution of wealth among all the others. Thus, the two main historical views of our future in terms of our past differ crucially with respect to the social role of the middle-income group.

Among the middle-income population, the present study differentiates those who are members by virtue of a distinctive skill-function. These are the corporate entrepreneurs and managers, skilled in industrial production and administration; the bureaucrats, skilled in organizing and administering controls over social behavior; the lawyers, skilled in interpreting the codified rules-of-the-game and applying them to concrete situations; the industrial engineers and other technologists, skilled in applying knowledge to specified social goals.

Our proposition is that this segment of the new "middle classes"—i.e., the middle-income skill groups—exhibits a relatively high rate of survival in the contemporary revolutionary process, at least in its initial phases. Other middle-class elements do not survive the revolutionary process which installs a new elite in the seats of power. The independent businessman, for example, whose distinctive success-trait is effective bargaining for private gains, tends not to survive because this trait is not readily adaptable to the goal of maximizing gains for others through a central decision-making apparatus. The skills of managers, bureaucrats, lawyers, technologists, as enumerated above, are adaptable to the revolutionary goal just stated.

We turn first, then, to an examination of data on the "Primary Lifework" among the members of our samples of the Nazi elite. By primary lifework we refer, throughout this discussion, to the occupation in which a person spent the largest number of years in his reported career. The data accumulated are as shown in Table 1.

These figures offer a confirmation of the proposition that the middle-income skill groups show a considerable survival value in the revolutionary elite—at least in its early stages (the Fuehrerlexikon from which our data are drawn appeared in 1934). The typical middle-income skill occupations are those in the first three categories in the above table. These are the occupations which, in the pre-revolutionary period, were stabilized through a skill component and rewarded in the middle-income ranges. The most important figures in this connection are those for the Random sample, which is the subgroup most representative of the elite as a whole. Adding these three categories together, we find 73.6 percent of this sample clustered in these middle-income skill occupations. While it is quite possible that these numbers were reduced in the decade which followed the Nazi Machtergreifung, the fact that three out of every four members of a random sample fell into these categories demonstrate the high initial survival value of these "stable" occupations in revolutionary changes.

Further confirmation is supplied by the data on Nazi Propagandists and Administrators. Our chief propositions about these subgroups will be: first, that they deviate in various ways from the attributes of the Nazi elite as a whole (as revealed in the attributes of the Random sample); second, that they deviate, respectively, in Propagandist affiliations with "higher" strata (intellectuals) and in Administrator affiliations with "lower" strata (plebeians) than the Nazi elite as a whole.

We shall make the accuracy of these propositions the subject of more detailed documentation later. If one assumes their accuracy at this point,

then it becomes the more significant that even these subgroups which are deviant in most other respects should conform roughly to the data for the Random subgroup. The Nazi Administrators, for example, locate 53 percent of their total in the three categories of Civil Service, Professions, and Business. This gives a concentration of about 2 out of every 4 Administrators, as compared with 3 out of 4 for the Nazis selected at random. The Propagandists place somewhat better than 1 out of every 4—or a total of 26 percent—in these three categories.

TABLE 1. PRIMARY LIFEWORK

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Civil Servant	9.0%	13.2%	27.7%
Professions	9.0	17.2	27.0
Business (Corporate)	8.0	23.2	18.9
NS Party Official	16.0	15.9	6.9
Military	1.0	14.6	3.1
Communications	51.0	2.6	7.5
Artisan	1.0	2.0	0.0
Farmer	1.0	7.3	5.0
Others	3.0	2.0	3.8
Unknown	1.0	2.0	0.0
Total	100.0% (100)*	100.0% (151)	99.9% (159)

*Our original sample of Propagandists numbered 128. A question was raised about the validity of including certain types in this category. We thereupon eliminated these types and were left with a sample of 100 Propagandists. Matching of distributions showed that there was no appreciable difference between the smaller and larger samples—few deviations appeared, and all differences were in the same direction. We have used the sample of 100 through most of the paper. However, to save the labor of complete recomputation, we used the sample of 128 in several cases where inspection showed no deviation. Such cases are noted when they occur.

We notice, in the above table, that the Propagandists cluster very heavily (51 percent) in the "Communications" category, the Administrators fairly heavily (14.6 percent) in the "Military" category, and both in the "NS Party Official" category. This latter suggests that many Administrators, and Propagandists, started but did not go very far in the occupations for which they were trained before they devoted themselves mainly to Nazi Party or proto-Nazi occupations. We therefore tabulated also data on the "Subsidiary Lifework" of our samples, including here the occupations at which

they spent the second longest periods of their careers. Below we present the combined percentages of those in each sample who made each of the three "stable" occupations their primary or subsidiary lifework:

TABLE 2. REPRESENTATION OF "STABLE" OCCUPATIONS

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Civil Service	21.0%	15.1%	40.1%
Professions	12.0	17.4	46.1
Corporate Business	10.0	26.2	20.7
Total	43.0% (100)	58.7% (151)	106.9% (159)

No man was counted twice in the same category—i. e., no man with civil service as his primary lifework was again assigned civil service as his subsidiary lifework. (Where no clear subsidiary occupation was given, the person was classified in "None".) Thus, the explanation for the total of 106 percent Random Nazis in the three "stable" occupations is that several of them moved from one of these occupations as his primary lifework to another of these three occupations as his subsidiary lifework.

Since the number of persons who did this was not large, it is fair to conclude that nearly every member of the Nazi elite sampled at random made one or more of these stable categories, as his first or second most prolonged occupation, the basis of his career. This is true, also, of approximately 1 out of every 2 Propagandists and Administrators in our samples of the Nazi elite.

These data document the proposition that the middle-income skill groups tend to survive the revolutionary process, as demonstrated by the relatively high frequency of their appearance in the revolutionary Nazi elite. Survival is facilitated by their readiness, when rewards for their skills are reduced in the disintegrating old society, to affiliate with the revolutionary counter-elite. Whereas other segments of the middle class are unacceptable, these skill groups are permitted (even encouraged, by high rewards) to affiliate with the new elite, precisely because their skills are needed for "consolidating" revolutionary control over the new society. This would appear to suggest that the "liquidation of the middle classes"—which various revolutionary constructs of our time postulate as a condition for attaining the ultimate revolutionary goal—may be more useful as a propaganda slogan than as an analysis of the contemporary political process. The rentier, the private entrepreneur, and the independent farmer do seem highly liable to liquidation; but the investment analyst, the corporate manager, and the agronomist are more likely to be "reorganized" into the revolutionary elite. This is probably the significant distinction which is brought to our attention by the proposition that the middle-income skill groups show a high survival value in the contemporary revolutionary process.

III. ALIENATED INTELLECTUALS (THE NAZI PROPAGANDISTS)

The middle-income skill groups supply some of the administrative and technical abilities required to operate revolutionary movements which aim to subvert the current symbols and sanctions of power and thereby to undermine the ruling elite. Three important specialties are required for efficient operation of a revolutionary movement: organization, coercion, persuasion.

Effective persuasion is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of revolutionary success. No small revolutionary core in a modern mass state can expect to seize and organize power without winning to its side substantial numbers of the population. These are needed to make and applaud the speeches, to address and stamp the envelopes, to carry messages, to fight in the streets, to convince their neighbors, to harass the ruling elite and its defenders, and in every way to heighten the morale (i. e., expectations of success) among the revolutionary movement. To win these lieutenants, sergeants, and privates of party action to the movement, great initial efforts must be made by the captains of persuasion who "spearhead" the movement. Prominent among the revolutionary elite, therefore, we expect to find the propagandists.

Who are these propagandists? Where do they come from in the old society? What sorts of men are they?

Our central answer to these questions is that the propagandists of revolutionary elites are, most characteristically, the "alienated intellectuals" of the old society. By intellectuals we mean those persons who are predisposed—through temperament, family, education, occupation, etc.—to manipulate the symbolic rather than the material environment. By alienated intellectuals we mean those who do not identify themselves with the prevailing structure of symbols and sanctions in the societies which nurture them. In particular, such alienated intellectuals are likely to respond negatively to the prevailing structure of deference values in the old society.

We shall leave to Part VI of this paper the exposition of several clues which our data provide on the question: What sorts of men are these propagandists? Here we shall attempt to answer the question: Where do they come from in the old society?

No answer to this question can be given in general terms. Where the propagandists of any revolutionary movement are drawn from depends mainly upon the structure of the old society which is to be revolutionized. A revolutionary movement in a highly developed industrial and urban mass society probably will recruit its captains of persuasion from different social ranks than will such a movement in an underdeveloped agrarian society. The latter, to illustrate with an extreme case, will have no need for—and also no candidates from—high-pressure advertising specialists. What will be common to both, then, is not the social group that produces the "alienated intellectuals" but the fact that—in their respective societies—they are the alienated intellectuals.

Age

Our first clue to the social sources of Nazi propagandists comes from the

comparative data on the age-distributions within our samples, as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3. AGE DISTRIBUTION (5-year periods)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Under 25	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%
26-30	13.0	11.2	5.6
31-35	19.0	15.3	8.1
36-40	26.0	21.2	13.3
41-45	20.0	15.3	14.5
46-50	12.0	16.6	15.1
51-55	3.0	11.2	12.6
56-60	3.0	6.6	14.5
61-65	0.0	2.0	10.0
66-70	0.0	0.6	4.4
Over 70	1.0	0.0	1.8
Total	100.0% (100)	100.0% (151)	99.9% (159)

The ages of the Random sample are most evenly distributed over the categories. If plotted on co-ordinate axes, this distribution would approximate a normal curve. Plotted on the same axes, the age-distribution of the Propagandists would give us a sharply left-skewed curve. Nearly 2 out of every 3 of the Propagandists are under 40, and more than 3 out of every 4 are under 43. Their differences from the Random sample are brought out even more pointedly when the figures are arranged cumulatively, as in Table 4.

TABLE 4.
AGE DISTRIBUTION (Cumulative Percentages)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Under 25	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Under 30	16.0	11.2	5.6
Under 35	35.0	26.4	13.7
Under 40	61.0	47.5	26.9
Under 45	81.0	62.7	41.3
Under 50	93.0	79.2	56.3

All but 7 of our 100 Propagandists thus are under 50, i.e., 93 percent of this sample, as compared with three-fourths of the Administrators and only one-half of the Random sample of Nazis. The disproportionate youth of the Propagandists increases as one goes from 50 down through the younger age-categories. The only three persons under 25 in all the samples turn out, indeed, to be Propagandists.

The average age of Propagandists is 38.9 years, running about 5 years age-categories. The only three persons under 25 in all the samples turn out, indeed, to be Propagandists.

The average age of Propagandists is 38.9 years, running about 5 years younger than the Administrators and about 10 years younger than the Nazi elite as a whole (as reflected in our Random sample). The comparative mean ages for the three groups are shown in Table 5, which also shows the mean deviations above and below the median age for each group. Since these are the ages as of 1934, the average age of the Propagandists when World War I broke out in 1914 was 18.9. The Propagandists thus appear as pre-dominantly a postwar generation.

TABLE 5. AGE DISTRIBUTION (Mean)

	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Plus Mean Deviation	47.2 (+8.3)	52.5 (+10.3)	59.4 (+10.9)
Mean Age	38.9	42.2	48.5
Minus Mean Deviation	33.5 (-5.4)	34.0 (-8.2)	37.4 (-11.1)

The youthfulness of the Propagandists in 1934 suggests that they must have commenced their Nazi activities at an early age, and that is indeed the case, as one can see by Table 6. The median age at which Propagandists

TABLE 6. MEDIAN AGE WHEN JOINED NSDAP*

	Through 1928	After 1928
Propagandists	22	34
Administrators	30	37
Random Sample	27	40

*It is probably true that the rise in median age at time of joining the NDSAP reflects a real aging of the Party, but the data at hand cannot support this hypothesis since the nature of the sample tends to produce the same result. To attain the elite, even in so young an elite as that of the Nazis takes a certain number of adult years. Thus a man who became a Nazi at 20 is much more likely to be in the Fuehrerlexikon in 1934 if he joined in 1923 than if he joined in 1933. A man who joined in 1933 if included is probably older and is probably included for achievements outside the Party. The years 1928-29 represent a sharp breaking point in this set of data. The results for those who joined in 1923 or before are almost exactly the same as those reported above for 1928 and before.

joined the Nazi Party is considerably lower than that at which Administrators or Random Nazis did. The Propagandists were young men in a hurry. The Administrators too were undoubtedly discontented persons, but they were slower and less impetuous than the precocious Propagandists. Age is a factor of more than usual importance in differentiating segments of modern German society. Two wars and two revolutions have broken the continuity of German life and so each generation has been molded by different sets of experiences. Growing up in the Kaiserreich, growing up in the years of inflation, or growing up in the Hitlerjugend were experiences which stamped their differences on the succeeding generations. The significance of the differential in age between Propagandists, Administrators, and Random Nazis may be seen if we look at the data on military service.

Military Service

Since the Propagandists were mainly of the postwar generation and became men in a "demilitarized" Germany, they had less military service than the Administrators or Random sample: 83 percent of the Propagandists saw no service before World War I, as compared with 66 percent of the Administrators and 70 percent of the Random sample. This means that in the Nazi elite as a whole, approximately 1 out of every 4 saw some service prior to World War I, and among the Administrators 1 out of every 3 saw some service, whereas among the Propagandists less than 1 out of every 5 saw service.

In World War I, 40 percent of the Propagandists report no service, as compared with 23 percent Administrators and 35 percent Random Nazis. In other words, nearly 1 out of every 2 Propagandists saw no service in the Great War, as contrasted with 1 out of 3 Random Nazis and only 1 out of 4 Administrators.

Age was thus the primary factor in determining the military experience of members of the Nazi elite. It was, however, not the only factor. Even when we hold age constant we find that the Administrators had more military experience than the propagandists or Random Sample.

In each of the tables below the ages are grouped so as to separate persons at ages for which military service was possible, but not normal, from those at ages for which military service was a normal experience. (The ages are given as of 1934.) Almost without exception, more Administrators from every age group had military experience than did Propagandists or Random Nazis.

The Nazi Administrators were clearly recruited not only from age levels wherein military service was common but also from among individuals who had an inclination toward military life. The Nazi Party in turn provided these individuals with a substitute for the Army. The Propagandists on the other hand were not only generally too young to have acquired much military experience, but also were types not prone to the ordered

TABLE 7. INDIVIDUALS IN
EACH CELL WHO HAD MILITARY SERVICE

	Service Before W. W. I			Service in W. W. I			
	36-40	41-45	46-70	31-36	36-50	51-55	56-70
Propagandists	7.4%	30.4%	38.1%	15.0%	90.1%	77.8%	80.0%
Administrators	9.4	43.5	67.9	39.1	96.2	88.2	100.0
Random	0.0	21.8	45.2	33.0	92.6	65.0	50.0

	Service in Reichswehr		
	26-30*	31-35	36-70
Propagandists	15.4%	35.0%	6.8%
Administrators	6.5	43.5	11.7
Random	11.1	38.5	1.5

*Only four individuals.

bureaucratic life of the barracks. Two points are of special interest on the Propagandists—first, their biographies show no disposition toward military service; second, those who did serve received high ranks for their age. Table 8 provides data relevant to the first point.

We have, then, represented in the Nazi Propagandists a generation

TABLE 8. RANK IN WORLD WAR I

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
General	0.0	0.7	1.9
Field Grades	0.0	3.3	4.4
Company Grades	25.0	40.4	28.9
Captain	5.0	13.9	10.7
1st Lieut.	7.0	5.3	5.0
2nd Lieut.	13.0	19.2	12.6
Unspecified	0.0	2.0	0.6
N.C.O.'s	7.0	4.6	1.3
Soldiers	8.0	23.2	16.4
Rank Unknown	20.0	4.0	11.9
No Service	40.0	23.8	35.2
Total	100.0% (100)	100.0% (151)	100.0% (159)

which, just over 18 when World War I started, reached maturity during the war and immediate postwar years. These were the historic years of political and economic crisis in Germany—military occupation and national

subordination, street fighting and political instability, fantastic inflation and widespread unemployment, self-pity and self-hatred and the "Shame of Versailles." Yet, not all the young men of this generation became Nazis—or Nazi Propagandists. To answer our question about whence, in the old German society, these men came, we shall have to differentiate the Nazis from other young men of their generation.

A clue is provided by a closer look at the data in Table 8. It is very striking, for example, that only 8 percent of this younger group should have served as common soldiers—as compared with the older groups of Administrators (23.1 percent) and Random Nazis (16.3 percent). One possible explanation is that these Propagandists-to-be uniformly demonstrated skills that rated higher ranks, despite fewer years, in the old *Reichswehr*. Another is that they uniformly demonstrated a talent for military self-advancement (regardless of special skills). Neither of these interesting hypotheses is inherently implausible. But we wish to offer instead an explanation, not incompatible with either of the others, which is more readily documented by our data: namely, that the Propagandists characteristically came from the upper middle class of Imperial (and Weimar) Germany; and further, that they represent the "alienated intellectuals" which characteristically emerge from this class in times of troubles.

Status

The data on World War I military ranks is revealing on this point—that the Nazi Propagandists were recruited from the higher social strata of Imperial and Republican Germany. The documentation of this point becomes clearer if we present the data on ranks as a percentage of those who served in known ranks (dropping the last two categories in Table 8—those whose rank is not known and those who saw no service). The results are shown in Table 9.

TABLE 9. WORLD WAR RANKS (of those who served)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Generals	0.0%	0.9%	3.6
Field Grades	0.0	4.6	8.3
Company Grades	62.5	60.0	54.8
Captains	12.5	22.0	21.4
1st Lieuts.	17.5	7.3	9.5
2nd Lieuts.	32.5	26.6	23.8
N.C.O.'s	17.5	6.4	2.4
Unteroffiziere	10.0	5.5	1.1
Feldwebel	7.5	0.9	1.1
Soldiers	20.0	32.1	31.0
Total	100.0% (40)	100.0% (109)	100.1% (84)

Military rank is normally a function of specialized skill, of civilian status, and of age. Since the sample of professional military men is excluded from this tabulation there seems no reason to assume that the three subsamples in the above table differed markedly in military skill. If skill is excluded as a variable, age and civilian status remain. And a cross-tabulation reveals that both factors were operative. The older the individual, the higher his military rank was apt to be. Also, however, at most age levels fewer Propagandists than Administrators or Random Nazis were found at lower ranks, indicating that the Propagandists came from a higher social status.

The absence of Propagandists among Generals and Field Grades reflects the fact that they are a considerably younger group than the others. All the men who achieved these grades were over 51 in 1934, or over 31 in 1914. There were only 8 such Propagandists who saw service and on whom we have data. Since only about one out of every four of the Administrators or Random sample over 51 who served achieved Field or General Officer rank in the First World War, it is of doubtful significance that no Propagandists out of eight did. If it is not pure chance, it may reflect the irregular and undisciplined character of the typical Propagandist career.

The group over 51 (31 in 1914) includes few enlisted men or N. C. O.'s, (7 altogether). Similarly at the other end of the age scale, the men from 31 to 35 in 1934 (or 15 to 19 in 1918) were overwhelmingly common soldiers and included but one officer. In the middle ranges of the age scale, however, a real possibility existed for a man to be either a common soldier or an officer, and age within this range made but a small difference. It is in this range, therefore, that we can see the effects of social class operating. It is precisely here that we find by far the smallest proportion of enlisted men among the Propagandists. Furthermore, despite their greater youthfulness, there are as many officers among the Propagandists as among the Administrators. In other words, holding age constant only reinforces the conclusions that stand out from Table 9 above. For, whatever influence is attributable to age only would lead us to expect that the younger Propagandists would be found predominantly in the lower ranks—as compared with the older groups. Yet our data shows precisely the opposite findings: they actually are found predominantly in the higher ranks.

TABLE 10. WORLD WAR RANKS (for Middle Age-Groups)

	36-40			41-45			46-50			36-50		
				Number						Percent		
	P	A	R	P	A	R	P	A	R	P	A	R
Officers	12	10	8	5	15	8	8	14	12	64.1	13.9	57.2
N. C. O.'s	4	1	1	4	1	1	-	2	1	20.5	6.6	6.1
Soldiers	2	7	6	2	7	6	2	4	6	15.4	29.5	36.7
Total	18	18	15	11	23	15	10	20	19	100 (39)	100 (61)	100 (49)

We have already mentioned the extraordinarily small number of Propagandists who were common soldiers—only 1 out of every 5, as compared with 1 out of every 3 Administrators and Random Nazis. This is brought out even more sharply in the N. C. O. grades, which were attained by about 1 out of every 2 Propagandists who did not attain the status of commissioned officer, as compared with 1 out of 6 Administrators and 1 out of 16 Random Nazis who did not become officers.

For a satisfactory explanation of the small number of enlisted men among the Propagandists, we must look to the distinctive special skill and civilian rank of those young men in the postwar generation of Weimar Germany who made their way into the Nazi elite as Propagandists. We have already mentioned two skill-hypotheses which are plausible and which, if our data on skills were fuller, might provide an adequate explanation of the results reported above. Here, we adduce the finding that the Propagandists, despite their youth, attained a higher proportionate representation as junior officers for themselves than did the older Administrators and Random Nazis as evidence that they were recruited from a higher civilian rank in German society.

Apart from comparison with our other samples, the simple finding that two-thirds of the Propagandists became officers is quite remarkable unless we assume that they came from higher social classes. To see this, we need only imagine the probability that two-thirds of all German youths who were 18 years old in 1914 became officers before the end of World War I. We have computed the actual mathematical probability from available statistics on the German Army. The question is this: How many individuals would any sample of 100 men drawn at random from the total population of the German Army have placed in Junior Officer grades? The simplest way to answer this question is to give the ratio between Junior Officers and total army strength which actually existed in the German Army. In 1914, just before the outbreak of war, the Army numbered 800,000 men, of whom 22,000 were Junior Officers.² The ratio of Officers to Total is therefore 1 : 36. In other words, a true random sample of 100 men would have only 3 chances of becoming officers. The probability coefficient for any individual drawn at random from this sample thus is 2.7, or success for only 1 individual out of 36. The sample of 100 Propagandists, on the other hand, shows a probability coefficient of 62.5 to each individual, or success for better than 1 out of every 2 Propagandists. (This is a very striking difference even if we assume, as seems likely, that after war broke out the ratio of officers to enlisted men increased.)

The Propagandists attained their prevalence in Junior Officer ranks, despite obstacles of youth and brief service because of some "other factor." This other factor was, we have indicated, higher civilian status in prewar German society. Data on our other indicators provides further evidence by which this assertion can be documented somewhat more directly.

Occupations

The Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park once said that what a man

works at occupies most of his lifetime and all of his obituary. Business civilization has made a man's occupation the definition of his status as well as the source of his income. We have already shown in Tables 1 and 2 that our samples provide uniformly high representations in the "stable occupations" of business societies—i.e., those occupations which continue to provide high rewards in deference and income despite fluctuations of political life. These are the characteristic occupations of the middle-income skill groups in modern life.

To distinguish the variant social status of our three samples, it is useful to look at the distribution of occupations among the fathers of persons in these samples. The Nazi elite, we have seen, mainly matured in the post-War I period. They found their jobs (when they found them) under a Republic which, legally, operated on the democratic basis of reward for individual merit. But they were oriented and trained for their lifework in pre-Weimar days. They came from families rooted in the social climate of Imperial Germany, and their fathers located themselves in occupations according to the pre-democratic conventions of the Kaiserreich, which rewarded status along with (and often ahead of) merit. To examine the occupations of these fathers thus gives us some insight into the social status from which came these members of the Nazi elite. The data, with the categories roughly ranked according to status, from high to low, are as follows:

TABLE 11. OCCUPATION OF FATHER

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Land Owner	3.0%	2.0%	1.9%
Military	7.0	5.3	1.3
Ecclesiastic	5.0	1.3	1.3
Professions	17.0	11.9	18.9
Civil Service	14.0	7.9	14.5
Business	16.0	9.9	19.5
Communication	1.0	0.0	1.3
Artisan	3.0	6.0	2.5
Peasant	1.0	7.3	3.1
Others	2.0	5.3	1.9
Unknown	31.0	43.0	34.0
Total	100.0% (100)	99.9% (151)	100.2% (159)

The Propagandists clearly outnumber the others in the first three categories, whose top status in Imperial Germany there is little reason to doubt. The cumulative totals for these top three occupations are:

<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
15.0%	8.6%	4.5%

These results become even clearer when we learn that of the Propagandists' fathers classified as "Military," 100 percent were reported as officers; whereas only 62.5 percent of the Administrators' fathers were officers.

The Propagandists continue to lead the others down the ladder of deference, although naturally less clearly as we get into the categories where specific rank may be as important as general occupation-type. When we compute the cumulative totals down through category 7 (Communications), the Propagandists are still ahead, viz.:

<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
63.0 %	38.3 %	58.7 %

This finding is confirmed when we consider the figures for the two categories of occupation which were definitely low-status in Imperial Germany—i. e. , Artisan and Peasant. The Propagandists are lower than both of the others on each of these categories, and the combined figures show the relative absence of Propagandists' fathers from low-prestige occupations, viz.:

<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
4.0 %	13.1 %	5.6 %

Further evidence of the higher status of Propagandists is provided by our data on ancestral background. The manner in which this data is presented requires brief explanation. We began by sorting the occupational data on his forebears given by each biographee into two separate tabulations: one on "Patriarchal Background" (giving the lineage on the father's side), the other on "Matriarchal Background" (giving the lineage on the mother's side). That enough relevant data should regularly be given in a "who's who" type of biographical dictionary is itself a remarkable demonstration of the Nazi elite's emphasis on the respectability of its roots in the German past. (Contrast this, for example, with the autobiographical reporting in Who's Who in America). Further, we were interested to learn whether Nazi great-grandpapas, lacking sufficient social status by birth, tended to acquire it by marriage—and vice versa. The reverse, but equally valuable, conclusion is supported by our data: there is practically no significant variation between the social stratification represented in the patriarchal and matriarchal lineage of the Nazi elite. Men and women who "had class," in the older Germany, tended to marry each other. Since there is no important difference between them, we have averaged the two (and dropped the "Unknowns") to make a single tabulation on "Ancestral Background" (see Table 12).

The most striking result in this tabulation is the enormous increase of "peasants" among ancestors over the number of peasants among the biographees themselves and their parents. In part, of course, this reflects the transition from rural agriculture to urban industry which has taken place in Germany as in all Western societies in modern times. There is good reason to assume, however, that partly this reflects also the German

TABLE 12. ANCESTRAL BACKGROUND (Occupations)

	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Landowner	10.2%	1.5%	13.6%
Military	6.1	6.1	4.5
Ecclesiastic	4.1	3.0	7.6
Professions	10.2	3.0	7.6
Civil Service	6.1	0.0	4.5
Business	6.1	7.6	13.6
Communication	0.0	0.0	0.0
Artisan	12.2	18.2	10.6
Peasant	44.9	56.1	37.9
Others	0.0	4.5	0.0
Total	99.9% (49)	100.0% (66)	99.9% (66)

myth as promoted by the Nazis. Under the dispensation of this City-Slicker movement, while it was silly to be a farmer oneself and perhaps even a little degrading to have a peasant father, it was a mark of the highest respectability to have one's ancestry "rooted in the German soil." (Contrast this with the American myth, for example, which has glorified, probably since Jackson and certainly since Lincoln, the farmer in the present man—viz., the continual reappearance of the barefoot boy from Wall Street as a political candidate, and the intimate connection between political ambitions and the front porch of one's country birthplace.) We emphasize the Nazi myth, rather than the possible facts regarding differential mobility, because reporting of data is a key variable in this study.

The German myth probably figures, too, in the large increase of ancestral artisans. Hans Sachs, the musical and happy cobbler, is an important German myth-figure. While the master-craftsman represented by Sachs is substantially higher than the farmer in his own epoch, artisans in the Nazi epoch rank quite low in the social scale. Thus, Nazi hypersensitivity to questions of their own current social status (shown in their persistent efforts to give themselves "class" by claiming as adherents high-status Germans whose actual Nazi affiliations were minimal) coexisted comfortably with the admiration for earthier origins in the more remote ancestral past. This is clear from a comparison of the Artisan and Peasant categories for the Nazis themselves, for their parents, and for their remoter ancestors. The figures in Table 13 are based on the combined data for artisans and peasants, expressed as a percentage of the known data in each case.

The progression is exponential. Among the Propagandists, for example, almost 1 out of 2 Ancestors were Peasants-Artisans, as compared with 1 out of 25 Parents, and only 1 out of 50 in the current Nazi generation. A similar trend, though somewhat less extreme, holds for the Random Nazis. Even the Administrators who, as we shall demonstrate later, form the plebeian element in the Nazi elite exhibit a similar pattern: 3 out of 4

Ancestors are Peasants-Artisans, but only 3 out of 25 Parents, and only 3 out 40 current Nazis.

An interesting sidelight is provided by our data on the occupations of fathers-in-law of the Nazi subgroups. Such data, because marriage in Germany (as elsewhere) is an act of social affiliation as well as ego-involvement, is particularly useful as a reflection of self-images among

TABLE 13. LOW STATUS
OCCUPATIONS (by Generations)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Nazis	2.0%	7.1%	3.1%
Parents	4.0	13.1	5.6
Ancestors	57.0	74.1	48.4

the Nazis and, therefore, even as a clue to their expectations and demands, with respect to social status. Many of the sampled Nazis do not report on this particular item of their life history (a fact which we shall discuss in Part VI). But of those 26 who do report, only one gives the occupation of his father-in-law as a peasant. Otherwise, both categories of Peasant-Artisan are, for all three samples, completely empty.

Education

Another important indicator of family social status is the level of education attained by the children. In Imperial and Weimar Germany, even more than in other Western societies, it was a particular point of pride with "good families" that their children should go well beyond the average in formal education. This desire also became widespread among families that may have been virtuous, but were not sufficiently well-heeled to activate their aspirations. The attainment of collegiate levels of education remained largely confined to the business, professional, and higher social strata, while children of the lower orders were compelled to leave school earlier. This effect of parental status on education attained may be documented from our data. Table 14 shows that a smaller proportion of those from plebeian backgrounds attended universities and a larger proportion never got beyond trade schools, high schools, or grade schools.

TABLE 14. FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND OWN EDUCATION

	Propagandists		Administrators		Random	
	Peas. and Artisans	Other Occ.	Peas. and Artisans	Other Occ.	Peas. and Artisans	Other Occ.
University	25.0%	60.7%	15.0%	29.2%	25.0%	63.5%
Higher Schools	25.0	11.1	10.0	20.8	--	11.5
Trade or High Grade Schools	50.0	28.2	75.0	50.0	75.0	25.0
Number	(8)	(117)	(20)	(120)	(8)	(148)

The data on highest educational level attended, presented in Table 15, provides a good indicator of the relative social status of our three samples.

TABLE 15. EDUCATION (Highest Level Attended)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
University	59.0%	25.2%	60.4%
Tech. Hochschule	6.0	6.6	7.6
Other Higher Schools	5.0	11.3	3.0
Trade Schools	11.0	25.2	11.3
High School	15.0	27.8	12.6
Grade School	1.0	3.3	5.0
Unknown	3.0	0.7	0.0
Total	100.0% (100)	100.1% (151)	99.9% (159)

There appears to be no significant difference between the educational levels attained by the Propagandists and the Random Nazis. The differences between these subgroups and the Administrators, however, provide clear evidence that the Propagandists were recruited from higher social strata than the Administrators. For example, better than 1 out of every 2 Propagandists attended a university, as contrasted with 1 out of 4 Administrators. On the other hand, 1 out of 4 Administrators finished his educational career in high school or trade school (categories 4 and 5), whereas only about 1 out of 10 Propagandists stopped at these levels instead of going on to the higher levels. The higher social status of the Propagandists, as compared with the Administrators, is brought out most clearly by comparing categories 1 and 4: more than twice as many Administrators went to trade schools (and no further) as did Propagandists; conversely, more than twice as many Propagandists reached the highest educational level at universities as did Administrators (of whom 3 out of 4 had been left behind far below the university level).

Interesting data relevant to social status come from comparing the courses of study followed by university men among our three samples. The full tabulation shows the distribution through ten major fields. Below we summarize these data in three categories: (1) culture-oriented (which includes humanities, foreign language and culture, and Germanistik); (2) skill-oriented (which includes business, journalism, agriculture, social sciences, natural sciences); and (3) professional studies (which includes all courses leading to licensed professional degrees). The figures, as presented in Table 16, express the percentage in each category of those who report on their major studies at universities (i. e., eliminating both those who did not attend universities and those who attended but did not report on their major studies).

It should be mentioned that these categories might be less significant if our samples included a large number of teachers. Since German teachers had to go through the program of studies we have called "culture-oriented"

in order to get their teaching certificates, for them such studies would be skill-oriented. However, our data show that a large proportion of Nazis in this category never completed their courses and hence that these courses did not become a significant career-component at all. Further, few of these top leaders became teachers, so that their humanistic studies did not form a specific skill-component. While it is true that teachers were numerous in the lesser ranks of the Nazi hierarchy,³ they clearly were not at the top. The combined data for lifework (Table 2) show that only 12 percent of the Propagandists were "Professionals," a category which included lawyers, doctors, engineers, and others, in addition to teachers. In this case, therefore, the categories of culture-oriented and skill-oriented are mutually exclusive in fact and may be treated as dichotomous.

TABLE 16. MAJOR UNIVERSITY STUDIES

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Culture-Oriented	33.7%	9.8%	12.4%
Skill-Oriented	6.7	23.2	9.7
Professional Studies	59.6	67.1	77.9
Total	100.0% (89)	100.1% (82)	100.0% (113)

The Propagandists greatly outnumber the others in the culture-oriented studies. These studies—generally classified as the humanities—seem to have carried, for this group, higher prestige and lower career-utility than the other fields of study. They were not used as skill-training for a teachers' certificate, since very many Propagandists never completed their courses at all and very few became teachers. They were affiliated rather with aestheticism of a sort particularly emphasized in Germany—Kant called it enjoyment "apart from the idea of an end"—and were very rich in "snob-appeal." Such studies were more likely to attract either students whose families were better able to afford to pay for this strictly non-utilitarian type of education, or students who yearned for Kultur-affiliations regardless of their families' ability to pay. These reflect, respectively, an actually high socioeconomic family status and a desire to share values commonly associated with such high status (whether one has it or not). Both are important indicators of the role of social status in career histories, and it is likely that both occur among the Propagandists in this category, who outnumber the Administrators and Random Nazis approximately 3 to 1.

This finding is strengthened by the figures on skill-oriented studies. Here, the Administrators outnumber the two other subgroups by about 3 to 1. And this, on the analysis we have been presenting, is what we should have expected. The skill-oriented studies are utilitarian in the sense that they prepare students for post-collegiate careers, but enjoy less prestige among the higher social strata whose careers are assured more by familial status than by formal training. Students who major in agriculture acquire tools that

will help them make a living as farmers, but they do not—in campus social life and later—attain the same lustrous levels of prestige as those who discuss Ranke and Rilke. Our proposition that the Propagandists are characteristically higher social status, and Administrators lower status, thus is further documented by the findings that 1 out of every 3 Propagandists majored in culture-oriented studies as compared with 1 out of 10 Administrators; whereas, conversely, 1 out of 4 Administrators concentrated on skill-oriented studies as compared with 1 out of 15 Propagandists.

Interesting additional evidence is provided by the figures on professional studies. These comprise the group of studies which lead to the "stable occupations" characteristic of the middle-income skill groups. As we showed earlier, these occupations combine in optimum degree the values of income, deference, and safety (the latter shown, as indicated earlier in this study, by the high survival value of the middle-income skill groups through revolutionary crises). The skill-oriented studies—leading mainly to such occupations as laboratory and research technicians, agricultural and business specialists, middle-to-lower status bureaucrats—yield very high safety, moderate-to-low income, and low prestige. The culture-oriented studies—leading to such occupations as artist, critic, lecturer, and professor—yield, conversely, high prestige, moderate-to-low-income, and low safety. It is the professional studies which distinctively enable persons to maximize all these values simultaneously and yield optimum combinations. This would explain the high representation of all three subgroups in this category. It is by comparing this category with the others—or, by combining professional with either of the other two to emphasize the distinctive skill or culture character of the third—that we see most clearly the higher social affiliations of the Propagandists (or the Random Nazis, who also compose a high-status subgroup) as compared with the Administrators.

Marriage

Other data seem to confirm our main proposition. Age at marriage, for example, is a particularly interesting indicator of socioeconomic status in Weimar Germany. Recall the prevailing circumstances recorded in Hans Fallada's *Kleiner Mann, was nun?*⁴ which dramatized the troubles of young Germans who wanted to get married during this period. The depression, inflation, and unemployment which undermined the Weimar Republic also undermined the marriage institution. Young people could not, economically, afford marriage; yet they could not, psychologically, afford celibacy. The result was that "companionate marriage" became an established practice, postponing formal marriage for several years, particularly among those in the less solvent social classes.

Under these conditions, one may regard the age at which people married, during this postwar period, as one indicator of their familial (and personal) socioeconomic status. Since the majority of our sampled Nazis married during this period of 15 years (1918-33), we have tabulated the data on

their age at marriage. These data are expressed in Table 17 as the average age, with mean deviations above and below the arithmetic mean, of those whose age at marriage is reported in their autobiographical sketches.

TABLE 17. AGE AT MARRIAGE (Mean)

Class	Propagandists (39)	Administrators (17)	Random (44)
Minus Deviation	25 (-3)	26 (-7)	27 (-3)
Mean Age	28	33	30
Plus Deviation	31 (+3)	40 (+7)	34 (+4)

This test again confirms our analysis of comparative social status among these three subgroups. The Propagandists married younger—on the average five years younger than the Administrators—and with a much smaller scatter of age-distribution. Their deviations are contained within a 6-year period, as compared with a 14-year spread of mean deviations for the Administrators. Even their older range (31 years) is still lower than the mean age 33 for the Administrators. The Random Nazis, as the analysis would lead us to expect, (since they are older but also higher status) run slightly older at marriage but conform almost perfectly to the pattern of mean and deviations exhibited by the Propagandists.

Foreign Contacts

A final indicator of social status which we shall introduce here is that of foreign contacts. Such activities as travel abroad and education abroad are regarded as marks of superior social status in most Western societies, and this seems to have been particularly pronounced in pre-Nazi Germany. In Table 18 we give the figures, on five categories of foreign contact, as percentages of the total number of persons sampled.

TABLE 18. FOREIGN CONTACTS (by specific indicators)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Born Abroad	7.0%	4.6%	2.5%
Foreign Marriage	3.9	0.0	1.8
Higher Education Abroad	7.8	1.9	5.6
Travel Abroad	26.5	17.2	21.3
International Organ.	5.4	1.9	2.5
Total	50.6% (128)	25.6% (151)	33.7% (159)

Categories 3 and 4 may be taken as relatively unambiguous indicators of familial status, for reasons mentioned above, while the other categories taken separately would be less adequate. Foreign birth is included because persons in this category mainly were born abroad by reason of high family

status—e.g., fathers represented the German government or important business interests in the place of birth. Foreign marriage was included because it appears that in many cases such marriages maintained (or increased) the social status of the persons in these categories. Membership in international organizations, as here defined, is an indicator of status in the careers followed by the persons in these categories. No data on "Occupation Abroad" are given, because this item seems to reflect skill rather than status (i.e., men normally are offered employment abroad on account of some special ability in the field of employment).

The possibility was investigated that our high figures for the Propagandists might be biased by close association among all these categories in actual life. Such association might mean that the probability of appearing in any one category was not independent of the probability of appearing in any of the others, and consequently that the same Propagandists recurred in several categories because they appeared in one category. To satisfy ourselves that this distortion (if present) only emphasized the prevailing tendency in the data, without altering its direction, we recomputed the data to get the number of individual persons who had at least one of the foreign contacts specified above. The results are presented in Table 19.

TABLE 19.
FOREIGN CONTACTS (by individual Nazis)

Propagandists (128)	Administrators (151)	Random (159)
35.1%(45)	19.8%(30)	25.1%(40)

These figures indicate that there is practically no distortion whatsoever in the totals presented for the combined index in Table 18. Comparing the totals given in the two tables as proportions of their sample sizes, we arrive at the following Coefficients of Independence:

<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
.714	.769	.740

Thus, while there obviously is a "dependence factor" (of the magnitude .25-.30) among the items in the combined index, this factor remains fairly constant for all three samples. It differs by .055 or less between any of the three possible paired comparisons. With only this insignificant range of deviations, then, the probability of appearing in any one category can be treated as independent of the probability of appearing in any other category. And therefore, joint occurrences (totals) can be expressed as the sum, or product, of separate occurrences in all the categories severally—for purposes of comparing totals as between the three samples.

Thus, we are justified in using either a combined index on all kinds of foreign contact or the separate figures on individual indicators. Both give

us the same results. Since we have postulated that degree of foreign contact, as defined above, is a simple function of socioeconomic status, these tests again confirm our hypothesis that the Propagandists are characteristically recruited from the higher social strata of pre-Nazi German society, the Administrators from the lower social strata.

Conceived as a "battery of tests," the data already presented constitute sufficient evidence that this proposition is true. It is important to note, as we have pointed out at appropriate places, that several of our indicators are possibly ambiguous—i.e., they are not demonstrably unidimensional and therefore, particularly when combined as "indices," they may in fact document other possible assertions as well as they do the propositions we intend them to confirm. Since methodological rigor has not been possible in all cases, we do not assert that our central proposition is confirmed by any one of these items—but that it is confirmed by the prevailing tendency uniformly exhibited in the whole battery of items, conceived as tests of the same central proposition.

Process: From Elite to Alienated Intellectuals of Counter-elite

With the proposition that the Propagandists are drawn from higher social strata confirmed, we may now turn to the propositions which indicate the significance of this finding: (1) The Propagandists are intellectuals; (2) They are alienated intellectuals. When these two statements are confirmed, we shall have documented the key proposition of this part of the study; that the Nazi Propagandists were, characteristically, a class of intellectuals born and raised within the elite of Imperial and Weimar Germany who became alienated from the prevailing structure of symbols and sanctions of the elite which nurtured them.

Once the accuracy of this key proposition is accepted, we shall be in a position to present the argument (which, since it concerns a process rather than a class of characteristics, we shall have to make plausible by reasoning rather than probable by data) that alienated intellectuals are both an index and agent of the modern revolutionary process. We view the history of the Nazi movement as a single instance of the process, and a test case of the general proposition. The main line of the argument is this: Intellectuals are, by definition, those distinctively occupied in manipulating the symbolic environment of the institutional structure of any society. As such, they expect—and receive—high deference among the elite of any society whose symbols and sanctions (i.e., institutional structure) of persuasion and coercion are in a continuous and reciprocal stable relationship. Any decline in the deference-position of intellectuals from their previous level among a particular elite is a "sign," or indicator, that the relationship between symbols and sanctions has become unstabilized and that disintegrative changes are occurring in that society. Decline in their deference-position is thus an index of "alienation" among the intellectuals and hence of social instability. As a corollary, such "alienation" is also an

agent of further disintegrative changes in the society. Intellectuals declining in deference-position among a ruling elite are no longer producing the symbols which justify the sanctions institutionalized by that elite. Instead they are producing symbols which justify a rival structure of sanctions proposed by a counter-elite. By withdrawing their support of the "myth" (the ruling symbols) in favor of a competing "ideology" (the rival symbols)—to use these terms in Mannheim's sense—alienated intellectuals thus contribute to the displacement of elite by counter-elite which we designate as the revolutionary process of our time.⁵

With this much of our context in mind, we now turn to documenting our proposition that the Nazi Propagandists are in fact "alienated intellectuals" of the former German elite. That they were drawn from the former elite has been demonstrated, and that they were intellectuals among this elite has already been indicated by the same data. The fact that they attended universities in very great number (1 out of every 2), and even when their family background discouraged such attendance, is one such indication (see Table 15); the fact that, among those who attended universities, they outnumbered the other subgroups by 3 to 1 in study of the humanities is another such indication (see Table 16). What we have called the culture-oriented studies are typically concerned with the symbolic environment of a society—both with the prevailing system of values and goals which constitute the "myth," and, particularly in times of troubles, with the literature of protest which accompanies the formation of contending values and goals into rival "ideology." The skill-oriented studies, *per contra*, are typically concerned with manipulation of the material rather than the symbolic environment. Students of business, agriculture, and engineering are trained to manipulate commodities rather than values. (Professional studies—medicine, law, engineering, etc.—usually involve facility with specialized sets of both symbols and commodities.) Our Table 16, then, which shows the Administrators solidly clustered in the skill-oriented studies and the Propagandists in the culture-oriented studies, can be adduced here as evidence that the latter are the intellectuals.

Besides his education, a man's occupation is an important indicator of his status as an intellectual—i.e., as a professional intellectual. This test, too, provides evidence that the Propagandists were drawn predominantly from the intellectuals of the pre-Nazi German elite. Table 1 shows that the Primary Lifework of over half the Propagandists in our sample falls into the category designated as "Communications." Conceiving intellectuals as symbol-manipulators (and there seems to be no more general way of defining the social function of professional intellectuals), this data confirms the validity of our sample. It also presents us with an interesting tautology which requires that we elaborate our original conception as follows.

Three occupations in which the professional manipulation of symbols has become institutionalized are those of preacher, teacher, and writer. Each of these occupations is regarded as having a certain psychic sanctity about

it, closely connected with the heavy burden of social responsibility (e.g., for the prevailing myth) laid upon its practitioners. It is regarded as important that any man who enters these occupations should exhibit a predispositional structure appropriate to these responsibilities—e.g., common parlance revealingly speaks of “having a call” in connection with the decision to enter one of these occupations. (It is possible that this view of medicine, sometimes heard nowadays, developed during the centuries when this profession consisted of magic and incantation, and was therefore more directly responsible for the social myth than at present.)

The appropriate predispositions, whatever they may be, are clearly encouraged or hindered by the childhood, and particularly family, environment of any individual. Such items in the childhood environment as the presence of a library in the home, the characteristic topics of discussion among dinner guests, the foci of interest of the parents, intellectual relations between parents and children—all these are involved in encouraging predispositions toward symbol-manipulation among the children. We have not accumulated data on such items, but a fairly reliable index to their presence or absence is provided by the occupation of the father. A father who is a preacher or teacher or lawyer will be more likely than one who is a farmer or businessman or worker to own a private library, discuss general principles of life with his friends, analyze politics on a high level, select readings for his children with an eye to their literary merit, encourage and aid his children in their schooling.

We therefore look back to the data on father's occupations presented earlier in this study (see Table 11). Combining the three categories of Ecclesiastic, Professional, Communications, we find the following totals:

TABLE 20.
INTELLECTUALS AMONG FATHERS

Propagandists	Administrators	Random
23.0%	13.1%	21.2%

As we should have expected, the Propagandists outnumber both the others—the Administrators by a very wide margin, the Random Nazis by a narrow margin. The results are even more pointed when we re-examine Table 11 and its sequels from this perspective. The Propagandists outnumber the others in all categories of paternal occupation—e.g., Landowners, Higher Civil Service, High Military Office—which are likely to provide the characteristics we mentioned above as encouraging predispositions among the children to become intellectuals.

The same pattern emerges from the data we have accumulated on one direct indicator of professional intellectualism—the production of printed matter. Professional intellectuals live, occupationally, by their output of symbols in spoken and written form. Since we are here interested in dem-

onstrating only the degree of professionalism as intellectuals, not the quality of thought, we adduce as a relevant indicator the amount of printed symbolic output among these groups:

TABLE 21. NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Occasional Pamphlets	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regular Pamphlets	0.0	0.0	0.0
Occasional Articles	12.0	8.6	12.6
Regular Articles	26.0	24.5	18.2
1 Book	1.0	0.6	3.8
2 Books	6.0	3.3	1.3
3 Books	7.0	2.6	1.9
4 Books	0.0	1.3	2.5
5 Books	0.0	0.0	2.5
6 Books	0.0	0.7	1.3
More than 6 Books	13.0	2.0	5.0
Unknown	8.0	3.3	0.6
None	23.0	53.0	52.2
Total	100.0% (100)	99.9% (151)	100.0% (159)

The first set of figures which engages our attention in Table 21 is that for the category "None." Less than one-fourth of the Propagandists reported no publications, whereas more than one-half of the Administrators and Random Nazis had none to report. Of those who did produce, the Propagandists exceeded the others in every category of publication—books, pamphlets, and even articles (which were an habitual form of expression for important Nazi officials, regardless of their literacy). The second set of figures which strikes us is that for the producers of "More than 6 books." These are the real professionals, and here the gap between Propagandists and others is most distinct: better than 1 out of every 10 Propagandists published more than six books, as compared with 1 out of 20 Random Nazis and 1 out of 50 Administrators. (This gap is even wider when one counts our larger sample of 128 Propagandists—which gives us the figure of 21.1 percent, or better than 1 out of 5 Propagandists who produced more than six books.) Since these categories in Table 21 are cumulative—no person is counted in more than one category—we may compute the number of persons in each sample who did some writing for publication. Even this figure, which minimizes the importance of the amount of publication, shows the Propagandists to be distinctively the professional intellectuals among the Nazi elite (see Table 22).

The type of writing done by these subgroups is also of interest here. The writer "by calling" tends to produce works of a more general nature than the person whose distinctive skill in some other field leads him to write a book about his specialty. The professional intellectual thus produces fewer

technical books, more general and belle-lettristic books, and far more books which present arguments for which he is the spokesman (though the ideas on which they rest may have originated with another person, group,

TABLE 22. NUMBER OF WRITERS

Propagandists	Administrators	Random
69.0%	43.4%	46.7%

or party). The Propagandists, as one would expect, outnumber the other Nazis in the production of writings on current history and politics (Zeitgeschichte)—which is the main area in which all three groups of Nazis do their writing. Conversely as expected, the Propagandists lag behind the others in production of technical writings. The pattern of contrast is shown in Table 23.

TABLE 23. FIELD OF PUBLICATION

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Belles Lettres	10.2%	.7%	3.1%
Philosophy and History	.8	.7	3.8
Zeitgeschichte	42.2	34.4	13.8
Natural Sciences	0.0	0.0	0.6
Technical	4.0	4.6	13.2
Social Science	0.0	.7	5.7
Communication and Prop.	7.0	0.0	0.0
Racial Themes	.8	0.0	0.6
Administrative	2.3	4.0	2.5
Other	.8	0.0	3.1
None	22.7	53.0	52.8
Don't know	9.4	2.0	0.6
Total	100.2% (128)	100.1% (151)	99.8% (159)

It seems clear that our sample of Propagandists are, characteristically, the intellectuals of the pre-Nazi German elite. Our next problem is to show that they are the "alienated" members of this intelligentsia. That this must be so seems obvious. For professional intellectuals of high status to affiliate with a revolutionary counter-elite means that they must disaffiliate with the prevailing elite. This act of disaffiliation must be based on disaffection—i. e., "alienation"—due either to the decline of the elite as a whole, or to the decline in status of these intellectuals within the elite, or to both.

Our data, unfortunately, is rather meager at this point—but it does provide some indications that both of the factors just mentioned were operative in the alienation of young German intellectuals from the old elite

and into affiliation with the rising Nazi counter-elite. The crucial period, of course, was that of the Weimar Republic (1918-33).

One very important indicator of the stability of any elite is the rate of unemployment in the society which it governs. Unemployment was, in fact, the rock upon which the Weimar Republic foundered and went down. The effects of unemployment upon young German intellectuals in the immediate postwar years were particularly poignant and catastrophic. We shall see, in a moment, the reflection of this unemployment on our Propagandists: the data do not show that these men were totally unemployed following the war; they do show, more importantly, that they were not employed in jobs which made them proud or content with their lot, i.e., jobs which they were willing to report in the Fuehrerlexikon. The data bear upon the postwar phenomenon among young German intellectuals which they themselves designated as Seelische Arbeitslosigkeit (spiritual unemployment). The alienating effects of this prevailing situation, leading to aggressive hostility toward Weimar, among precisely the group we are discussing—whom we earlier showed to be the junior officers of the Reichswehr in World War I—has been depicted by Konrad Heiden:

When the German Republic disbanded the army, more generals retained their posts than the English army has in peacetime; those who were discharged received pensions they could live on. The well-paid generals became easily reconciled to the republic. But the lieutenants and captains saw no place for advancement in the tiny army of a hundred thousand men; they saw themselves reduced to the level of armed elite proletarians. . . .

This seemed the end of the lordly life to which the German intellectual youth had grown accustomed during the war. Their school course had been broken off ahead of time; their examinations had been made easy for them. After a short period of active service, they were sent to an officers' training course and soon they were lieutenants with a monthly salary of three hundred gold marks. It was a dangerous existence, but one full of pride and pleasure. The material level of life was high enough to permit of a hard fall, when, as Roehm put it, 'peace broke out'. . . .

These armed intellectuals were the German army, they preserved its spirit, upheld its tradition. Even before the First World War, it had ceased to be the army of Prussian junkers, which foreigners held it to be. . . . Since the broad mass of the lower officers gives an army its character, the German Army of the World War could be called an army of armed students. And since these intellectuals in uniform found no career and no bread in the breakdown after the peace, their

officer days remained for many the high point of their existence; the hope for a return of the golden days remained their secret consolation.⁶

Heiden's commentary dramatizes the process of alienation in terms of several indicators which we have been using in this study. We have already shown that the Propagandists were, distinctively, the scions of those upper middle-class strata which sent their sons to the universities in great numbers. They were, again distinctively, the junior officers in the "army of armed students" whom Heiden emphasizes. They were, finally, also the "armed intellectuals." Finding no provision for the maintenance of their high deference-status in the plans and operations of the Weimar "elite" (whom they regarded contemptuously as trade-union Bonzen and domesticated bureaucrats, when they did not despise them as Verraeter of the people and traitorous tools of foreign interests), they became the disaffected and alienated elements who shifted their allegiance to the Nazi movement, which offered them the promise of a brighter place in the sun. The terrific rate of postwar unemployment among these "armed intellectuals" is shown in Table 24.

TABLE 24. POSTWAR
UNEMPLOYMENT (more than one full year)

	Propagandists	Random
No Job Reported	20.0%	13.8%
Only Nazi Jobs	25.0	7.5
Vagueness	31.0	18.2
Total	76.0% (100)	39.5% (159)

These comparative figures for Propagandists and Random Nazis (no data on this indicator was accumulated for the Administrators) show quite striking differences. Since we counted only the employment date after age 18, the fact that Propagandists are a younger group does not bias the results. (If anything, the bias is adverse to our hypothesis, since more Random Nazis stayed in universities, as we showed in Table 15, past the age of 18.)

Nevertheless, the Propagandists clearly outnumber the Random Nazis in each category. For the Weimar period, 1 out of 5 Propagandists reports no job at some point, as compared with somewhat less than 1 out of 7 Random Nazis. The unemployment of these people came in the immediate postwar years—16 percent of the Propagandists (and 13.2 percent of the Random Nazis) reporting no jobs for the years 1919-23. The average duration of lack of reported employment for the Propagandists was slightly over 4 1/2 years, less for the others.

To these figures must be added those who report only Nazi jobs, i. e., employment in the NSDAP which appears to have precluded the reporting

of unemployment elsewhere. In this category Propagandists outnumber Random Nazis by 3 to 1. To these should be added also the category of "vagueness"—in which are included those whose failure to specify any particular jobs or dates indicates that they were in fact unemployed during part, at least, of the Weimar period. A typical example of vagueness so classified is Heinrich Salzmann, whose Berufsgang (occupational history) for the postwar years reads as follows:

. . . 1920 aus dem Heer ausgeschieden und fuer das Propaganda-fach ausgebildet; spaeter in diesem Fach in grossen Firmen taetig; selbstaendiger Propagandafachmann.

(1920 demobilized from the Army and trained for Propaganda field; later active in this field in big firms; free-lance Propaganda specialist)

When all three categories are combined, we find that the rate of unemployment—which we should call, more exactly, unreported and unsatisfactory years of occupational history—we find that the Propagandists outnumber the Random Nazis by approximately 2 to 1. Among the Propagandists, nearly 4 out of every 5 fall into these categories, as compared with only 2 out of 5 Random Nazis.

The data in Table 24 are based on the autobiographical data for Berufsgang supplied in the Fuehrerlexikon. The fact that a man does not report a specific job for a given period can not be taken to mean that he had no job at all. It can, however, be taken to mean that during this period he held no job of which he was proud (since the main point of the Berufsgang in these autobiographical sketches is to report those occupations in each man's past of which he feels proud). This is, of course, the basis of our argument that "spiritual unemployment" (Seelische Arbeitslosigkeit) is a key indicator of the alienation of our group from the upper middle-class German elite which nurtured them, into the Nazi counter-elite which promised them the rewards to which they felt themselves entitled. Their autobiographical occupational histories illustrate the various ways in which they found a spiritual home, as professional intellectuals, in the Nazi movement.

IV. RISE OF THE PLEBEIAN (THE NAZI ADMINISTRATORS)

The distinctive character of the Nazi Propagandists, we have seen, was its recruitment from among the alienated young intellectuals of the upper middle classes who had formed the elite of pre-Nazi Germany. The men who rose to prominence in the Nazi elite as Administrators, rather than Propagandists, present us with quite a different typical social status in the background of their careers (though as we shall see later, they exhibit several interesting characteristics in common with the Propagandists and with the Nazi elite in general).

Nazi Administrators as German Plebeians

The Administrators, to put the matter sharply, represent the rise of the plebeian—men born and raised in the lower social strata—to positions of high deference by means of the revolutionary process. Many of the indicators which produce evidence of their lower origins were discussed in the preceding section, where the pre-Nazi social status of Administrators was compared with that of Propagandists. These can be summarily recapitulated and several additional indicators can be adduced here to clarify the point still further.

We have seen that the ancestral background of Administrators shows lower status than that of Propagandists and Random Nazis (Table 12). We have seen, too, that their parental background was also lower status (Table 11). Particularly in those parental occupations which are likely to provide a home atmosphere conducive to intellectuality did we find Administrators significantly outclassed by the others (Table 20). Their own education stopped at considerably lower levels (Table 15). Even among those who acquired education, its prevailing direction was in the lower status types of learning—e.g., trade school instead of high school; skill-oriented studies (among the much fewer who went to college) instead of culture-oriented studies (Table 16). The Administrator wrote least (Table 21) and married latest (Table 17). He remained more often in enlisted status in the Army (Table 9). Where he achieved successes at all, outside of the Nazi movement, he did this less often in the high-prestige occupations and more often in the "open" field of business manipulation (Table 1).

These and other findings have already been presented to document our assertion that the Nazi Administrator was recruited from the lower strata of pre-Nazi German society. What is the significance of this proposition? What does its documentation add to our understanding of the revolutionary process of our time, as illustrated by the success story of the Nazi movement in Germany? These are difficult questions, and we shall present here only the main lines of the argument needed to clarify our analysis.

We have already presented the view that the Nazi movement was the political instrument of a counter-elite determined to undermine the governing elite of Weimar Germany and install itself in the seats of power. We have indicated why this movement scorned and despised the prevailing

structure of symbols and sanctions upon which rested the power of the Weimar elite, and how they proposed to undermine this structure. We have indicated, finally, how the decade of crisis—inflation, unemployment, and national shame on the internal scene; isolationism, unstable international relations, catastrophic economic depression in the world arena—facilitated the conquest of the Weimar politics of parliament by the Nazi politics of the street.

Politics of the street is a complex process. It involves a number and variety of skills, which we earlier characterized simply as "the organized use of voice and violence to gain power." The co-ordinated use of mass persuasion and coercion to gain power through the streets requires certain types of behavior which are not permissible to representatives of a modern governing elite which operates under a democratic structure of symbols and sanctions. Elite representatives who have become routinized in the behavioral restraints of a democratic process may no longer be capable, temperamentally, of behaving in such ways. This is illustrated by the complete failure of the German Social-Democratic Party—the newest comer to the German elite under Weimar and the only group within this elite whose official ideology gave formal sanction to such tactics—when it attempted to compete with the Nazi Party in the politics of the streets.⁷

We have already enumerated some of the tasks which must be accomplished in the Nazi type of street politics: make and applaud speeches, write and deliver messages, fight in the streets, etc. Such activities become the province of skill-specialists: the Propagandists handle the politics of voice; the Coercers (whom we shall discuss in the next section of this study) handle the politics of violence. As the movement grows, such activities multiply and their effective co-ordination becomes a major task. The key to success thus moves into the hands of those men who organize such special skills and separate activities so that they make maximum contributions to the movement's objective—gaining power. These men are the Administrators.

The Administrators are those who come early and stay late in the movement. In the early days, they use voice and violence themselves, as well as organizing its use by others. As the movement grows they move up its ladder of deference-status; as the number and variety of the movement's activities increase, they become those who direct the behavior of others on a full-time basis. They are the operating arm of the movement's policy directorate, which is usually composed of individuals who have come from their own ranks. They are the echt-Nazi corps of the Nazi elite, the embodiment of the new structure of symbols and sanctions which is to prevail when "the revolution" succeeds.

It is of great importance, therefore, to notice what manner of men these are and where they came from. The fact that the Nazi Administrators were drawn from the lower social strata contributes to our understanding of German society, and particularly its ills in the Weimar period. It contributes to our understanding of the role of the Nazi movement, and particularly its appeal to those men who became its Administrators. It contributes to

our general understanding of the characteristic behavior of these Administrators as a social formation in a time of prolonged crisis.

Among the ills of German society in the Weimar period was, centrally, the absence of a unified elite operating a homogeneous structure of symbols and sanctions which commanded a consensus of loyalty among the citizens. The social process fluctuated without central purpose and governing direction in its movements. With each fluctuation, one or another segment of the population was alienated. Hardest hit, perhaps, was the numerically most important segment—the plebeian masses. The plebeian is not identical with the proletarian. He is, rather, the “unorganized” worker, the unemployed worker (Lumpenproletariat), the peasant, the small peddler and shopkeeper—all those variants of the “*kleiner Mann*,” the little man without strong and dignified interest-group affiliations, with whom so many Germans identify themselves. The life-pattern of the plebeian, historically, has been the brutish life of incessant toil whose purpose was supplied by the sense of direction elaborated by the elite which governed him.

The movement of Western history had been, in other countries, directed toward ameliorating the lot of the plebeian—by lightening his daily toil and by giving him a share in the shaping of its purpose. This movement in history had achieved few conspicuous successes in Imperial Germany, but the elite of the Kaiserreich remained fairly homogeneous and in possession of a fairly stable structure of symbols and sanctions.⁸ The heterogeneous elite of the Weimar Republic, whose avowed purpose was to give the lagging democratic process in Germany a push forward, failed miserably to provide its plebeian masses with either the toil to keep them busy or the sense of direction to keep them happy. It failed even—and this is the bitter paradox—to increase their share in the articulation of a governing code to their own choosing. The trade-union Bonzen and others who drew the scorn and contempt of the Nazis drew also the scorn and contempt of the plebeian masses whom they sometimes claimed to represent. It was the Nazi movement, during these high-tension years of Weimar frustration and failure, which increasingly became the sole spokesman that said to the plebeian German: Come with us to seize the seats of power, throw out these contemptible “representatives” who speak for no German interest or ideal, and thereafter we German people shall be our own spokesmen.

Role of the NSDAP

The plebeian was naturally drawn to such a movement, even if the proletarian (the urban worker with a movement of his own) was not. For such a goal, he saw purpose in licking stamps and envelopes, in chalking swastikas on walls, in courting injuries from “their” security police. The Nazi movement gave him work to fill his hours and a sense of purpose to fill his days. The Bewegung would bring into being the plebeian republic of which the Bonzen only talked and despaired. To the Bewegung, then, the plebeian came—first only the hardy and convinced ones; then as success

began to succeed, the desirous many. The Administrators-to-be were the first to come, as is shown in Table 25.

TABLE 25. DATE OF JOINING NSDAP

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Pre-1923	20.3%	27.2%	9.4%
1924	.8	3.3	0.0
1925	2.3	5.3	1.9
1926	0.8	5.3	0.6
1927	1.6	4.0	3.1
1928	2.3	4.6	1.9
1929	7.8	9.9	5.0
1930	3.1	9.9	1.9
1931	0.8	9.3	5.0
1932	1.6	1.3	0.0
1933 and after	1.6	2.0	0.0
Unknown	57.0	17.9	71.1
Total	100.0% (128)	100.0% (151)	99.9% (159)

The priority of the Administrators over the Random Nazis, and even over the Propagandists, is quite striking. More than 1 out of 4 Administrators who reached elite status (through inclusion in the *Fuehrerlexikon*) was already affiliated with the infant NSDAP in its birth pangs of the pre-1923 years—as compared with 1 out of 5 Propagandists and 1 out of 10 Random Nazis. The results are even clearer when presented cumulatively:

TABLE 26. DATE OF JOINING NSDAP (Cumulative)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Through 1923	20.3%	27.1%	9.4%
Through 1925	23.4	35.6	11.2
Through 1930	39.0	69.1	23.5

By 1930—that is, before the Nazis achieved their first great public victory—two-thirds of the Administrators were already members of the Party, as compared with only one-third of the Propagandists and one-fourth of the Random Nazis. (The interesting category of “Unknown,” which we shall later analyze in some detail, here as elsewhere is quite revealing. The exact inverse correspondence between the size of the unknowns and the priority of known dates in the three samples is a strong indication of what we would anyhow expect: that the dates not given were those that came late, or not at all, rather than early.)

The Administrators not only came early and stayed late, but they also went higher in the Nazi movement. Evidence of the central role of the

Administrators is the data on status in the NSDAP (as reported in the 193 Fuehrerlexikon) shown in Table 27.

Administrators outnumbered Propagandists in the higher ranks of the NSDAP by 2 to 1, and again outnumbered them by 2 to 1 in the middle ranks.

TABLE 27. NSDAP STATUS

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
High Officer	28.1%	51.7%	14.5%
Middle Officer	12.5	24.5	13.2
Low Officer	0.0	3.3	0.0
Officer (no rank given)	1.6	0.7	0.0
No Officer (membership given)	5.5	0.0	0.6
Don't know	52.3	19.9	71.7
Total	100.0% (128)	100.1% (151)	100.0% (159)

They outnumbered the Random Nazis by nearly 4 to 1 in the higher ranks, and by 2 to 1 in the middle ranks. Again, the "don't know" category may be taken as approximately the number of those who held no high or middle rank (or else, in the Fuehrerlexikon, they would surely have volunteered this information). And here, the other two samples overwhelmingly outnumber the Administrators.

The same result appears uniformly in our survey of the major organizations affiliated to the Nazi movement. This is shown in the two tables which follow:

TABLE 28. STATUS IN
NSDAP ACTION ORGANS (SA, SS, NSKK)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
High Officer	3.9%	14.6%	4.4%
Middle Officer	6.2	7.9	3.8
Low Officer	3.1	2.0	1.3
Don't know	86.7	75.5	90.6
Total	99.9% (128)	100.0% (151)	100.1% (159)

TABLE 29. STATUS IN
NSDAP CULTURAL-PROFESSIONAL ORGANS

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
High Officer	33.6%	59.6%	22.0%
Middle Officer	1.6	2.6	3.1
Low Officer	0.8	0.0	0.0
Don't know	64.0	37.7	74.8
Total	100.0% (128)	99.9% (151)	99.9% (159)

Tables 28 and 29 are very striking. It is perhaps natural that Administrators should greatly outnumber the others in the top status of "action organs" such as the S. A., S. S., and N. S. K. K. That Administrators should outnumber Propagandists by 2 to 1, and Random Nazis by 3 to 1, in the direction of the "cultural-professional organs" for those fields of interest to which these other Nazi subgroups were predominantly specialized can only be accounted for by the proposition that the Administrators came early and took over the direction of the Nazi movement as a whole—a proposition documented by all the available data.

That the Administrators, who were the ones that came earliest, took the highest positions in the Nazi movement is in line with a heavy emphasis in the Nazi Party on seniority. Early membership was one of the most important distinctions a Nazi could claim. Not only among the Administrators, but in each sample, the oldest members predominate in the highest ranks. The conclusion we draw is that in the Nazi Party, despite its being a revolutionary movement, leadership came chiefly not to those of propagandist brilliance or charismatic qualities, but to those with the more bureaucratic qualities of loyalty and seniority—traits the Administrators showed.

TABLE 30. RANK IN NSDAP BY DATE OF JOINING

Date Joined NSDAP	Propagandists				Administrators				Random			
	High Off.	Mid. Off.	Low Off.	Mem* ber	High Off.	Mid. Off.	Low Off.	Mem* ber	High Off.	Mid. Off.	Low Off.	Mem* ber
1923 or bef.	20	4	1	1	29	10	1	1	8	7	-	-
1924- 1926	3	2	-	-	12	5	-	4	2	2	-	-
1927- 1929	4	5	1	5	18	6	2	2	5	4	-	7
1930 and aft.	3	3	-	3	8	12	2	11	2	4	-	5
Total	30	14	2	9	67	33	5	18	17	17	-	12

*Holding of office not mentioned in biography.

While the Administrators had joined early and remained steadfast long, it should not be assumed that they joined young. It will be recalled that both in the early years of the Nazi movement and later on, the Administrators joined at a later age than did the Propagandists (see Table 6). They had "knocked around" longer. They were not student Bohemians like the Propagandists, but disappointed men from the lower ranks who had tried to make a middle-class career, and had failed.

Origins

Where did these plebeian Administrators, who took over the movement,

come from? Our data on their region of birth, as shown in Table 31, gives some interesting comparisons with the other groups:

TABLE 31. PROVINCE OF BIRTH

	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Prussia, North of Berlin (incl. Berlin)	14.1%	8.6%	17.0%
Prussia, East of Berlin (incl. Silesia)	13.3	11.9	11.3
Prussia, West of Berlin	10.9	15.2	22.6
Saxony (State)	7.0	4.6	5.0
Thuringia	3.9	3.3	3.1
Bavaria	10.2	20.5	9.4
Wuerttemberg-Baden	9.4	8.6	10.1
Alsace-Lorraine and Saar	1.6	6.0	1.3
Hessen-Nassau	4.7	6.0	8.2
Rhineland	7.8	6.0	3.1
Ruhr	3.9	.7	4.4
Other	2.3	2.0	1.9
Abroad	7.0	4.6	2.5
No data	3.9	2.0	0.0
Total	100.0% (128)	100.0% (151)	99.9% (159)

We shall return to this table later, in our discussion of "marginality" among the Nazi elite (Part VI), when the preponderance of Random Nazis in the central provinces of Germany will be contrasted with the preponderance of Propagandists and Administrators in the outlying, border, and foreign areas. Here we wish to note especially only the very heavy concentration of Administrators in Bavaria—1 out of every 5 was born there, as contrasted with 1 out of every 10 Propagandists and Random Nazis. These figures show a clear deviation: the population of Bavaria in 1890—which is approximately the median date of birth for these samples—was 5,594,982.⁹ This is approximately one-tenth of the total population of Germany at that time (49,428,470), which corresponds to the 10 percent of Propagandists and Random Nazis born there. The fact that twice as many Administrators were born there as were Germans as a whole, or even other samples of the Nazi elite, probably must be accounted for by the fact that the Nazi movement originated and grew to power in Bavaria (with its chief command posts at Munich and Nuremberg). The Administrators, who, as we have seen, came earliest and rose highest fastest, were predominantly recruited from the local talent available in Bavaria.

This finding that the Administrators born in Bavaria outnumber the others by 2 to 1 takes on added meaning, with reference to the "rise of the plebeian," when we examine the comparative data on size of birthplace, as presented in Table 32.

That none of these Nazis reports himself as born on a farm is probably due to the habit of reporting birthplace in terms of the nearest Gemeinde (civil administration unit). The Administrators substantially outnumber

TABLE 32. SIZE OF BIRTHPLACE

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Farm	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Village (under 2,000)	18.0	25.8	21.4
Rural Town (2,000-5,000)	2.0	9.3	6.3
Small City (5,000-20,000)	11.0	9.3	13.8
Middle City (20,000-100,000)	14.0	19.2	17.0
Large City (over 100,000)	13.0	16.6	17.6
Metropolis*	24.0	13.2	14.5
University City	2.0	0.0	0.0
Abroad (Metropolis)	6.0	4.6	2.5
No data	10.0	2.0	6.9
Total	100.0% (100)	100.0% (151)	100.0% (159)

*Metropolis includes Berlin, Munich, Breslau, Dresden, Hamburg, Koeln, Koenigsberg, Leipzig, and Stuttgart.

the others in villages and in rural towns. The comparative pattern of birthplaces becomes clearer when the figures are presented grouped, as in the following recapitulation:

TABLE 33. SIZE OF BIRTHPLACE (Grouped)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Rural (under 5,000)	20.0%	35.0%	27.5%
Urban (5,000-100,000 plus)	38.0	44.9	48.3
Metropolitan (Categories 7 and 9)	32.0	17.7	16.9

This shows, quite clearly, that the Random Nazis conform most closely to the normal distribution of the German population—heaviest in the middle-sized cities, with the next greatest concentration in rural places, outnumbering the density in metropolitan places by about 1 1/2 to 1. The Propagandists are the “big city slickers”: they deviate by reversing the pattern in favor of the metropolitan (communication) centers—showing 1 out of 3 born in a metropolis as compared with only 1 out of 5 born in a rural area. The Administrators precisely reverse this pattern of the Propagandists—showing more than 1 out of 3 born in rural places and less than 1 out of 5 born in metropolitan centers. The Administrators characteristically differ from the other Nazis in their origins as peasants and sons of peasants—and, to a marked degree, Bavarian peasants.

Movements and Career

We shall not undertake here any commentary on the psychology of the German peasant, and particularly the Bavarian peasant. Our interest here is to show that, whatever this German peasantry was like, the men who became our sample of Nazi Administrators moved away from it and into greener pastures fairly early in life. The autobiographies in the Fuehrerlexikon show a remarkable rate of movement from smaller birthplaces to larger cities. We therefore computed the percentage of those within each sample who made such a move, and noted the age at which the move was made. The results are shown in Table 34:

TABLE 34. AGE AT MOVE
TO METROPOLIS (Entire Sample)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Under 18	17.2%	25.2%	13.8%
18-25	8.6	20.5	47.8
Over 25	1.6	2.0	4.4
No Move	3.1	0.0	3.8
Born in Metropolis	25.0	15.2	13.8
No Date	44.5	37.1	16.4
Total	100.0% (128)	100.0% (151)	100.0% (159)

The most interesting categories here are the first two. Of the Administrators, 1 out of every 4 moved to the big city before he was 18 years old; 1 out of every 5 who stayed home longer made his move before he was 25. Since these percentages somewhat obscure the factor of birth in metropolis (which obviates the need for a move), and since the importance of this factor varies considerably between the three samples (as does the size of the "no data" category), we have recomputed the data and express it below as percentages of those whose moves are reported:

TABLE 35. AGE AT MOVE
TO METROPOLIS (Moves Reported)

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Under 18	56.4%	52.8%	19.8%
18-25	28.2	43.1	68.4
Over 25	5.1	4.2	6.3
No Move	10.2	0.0	5.4
Total	99.9% (39)	100.1% (72)	99.9% (111)

This presentation gives us a somewhat better perspective on the Propagandists as young-men-in-a-hurry. The Administrators, however, clearly

lead the procession when one cumulates the first two rows, to get the percentages of those who moved to the big city before they were 25 years old, viz.:

	<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
Under 25	84.6%	95.9%	88.2%

Not only did the Administrators go younger, but apparently more of them went. No Administrator born in a smaller place reports that he did not move to a metropolis, whereas 1 out of 10 Propagandists and 1 out of 20 Random Nazis report no such move.

The questions which then arise are: What did these young men go to the big city for? What did they do after they got there? Data bearing on these questions were gathered by tabulating the main occupations of these persons after their move to the metropolis. The results are expressed in Table 36 as percentages in each category of those who did move:

TABLE 36. MAIN OCCUPATION
AFTER MOVE TO METROPOLIS

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Schooling	64.2%	48.5	70.5%
Nazi Party Official	0.0	3.1	0.8
Civil Service	0.0	2.3	2.3
Military	3.2	3.1	0.8
Business	2.1	3.9	4.5
Professions	0.0	0.0	0.8
Communications	6.3	0.0	0.8
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0
No data	24.2	39.1	19.7
Total	100.0% (95)	100.0% (128)	100.2% (132)

So, though the Administrator-to-be hurried to the big city at a tender age, and got there before the other Nazis, he did not go for an education, as Table 36 indicates. Whereas two-thirds of the Propagandists and Random Nazis went to school after their arrival in the metropolis, less than one-half of the younger Administrators occupied their time in this way. Nor were the Administrators more significantly employed in gainful occupations. (The null-category of "other" employment is shown in the above table merely to demonstrate that all reported employment is exhausted within our categories.) If we omit schooling and NSDAP-affiliation, neither of which was an income-producing occupation, we find the following figures for gainful employment after moving to the metropolis:

	<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
Gainful Employment	11.6%	9.3%	9.2%

The one place where the Administrators, who lag behind in both schooling and gainful employment, got something of a head start over the others by rushing to the city was in the officialdom of the Nazi Party. But the most important category in Table 36, as in so many other cases, is that of "no data." It is here that the Administrators make up their lag behind the others: 39 percent of them report no data on this important period in their life-histories. That is, 15 percent more Administrators than Propagandists, and 20 percent more Administrators than Random Nazis, chose to remain silent about how they occupied their time after they moved to the big city. It seems highly probable that, here as elsewhere, "no data" can be taken as roughly equivalent to a statement, "no worthwhile activities to report," by the autobiographers.

Valuable evidence that "no data" is, in this particular case, an important equivalent of "no worthwhile activity" comes from the figures we have gathered on the age at which these men held their first career jobs. To define the categories used in Table 37, we considered as the "first career job" that in which the person first worked in the field of his own Primary (or Secondary) Lifework:

TABLE 37. AGE AT FIRST CAREER JOB

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random*
Under 18	3.9%	2.0%	1.4%
18-25	32.8	27.8	37.1
26-30	18.0	21.9	37.1
31-35	10.9	16.6	10.1
36-40	3.1	3.3	1.4
41-45	3.1	4.6	0.6
46-50	1.6	1.3	0.0
51-55	1.6	0.7	0.0
56-60	0.8	1.3	0.0
61-65	1.6	2.6	0.0
Over 65	0.0	0.0	0.0
No Data	22.6	17.9	12.2
Total	100.0% (128)	99.9% (151)	99.9% (159)

*In the case of the Random Sample the first responsible job was coded. This is not necessarily the same career which they later followed.

Table 37, in the light of the data already presented, provides us with some of our most valuable material on all of these three samples. We shall take space here to draw only the main conclusions that bear on the key propositions we have formulated, particularly with respect to the Administrators.

One striking pattern is that exhibited by the Random Nazis. Practically

all of these persons are launched in their careers before they are 35; only three of them lag into the next decade of their lives; after 45, all of them are "settled." This contrasts greatly with the two other Nazi subgroups, many of whom continue to find their first career jobs after 35 and up to 65. The distinctive patterns are brought out more clearly by separating the groups under and over age 35, where the natural division in Table 37 seems to come for all three samples, viz.:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
Under 35	84.8 %	83.0 %	97.8 %
Over 35	15.1 %	16.9 %	2.1 %
Totals	99.9 % (128)	99.9 % (151)	99.9 % (159)

The picture is clarified still further when, again presenting the figures as percentages of known data, the division is made at age 30, viz.:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
Under 30	70.7 %	62.9 %	86.3 %
Over 30	29.2 %	37.0 %	13.6 %
Totals	99.9 % (128)	99.9 % (151)	99.9 % (159)

By age 30, then, only 2 out of 3 Administrators had settled in some career job—as compared with 3 out of 4 Propagandists and 9 out of 10 Random Nazis. By age 35, the Random Nazis were practically all "settled," but the Administrators—with 1 out of 6 still unsettled—had nearly caught up on the Propagandists. This lag of five years behind the Propagandists is characteristic of the broken and halting character of the careers of the Administrators. They started with a handicap, coming from provincial backgrounds, poorer families, and lesser schooling. More often they served time in the Army. Then they came out into an economy where unemployment was widespread. Lacking the skills of the other groups, they were unemployed longer and held more transitory and menial jobs. This was true of those Administrators who joined the Nazis in the early years. It was even more strikingly true for those who joined later on.

TABLE 38. PARTY MEMBERS
WITHOUT FIRST RESPONSIBLE JOB BY AGE 25

	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Joined by 1928	34.2 %	46.0 %	28.5 %
Joined After 1929	42.9	79.5	56.3

Despite their shorter schooling and therefore earlier job availability, the Administrators were slower in getting responsible jobs. The most striking

fact, however, is the great increase in the number without early responsible jobs. Those who joined the Party earlier were older, for one thing. They may have held responsible jobs in the more stable days before the War, or they may have held responsible military posts during the War. Furthermore, those who joined the Party early acquired Party jobs. Those who stayed out until later postponed the possibility of acquiring such positions. Those, however, were a minority. The majority of Administrators had joined by 1928.

This we have already seen from the data on their comparative dates of joining the NSDAP (see Table 25). The point is clear from comparing the numbers who joined in the five years between 1918 and 1923. These were the years when the NSDAP was merely a gleam in the eyes of a Munich "lunatic fringe" and the act of joining it was mainly significant as a symbolic rite of alienation from existing German society. It is therefore useful to look here at the figures on those who performed this rite prior to 1923:

	<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
Joined NSDAP Pre-1923	20.3%	27.2%	9.4%

It is clear that the "alienated intellectuals," the Propagandists, also found their way early into the Nazi movement. But it is the "alienated plebeians," the Administrators, who outnumber the others—with almost as many members in the NSDAP prior to 1923 as the two other samples combined.

Education, Occupation, and Career

What careers did these men make for themselves, these men who joined the Party early and settled in their careers late? Let us look first at the group which, after moving to the big city, attended school for a time. We have already seen that comparatively few of the Administrators reached the university level of education, viz. (from Table 15):

	<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
University Education	59.0%	25.2%	60.4%

Whereas better than 1 out of 2 Propagandists and Random Nazis attended universities, only 1 out of 4 (or half as many) Administrators attained this level. Of those who did attend, the great majority concentrated on professional studies leading to licensed occupations—in this case even a higher proportion of Administrators than Propagandists—viz. (from Table 16):

	<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Random</u>
Professional Studies	59.6%	67.1%	77.9%

Comparatively few of the Administrators actually received professional degrees—only 29 percent of the Administrators, as compared with 38 per-

cent of the Propagandists and 48 percent of the Random Nazis. The numbers, and the fields to which they received academic certification, are shown in Table 39. In this table the categories are arranged according to a rough ranking of their deference-status in postwar Germany, and the figures are expressed as percentages in each category of those who actually received degrees.

TABLE 39. PROFESSIONAL DEGREES RECEIVED

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Law	57.9%	17.3%	56.0%
Civil Service	0.0	1.9	1.2
Theology	2.6	1.9	6.0
Medical Sciences	10.5	13.5	15.5
Education	10.5	15.4	6.0
Engineering	5.3	7.7	13.1
Architecture	7.9	9.6	0.0
Business (Diplomkaufmann)	0.0	3.8	1.2
Military	5.3	28.8	1.2
Total	100.0% (38)	99.9% (52)	100.1% (84)

Our data do not permit us to make all the precise distinctions we would wish to have, for example, as between those law and education degrees which bore the title of "Referendar" or "Assessor." The information given, however, is adequate for accurate distinctions between high, middle, and low status in these professions. In the civil service category, indeed, we have included only those whose status entitled them to the "Professional" label. Hence, we may discuss the meaning of this table for deference-status with some confidence.

Deference includes, in addition to the rewards in income and prestige which are attached to an occupation, the opportunity to gain these rewards by actually working at these occupations. For this reason we have placed law and civil service in the two top categories; and the building, business, and military professions in the bottom four categories.¹⁰ There can be little doubt that the postwar years in Germany offered persons in these last four professions fewer opportunities to gain through actual practice the rewards which traditionally were accorded to them. Yet it is precisely in these lower categories that the Administrators, who lag behind at the top, begin to outnumber the other Nazis. Because expectations among these professionals were high, such deprivations were felt all the more keenly. (We can mention here Hitler's disappointment in an abortive architectural career, and also Rosenberg's, not as impressive evidence but merely as illustrative cases.)

The point we wish to make is shown most clearly by comparing the top category with the bottom category. The lawyers, who enjoyed high prestige, had fair opportunities for employment even under Weimar: with a

new type of government to operate (Republican rather than Imperial), with a brand-new constitution to expound and interpret, with many and varied claims arising from the War to be presented for legal adjudication. At the bottom, we have placed the military professionals, who were surely among the most frustrated Germans under Weimar—with a profession traditionally entitled to high deference, but with no opportunities to acquire its rewards through practice. At the top, the Administrators are outnumbered 3 to 1 by the others; at the frustrating bottom, the Administrators outnumber the others by even wider margins.

The unimpressive careers of the Administrators are further evidenced by the jobs they actually took. This was shown in Table 1, above. We might add, however, that even when an Administrator went into the higher-ranking categories of profession it was often at a lower level. Thus, we noted that the civil service was the primary lifework of 9.0 percent of the Propagandists, 13.2 percent of the Administrators, and 27.7 percent of the Random sample. The civil service jobs that the Administrators took, however, were ones open to persons with less education than the jobs taken by the Propagandists and Administrators. German civil service examinations were closely geared to the educational system. The Propagandists and Random Nazis took them when they were equipped for the better jobs. The Administrators took them even when they were prepared only for lower jobs. Table 40 makes this clear:

TABLE 40. INDIVIDUALS IN EACH
CELL WHOSE PRIMARY LIFEWORK WAS CIVIL SERVICE

Education Attained	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
University	12.3%	7.8%	37.5%
Higher Schools	6.7	14.8	29.4
Trade, High or Grade School	2.7	14.1	4.7

How about that large group of Administrators who did not go to school, but also did not find jobs? It is difficult to trace their history through the usual criteria, for they chose not to report on these postwar years when little that they did by way of "normal" occupation gave them satisfaction and pride. Some evidence of how these persons spent their time can be gleaned, however, from our data on their participation in "abnormal" occupations—such as the Reichswehr, the Freikorps, and the NSDAP. For these were activities which—from the perspective of the Fuehrerlexikon in 1934-35, at least,—did give them satisfaction and pride. On such activities, accordingly, those who did participate report without reserve.

The comparative figures on service in the Reichswehr, expressed as percentages of all who report service within each sample, are shown in Table 41.

TABLE 41. SERVICE IN REICHSWEHR

Propagandists	Administrators	Random
7.8%	14.7%	4.3%

The average length of service for those who served is as follows:

TABLE 42. AVERAGE LENGTH OF SERVICE IN REICHSWEHR

Propagandists	Administrators	Random
2.4 years	4.1 years	2.0 Years

These figures indicate that Administrators outnumbered Propagandists about 2 to 1, and outnumbered Random Nazis by well over 3 to 1, in Reichswehr service. Those more numerous Administrators who served, we notice, also served twice as long as the others.

The autobiographical information reported on service in the Freikorps, which sprang up throughout Germany as the most extreme form of protest against Weimar and particularly against its acquiescent posture toward the "shame of Versailles," shows the same pattern even more clearly. (Figures for average length of service all are insignificant owing to the brief life of the Freikorps). The comparative percentages of each subgroup for service in the Freikorps are as follows:

TABLE 43. SERVICE IN FREIKORPS

Propagandists	Administrators	Random
9.2%	23.5%	14.3%

The Freikorps drew into its ranks 1 out of 4 Administrators, as compared with 1 out of 7 Random Nazis and 1 out of 11 Propagandists. These Freikorps, which began the work of undermining the Weimar elite, became the main recruiting ground of the Nazis who finished that job. They were also the training ground of those echt-Nazi German plebeians who came early to the Party, rose highest in its ranks, and gave it the distinctive character which brought it to triumph in one decade, and then to ruin in the next decade.

The last set of data we shall present on the Administrators, to complete this portrait of their life-histories during the postwar and pre-Nazi Weimar decade, shows what happened to the vast majority of them—those who went to school and those who did not, those who joined the Reichswehr-Freikorps and those who did not. These data bear on what we have called the Subsidiary Lifework of the Nazis. Our interest in this class of data arose when we noted the extraordinary amount of shift and discontinuity in the occupational histories reported by these persons. We noted that Primary Lifework was, in very many cases, an inadequate indicator of the career line because so many men who wanted to receive professional degrees never received them, those who did receive them practiced their professions for only a limited

period, and so on through the run of items in the "Berufsgänge" of these Nazis. Accordingly, we began to supplement our data on education and occupation with other indicators, such as we have been reporting on above—Reichswehr, Freikorps, etc. We found that these data accounted for most of the years of the Weimar period (1918-33) for most of the individuals sampled. But they most distinctly failed to account satisfactorily for the activities of the Administrators, until we began to collect information about those activities at which these men spent the second-longest period of time in their "Berufsgänge." These data provide the thread of continuity through the decade when the Nazis were moving from obscurity to total power, and they show most clearly why the Administrators are distinct from the others in the way they spent their time during these years, viz.:

TABLE 44. SUBSIDIARY LIFEWORK

Class	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
NSDAP Official	21.9%	81.5%	24.5%
Civil Service	11.7	2.0	12.6
Professions	5.5	0.7	19.5
Communications	36.7	2.6	6.3
Military	1.6	1.3	2.5
Business	3.1	3.3	1.9
Artisans	0.8	0.7	0.0
Farmers	0.8	2.0	1.3
Others	2.4	0.0	1.9
No Subsidiary Lifework	15.6	6.0	29.6
Total	100.1% (128)	100.1% (151)	100.0% (159)

Many important points are brought to light by this table. Starting from the bottom, we notice first that more than 1 out of 4 Random Nazis and 1 out of 6 Propagandists report no Subsidiary Lifework—thus indicating that they stayed put, relatively, and thereby explaining why their years were pretty adequately accounted for by adding education to Primary Lifework and comparing the sum with their average age. The Administrators, however, for whom this procedure left us with a gap of years unaccounted for, report that only 1 out of 20 had no Subsidiary Lifework. In other words, more than 9 out of 10 Administrators did make significant career-shifts outside of the normal occupational categories during this period.

Coming up the table, we notice other useful bits of evidence concerning the Administrators. Their absence from the category of "Other" indicates, for example, that all their Subsidiary Lifework activities are contained in the categories enumerated above. The next two categories of Farmers-Artisans indicates that relatively few Administrators—but still more than double the other samples—stuck to their plebeian lasts for a protracted period during the Weimar years. The next two categories of Business-Military, the very categories of educational specialization in which the Ad-

ministrators consistently outnumbered the others (see Table 16), show that even these fields did not hold them any more than they did the other Nazis.

The crux of the story lies in the first four categories. Here the distinctive role of the Administrators in the Nazi movement is most clearly demonstrated. Notice Categories 2 through 4: these together account for the great majority of the other two subgroups—54 percent of the Propagandists and 38 percent of the Random Nazis—but account for only 5 percent of the Administrators. What is the significance of this? We see this by looking at the three categories separately: the Propagandists cluster in their distinctive skill-status role as Communicators; the Random Nazis cluster in their distinctive skill-status as Professional Men; both score high in the skill-status category of Civil Service.

The Administrators are conspicuous by their absence from these categories. These, we recall, are distinctively the plebeians—the men without distinctive skill and without distinctive status. When their Primary Lifework fails them, they have no place to go in the framework of deference established by the ruling elite. To find deference for themselves, they must go outside of this established framework. And outside of it these Administrators-to-be, these men without distinctive skill or status, in fact did go. As compared with 1 out of 5 of the other Nazis, 4 out of every 5 of these echt-Nazis devoted his Subsidiary Lifework to the Nazi Party.

Composite Portrait

The portrait of our Administrators, as sketched by our data thus far, seems to run something like this (we are speaking now in terms of the special characteristics of this group—i.e., the pattern of its deviations from the two other samples representing the Nazi Propagandists and the Nazi elite as a whole): Born largely in rural places and smaller towns, of parents with little income and less prestige, they acquired little formal education and, after military service, found themselves confronting a life filled with hard and unrewarding labor in jobs that offered them, like their fathers, little income and less prestige.

The shame and instability of the Weimar years deprived them of even one more ingredient of a satisfying life—that ingredient which, perhaps, was what made their lot satisfying or at least bearable to their fathers—a sense of purpose. Cut off from their roots by the World War (in which some of them had risen to become NCO's and even junior officers), and by the bitter sequel of the postwar years (in which the opportunities to maintain themselves even in their lowly inherited status had become severely restricted), these men of plebeian origins rebelled at the prospect of a miserable life devoted to the maintenance of a governing elite which they despised. These feelings of rootlessness, repugnance, and rebellion carried over to younger brothers and neighbors. Thus they spread even among those youths of plebeian Germany who had not served in the World War, but whose received version of it gave them the same perspective on the postwar situation under Weimar.

These young men, confronting prospects for the future which seemed to them intolerable, cut their roots and early left the village for the metropolis. Some went to school, but their post-school careers did not bring them successes and satisfactions (inflation was still rampant and unemployment still high). A very few found employment, but these, too, moved from job to job with a frequency and discontinuity which indicated discontent. A substantial, and very significant, number wandered about the big cities neither at school nor at work. Rootless, restless, unoccupied, with nothing but time in hand and ambition in heart—these plebeians on the loose gradually found their destiny.

Some of them discovered the Nazi "movement" early and became its "alte Kaempfer." Here was vitality and a mission; here was lots of work (even if unpaid, at first) for idle heads and hands; here was a fraternity which offered status and reward to the brethren—a place in the sun for them and the Fatherland. As these first young men moved in and happily began to take and give orders, as the orders began to take shape in effectual action, the Bewegung began to grow. Other young men, and older men, too, came to join the movement. No longer did Administrators-to-be wander the streets with useless diplomas and no work, or shift from one unrewarding job to another, or wonder what to do next. The Bewegung showed them how to make these streets come alive with action and purpose, how to take over these streets as a prelude to taking over the houses and shops and banks and bureaus. The streets became theirs, and the plebeian revolution had conquered.

V. SPECIALISTS ON VIOLENCE (THE NAZI COERCERS)

In the preceding sections, after discussing the general class role of the middle-income skill groups, we have dealt in turn with two of our subsamples—the Propagandists and the Administrators. Each of these was compared with the other; and both were compared with our subsample of Random Nazis, who represent most closely the salient attributes of the Nazi elite as a whole. It was largely in terms of their characteristic deviations from the Random subsample that we characterized the Propagandists and Administrators. In turning to the subsample of Coercers, we confront a special problem. They include two rather distinct groups, reflecting the fact that the use of violence is specialized in two quite different ways—for external purposes and for internal purposes.

Coercers: Soldiers and Police

The external use of violence, through war and the threat of war, is primary among the traditional instruments of social policy. Defense of the tribe, and attack upon its enemies, is a function honored by time and usage. The warrior caste has rated high in the deference-scale of most societies in recorded history. So, in most modern nations, the soldier high in his profession has also been high in his society. In Germany, more securely than in most other societies of the Western world, professional soldiery retained the extreme deference once accorded to military castes. The soldier was conceived as the hero in posse, and his rewards were those of the hero in esse.

The internal use of violence was in rather different condition. With the spread of civilization, the use of violence by the governors against the governed became increasingly disapproved. The process of civilization may even be defined as the substitution of rational persuasion for violent coercion as a mode of social control. Not that coercion has ever been completely eliminated from government, but the fairly steady trend of modern history has been toward reduction of coercion and elimination of its violent techniques. Most modern societies have made corporal punishment illegal, and many have eliminated capital punishment.¹¹ Policemen who do unsanctioned violence to citizens are themselves subject to very extreme penalties. The most respected police in the Western world undoubtedly are the British "bobbies," who (by law) carry no instruments of violence.

With the decline of internal coercion, the status of those specialized to such coercion also declined. The dazzling "palace guard" of earlier centuries has become a symbol of mockery, rather than might, in our days. "Flic" and "flatfoot" are not symbols of high deference. Rewards in income and power have declined along with prestige. The attempt to assassinate President Truman brought to light the fact that the would-be assassin received a higher wage than the Secret Service man killed by his bullet. In a democratic business society, the productive worker receives higher rewards than members of the "palace guard." It was not without justice

that W. S. Gilbert's protagonist complained, perhaps wistful over past glory, that in nineteenth-century England "a policeman's lot is not a happy one."

Whereas the soldier has maintained his high status in recent history, and seems in fact to have elevated it in several ways, the policeman's status has steadily declined. The profession specialized to internal violence had become so unrewarding that it attracted only those whose aspirations, affiliations and abilities could take them no higher. A study of "New York's finest," or the uniformed police force of any important city in the Western world, probably would reveal lower- or lower-middle-class origins.

In Germany, the difference between Junker and Schupo (Schutzpolizei) is the distance between the very top of the deference scale and an area rather close to the bottom. This, however, would be a misleading comparison—for the soldier-status comparable to Schupo is Landser (common uniformed soldier); the police-status to be compared with Junker is Polizei-praesident (the top officials of the police hierarchy). Even these two pairs of terms, however, suggest important differences of deference-status familiar to all who know Germany. The Junker belongs to a caste with fairly definite homogeneous characteristics: whose landed families possessed traditional prestige, including many titles of nobility; whose members were raised on manorial private estates, frequently located in East and North Prussia; whose sons were educated to succeed their fathers as officers of the German Army and in fact devoted their careers to this end. The Polizei-praesident suggests a quite different set of heterogeneous characteristics: first of all, his role is not inherited but acquired, and thus is presumably (in Weimar Germany) based not on status but on merit. Second, his office usually represents a "step up," or several steps up, in a career composed of such steps. Third, his office is Civil Service and therefore falls within the German stereotype of bureaucratic "Bonzen" (as contrasted with the "English Gentleman" stereotype with which many Germans identified their caste of Generals).

Soldiers vs. Police in "Fuehrerlexikon"

These differences show up in our comparative data on Soldiers and Police selected for inclusion in the Fuehrerlexikon. It is interesting to begin with, that the book contains only 35 Police of the top grades (since no lower grades appeared in the book), as compared with 104 Soldiers (this excludes a few individuals counted as Propagandists or Administrators; see Appendix A). This is particularly revealing when we point out that of these 35 Police, at least a dozen were Soldiers of career who had to be mustered out when the Reichswehr was cut after the Versailles Treaty. The Police simply do not rate, as compared with the Soldiers. The differences between them stand out clearly, despite the elevating bias introduced by the dozen Soldiers counted as Police. We shall later discuss this point more fully. Here we wish to present, in summary fashion, a few tables which compare the data on these two groups, using the same categories of status

as throughout this study. We shall try not to repeat excessively the evaluations of these indicators which were presented in the preceding sections and with which the reader is presumably familiar. We note that the Soldiers are an older group—average age 52 years as compared with average age 47 years for the Police—and proceed to the data on birthplace:

TABLE 45. BIRTHPLACE

Class	Soldiers	Police
North and East Prussia	37.5%	25.7%
Status Places	6.7	0.0
Large Cities (over 100, 000)	7.7	20.0

The Soldiers originate in birthplaces of smaller size, while the Police are more heavily clustered in the large cities. The fact that better than 1 out of 3 Soldiers comes from Northeast Prussia is reported here as an item relevant to the Junker stereotype mentioned above. We have classified as "status" birthplaces:—family estates (3.8 percent of these Soldiers mention that they were born on a Rittergut); university towns and foreign capitals (for reasons we elaborated earlier which indicated both these birthplaces to be associated with higher status of father).

The data on careers also yield patterns of considerable interest:

TABLE 46. CAREER PATTERNS

Class	Soldiers	Police
Sustained Military Contact		
Under 18	44.2%	20.0%
First Career Job Under 25	94.2	68.6
First Job in Military	99.0	60.0
First Job in Police	0.0	14.3
First Job in all Other Fields	1.0	25.8
Primary Lifework in Career	72.7	42.8

Some clarification of the categories used in Table 46 is necessary to discuss the meaning of these figures. "Sustained military contact" was defined to mean continuous contact with the military service over a period longer than five years (to eliminate those who might have served in World War I from start to end but had no continuous service before or after the War). The percentages show how many of each group began such sustained service before they were 18 years old. The Soldiers outnumber the others by 2 to 1. This unusual figure is explained by the very large number who acquired their education at the Kadettenanstalt (military academy) before they were 18, at which time they became junior officers. For this group, then, it would appear that the career decision was made for them, by family tradition or preference, and that this first decision settled their careers in fact.

The second category shows what percentage of each group was launched

on its final career before the age of 25. Here again the Soldiers vastly outnumber the others, by a ratio of approximately 3 to 2. The significance of this item comes out more clearly in connection with the next three categories, which indicate several interesting points about the respective career-patterns of these groups. The Soldiers, of whom 94 percent were started in their careers before they were 25 years old, began these careers in the military to the extraordinary figure of 99 percent. (We shall explain in a moment why this is surprising, rather than a mere validation of our sample). None of them began his career in the Police, and only one (actually a fraction less than 1 percent) began his career in any occupation other than Military.

Now obviously, this indicates that our sample is a good one—i.e., those we are calling Soldiers are professional soldiers in fact. But it also indicates more than that. In sorting biographees in the Fuehrerlexikon into our categories, our chief criterion was the occupation or title each man gave himself at the head of his sketch. Thus a man who labelled himself General der Infanterie or Stabsoffizier was automatically classified as a soldier in our tabulations. To increase the size of the sample, we later added those biographees who had served over 5 years as officers. However, it is possible, indeed likely, that many men who chose to label themselves in this way, or who served five years as officers, had spent only the last 5 or 10 or 20 years of their lives in military service. It was not at all required by our sampling procedure that: all but one of them should have begun his career in the military; that all but six should have begun this career before he was 25 years old; and that over four out of five should have worked longer in the military service than in any other occupation.

This latter fact is shown by our final category. Whereas "Career" was defined by the occupational label each biographee chose for himself, "Primary Lifework" was defined as the occupation in which he spent the greatest number of his working years. Hence, it was far from certain that over 81 percent of the Soldiers would have their Primary Lifework in their occupations of Career. Particularly was this uncertain because these men lived a substantial portion of their working life through the 15 years of Weimar—when the Reichswehr was cut to the bone and the vast majority of Career soldiers had to find other occupations whether they wanted to or not.

These facts indicate that the occupational pattern of these Soldiers conforms rather well to the stereotype of the Junker which we sketched earlier: they started their military contact very early, by registration in the Kadettenanstalt upon graduation from elementary school. Since this was regarded as a great privilege (during one period even requiring the permission of the Kaiser), it was regarded as a special prerogative of "the better German families." It shows, too, the strong family influence on predispositions and decisions to enter the military service. Further, all but one of these young men tried no other occupation as a start, but went straight to the military for his first work (again indicating family influence). The vast majority remained within military service for the greatest part of their

lives, even during a long period when professional unemployment and absence of traditional rewards were the rule for soldiers. Such fidelity to the shadow of a profession indicates disdain for other types of work, and a refusal to "lower oneself" by trying it, which is caste behavior of a degree rare in the Western world.

The occupational pattern of our Police sample stands in sharp contrast to the above at every crucial point. Less than half as many Police as Soldiers were in military contact (via the Kadettenanstalt) before they were 18, and one-third fewer had gotten a start in their Career jobs before they were 25. The following categories are even more revealing. As compared with 99 percent Soldiers whose first job was military, only 42 percent Police started out in the police field which was to become their Career. Some 25 percent Police started out in other miscellaneous fields, as compared with 1 percent Soldiers—a unique stray from the military fold. Most interesting of all, perhaps, whereas not a single man who called himself Soldier started out in the police, 60 percent of the Police started out in the military. This extremely high figure is due to two main sequences of events in the careers of these police: (1) A large number of temporary younger officers who served through World War I, perhaps a year or two before or after, were mustered out into civilian life; (2) A somewhat smaller number of professional senior officers who, as the Reichswehr was compelled to reduce its officer corps, were assigned to high-ranking posts in the police.

Military Career

These sequences are documented by our data on the military careers of these two groups. The importance of military career to these men, whose working lives were very largely spanned by World War I and its aftermath in Germany, has been discussed at some length with respect to the personal histories of the Propagandists and Administrators. It should be kept in mind as we pass rather quickly over the data which follow.

TABLE 47. PRE-
WORLD WAR I RANKS

Class	Soldiers	Police
Generals	2.0%	0.0%
Senior Officers	7.0	0.0
Junior Officers	88.0	100.0
Soldiers	3.0	0.0
Total	100.0% (101)	100.0% (17)

Before World War I, then, some 9.0 percent of the Soldiers had already attained senior and general officer ranks. None of the Police had attained such ranks. In fact, only half of the Police had served at all pre-World War I, as compared with practically all the Soldiers (101 out of 104). Of

those Police who served, about one-third had served less than 5 years. This is not to be explained simply in terms of age. The average ages of the groups in 1934 were 52 years for the Soldiers and 47 years for the Police. These 5 years would have made some difference before 1914, but not so much as appears in our data. After all, in 1914 the Police were average age 27—which means they had 10 working years already behind them. Further, the differences remain constant through World War I and after, though the five-year age differential faded in importance:

TABLE 48.
WORLD WAR I RANKS

Class	Soldiers	Police
General	17.3%	0.0%
Field Grade	27.2	21.4
Captain	42.0	28.6
Lieutenant	9.9	39.3
Soldier	3.7	10.7
Total	100.1% (81)	100.0% (28)

By this time two-thirds of our Police sample are in the picture. The Soldiers vastly outnumber them in the top three categories, which are the distinctive status-categories of the military occupation. The combined score for these three top categories is: 86.5 percent Soldiers, 50.0 percent Police. Half of the Police (very likely the half which does not include the Versailles-displaced Soldiers who were forced into the Police) are still in the lower-status positions. (The 13.6 percent Soldiers who are still lieutenants or under at this point probably introduce a converse bias in our sample of Soldiers—including men of the type of Sepp Dietrich and Ramcke, who became ranking generals of the Wehrmacht through identification with the Nazi counter-elite rather than the Junker caste.) The point of the two preceding tables has not been merely to document the obvious point that the Soldiers ranked higher in the military than did the Police. It has been, rather, to show that our Police group was heavily military in character during its early years (half served in the prewar army, and all who served were junior officers) and that this military connection weakened during the postwar years. The latter point is documented by the data on separation from military service, by years.

TABLE 49. SEPARATION
FROM MILITARY SERVICE

Class	Soldiers	Police
Before 1918	3.9%	6.9%
1918-1920	75.3	89.7
1921-1926	7.8	3.4
After 1926	13.0	0.0
Total	100.0% (77)	100.0% (29)

These figures express percentages of those who left the military service. Of those who were separated, 20 percent of the Soldiers remained in the army after 1920—when the demilitarization provisions of the Versailles Treaty went into effect—whereas only 3.4 percent of the Police remained. It is noteworthy, however, that the 89.4 percent Police separated in 1918-20 show the following figures on a year-by-year basis:

<u>Year of Separation</u>	<u>Percent of Police Separated</u>
1918	34.4%
1919	13.7%
1920	41.3%

After the initial flood of separations, following the Armistice in 1918, those in service tended to stay in during the treaty negotiations which continued through 1919. With the signing of the treaty, and the activation of its disarmament clauses in 1920, the largest number of Police were separated—twice as large a percentage (41.3 percent) for Police as for Soldiers (22 percent) separated in 1920.

It seems reasonable to attribute this to the fact that the General Staff, forced to cut its officer corps somewhere, naturally was more inclined to cut first those not of the military caste. The “genuine” Soldiers, as we see from Table 49, were separated in small numbers during the decade that followed. What happened to those who were separated—and in some measure to those who remained—is the subject to which we now turn.

Postwar Careers

Our analysis of the postwar careers is limited by the paucity of reporting on these years among both Soldiers and Police in the Fuehrerlexikon. For this reason, we present much of our data as averages (arithmetic mean) on those who report in the various categories. In a few places, where it seems to clarify the data, we have also given extrapolations from figures on those reporting to the group as a whole. We have done this only where the procedure seemed appropriate. The reader will judge for himself, in each case, the validity of the assumption of continuity from the sample to the whole group.

Of those who spent some (or all) of the postwar years in the Reichswehr, respectively 50 percent of the Soldiers and 30 percent of the Police, the average length of service in years was as follows:

TABLE 50. AVERAGE
LENGTH OF REICHSWEHR SERVICE

Class	Soldiers	Police
Arithmetic mean (in years)	8.5 (57)	1.9 (11)

The Reichswehr thus accounts for a fairly substantial proportion of the postwar lives of the Soldiers. If we consider the postwar period as the

decade 1920-30 and multiply our sample of 104 Soldiers by 10 years, we get 1,040 postwar man-years to be accounted for by this sample. Table 50 indicates that, if we multiply the 57 Soldiers who served in the Reichswehr by the 8.5 years of service which they averaged, we get as our product 484.5 man-years. Thus, the Reichswehr accounts for almost half the postwar man-years of the Soldiers. Performing the same operations for the Police, we get 350 man-years to be accounted for and only 20.9 actually accounted for—or 6 percent of the Police man-years as compared with 47 percent of the Soldier man-years.

Our problem, therefore, is how to account for the postwar years of 53 percent of the Soldiers and 94 percent of the Police. We shall not be able to do this conclusively, for some activities are not reported and some are reported but may have been contemporaneous with others. We do have some indications, however, of the direction taken by these respective postwar careers. One suggestive indicator is the data on Freikorps service. The average length of service, by years, is 1.2 for the Soldiers and 1.6 for the Police. The difference here is not great in length of service, but is quite noteworthy in two other respects: (1) It is the only military category in which Police exceed Soldiers in length of service; (2) It is the only such category where Police proportionately outnumber Soldiers. This is brought out in striking fashion if we compare the percentages with "No Service" in the various categories already discussed, viz:

TABLE 51. "NO SERVICE"
IN MILITARY CATEGORIES

Class	Soldiers	Police
Pre-War I	2.9%	48.6%
War I	1.0	11.4
Reichswehr	44.2	68.6
Freikorps	82.7	77.1

This table indicates several points of contrast: The Soldiers in our sample are a professional military group, practically all with service prior to War I. (Although their younger age cannot account for this, only half the Police saw prewar service; and it is likely that even this figure would have been less without the former professional Soldier forced out of service under Weimar and into the Police.) Through World War I and the postwar Reichswehr, the Police with "No Service" continue to outnumber the Military by very considerable margins. It is in the Freikorps, for the first time, that more Police than Soldiers see service (and, as noted above, somewhat longer average service).

The explanation for this is to be sought in the character of the Freikorps. These Free Corps were made up of veterans and violent nationalists, with no legal status. In fact, they maintained their illegal existence despite the general provisions of Versailles and the specific interdictions of Weimar. These units were officered by Reichswehr men and attracted to their flag

(the Imperial black-white-red, not the new Republican black-red-gold) a hard core of the "armed bohemia" which Konrad Heiden has described as the backbone of the Nazi movement—the spiritually homeless, jobless, restless. Without income, without status, without power, their only hope was to win these things for themselves and the only method open to them was violence.

The big push came in March 1920—with the first concerted effort to overthrow the Republican government by violence. The "Kapp Putsch," led jointly by the Nationalist politician Kapp and the Reichswehr General von Lüttwitz, was carried out by the Freikorps from the Baltic States. It drove the government out of Berlin all the way to Stuttgart and installed Kapp as Chancellor. While this lasted only four days, it frightened the Republican coalition enough to put new vigor into dismemberment of the illegal Freikorps.¹²

This accounts for the brief duration of average service in the Freikorps: 1.2 years for the Soldiers and 1.6 years for the Police. It also helps to explain why the victorious counter-revolution ultimately was made under the NSDAP rather than the Freikorps. The short life of the putsch made it evident to interested observers—among whom, as his autobiography makes clear, Hitler must be reckoned a very intense member—that "the necessary political preparation was lacking to Kapp's enterprise." The leading historian of the period, a member of the Reichstag and an official of both the Communist and left-Socialist parties, has written the following estimate:

The venture might easily have succeeded if it had been proclaimed as the movement of an influential section of the German middle classes. If the leading politicians of the middle classes, or at all events of the Nationalist Party and the People's Party, had headed the revolt, the workers would not have been able to put up any resistance worth speaking of. The Army and the Police, the Home Defence Service, and the short-service Volunteers, in addition to the Civil Service, would have put themselves at the disposal of the new rulers.¹³

The lesson learned by this observer was not lost on Hitler and others with counter-revolutionary goals and a predisposition to violence. The Nazi movement gained power by carefully making "the necessary political preparation" which had been found "lacking to Kapp's enterprise." These preparations consumed the decade 1920-30 of Nazi activity, and our sample of Coercers participated in this activity—particularly the Police, whose emergent inclination toward counter-revolutionary violence became apparent with the above data on their affiliation to the Freikorps. Republican disbandment of the Free Corps thus robbed those men only of a transient institutional vehicle for their counter-revolutionary aspirations, and one which had already shown its inadequacy for their purpose. Their aspirations were not changed; a new instrument for fulfilling them had to be forged. The instrument was the Nazi movement.

How can we get a measure of the activities of these groups of men during the decade 1920-30 when this new instrument was being forged? Perhaps

the most enlightening indicator would be a direct measure of unemployment. However, for obvious reasons, these stars of the Nazi firmament did not choose to report their years of unemployment in the *Fuehrerlexikon*. Our best clue is the absence of reporting. As we observed at several points in the preceding sections of the study, the biographees were careful to mention only those past activities of which (at their ascendancy in 1934) they were proud. They were equally careful not to mention those past activities of which they were not proud. We have therefore computed the figures on years for which no occupation is reported in their biographical sketches. While this is not a direct measure of unemployment—since unsatisfactory unemployment also is not reported—it does help us to account for the way these men spent their lives in the 1920-30 decade.

TABLE 52.
NO REPORTED OCCUPATION

Class	Soldiers	Police
At least 1 year	37.5%	27.2%
At least 2 years	25.0	18.1
At least 3 years	18.7	18.1
At least 4 years	6.2	9.0
At least 5 years	12.5	18.0

These percentages refer only to those who do not report employment—which includes about one-third of the Police as compared to about one-sixth of the Soldiers. Also the Soldiers decline more steadily and rapidly than the Police as the number of non-reported years increases. (The last category includes also those with over 5 years not reported.) The average duration of non-reported years is therefore also larger for the Police—3.7 years as compared with 2.3 years for the Soldiers. Using the accounting procedure outlined above, we find that non-reporting covers 11.6 percent of Police man-years, as compared with only 3.7 percent of Soldier man-years, for the whole decade.

Where else can we look for information on how the Coercers spent these years? After unemployment, or non-reporting, an obvious place to look is the Nazi Party. Below we give the year of joining the NSDAP, with figures expressed as percentages of those who report their date of joining:

TABLE 53.
DATE OF JOINING NSDAP

Class	Soldiers	Police
Pre-1923	31.2%	50.0%
1924-1929	18.7	30.0
After 1930	49.9	20.0

The pattern here is quite clear. The Police came to the NSDAP considerably earlier, half of them before 1923. By 1930, when the Party was on its feet

and marching to power, 80 percent of the Police were already members as compared with only half of the Soldiers. These two figures show that the average duration of membership for the Police was considerably longer during the decade we are discussing. Applying the procedure we have been using to account for man-years in 1920-30, we find the following results: average duration of 6 years NSDAP-membership for the Police who joined as compared with 3.9 years for the Soldiers. This accounts for 60 Police man-years (or 17.6 percent of their total), as against 62.4 Soldier man-years (or 6 percent of their total).

The more intimate connection of the Police with the NSDAP is shown also by the comparative figures on status in the Party and its affiliated organizations. Here are the percentages of both groups who held office (the organizations and categories are precisely the same as were described in preceding sections).

TABLE 54. NAZI STATUS

Class	Soldiers	Police
High Officer	19.3%	37.5%
Middle Officer	10.6	22.8
Low Officer	1.0	0.0

Particularly noteworthy is that Police considerably outnumbered Soldiers as high officers of the NSDAP itself (approximately 3 to 1) and of its Action organs (approximately 4 to 1). Only in the Culture organizations of the NSDAP did the Soldiers outnumber the Police, which reflects both their greater distance from the Nazi core and their higher social status. The latter point is documented also by our data on comparative status in non-Nazi cultural and political organizations:

TABLE 55.
NON-NAZI ORGANIZATIONS

Class	Soldiers	Police
Officer	30.8%	17.2%
Member	27.9	22.9

Social Status

The discussion thus far has turned on three main propositions: (1) the Soldiers come from the upper strata of German Society (the Junker caste, those who shared its pretensions if not its history), the Police from the lower middle strata (Civil Service); (2) the careers of both groups were disturbed by World War I and its aftermath, but the Soldiers stuck closer to the military profession of their caste, while those who were to become the Police were much more seriously uprooted and displaced; (3) displacement, and the alienation from Republican Weimar which this entailed, led these policemen quicker and closer to the Nazi movement.

In an important sense, the life-histories of these men in the Weimar and Nazi decades can be viewed as a function of the social status in which they were born. The higher social orders of Imperial Germany regarded Weimar as a threat to the values ingrained in them during the rather loud-mouthed prewar years under the late Kaiser. Some among the top social groups regarded even the Wilhelm era as a vulgarization of the Imperial tradition shaped in the preceding generation by Bismarck. Such people never could be reconciled to Weimar, nor could their children be expected to love either the democratic Republic or the plebeian dictatorship which followed. Of the group of Soldiers, many came from this aristocratic tradition.

For the middle orders of German society, the position was quite different. Wilhelminian Germany—with its emphasis on industrial expansion and its glorification of production technique—had already, before World War I, become a business society. The "Danker und Dichter" were still honored, but in the past. In the present, German artists and thinkers sought ever more extravagant modes of expression, imported like Impressionism and indigenous like Expressionism, but they attracted little attention outside the narrow circles of the faithful in Berlin and Munich cafés. The heroes of the present Germany were those who made and used the steel of the Ruhr. The businessman was, if not king, then surely the king's most favored subject.

The postwar aftermath changed all this. The government of Weimar was not anti-business, but the circumstances under which it governed clearly were. The German businessman, after the war, found his factories intact, a labor force clamoring for work, markets available almost as before, and productive energies high. All that stood in his way, it seemed to him, were the horrible provisions of the Versailles Treaty and the contemptible Weimar government (with its unspeakable little heraufgekommene trade-union Bonzen) who showed no backbone except in enforcing this Treaty. Small wonder, then, that the Nazi movement claimed his attention and increasingly—as his own middle-class parties went down in coalition after coalition with the Socialists—claimed his affection. Here was a movement which denounced the shame of Versailles, which dedicated itself to the release of German Tüchtigkeit rather than its repression, which promised to restore the great nation that Germany had become under the Kaiser. True, there were some disorderly, even ruffian, elements in the NSDAP. But even Wilhelm had said: "Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten!" Besides, the movement was only feeling its oats. Once in positions of responsibility, the good German sense of Ordnung would put things right. Certainly they can't be worse than what we have. Let's give them a chance and see.

These sequences of interplay between social class and attitude from prewar through postwar Germany have been dramatized by German novelists of the period. Perhaps the most perceptive and vivid is the series of novels by Ernst Glaeser. The first of these, Jahrgang 1902, portrays these prewar and wartime years to the Armistice through the lives of two German lads who just missed the war.¹⁴ Born in military class 1902, they were 12 at its start and 16 at its end. Their perspective on these years is poignant and

plausible—and particularly so is the view seen through the eyes of their fathers. One boy is the son of an aristocratic soldier, whose contempt for the new bourgeois Germany and consequent belief that a war against England is suicide for his class earns him the appellation "Der rote Major." The other boy's father is a higher civil servant with business affiliations, whose view of German greatness reflects the goals of Wilhelm II, and who has learned to keep his mouth shut on public questions in public places. These two men and their sons illustrate the sequences we have been discussing. In the pages which follow we wish to show the distribution of these attributes in the Nazi movement during the postwar decade.

One indicator of top status in Germany was the presence of "von" in the family name. Although cases are known where this distinctive preposition was misappropriated, the indicator is fairly reliable—particularly when used in conjunction with a battery of indicators. In Table 56 we give the percentage in each subgroup whose family name includes the "von":

TABLE 56.
"VON" IN FAMILY NAME

Soldiers	Police
34.6% (36)	8.5% (3)

The Soldiers rather clearly score high above the Police in top-status affiliation. The gap is widened even further when we observe that of the 3 Police with "von," 2 are professional Soldiers of Career who were assigned to high Police posts late in the Weimar period. The only titled civilian among the Police is Count von Helldorf, Polizeipraesident of Berlin. Since he acted in concert with the Soldiers, as we shall see in discussing the July 20th putsch against Hitler, it is probably fair to say that no Police of Career were in this category of patronymic "von," that about half the Soldiers were, and that all but one in this category were Soldiers.

A second indicator is the occupation of fathers among the Fuehrerlexikon elite. We have discussed the significance of this indicator in preceding sections and here need only recapitulate that the father's occupation sets the tone of home and family life, conditions the level of aspiration among the children, and even affects the level of achievement. The latter point is particularly important with regard to prewar Germany, when family wealth and status largely determined the kind and degree of education received by the children. In this context, the distribution of paternal occupations among those who report provides a quite useful indicator.

The caste character of the German Officer's Corps is again indicated by the figure for military fathers. If we add the figures for the first three categories, which represent top-status, we get these results: 72.4 percent Soldiers and 42.8 percent Police. Categories 4 and 5 combined, representing the middle-status, give us: 26.4 percent Soldiers and 52.3 percent Police. With an adjusted sample, therefore, Soldiers would outnumber Police by at least 2 to 1 in the top categories, Police would outnumber Soldiers at

least 2 to 1 in the middle categories. No person reported a worker or artisan father, and the one Soldier who reported a peasant father is clearly among the "Nazi generals" whom we shall discuss later.

TABLE 57.
OCCUPATION OF FATHER

Class	Soldiers	Police
Military	40.8%	19.0%
Landowner	6.6	0.0
Professions	25.0	23.8
Civil Service	13.2	33.3
Business	13.2	19.0
Peasants	1.3	4.8
Total	100.1% (76)	99.9% (21)

A supplementary indicator of familial social status is ancestral background. Here, as on paternal occupation, the Police report far less than the Soldiers. This factor of non-reporting we have already seen to occur most frequently when the Fuehrerlexikon elite have nothing they are proud to report. The sparse data which are available confirm this impression regarding ancestral background (which combines patriarchal and matriarchal figures) in the next table:

TABLE 58.
ANCESTRAL BACKGROUND

Class	Soldiers	Police
Military	21.9% (7)	9.1% (1)
Landowner	34.4 (11)	0.0 (0)
Professions	6.3 (2)	36.4 (4)
Civil Service	3.1 (1)	27.3 (3)
Others	34.4 (11)	27.3 (3)
Total	100.1% (32) (32)	100.1% (11) (11)

A fourth indicator, and a rather crucial one because it provides the channel from inherited status to the acquired skills by which status is maintained, is the level of education attained. We have already seen that a very large number of the Soldiers acquired their education in the Kadettenanstalt whence, at 18, they graduated into their officer's commissions in the Army. It is very striking, therefore, that a higher proportion of Soldiers than Police graduated from universities. The figures in Table 59 are particularly interesting.

TABLE 59. UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Class	Soldiers	Police
Graduated University	11.5%	8.5%
Attended, but did not graduate	15.3	31.4
Total	26.8% (28)	39.9% (14)

Of the 26 percent Soldiers who attended universities, about half graduated; of the 40 percent Police who attended, about one-fifth graduated. This higher casualty rate among the Police is to be explained partly by the aid which the Weimar Republic gave to veterans who wished to try higher education. The state of Prussia alone gave these increasing sums for the support of students in three postwar years:

1924	RM 182,600
1925	RM 527,600
1926	RM 558,000

These were the years immediately following the imprisonment of Hitler and the illegalization of the NSDAP. Such events, plus the earlier reduction of the Reichswehr and disbandment of the Freikorps, may have decided many unemployed veterans to try college. There, at least, one could get a subsidy and live cheaply: e.g., in 1923 the student Wirtschaftshilfe sold 40,000 meals daily at a cost of 5-10 Pfennig.¹⁵ In inflationary Germany, this was worth a good deal more to an unemployed veteran than some bare-subsistence job or no job at all. Besides, it left more time free for other things.

That they put in a good deal of time on "other things" is indicated by comparing the figures for those students in each group who specialized in professional (certificated) fields and those who actually received their certificates in these fields:

TABLE 60.
PROFESSIONAL STUDIES AND CERTIFICATES

Class	Soldiers		Police	
	Studied	Certified	Studied	Certified
Law	6.7%	1.9%	28.6%	8.5%
All Others	40.4	4.7	25.7	2.8

These data have been selected because students in professional fields presumably have their eyes on a definite goal and are therefore more likely to carry through till finished. It is therefore enlightening that these data resemble the outcome on the other studies: most never finished. Some went into the NSDAP; some worked at various jobs; some drifted without work. We have already examined the data on these various sequences in

the 1920-30 decade. Some were married, and the data here has several points of interest. A greater number of Soldiers apparently could afford, despite the hard times for the military caste, to marry younger. Even more interesting, in this table, is the discrepancy on non-reporting and the high level of non-reporting for both.

TABLE 61.
AGE AT MARRIAGE

	Soldiers	Police
Under 30	15.4%	8.6%
Over 30	15.4	11.4
No Data	68.3	80.0
Total	99.1% (104)*	100.0% (35)

*One unmarried.

Of those who report on their marriages, two items are suggestive. The data on father-in-law's occupation distribute as follows:

TABLE 62.
FATHER-IN-LAW'S OCCUPATION

Class	Soldiers	Police
Military	29.0%	12.5%
Landowner	13.0	12.5
Professional	16.0	25.0
Civil Service	13.0	12.5
Business	29.0	37.5
Total	100.0% (31)	100.0% (8)

Our second item of interest concerns the sex of their children. Both groups raise families of exactly the same average size—1.7 children per family. On dividing the children by number in each sex, however, the following figures appear for the 89 cases reported:

TABLE 63. CHILDREN (By Sex)

Class	Soldiers (73)		Police (16)	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
None	4.8	9.6	0.0	14.3
1	14.4	15.4	8.6	5.7
2	11.5	3.8	8.6	2.9
3	4.8	2.8	5.7	0.0
4	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0
5	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0

It would appear that both groups curtailed their procreative activities with the appearance of three male children. The Police also stopped with two females, while several Soldiers continued to produce female children up to five in number. The close correspondence between the number of Soldiers without sons and the number with more than two daughters suggests that this added effort may have been expended in search of a son and heir. Such activity is common in male-oriented societies. We merely call attention to its apparent intensity among these Soldiers.

The superior social level of the Soldiers is indicated again by our combined index of Foreign Contact (see Table 18 for items in the index):

TABLE 64. FOREIGN
CONTACTS (Combined Index)

Soldiers	Police
6.3%	4.3%

The figure for the Police is considerably overweighted by the item on "Occupation Abroad"—the only item on which they scored significantly, and the one which must be attributed to former Soldiers counted as Police. Although both groups rate low in this index, the Soldiers clearly outnumber the Police.

On the indicator of publication, the Soldiers outdistance the Police by a very wide margin. Only 2 Police produced books as compared with 20 Soldiers, and the average production per author was about 3 books for the Soldiers as against 1.5 books for the Police. The writing of these Soldiers also fell into a wide range of content categories. In addition to the usual technical and strategic (Wahrpolitik) books and the inevitable memoirs, they produced books in philosophy and history, social and economic studies, and several books on Zeitgeschichte (current history).

Postlude: The Nazi Decade

The preceding sections make it quite clear that the Soldiers were of considerably higher social status than the Police (or any other subsample examined in this study). What is the significance of this finding? Its significance lies in the whole matrix of relationships between Nazis and Junkers—relationships which helped the Nazis to win power, and to consolidate their victory, but which eventually contributed to their downfall.

How does our data contribute to an understanding of this relationship? Consider, first of all, the indicators of family background. The figures on region and size of birthplace, on paternal and ancestral occupations, all show that the Soldiers were born into a different social world from those in which our other subsamples saw the light of day. Consider next the data on their early training in Kadettenanstalten, their superior status in World War I (the deep traumatic events for this generation of Germans), their persistence in the debilitated Reichswehr, their marriage to girls of or

near their own social class, their production of books in various fields, their foreign contacts, and so forth. All these indicate that they were living the life-patterns marked out for them at birth.

But Germany was becoming different, and the Soldiers did not like the changes as they saw them. Where the Kaiser and his advisers ruled firmly over a rich and expanding Germany, now a pusillanimous coalition of Socialists and "traitors" (whose boldest act was to try to substitute a new flag for the Imperial black-white-red) presided by endless bickering over the liquidation of the Reich according to the Dictate of Versailles. The Eastern Territories were gone (not to mention the colonies), the Reichswehr was enfeebled and under the Weimar treaty would ultimately become a farce, the nation had lost its Stimmung and listened to wild-haired Red agitators while nobody acted.

Some of the so-called Nationalists seemed to the Soldiers no better—forming endless coalitions with the Civil Service bureaucrats and laborite Bonzen, acquiescing in the liquidation of the Freikorps, and appearing more concerned about staying in office than saving the nation. What the Army needed, it was clear, was some energetic new force that would put vitality into a real German program, that would devote itself to winning German rights rather than meeting Allied demands, that would tell the Frenchmen what they could do with their ridiculous claims for reparations. These Nazis, for example, had the passion needed. True, they seemed a bit coarse and undisciplined. But perhaps their mass appeal could be made to serve military purposes without the Reichswehr becoming involved in their excesses!

How to do this? Indications are provided by our data on the number and date of Soldier affiliations with the NSDAP. The affiliations were few in number, and they came late. This documents the assertion that the military did not work either by infiltration or coalition—two important techniques commonly used by counter-revolutionary organizations. That is, they neither sent in picked officers to take over control of the NSDAP, nor encouraged Soldiers to join the NSDAP as individuals (which would have required them to blink at the law prohibiting political affiliation among Reichswehr men).

Instead they used the technique of liaison on high levels—a technique favored by any hierarchy which prizes its organizational independence and possesses an indispensable skill-function. Such liaison, indeed, with civilians at home (and military men abroad) had been for decades the traditional mode of operation in the German Officer Corps. In this case, the liaison was performed mainly by "ex—" Reichswehr men who had left the service officially but whose heart belonged to the Officers' Corps and who maintained intimate channels with its desires and decisions. Such "ex—" Reichswehr officers as General Erich Ludendorff, General von Lüttwitz (of the Kapp Putsch), and General Franz von Epp kept the General Staff informed of NSDAP activities—and made the NSDAP aware of military attitudes through younger "ex-officers" like Captain Roehm (who had been von Epp's aide-de-camp in postwar Munich). Another was Captain Goering, whose World War I career as squadron leader in the famed Richthofen

Circus had won him the Pour le Mérite, highest military honor in Germany, and entry into high circles—including the private study of Marshal Hindenburg.¹⁶ Through such channels of liaison, the Reichswehr was able to maintain its respectable facade of observing the law against political affiliation and the traditional German legend of the Officers' Corps as unpolitische Fachleute (non-political specialists).

The case of General von Epp is particularly instructive. While still in active service, as commander of the Reichswehr in Bavaria, he was inept enough to allow his name to be associated publicly and continuously with the beer-hall conspirators in Munich. A flood of complaints from Socialists and others came to the Social Democratic president of the Reich, who complained to the Reichswehr Minister. Reluctantly, the Reichswehr Minister, a former major, called his generals to account. In the end the Berlin generals conducted a hasty and inadequate investigation in Munich.¹⁷ General von Epp was transferred. A year later, in 1923, he resigned. His next important job was as head of the Wehrpolitisches Amt (Military-Political Bureau) of the NSDAP.

Through such liaison the Reichswehr maintained all the connection it wanted with the NSDAP; and at the same time its superiority, its independence—and its distance. It was no part of the General Staff's purpose to work for the great power and glory of the NSDAP. Their purpose was to use the NSDAP as an instrument for achieving the kind of Germany they wanted—unfettered from Versailles, treated as a first-class power in the world arena, and able to maintain a Reichswehr appropriate for such a power.

The Nazi leaders understood this relationship quite well and had their own ideas about how to use it. They courted the top-prestige generals incessantly before 1933, and even afterward for a time. The Fuehrerlexikon, for example, includes all the most respected generals—whether field commanders like Rundstedt and Bock, or General Staff officers like Fritsch and Witzleben. Every one of these has the "von" in his name. (On the other hand, none of these who were later to rise to fame as "Nazi generals"—e.g. Rommel, Jodl, Model, Dietrich, Guderian, Ramcke—appears in the Fuehrerlexikon.) The Nazis, clearly, were playing for the top rank of Reichswehr officers.

These they never got. For these men co-operated only on their own terms. Their terms, however, were not terms the Nazis would grant. A monolithic party-state does not grant independence and autonomy to any social formation—and particularly not the military. As the Reichswehr Chiefs of Staff continued after 1933 to work toward autonomy as their price, they were dismissed—first von Brauchitsch, then von Fritsch. The Nazis continued to insist on their own supremacy and installed a weaker, more amenable general, Halder, though even he was characterized by Hitler as an "ewiger Besserwisser" (chronic know-it-all) and had to be dismissed ultimately.¹⁸ Then began the ominous withdrawal of support by the military caste which led to the attempted assassination of Hitler in 1944. This was, with Goerdeler and other civilians figuring mainly through the same sort

of liaison which is the traditional Reichswehr technique of counter-revolutionary activity, predominantly a military operation. It was their final effort to stop the man and government that wished to rule the Officers' Corps. They failed; but they carefully underwrote the failure of their adversary as well. At Nuremberg, two years later, the Nazis and some puppet generals lost their heads. The Officers' Corps, having made its sacrifice on July 20, 1944, survived.

Many lessons are contained in this relationship of over 25 years, between Reichswehr and NSDAP. The point we wish to notice here, since it is the Nazi organism we are studying, is that as his final effort to break the Soldiers to his power Hitler turned to the Police. Himmler, the former Kadettenanstalt student and Faehnrich (standard bearer), the schoolteacher who had become supreme policeman of the Reich, took over control of the Army as well.

To understand this strange phenomenon, we must recall something of the structural and functional development of the German police under the Nazis. The NSDAP made its start, in Munich, with a beer-hall putsch. This was the token of its entire career—violence and the threat of violence as the method of social control. It ran up an impressive record of murder and assassination—Kurt Eisner, Matthias Erzberger, Walther Rathenau, General Kurt von Schleicher. These men were, respectively, an Independent Socialist leader (because he was a leftist leader), a Reich Finance Minister (because he had signed the Armistice of Compiègne), a Reich Foreign Minister (because he was Jewish), a pro-Nazi general who had developed the Freikorps system (because he had become too close with Roehm and Gregor Strasser). The variety of these four cases illustrates the wide-spread of purpose for which the NSDAP found murder their best weapon. Although some of the above four were murdered before the NSDAP was officially organized, all of these assassinations were sanctioned by the NSDAP and the murderers heroized. The precise number of assassinations instigated, performed, or endorsed by the Nazis has never been established. The Fehme and Stahlhelm and Kyffhaeuserbund were rival units, but with interlocking memberships, in the politics of violence. It took only a few years, however, for the Nazis to establish their undisputed mastery in this field of operations.

The Nazis integrated individual assassination with mass violence and terror. Mass violence dominates NSDAP history from their first putsch through the "blood purge" of their own membership (the Roehm-Strasser factions) after the seizure of power. The two episodes just mentioned, in fact, provide a key to the history of the Nazi movement and the sociology of the Nazi Police. The beer-hall putsch in Munich was the traumatic birth-event of the S. A. (Sturm-Abteilung) in the form it was to maintain through the next decade. The blood purge in 1934 symbolized (and accomplished) the liquidation of the S. A. in this form by the S. S. (Schutz-Staffel) and the rise of a new Police concept embodied in the S. S. A brief glance at these two police instruments of Nazi policy clarifies the crucial difference between them.

The S. A., organized mainly of students by Rudolf Hess in 1921 (and later briefly commanded by Goering), came into its own with the beer-hall putsch of 1923. Of some 2,000 S. A. participating, 14 were killed. The blood-soaked banner carried in that fight immediately became the symbol of the NSDAP and the proudest possession of the S. A.—the Blutfahne, which every subsequent party banner had to be hallowed by touching. The symbol glorified the S. A. weapon—violence; and the S. A. motto shouted their goal—"today Germany, tomorrow the world." The combination was their ultimate undoing. Violence in German streets designed to gain the NSDAP total power was highly approved. But when the Nazis gained total power, the S. A. claim to manage external violence for the state proved embarrassing and the claimants had to be removed. The reason: they compromised the Party's continuing, and after 1933 intensified, efforts to win over the General Staff of the Reichswehr.

The post-1923 conception of the S. A. had been that it should form the nucleus of the future German Army. Point 22 of the original Party program stated: "We demand the suppression of the army of mercenaries [the Reichswehr was a professional army] and the founding of a national army." During the decade which followed this view, spread among and beyond the S. A. by its Chief of Staff, Captain Roehm, was a good morale-builder and a useful threat in Nazi negotiations with the Reichswehr. But when the Nazis took power, and Roehm, installed as a secretary of state and war minister of the Party, persisted in behaving as though he were war minister of the government (a post toward which he obviously was conniving) the old concept became embarrassing. When Roehm, in April 1934, told the diplomatic corps at Berlin, fearful of this paramilitary force, that "the Storm Troops are a guarantee for the peace of Central Europe," he joined his issue with the Reichswehr in public: "A clash became unavoidable between the brown army and the Reichswehr over the function of the 'supreme arms bearer' in the Third Reich."¹⁹

But Hitler could no longer afford to back Roehm's "political soldiers" against the professionals. As responsible chief of state he needed the General Staff. Joint Reichswehr-S. A. maneuvers along the Polish frontier, later that spring, demonstrated conclusively the incompetence of the amateurs against the professionals, even after the long restrictive diet on which the Reichswehr had labored while the S. A. was fattening itself on Party funds and loot. The Reichswehr won, the S. A. was sent on a month's furlough. On June 30, 1934, Roehm was murdered and the S. A. top command was decimated (a process defined by Hess as follows: "every tenth man, without any investigation, whether innocent or guilty, was struck by a bullet").

The reason given in public was the widespread sexual depravity of the S. A. leadership (which Hitler had known and tolerated for over ten years); in party circles the rumor of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy was spread (which meant that Roehm would not acquiesce in subordinating the S. A. to the Reichswehr). In truth, Hitler in power no longer needed the S. A. of pre-1933 days. For external violence he needed a professional army;

for internal violence a disciplined police corps that would question no decision of his. The S. A. now embarrassed him. He therefore "decimated" its leadership (including some of the oldest "Alte Kämpfer"), deputized the Reichswehr for external violence, and turned over to Himmler's S. S. the management of internal violence. On July 13th, Hitler piously told the Reichstag:

For fourteen years I have stated consistently that the fighting organizations of the party are political institutions and that they have nothing to do with the Army. . . . In the State there is only one arms bearer, and that is the Army; there is only one bearer of political will, and that is the NSDAP.²⁰

The S. A. mass was permitted to survive. It ranks reduced from 3 to 1 million (drawn from the "better elements"), stripped of all weapons (aside from its daggers), the S. A. was reorganized in January 1936 with Viktor Lutze, servant of Hitler and friend of the Reichswehr, as Chief of Staff. Only once again was its flair for mass bloodletting mobilized—in the Jewish massacre of 1938 known as "Die Nacht der langen Messer" (Night of the Long Knives).²¹ Lutze gave the new orientation as follows: "Our task as S. A. is to take care that the German people remain National Socialists." To the diplomatic corps in Berlin, he tried to repair Roehm's indiscretion of 1934 as follows:

The tasks of the S. A. are the tasks of the party. They are consequently in the field of home policies. When the S. A. was set up, there was for the first time in history created a soldier type with functions of an exclusively weltanschaulich kind, the political soldier! And even today, after we have obtained the power in the State, this political soldierdom still survives. For there is a sharp difference between the soldier who is the carrier of the National Socialist worldview and the soldier who is the arms bearer of the nation.²²

Thus did Hitler make his peace with the generals. His bid for the minor virtue of consistency (patently false to all familiar with Point 22 of his original program of 1923) could not, however, obscure the major change of policy, occasioned by the passage from ambitious pretension to actual power, and expressed through a basic redefinition of the police function. No longer was there any need for "street soldiers," for the Nazis now ruled the streets. The need was for "loyalty soldiers," to ensure the streets against any new pretenders. The job, as Lutze put it, was to make sure "the German people remain National Socialists." But for this purpose Lutze's shadow of the once-omnipotent S. A. was ill-suited. For systematic surveillance, and liquidation, of potential opposition, a Grand Inquisitor with modern methods was needed. Himmler and his elite S. S. were obviously the ideal instruments. Thus began the extraordinary second act in the career of the most remarkable chief and corps of police in recent history.

The new conception of the police role was epitomized in the phrase in-

vented by Himmler himself: "Kriegsschauplatz Inner-Deutschland" (Theatre-of-War Inner Germany). The role was to come downstage center during the third act of the Nazi drama after 1940 (when Hitler decided to invade Russia and finally alienated the top men of the General Staff). In the second act, 1934-39, Himmler put his machinery for policing Germany as a theatre of war into order for the great scenes to come. His first attention, as a good administrator, was to his own personnel. The Police, naturally, had already been "purified" and "co-ordinated" several times. Goering, in his exhibitionist way, early disclosed his operations as Prussian Prime Minister (and head of its Gestapo):

To begin with it seemed to me of the first importance to get the weapon of the criminal and political police firmly into my own hands. Here it was that I made my first sweeping changes of personnel. Out of thirty-two police chiefs I removed twenty-two. Hundreds of instructors and thousands of police-sergeants followed in the course of the next months. New men were brought in and in every case these men came from the great reservoir of the Storm Troopers and Guards.²³

Criteria that might satisfy Goering, however, would not satisfy Himmler. He sometimes behaved as though he were the only top Nazi who genuinely believed in the Aryan myth as his leading article of faith. The measures he took to ensure "racial purity" among his political soldiers seemed to many, including other top Nazis, fantastic. But the eugenic screen through which S.S.-aspirants had to pass, the battery of tests designed to ensure that only those incapable of disloyalty to Hitler-Himmler would survive their S.S.-novitiate, were fantastic mainly in the sense that never in modern history has a myth been so creatively sustained by industrious (even ingenious) application of personnel procedures.

Along with this went continuous refinement of functional techniques. As the Grand Inquisitor of the epoch, Himmler knew the supreme importance, for the loyalty police of a "total state" run by clique, of the "man with the dossiers." Accordingly, he expanded the "intelligence function" of the S.S. to a point of efficiency perhaps never before attained by a modern police force. Compared with the reports of his S.D.(Sicherheitsdienst), the Gestapo produced mainly sycophantic nonsense, Goebbels' apparatus was powerless, and even Bormann's formidable card-files on top leaders (his strongest point) were feeble.²⁴

With each succeeding year, Himmler extended and strengthened the police function performed by him and his organization. With the disaffection of the generals in 1940, he began to bring the Army as well under his official surveillance (it was an open secret that they had been there unofficially all the while), and finally under his control. Already head of the S.S., Waffen-S.S., Gestapo, and KRIPO (criminal police), in 1943 he became Minister of the Interior and thereby united under his command the entire police system of Germany. In 1944, he made his first major inroad on the Wehrmacht by taking over from Admiral Canaris the Abwehr (Foreign In-

telligence Service) which hitherto had operated under the Combined General Staff (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). With the failure of the July 20 plot, Himmler opened the throttle to full speed ahead. On that very day he succeeded Fromm as commander-in-chief of the Reserve Army (Ersatzheer). Next he took over from the Wehrmacht command of all prisoner-of-war camps. Next this former Faehrich (roughly equivalent to warrant officer), who had acquired in the Army mainly his skill for keeping orderly card-files, was himself in command of an Army Group on the Vistula Front, vainly resisting the Russians—whose destruction was the key goal of his entire career.

But all this came too late. The Policemen had conquered the Soldiers, but the victory was indeed pyrrhic. The triumph came in the last scene of the last act, just as the curtain was going down on both.²⁵

VI. THE NAZI ELITE: CONCLUSIONS

We have presented comparative data on five groups within the Nazi elite: Administrators, Propagandists, Soldiers, Police, and a Random subsample. We have examined similarities and differences in the biographical characteristics of these groups, with a view to gaining insight into the process of social change which produced the Nazi movement. The propositions we have sought to document and test, while specific to the Nazis, we believe to hold for other revolutionary movements of the present century.

As we said at the outset, the RADIR Project conceives revolution as "rapid and extensive change in the composition and the vocabulary of the ruling few." In our parallel Symbol Series we have studied changes in the vocabulary of various ruling groups. The Elite Series, in which this study appears, has studied changes in the composition of ruling groups in diverse societies. These studies show the "pattern of differences and similarities which we regard as the social process characterizing the "world revolution of our time."

To demonstrate the more general relevance of the propositions studied in this monograph will require comparative analysis of our data on various elites. To see how radical were the changes made by the Nazis in the composition of preceding elites in their society, the data in this monograph should be compared with those on the German elites of the Imperial and Weimar epochs. To see how closely the Nazis approximate trends in other revolutionary movements of our century which have made rapid and extensive changes in the composition of the ruling few, we can compare the data in this study with those on the Politburo in Russia and those on the Kuomintang and Communist Party elites in China. The results of such a comparison would enable us to go a step further and compare data on the revolutionary counter-elites with trends in the relatively stable (or non-revolutionary) elites of Britain, France, and the United States.

In concluding this study, we wish to recapitulate our findings with sufficient generality to indicate how they might serve for the different sorts of comparative analysis mentioned above. To do this we first evaluate the method we have used. Next, we summarize the differences between subsamples which have occupied most of our attention in this study. Next, we discuss the similarities between the groups, somewhat more fully since we have paid less attention to these points in the running analysis of our data. In discussing similarities among the Nazis, we make extensive use of the category "Marginality." As will be seen, we use this term as shorthand for a quite general proposition about the role of "marginal men" in the process of social change. We conclude with a brief statement on the policy significance of our findings.

Evaluation of the Method

Our analysis of "differences" used three main standards of measurement: (1) direct comparison between two subsamples (as in the section on Soldiers and Police); (2) comparison between one subsample and another

with respect to a third (as in comparing Propagandists and Administrators with respect to their deviations from figures on the Random Nazis); (3) comparison of one or more subsamples with the population of the NSDAP or of Germany as a whole.

Our samples are small (the sample of 35 Police being conspicuously weak in this respect) and our indicators are subject to some of the ambiguities which bedevil most "operational indexes." In some cases we have reduced or eliminated such ambiguities by technical means, e.g., use of a fourfold contingency table and a "coefficient of independence." For the most part, however, we have relied on a procedure more open to common-sense evaluation. We have foregone tests for "significant difference"—which can be very misleading when applied to differences between small samples on qualitative variates—and thereby cut ourselves off from conclusions based on any one indicator. Instead, we have grouped our indicators so that they form a "battery of tests," rather than a single-indicator "crucial test," of our various propositions. That is, we have based none of our conclusions on the fact that differences between subsamples on any one indicator are "statistically significant." Our conclusions disregard the size of differences on individual indicators and base themselves on the number of indicators on which differences (however large or small) tend in the same direction as between subsamples.

To illustrate: We do not conclude that Propagandists came from a higher social class than Administrators simply because their fathers appeared in the high-status occupations in much greater numbers. Rather, we base this conclusion on the fact that the Propagandists outnumber (sometimes by a wide margin, sometimes by a small margin) Administrators in the higher-status categories of practically all our indicators. Not only in their fathers' occupations—but in their own occupations, their own level of education, their fields of educational and other interest, their Army ranks, their ancestral background, their age at marriage, etc.—the Propagandists consistently "outrank" the Administrators with respect to status in social origins. (Conversely, Administrators clearly outrank Propagandists with respect to status in the Party machinery.)

One pitfall lurks in such a method, which we believe we have avoided, but to which the reader should be alerted. When the differences are consistently small, in a group of indicators, even though they tend consistently in the same direction, the possibility must be considered that these differences are all due to the same individuals in the sample. This is particularly true when the samples are small and when the indicators are validly grouped. Both of these conditions obtain in our data. Valid grouping of such indicators as we have used tends to reduce their independence of each other—e.g., it is reasonable to suppose that high-status occupations among both fathers and sons, if these are validly grouped as indicators of high social class, will be more highly correlated than high-status fathers and low-status sons. Hence, occupational status of fathers and sons can not be regarded as completely independent indicators in research because they are associated (to some undetermined but significant degree) in actual life.

We have avoided the pitfall of assuming independence of indicators, where interdependence may in fact exist, in three ways: first, by using a "coefficient of independence" which gives us an approximation of the actual degree of independence between two indicators; second, we have run a fairly extensive series of cross-tabulations, which enable us to determine which pairs of indicators in fact reflect the characteristics of the same individuals (e.g. to what degree the number of Catholics merely duplicates the number of Bavarians); third, we have formulated our conclusions in terms of characteristic deviations as between subsamples rather than characteristics of the subsamples as wholly homogeneous groups.

That is, we recognize that none of our subsamples is completely homogeneous with respect to any characteristic—other than that by which they were defined. All are persons honored by the Nazis through inclusion in the Fuehrerlexikon. This gives them the one common characteristic needed to define them as a sample of the Nazi elite, from which subsamples may be drawn and compared with each other. Each of these subsamples is constituted by sorting persons into categories defined by another single common characteristic—their distinctive function with respect to the Nazi movement.

We demand, therefore, that they be homogeneous with respect to their defining characteristic—that the Propagandists be propagandists, the Administrators be administrators, etc. We do not demand—nor do we even expect—that they will be homogeneous with respect to other attributes. Homogeneity of this sort could be expected only in a caste system with a degree of rigidity which probably has never existed in recorded history. Certainly, common knowledge of Nazi history leads us to expect considerable heterogeneity on other attributes among individuals classifiable as Propagandists, Administrators, etc.

On the central attribute of social status, certainly, it is clear that each of our subsamples includes some individuals who rank very high and some who rank quite low. Our conclusions, therefore, are not that any subsample is wholly high or low but that its characteristic deviation from other subsamples, or from some other population, is in the direction of "higher" or "lower." This may mean only that, while a large number (perhaps a majority) in one subsample have the same status as a large number in another subsample, those who do deviate, deviate upward in the one sample, while in the other sample they deviate downward. It was to make this point clear that we began our presentation of data with a section on the "middle-income skill groups." We believe that the data adduced there and later show a considerable, perhaps predominant, representation of these groups throughout the Nazi movement as a whole and through each of the subsamples. When we speak of the Propagandists as exhibiting higher social status than Administrators, we refer to the characteristic deviants among these subsamples. We do not repeat this point in every possible place, to avoid making a paper already very lengthy even more tiresome. Occasionally, some stylistic ineptitude may suggest that we have disregarded our own self-imposed limitation. At such places, the alert reader will translate our words into the terms of reference just outlined. We turn now to a summary recapitulation of the actual deviations detailed in the body of the study.

Characteristic Differences: Recapitulation

In the next section we summarize certain similarities among the various groups of Nazis. Such similarities become significant when they distinguish Nazis from other Germans. In this section we concentrate upon differences as between groups of Nazi, and these become significant when they distinguish components within the Nazi movement.

Our Random subsample we have taken as fairly representative of the distribution of certain definite attributes among the Nazi elite as a whole, at the time when it culminated its career as a counter-revolutionary movement by taking over total power in the State. This subsample seems to reflect the Nazi elite fairly well, even to its foibles, according to our common knowledge of Nazi beliefs and behavior. For example, the Random subsample includes many individuals who were not members of the NSDAP—and some who were known (to the Nazis at that time) to be hostile to one or another aspect of the Nazi program. Such individuals were often included because of their national prestige, which the Nazis wished to identify with themselves. Included in the *Fuehrerlexikon*, for example, were Hermann Oncken, noted historian whose cordiality to the Nazis was dubious, and Karl Goerdeler, the Lord Mayor of Leipzig whose anti-Nazism early led him to become a key figure in the July 20 conspiracy against Hitler.

Both in its central tendencies and its peculiar deviations, the Random subsample appears to represent adequately the distribution of relevant attributes in the German elite under the Nazis. We have therefore used data on this subsample as a standard against which to evaluate deviations in the other subsamples. It is largely by this procedure that we reached several of our conclusions concerning the Propagandists and Administrators.

Our group of Administrators we characterized as "plebeians on the make." Though a substantial number of middle-status individuals appear in this subsample, and even a few high-status individuals (mainly professional soldiers trained in military administration), the prevailing direction of its deviations is downward with respect to social origins. The Administrators consistently outnumber all other subsamples in the low-status categories on indicators of social origins—ancestral and parental background, university attendance and specialization, career history, military rank, etc. On the other hand, the Administrators rather consistently outnumber the others of Nazi prominence—e.g., rank within the Party and its affiliated organs. When the Party came to power, consequently, they rode with it into the higher categories of elite-status in German society as a whole. The career of Martin Bormann, head of the Party Chancellery and Nazi Administrator *par excellence*, indicates this sequence from plebeian origins to top social status by means of increasing deference-position within the counter-elite NSDAP. Others are: Fritz Sauckel, who left grammar school to be a common sailor, and later became *Gauleiter* of Thuringia and *Reichstatthalter*; Robert Ley, son of a peasant, who became head of the D. A. F. (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) and thereby chief ruler over Germany's civilian manpower. We have called this process, illustrated most clearly by the Nazi Administrators, the "rise of the plebeian."

A special case of this sequence is the Nazi Police. This is our poorest subsample because it is small and impure (only 35 individuals, of whom eight are professional soldiers sorted into this category as an artifact of our definition). We are able to use these data despite impurity of the subsample because we can account for its bias with precision and because the bias throws the advantage of every doubt against the conclusion we reach. That is, these eight soldiers bias every indicator in the direction of high-status social origins, whereas our conclusion is that the Police deviate characteristically toward lower-middle status in their social origins. We speak here of the police proper. That is, we exclude top Nazi administrators of the Police, like Himmler and Lutze, whose plebeian origins conform to those of Nazi administrators generally; and we exclude the eight professional soldiers, whose origins are top-status like the others of the military caste. The Police proper seem to originate uniformly in the middle classes. These men did not rise from the bottom to the top via the NSDAP as their career. They tended to rise rather from lower-middle to the upper-middle ranges of deference via the civil service as their career, combined with Nazi-receptive attitudes. They tended to come from families in the middle (probably somewhat lower-middle) ranges of civil service, business, and professional activity. An illustrative case is Johannes Lieff, who became Polizeipraesident of Braunschweig. Lieff characterizes his social origins thus: "stammt aus einer alten braunschweigischen Beamtenfamilie arischen Ursprungs" (stems from an old Braunschweig family of officials, of Aryan ancestry). Without this family background, but with this inclination to mention his Aryan ancestry (which many biographers omit), he might have become a Party rather than Civil Service Police administrator; with the family background, but without this inclination, he might have stayed where he was (or been thrown out in the successive purges of Prussian Police initiated by Goering and continued by others). With both the background and the inclination, he was most likely to rise just as he did.

The subsample next highest on the status-ladder of social origins is the Propagandists. Considerably higher than the plebeian Administrators and discernibly higher than the lower-middle-class Police, the Propagandists cross the imaginary line drawn along the averages for the Random Nazis on our various indicators. Whereas the Administrators and Police outnumber Random Nazis in low-status categories (and are outnumbered by them in high-status categories), the Propagandists reverse this pattern. We are, therefore, led to conclude that the Propagandists not only come from higher social strata than the other subsamples discussed, but that they are drawn from the upper-middle strata of German society as a whole.

In this, naturally, we are referring to the tendency of their deviations. The subsample is heterogeneous, including such individuals as Max Amann who, as Director of Franz Eher Verlag (main Nazi publishing organ), was an important administrator of Propaganda and shows the plebeian origins common to Nazi Administrators. The operating Propagandists—those who made their careers via their skill in manipulating symbols for Nazi pur-

poses—mainly deviate toward the upper-middle ranges of German society. An illustrative case is Alfred Berndt, Chief Writer of D. N. B. (Deutsches Nachrichtenbureau), who reports his ancestry thus:

. . . Enstammt mütterlicherseits einer jahrhundertealten ost-deutschen Kolonisten-und Bauernfamilie, väterlicherseits einer pommerschen und schwedischen Landwirts-und Beamtenfamilie.

. . . Stems on mother's side from a centuries-old East German family of colonizers and farmers, on father's side from a Pomeranian and Swedish family of Landowners and Officials.)

Other cases are abundant. Walther Funk, Press Chief of the Reich government, gives his ancestry as follows:


. . . Father was Royal Architect, Grandfather a Great Merchant (wholesale) of Koenigsberg; lineage certified to 16th century; forefathers played an important role in the Lutheran wars of religion.

The Propagandists, though they come from higher origins than the others just reviewed, do not tend to attain higher positions in the NSDAP or the Nazi State. They are specialists with the "correct" orientation (somewhat like the Police) and they go only as high in the Nazi movement as the function served by their skills. This was quite high indeed in some cases, for the skilled Propagandist is an important voice in the councils of those who seek power. So long as he continues to function qua propagandist, however, his importance is limited by his skill; and his skill is primarily as adviser and executor, not decision-maker and leader. This is indicated by our data on the comparative distribution of the subsamples in the higher offices of the Nazi movement. The Propagandists are considerably outnumbered by the Administrators in these offices; they are outnumbered, too, in such offices as Gauleiter which enabled Nazis to amass private fortunes and private armies (or, at least, private courts) to guard their power and status. Whereas the Propagandists tended to maintain status of origin by means of their skill, or to recover Imperial status lost under Weimar, top honors of the counter-elite went to the Administrators. The Administrators were not specialists with the correct orientation, but generalists in the correct orientation.

The group whose origins are indisputably top-status are the Soldiers. While our subsample has a slight "impurity"—notably the Nazi Soldiers in the Fuehrerlexikon who would probably never have made the grade apart from their Nazi affiliations—it must be recognized that the Junker caste had been infiltrated even before Weimar by strong bourgeois elements. Such elements, however, tended to rise in field commands, and sometimes, when they rose sufficiently high, were "integrated" into the caste by the bestowal of a title. The General Staff remained firmly under Junker control.

The caste features of this group are well known and our data merely confirm their presence in the Nazi period. Since the caste could not run the Nazis, and would not be run by them, they went down in official disgrace and physical destruction. Here was the reverse of the Nazi plebeian—the aristocrat who originated at the top level of social deference, but was broken by the counter-elite which could not absorb him along with his skill.

If we were to portray graphically the beginning and end of these four groups (omitting the Random), showing their level of origin and level of attainment on a scale of social deference, we might get the following suggestive picture of their characteristic deviations:



The Administrators, low and touching bottom in some cases, go to (or very close to) the top. The Police move up in a more restricted range—from middle to high (or lower-middle to upper-middle). The Propagandists, starting fairly high and obviously gaining personal power, do not appear to have increased their status as a group over that which was held by their fathers a generation earlier. Their accomplishment seems to have been that, faced with a sharp decline in status, they disaffiliated from a founding elite and, by using their acquired skills, maintained or regained high status through affiliation with a counter-elite by whom such skills were prized and rewarded. The Soldiers, equipped with skills less plastic than those of the Propagandist (or the generalized talents of the Administrator), came from a background which ingrained the identification of skill with class—i.e., caste. The Nazis, though they needed the skills, could not tolerate its caste context. Their counter-elite required places for themselves at the top in every agency of social policy. For the sake of these—which meant their freedom to control external violence through Rommel, Jodl, Guderian, (and ultimately Himmler) rather than be shackled by von Brauchitsch, von Fritsch, and even Halder—they were prepared to destroy the caste which had been the pride of Prussia and Germany for centuries.

In these ways do our subsamples of the Nazi counter-elite differ from each other. Other, deeper individual differences are also discernible which we have not studied here. Our focus has been upon status-differences on the view that, in a status-ridden society, "class will tell." The differ-

ences spotlighted by our data are sufficient evidence that the Fuehrerlexikon is not really a handbook of "the Nazi elite" in any strict sense. From this we infer that there was in fact no Nazi elite that spanned and integrated the whole German society. There was, rather, a more limited set of changes in "the composition of the ruling few" which produced a Nazi variant of the German elite. The character of this variant is clarified by study of the common attributes of its two most distinctive groups—Administrators and Propagandists. As we have seen, these differ from each other in very significant ways. Their similarities, too, are significant.

Marginality: The Common Attributes

In a society predominantly Moslem, Christians are marginal with respect to religion. In a Catholic society, Protestants are marginal on this characteristic. "Predominant" attributes are those most frequent in the Elite and most preferred by all. A man who deviates from a substantial number and variety of predominant attributes in his society may be regarded as a "marginal man." In this sense, the Nazi movement was led and followed by marginal men. The groups at the core of the movement—Administrators and Propagandists—exhibit marginality as their strongest common bond.

We have suggested this similarity underlying their differences by speaking of them as "alienated intellectuals" and "disaffected plebeians." Their differences, as intellectuals and plebeians, are quite clear. Their alienation and disaffection is their common link in the "armed bohemia" of the NSDAP. Such attitudes are consequences; here we wish to look at some of the common characteristics associated with disaffection and alienation.

Our conception of marginality concentrates on the number and variety of indicators on which we found deviations among our subsamples. As we explained earlier, it is the deviant cases which give each group its special character. To test our general proposition, that the echt-Nazi elite were the "marginal men" of Weimar Germany, we formed a combined index based on thirteen of our indicators (the complete list is given in Appendix A). Computing the number of individuals marginal on one or more of these thirteen indicators, we arrived at the following totals:

TABLE 65. THE NAZIS AS MARGINAL MEN

Class	Prop.	Admin.	Pol.	Mil.	Random
Marginal	77.4%	82.1%	77.1%	51.0%	56.6%
Non-Marginal	22.6	17.9	29.9	49.0	43.4
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(128)	(151)	(35)	(104)	(159)

We turn now to the data on several single indicators, to illustrate the influence of marginality in shaping the career line of these Nazis. Rather

consistently the Random Nazis and the Soldiers are heavily concentrated in the categories of centrality (non-marginal), while the Propagandists and the Police deviate strongly, and the Administrators even more strongly, into the marginal categories.

Perhaps the most striking characteristic is the marginality of the Nazis with respect to birthplace. This has been noted by several commentators. Hitler himself was born in Austria and not in Germany at all. Several extreme nationalistic and counter-revolutionary movements against Weimar, particularly in the early postwar years, originated in marginal eastern areas. People in or near the "lost eastern territories," lost through the Versailles Treaty and the acquiescence of Weimar, resorted to violence against the government whose passivity threatened them with loss of their "Deutschtum" and submergence in the "Slavic hordes" for all time. The Kapp Putsch was conceived and executed from these marginal territories. Alfred Rosenberg, the racial "philosopher" of the Nazi movement, was a Balt, whose fears of eternal marginality or intolerable Slavization probably were associated with his great contribution to Nazi political folklore—the categories of Reichsdeutsch and Volksdeutsch. The NSDAP itself was born and raised in the marginal area of Bavaria—whose marginality, indeed, had been a major problem since the triumph of Hohenzollern over Wittelsbach and the integration of Grossdeutschland under predominant Prussia.

The core-Nazis are considerably over-represented in marginal areas, as the following figures make clear:

TABLE 66. MARGINAL BIRTHPLACES

	Prop.	Admin.	Mil.	Pol.	Random	NSDAP	Pop.
Bavaria	10.2%	20.5%	9.6%	2.9%	9.5%	9.8%	10.1%
Rhineland	7.8	5.9	4.8	2.9	3.1	5.7	5.5
Alsace and							
Saar	1.6	5.9	1.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0
Foreign	7.0	4.6	1.9	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.0
Total	26.6%	36.9%	17.3%	5.8%	16.2%		

We have included the fragmentary data on NSDAP and total population (statistics on other areas were so organized as to be non-comparable with our data) to indicate the close correspondence between NSDAP and general populations for the marginal areas of Germany—interesting because these areas were always under-represented in the pre-Nazi elites, which exhibited the predominant, rather than marginal, attributes. The Random sample, too, corresponds rather closely. Their total for Bavaria-Rhineland is 3 percent less than those for NSDAP and total population; this margin is probably filled by the non-Nazi but high-prestige Germans brought into the Fuehrerlexikon for reasons we have discussed.

What mainly interests us here is the common marginality of the core-

Nazis on this indicator, The Administrators, whom we have described as the *echt*-Nazis incarnate, are the most marginal—exceeding the Propagandists by 10 percent (the extra 10 percent who originated in the Bavarian homeland of the NSDAP). It is also interesting that the plebeian Administrators predominate in Bavaria, Alsace, and Saar—rural and peasant areas; whereas the Propagandists are more numerous in the Rhineland and foreign capitals, centers of commerce and culture (i.e. universities). The totals indicate that both core-groups considerably outnumber the Random subsample in marginality on birthplace.

Another indicator of interest is age. The Nazi movement has frequently been characterized as one of bitter young men. To see how closely the facts bear out this view, we computed the mean ages for all German men over 25:

TABLE 67. MEAN AGES (German)

	Prop.	Admin.	Mil.	Pol.	Random	NSDAP	Pop.
In 1934	38.9	42.2	52.0	47.0	48.5	37.6	44.9

The figures for 1934 indicate rather clearly what, on the analysis we have made, was to be expected. The NSDAP male membership averages more than seven years younger than the male population (over 25) as a whole. The core of the NSDAP elite are naturally somewhat older than the NSDAP mass—the Propagandists about one year older, the Administrators about four years older. The Nazi-core is exactly eight years younger on the average (the combined Propagandist-Administrator average being 40.5 years) than the Random sample. (That the Random group and the Soldiers are the oldest was to be expected, owing to its heavy admixture of non-Nazis with high status attained through career-prominence.) The Nazi-core is also about five years younger than the German male population as a whole. With respect to age, then, the Nazi elite may be considered “marginal” in the sense that it is dominated by a generation which took power in the state a decade or so younger than was the rule for German and other elites in Western societies. Note the comparison with mean ages for cabinet members in the other elite studies of this series:

TABLE 68. MEAN AGES (Cross-National)

United States	56
United Kingdom	56
France	53
Germany	53
Nazi Core-Elite	40

The figures for mean age in 1920, which are merely those for 1934 subtracted by 14 years, are given below in Table 68 simply to make more vivid the position of these core-Nazis when demobilized at the end of World War I, i.e., when they began their careers in the Nazi movement. A sig-

nificant detail is added when we view mean age in 1918 alongside of the data on mean age at marriage:

TABLE 69. AGE DATA (in years)

	Prop.	Admin.	Mil.	Pol.	Random	NSDAP	Pop.
Mean Age in 1920	24.9	28.2	38.0	33.0	37.5	23.6	30.9
Mean Age at Marriage	28.0	33.0	31.3	30.4	30.0	-	30.0

The adult male population of Germany, in 1920, married at age 30 on the average. Thus, this population had already been married about one year in 1920. The Random Nazis had already been married about seven and one-half years, on the average, at this time. The position of the core-Nazis in 1920 was quite different: not only were they unmarried in the main, but the Propagandists were to put in another three years as "lone wolves," while another five years were to elapse before the Administrators married. These men, as our data has shown, were joining themselves to the NSDAP rather than to wives. The figures for those who joined the Party before 1923 (see Table 25) are:

<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Random</u>
20.3%	27.1%	4.8%	14.3%	9.4%

In this respect, too, the core-Nazis are marginal. At the ages, and during the years, when most German males were already married, these core-Nazis were hanging around beer halls plotting murders and planning a future for Germany in which they would figure prominently. While their contemporaries were adjusting to the wife-home-family sequence of behavior, these core-Nazis were prowling the streets in the company of other ex-heroes in fact or fantasy.

The restlessness of these men is further displayed in their occupational histories. Our earlier data on these indicators showed that the core-Nazis took their first jobs of career (i. e., as denoted in their own Fuehrerlexikon sketches) much later than the Random sample and much later than the Soldiers and the Police.

The figures for those who were in their first career jobs by age 30 are as follows (see Table 37):

<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Police*</u>	<u>Random</u>
54.7%	51.3%	95.2%	91.4%	75.4%

*In the case of the Police the first responsible job was coded. This was not necessarily Police work.

Our earlier data showed, too, that these core-Nazis did not stay settled after they once were settled. At age 30, about half of the Propagandists and Administrators had not yet found jobs in the fields which they were to

consider their career. But most of these did not stay put even when they had taken these first jobs, as is shown by the figures for those who report no subsidiary lifework (see Table 44):

<u>Propagandists</u>	<u>Administrators</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Random</u>
15%	5%	37.5%	5.7%	30%

About two-thirds (70 percent) of the Random Nazis changed their primary occupation long enough to be counted under some subsidiary lifework. This is a fairly large proportion, and reflects the instability of employment in postwar Germany. The high number of professional Soldiers who changed their job (62.5 percent) can probably be attributed to the demilitarization of Germany after World War I. But twice as many Propagandists, and six times as many Administrators, and Police, made such shifts in employment. This is clearly quite excessive job-instability, even for Weimar Germany, by available measures. It would seem appropriate to consider the core-Nazis "marginal" with respect to the search for stability in personal life—a trait we here designate simply as "restlessness."

With such an expanded concept of marginality, however, we move onto different terrain than that covered by our study. Our indicators have been concerned exclusively with objective measures of public behavior. To some degree, we have dealt even with objective measures beyond the control of the *Fuehrerlexikon* biographees—e.g., family status, birthplace, religion. The main control biographees could exercise over such indicators was suppressing information—i.e., the factor of "no data." (Out-right falsification was probably infrequent in the data, because verification by one's friends—or, more important in Nazi circles, one's enemies—was fairly easy.) We have, at several places in the study, called attention to the significance of over- and under-reporting on various indicators. And we shall return to this factor once more by way of illustrating a general point in the concluding section.

Here we wish to point out that such objective indicators as we have reported in this monograph may provide useful clues to personality attributes common to a group of individuals. We have not permitted ourselves to formulate explicit conclusions regarding "the Nazi personality" but have confined ourselves rather to conclusions about the interaction of our quite formal indicators with the sequence of public events familiar to all who know Nazi history. We suggest here an inference from our data to such a personality concept as "restlessness," to indicate a point of general methodological interest and of specific substantive bearing on the Nazis.

To wit: political analysts have frequently alluded to ambition or power-seeking as a common trait of Nazi personality; clinical psychologists have long been familiar with job-instability as an indicator for diagnosing case-histories; sociologists (and economists) have accumulated masses of data on the distribution of job-instability with reference to various social institutions. Few studies, however, have used the methods of the sociologist

to test the indicators of the psychologist with respect to the propositions of the political analyst. In consequence the "political personality" is, from the standpoint of systematic research, very largely *terra incognita*.

We have not explored this unknown territory either, but we wish to suggest that re-analysis of the data here presented could make a substantial contribution to our understanding of the Nazi psyche. Other data would be needed, certainly, but those already reported would serve rather well as a starter. A person interested in analyzing (in addition to naming) "restlessness" as a common characteristic of core-Nazis—or more specific characteristics like "ambition" or "power-seeking"—would find useful data by comparing our data on education. He would find the discrepancies between university attendance and attainment quite revealing, viz.:

TABLE 70. UNIVERSITY ATTENDANCE AND ATTAINMENT

	Prop.	Admin.	Mil.	Pol.	Random
Attended University	59.0%	25.1%	26.8%	39.9%	60.3%
Graduated University	32.8	13.9	11.5	8.5	52.2

He would probably be struck by the extremely high proportion of Nazis who attended universities. By consulting a statistical handbook, he would learn that in the academic year 1922-23 (which is probably the median year of attendance for many of the core-Nazis tabulated above) 82,213 students were registered at German universities. Discounting slightly for foreign students, this is around 4.2 percent of the total male population over 25 (the group which includes our subsamples). The Administrators exceed this figure, despite their plebeian origins, probably owing to the generous state aid to students during these years. The low figure for the Soldiers can be traced back to the fact that most of them went to military schools rather than universities. The Propagandists and Random Nazis more than double the attendance of the Administrators, probably owing to their higher family status, since home orientation and family pressure undoubtedly are major factors in the decision whether a person goes to college.

Thus far, we are still on the familiar terrain of interaction between sets of objective data. But, how shall we account for the failure of so many core-Nazis to complete their university courses? Of those who attended universities, only slightly over one-half of the Propagandists and Administrators graduated as compared with over 80 percent of the Random Nazis.

The difference becomes even more striking if we examine the data on academic completion by certain kinds of primary lifework. We have described Civil Service, Business, and the Professions as the stable occupations. To these we can contrast the typically Nazi occupations of Party Official or Communications. Table 71 shows what proportion of those

persons in each of these occupations who attended a university or technische hochschule failed to complete the course of studies.

TABLE 71. PERSONS WHO FAILED TO COMPLETE STUDIES

	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Stable Occupations	20.6%	20.0%	9.5%
Nazi Occupations	60.4	80.0	25.0

This result does not simply reflect the fact that completion of education is a sine qua non for some stable occupations, for the businessmen, who required no degrees, left school in no more than 25 percent of the cases in any sample. This result seems to reflect an important fact which our other sets of objective data do not account for. The data most closely associated would seem to be those mentioned above, which indicate that the core-Nazis also failed to complete their job-career activities. However, neither of these can "explain" the other (as higher family status could partly account for higher university attendance). Failure to complete educational activities and failure to complete occupational activities seem to stem from the same source—and hence both need be accounted for by some common trait of these individuals which would explain a pattern of "uncompleted life activities." In this way, re-analysis of the present data could lead to refinement of such a gross category as "restlessness" (or even "power-seeking") and to documentation of basic propositions about "the Nazi personality."

Other items that call for re-analysis from this perspective suggest themselves throughout the paper. Our treatment of the category "no data" has been merely illustrative. Re-examination of the figures which appear in this category under the various indicators would probably lead to fruitful conclusions concerning the characteristic "focus of attention" among ex-Nazis. Re-analysis would probably note such an indicator as religion, which gives us these data:

TABLE 72. RELIGION

	Prop.	Admin.	Mil.	Pol.	Random
Protestant	45.0%	27.1%	36.5%	40.0%	35.2%
Roman Catholic	8.0	9.2	3.8	2.9	5.6
Deutschgläubig	4.0	0.6	-	-	0.0
No Data	43.0	63.0	59.6	57.1	59.1
Total	100.0% (100)	99.9% (151)	99.9% (104)	100.0% (35)	99.9% (159)

Many questions are raised by these data: Why is the proportion of Catholics so low, particularly since the core-Nazis come so heavily from "marginal areas" predominantly Catholic (Bavaria, Rhineland). We are particularly struck by the figure of 9 percent Catholic Administrators, since we already know that 20 percent of this subsample was born in Catholic Bavaria: Why

then, does cross-tabulation show that of 31 Administrators born in Bavaria only 6 report themselves Catholics, while 5 say Protestant, 1 Deutschgläubig, and 19 give "no data"? If we choose simple explanations—e.g., that Nazism was an anti-religious movement—how account for the large differential in the "no data" category? Why, particularly, do the more sophisticated Propagandists (the specialists on what to say and what not to say in public), who on most other points tend to withhold most data, give exactly 20 percent more answers on this item of religion? To answer such questions, systematic re-analysis of the "no data" categories would be enlightening.

An extremely suggestive set of figures, for such a purpose, appear in the "no data" categories with respect to women. Starting with the glaring absence of women from the Fuehrerlexikon, the researcher would notice that some of the most numerous "no data" categories are those which concern women—whether the core-Nazis are married at all, whom they married, etc. Re-analysis of these "no data" items in the light of personality theory might suggest answers to the above questions concerning "no data" on religion. In any case it would surely add an important dimension to our conception of "marginality" among the core-Nazis.

Such re-analysis would also throw light on some key propositions advanced by political analysts. An outstanding writer on Nazi military politics (Wehrpolitik), Alfred Vagts, was so struck by the consequences of this Nazi attitude toward women that he concluded his main work on the subject with this final sentence:

. . . It would be supreme historical irony, if, in the final balance of this war, the eugenic principles of these warriors, standing in the way of making timely use of women in war work, should cause them to lose the war!²⁶

Our data, re-analyzed, would give a clearer conception of the typical Nazi attitudes toward women by clarifying the causes and correlates of these "eugenic principles." Re-analysis would also give us a better measure of the importance of these attitudes, by showing their frequency and distribution among various groups in the Nazi elite. Such information could be of considerable value for the policy scientist. We turn, in conclusion, to a few brief suggestions concerning the utility of our findings for students of the contemporary political process.

Some Conclusions for Policy Scientists

We consider as "policy scientists" those who are concerned with bringing the findings of systematic research to bear upon current issues and processes of policy. One persistent issue of democratic policy in the past three decades has been: how to cope successfully with aggressive totalitarianisms?

In an important sense, the whole RADIR Project is an effort to help answer this question by improving our information about the issue. Certain

steps precede the effective use of such information as is presented in this study and in this series. An essential step is to clarify one's own goals. Aside from its psychic value in reducing ambivalence and indecision on important matters, such clarification puts us in a position to evaluate how effectively these goals are being realized in theory and practice. Another essential step is to clarify the goals of others with whom we are related by conjunction or conflict of interests, needs, and desires. In this way we "know our neighbors," a wise and ancient injunction, at least well enough to distinguish our friends from our adversaries. With such information in hand, we are in a better position to make rational decisions on how to behave with respect to recurrent issues.

How to cope with aggressive totalitarianism is such a recurrent issue. To take the clarifying steps mentioned above on such an issue requires a perspective that eschews parochialism. The Soviet Union, which is currently the chief protagonist of this issue, has always operated on a world stage. If we study its challenge on the same scale, we are more likely to detect essential similarities and differences that will clarify our situation than if we forsake inquiry in favor of some *a priori* and parochial dogma like "Soviet Russia and World Communism are one and the same thing." Perhaps research will lead to this conclusion—which hardly seems likely—but if it does, the proposition will be more solidly founded. The point is that we are better served by accurate information than dogmatic affirmation—and that the information we require for our most crucial issues is global in scope.

Since we are concerned with the aggressiveness of a centralized revolutionary force that is global in scope like world communism, and with dispersed totalitarian forces that nevertheless exhibit striking similarities like Italian Fascism and Japanese Imperialism and German Nazism, then we are surely well advised to study the "world revolution of our time." Comparative data on such movements will reveal the patterns of similar and dissimilar behavior underlying the movements which have constituted the persistent problem of democratic policy. By studying ourselves and our friends—Britain, France, etc.—on the same scale of behavior, we clarify the similarities and differences among ourselves, and between us and others. Such information enables us to decide more rationally—i. e., with a higher probability of accomplishing our purpose—what to do on current issues.

This series of elite studies is designed to provide comparative information of this sort about the men who make top decisions in various societies of the world community. We study ourselves and our adversaries. The executive branches of Britain, France, and the United States are investigated; so is the Soviet Politburo. So are cases where the issue is still being fought, where there is not one government but two parties—e. g., Kuomintang and Communists in China. So are aggressive totalitarianisms which have been overthrown, but which have contributed ideas and practices still current in the world political arena—e. g., the Nazi elite.

The present study has presented our data on the Nazis in terms of

several propositions concerning the personnel and personalities who have been engaged in engineering the "world revolution of our time." These data will become more significant when subjected to comparative analysis alongside our data on other revolutionary counter-elites of our epoch. Such analysis, to be published by the RADIR Project in a subsequent book on world elites, will reveal the pattern of similarities among aggressive-totalitarians. The utility of these data will be increased also when they are located as details within the context of German history, as will be done by the German volume in a series of country-studies now being prepared under the RADIR Project. The present study, which is primarily a research report, offers only some suggestions or tentative conclusions in both these directions.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES

Source: The "Fuehrerlexikon"

The Fuehrerlexikon was published in 1934 by the publishing house of Otto Stollberg, Berlin. It was not an official publication of the NSDAP, but the fact that it had the approval of the Party is indicated by a sentence on the title page which reads:

The NSDAP has no objection against the publication of this book.

Munich June 15, 1934

In the Preface to the book the publishers state their purpose as follows:

The German Fuehrerlexikon attempts to show the realization of the Fuehrer principle in the public life of Germany.

The publishers state that they are not compiling a social register, but that their sole criterion for inclusion of a man was whether he was officially charged with a leadership function. The book does not include a single woman.

No information is given on how the biographies were secured. Since most of the biographies follow a standard pattern, it is reasonable to assume that a standard questionnaire was used. Although not explicitly stated, it appears that each biographee was sent a questionnaire and filled it in himself. The material was then checked by the organization to which the biographee belonged. A list of organizations which helped to check the material is given at the beginning of the book.

The Preface also states that the book contains more than 1,700 biographies. Actually, however, it contains only about 1,600 biographies and over 100 blank spaces. These blank spaces represent biographies originally included, but later dropped—between typesetting and publication. This strange fact can be explained by the date of publication. The book was published toward the middle of 1934, just about the time of the "blood purge" of Roehm and the decimation of S.A. leadership discussed earlier in this monograph. It is clear that about 100 persons involved in the purge were originally included in the Fuehrerlexikon but were no longer current when the book went to press. Evidence that this assumption is correct is provided by a postscript to the publisher's Preface, which reads as follows:

Because of a series of political events we have corrected the already finished volume in all important places, taking into account the events up to August 2nd of this year. The further influence of these occurrences on party, state and people will be taken into account in a special supplement or in the second edition.

August 2, 1934

The Publishers.

The Samples

The Propagandists: The following groups of persons were selected for inclusion in the sample of propagandists:

- High officers of the Propaganda Ministry
- Officials of the Reichs Culture Chamber or one of its subsidiaries
- Managers of radio stations
- Newspaper editors
- Journalists
- Writers
- Officers of the Reichspropagandaleitung der NSDAP
- Press and Propaganda officers of other Nazi organizations.

In this, as in all the other samples, the main criterion for inclusion was the title given at the head of each man's biography. Second, the biographies were read to search out those who had spent a major part of their active life as propagandists, even if they were not in such a position when the Fuehrerlexikon appeared.

A careful perusal of the Fuehrerlexikon yielded 128 individuals who could be classified under the heading of "Propagandists." A question was later raised whether it was proper to include some of the officials of the Propaganda Ministry (those who were primarily civil servants), officials of the Culture Chamber and its subsidiaries (those who were primarily Party administrators), and some of the literary artists (those who wrote only in non-political fields). It was felt that the inclusion of such individuals, who were only indirectly concerned with propaganda, might prejudice the validity of our sample. To guard against bias in the sample, all 28 individuals in the above three groups were eliminated. Later, however, it was found that the smaller sample of 100 men exhibited essentially the same characteristics as the full sample of 128. The differences in all cases were small and in the same direction. In the presentation of the data both subsamples have been used. In no case, however, would the subsample which was not used show a significantly different result from the one that was used (see footnote to Table 1).

The Administrators: Under this category we included those who held an administrative job in the NSDAP or one of its subsidiaries. The Fuehrerlexikon includes more administrators than there are in our sample. Since it was important to keep the samples comparable in size, we excluded the lower-ranking group of administrators, taking only the higher ranks for our sample. According to these standards, 151 individuals were selected, consisting of the following groups:

- Officials of the Reichsleitung der NSDAP
- Officials of the Reichsleitung of subsidiary NS organizations
- Gauleiters (because of the special importance of Berlin the Deputy Gauleiter of that city is also included)

Gauarbeitsfuehrer
Landesbauernfuehrer

High Officers (down to the Land level) of Nazi-sponsored organizations

In order to avoid duplication, individuals already counted as Propagandists were not included, even if they had an administrative function along with their propaganda function.

The Random Sample: The procedure used in the selection of the Random sample was to take every tenth name out of the Fuehrerlexikon. Since we required a systematic random sample, no tenth name was skipped, even if the man was already included in one of the other samples. Because of this characteristic of the sample, it includes: 16 Propagandists, 18 Administrators, and 5 Coercers. In the light of this known bias, the differences between the Random sample and our samples assume added significance. For, were we to eliminate the 39 individuals specified above, the differences now apparent in the data would be increased to that extent in every case.

The Coercers: Two groups are included under this heading: the Soldiers and the Police. Again, those already counted as either Propagandists or Administrators were not included again in this sample. All members of the Police were included. By the very nature of the book, these were only police officers of high rank such as police presidents and police generals. The total number in this subgroup came to 35.

Under Soldiers we included those who listed a military rank in the title-line of their biography, and we also added those who had served in the Army or the Navy for a period of more than five years. There were two reasons for this:

- a) The professional soldier, in whom we were interested, would be the one who stayed in the service for more than five years.
- b) It was our aim to eliminate those who served only through the First World War from 1914 to 1918.

Again because of the nature of the book, this sample contains mainly higher-ranking officers. Their number came to 104. Hence, the size of the whole sample of Coercers, combining Soldiers and Police, amounted to 139.

Techniques

After the sample had been selected, we proceeded to code every biography, to attain data on the 43 indicators in our check list. Almost all of the indicators yielded a sufficient number of answers to be used in the interpretation of the data. After the coding was completed, the information gathered was punched on IBM cards. All tabulations and cross-tabulations were made from these cards.

Some of the standards according to which the coding was done are described in the list which follows.

- a) Primary Lifework: Under this index we chose the kind of work in which the biographee spent the most years of his reported Berufsgang (occupational history).
- b) Subsidiary Lifework: Here we included the kind of work which occupied the second largest number of years of his reported Berufsgang.
- c) Education: The highest grade of education attained was coded regardless of whether or not the man finished the school in question. Military schools and Kadettenanstalt were coded under "Trade school."
- d) Special Educational Interests: Since many mentioned more than one subject, the one listed first was taken as the field of primary interest.
- e) Military Career in World War I: Only the highest rank attained was coded.
- f) Number of Publications: Several men wrote articles as well as books. Since we could not conveniently count both (to avoid "double-punching" on the IBM code-cards), we ranked these and gave books precedence over articles. Hence, if a man wrote two books and many articles, for instance, he was coded as having written two books. Only those who wrote no books were counted in the category of articles.
- g) Subject of Publications: If a man wrote on more than one subject, the one in which he did most of his writing was coded.

It is believed that the coding of all other indices is self-explanatory.

Marginality

In compiling Table 65, the following items were treated as indicating a marginal status. Those individuals having any one of these traits were considered marginal for the purposes of the table. These criteria were selected as deviations from the stereotype of the ideally preferred background and career of a nationalist elite German.

Province of Birth

Alsace-Lorraine and Saar
Rhineland
Abroad

Religion

Catholic
Deutschglaeubig
Atheist

Primary Lifework

Peasant
Artisan

Occupation of Father

Peasant
Artisan

Education

Attended university but did not graduate
 Attended Technische Hochschule but did not graduate
 Attended other higher schools but did not graduate
 Attended trade school but did not graduate
 Attended grade school but did not graduate
 Graduated from grade school

Age at Marriage

18-21
 35 and over

Father-in-law's occupation

Peasant
 Artisan

Military Career pre-World War I and World War I

Enlisted man

Date of joining NSDAP

Pre-1923 to 1925

Foreign MarriageForeign ParentageHigher Education AbroadOccupation Abroad

APPENDIX B: NAZIS AND THEIR ALLIES IN THE CABINET

The object of this appendix was to find out how far our findings from the Fuehrerlexikon held for the very top of the elite, both the top of the Nazi hierarchy and those Germans who were sought by the Nazis as allies. To study this problem we took the German Cabinet at the end of 1934 and divided it into two groups: (1) the Nazi leaders, and (2) the other members of the cabinet who were not Nazi leaders.²⁷ The latter group contained two men who joined the NSDAP before 1933: Guertner and Rust. These two, however, did not belong to the top of the Nazi hierarchy. Their inclusion in the second group, which we call Non-Nazis for short, seems justified by their actual status. The Cabinet thus had fifteen members, divided into six Nazis and nine Non-Nazis.

<u>Nazis</u>	<u>Non-Nazis</u>
Hitler	von Neurath
Goebbels	Schwerin von Krosigk
Goering	Schmitt

<u>Nazis</u>	<u>Non-Nazis</u>
Frick	Seldte
Darre	Guertner
Hess	von Blomberg
	von Eltz-Ruebenach
	Rust
	Kerrl

In order to increase the size of the Nazi sample, we added several other top Nazis who were not in the Cabinet at this time. They were:

Himmler	Streicher
Rosenberg	Funk
Ley	Schirach
von Ribbentrop	

This gave us a sample of thirteen top Nazis and nine Non-Nazis. Information on these men was compiled for the same indices as in our study of the Fuehrerlexikon. Since the numbers are very small, proper comparisons and valid conclusions were not possible in every case. We therefore confine ourselves here to showing similarities and dissimilarities on a few selected indices.

Marginality

In the main body of the study (Table 65) it has already been shown that the majority of all our samples were marginal to German society as a whole. The Administrators were the most marginal, followed by the Propagandists and the Random Sample. Using the same indicators of marginality which are described in Appendix A, we find that, of the 22 men included in both the Nazi and the Non-Nazi sample, only one (among the Non-Nazis) did not have at least one attribute of marginality. All the rest had one or more of these attributes. Hitler himself led the field with seven counts of marginality. For the total counts of marginality we get the following figures:

	<u>Non-Nazis</u>	<u>Nazis</u>
Total Marginality Counts	15.0	44.0
Average per individual	1.7	3.4

We see that the Nazis are exactly twice as marginal as the Non-Nazis. Since the Nazi leaders were always fond of describing themselves as true German men of the people, these figures throw an interesting light on this claim.

The comparison between Nazis and Non-Nazis can be illustrated by one specific marginality—place of birth.

TABLE 73. PLACE OF BIRTH

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
Bavaria	1	4
Rhineland	1	3
Abroad	-	4
Total Marginal	2	11
Total Non-marginal	7	2

Here we find an important difference between Nazis and Non-Nazis. Among the Nazis, 11 out of 13 were born in three marginal areas. If we look at the figures given in Table 66, we see that only 15 percent of the population came from these areas, whereas all but two of the top Nazis came from there. The Nazis are therefore marginal on birthplace by a ratio of about five to one. The Non-Nazis in the Cabinet, on the other hand, conform roughly to the Random Sample and to the German population as a whole (two out of nine being about 22 percent rather than 15 percent).

The above sets of figures indicate that the top Nazi leadership is even more marginal than all of our other samples, while the Non-Nazis in the Cabinet are roughly similar to the Random sample (which, as we have pointed out, also includes many important Germans who were included in the Fuehrerlexikon elite even though they were not particularly devoted Nazis).

Career

In the pursuit of their careers, the two groups again show interesting differences. In general, the Non-Nazis stayed in the stable occupations and received more education, while the Nazis in most cases worked only in the Party administration itself or in "Communication" jobs. To illustrate:

TABLE 74. FIELD OF FIRST JOB

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
Stable Occupations (Law and Civil Service)	6	1
Party Administration and Communication	-	8

The Non-Nazis show themselves fairly similar to the Random sample and very different from the top Nazi leadership. They illustrate the survival value of the middle-income skills, despite only casual affiliation with the NSDAP. For the Nazi-group in the Cabinet, however, the NSDAP was their career. Any skills these men possessed they brought to the Party at an early age and developed in its service. While the Non-Nazis were getting their education in schools, the Nazi group was going to the

Party young and making careers in its service. This is shown by the data concerning the age at which they held their first responsible jobs:

TABLE 75. AGE AT WHICH
HELD FIRST RESPONSIBLE JOB

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
18-25	2	7
26-30	5	-
31-35	1	2
36-40	1	-
Don't Know	1	4

As Table 75 indicates, the top Nazis started on their main career, which was mainly Party administration, at a fairly young age. These were the men who, as the body of the monograph has shown, came early and rose high in NSDAP officialdom.

The Non-Nazis also concentrated their educational careers mostly on professional studies, whereas the Nazis went in for Party administration. This is illustrated by the figures for primary lifework:²⁸

TABLE 76. PRIMARY LIFEWORK

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
Farmer	-	1
NS Official	-	10
Civil Service	4	1
Professions	2	-
Business	1	1
Military	1	-
Other	1	-
Total	9	13

The figures for subsidiary lifework confirm the same conclusions:

TABLE 77.
SUBSIDIARY LIFEWORK

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
NS Official	2	2
Civil Servant	5	1
Professions	-	1
Military	-	2
Communication	-	5
None	2	2
Total	9	13

These figures show why the Nazis started out on their first job at an earlier age than the Non-Nazis. The Nazis are heavily concentrated in Party administration and Communication, whereas the Non-Nazis are concentrated in the Stable Occupations, which require more time for preparation and study. These figures also show again that the Non-Nazis conform most closely to the Random sample while the Nazis are closely related to the Propagandists and Administrators.

The information on primary and subsidiary lifework can be summarized as follows:

TABLE 78. FIELD OF LIFEWORK

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
Stable Occupations (Professions, Civ. Ser.)	11	4
Party Administration and Communication	2	17

Education

On the indicator of university attendance, both groups are strikingly similar. This suggests that both groups came from the higher social strata. Among the Non-Nazis, 6 out of 9 attended a university; among the Nazis, 8 out of 13 did. An interesting difference appears, however, if we consider the fields of study of the two groups. Using the same groupings as were used in Table 16, we see the following comparison:

TABLE 79. FIELDS OF STUDY

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
Culture-Oriented	1	5
Skill-Oriented	1	3
Professional Studies	6	3

Since the Nazis predominate in both the culture-oriented and skill-oriented studies, it would appear that they have the characteristics of both the Propagandists and the Administrators. In fact, men of these two kinds were what the leadership of the Nazi Party consisted of, as has been shown by previous figures.

Publications

As would be expected, the top Nazis are the more verbal Nazis. On the indicator of publications, the Nazis lead by far. Although 8 out of 9 Non-Nazis did not report any publications, 11 out of 13 Nazis did. Since the main profession of the Nazi leadership was politics, it is reasonable that this should be the principal field in which they published. Indeed, it is the only one; all eleven Nazis in our group published their books or articles in this field.

Foreign Contact

In the main text of this study we discussed foreign contacts as an indicator of social status. The result was that the three groups were ranked in the following order in descending frequency of foreign contacts: Propagandists, Random, and Administrators. Using the same indices on the two groups at hand, we arrive at the following results:

TABLE 80. FOREIGN CONTACT

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
Born Abroad	-	4
Foreign Marriage	-	1
Higher Education Abroad	1	3
Travel Abroad	5	6

Since, among the Nazis, several of the indicators apply to the same person, two groups actually contain about the same proportion of persons who have had foreign contacts. If these figures are compared with those in Table 18, it appears that both groups have had far more foreign contacts than any of the other subgroups. This indicates not only the high status from which they come but also their marginality, which we have discussed earlier.

Occupation of Father

Arranging the data in the same way as in Table 11, we get the following results:

TABLE 81.
OCCUPATION OF FATHER

	Non-Nazis	Nazis
Landowner	2	-
Military	1	2
Professions	2	4
Civil Service	1	2
Business	1	3
Peasant	-	1
Worker	1	-
Unknown	1	1
Total	9	13

These figures indicate that the Non-Nazis as well as the Nazis came from the upper social stratum of German society, with the Non-Nazis having a slightly higher background than the Nazis. In this instance, again, both groups are more similar to the Propagandists and to the Administrators than to the Random sample.

Miscellaneous

In their age distribution, the Nazis, with a mean age in 1934 of 41.4, are located between the Propagandists (38.9) and the Administrators (42.2), while the Non-Nazis, with a mean age of 53.6, are far older than all the other groups.

It has been suggested earlier in this monograph that the Nazis tend to report less on all indices which have to do with women. Although some of these figures are probably connected also with social status and age, they seem, nevertheless, to suggest the validity of this assertion.

	<u>Non-Nazis</u>	<u>Nazis</u>
Don't know if married	1	4
Father-in-law's occupation unknown	4	10
No report on children	1	6

Conclusion

It was pointed out in the beginning of this Appendix that the figures used in this survey are too small to permit firm conclusions. Nevertheless, if all indicators are taken together, a few points seem reasonably clear:

(1) Both groups are more marginal to German society than any of the other groups sampled.

(2) Both groups come from a high social stratum, the Non-Nazis from an even higher one than the Nazis.

(3) The Nazis reveal a mixture of the attributes which we found previously in the Propagandists and the Administrators. In general, they seem to conform more to the Propagandists, but they contain strong elements of both.

(4) The Non-Nazis had the skill-oriented professional education and careers which helped them to survive the revolution which the Nazis had achieved with their politics of the street. They served the Nazis in this capacity until the Nazis themselves were secure enough, and versed enough in the processes of government, to be able to dispense with the services of the Non-Nazis.

(5) The first Hitler Cabinet, as a test case, indicates that the top German elite of the Nazi period exhibits the general characteristics which we found for the Fuehrerlexikon elite. Indeed, the top Nazis exhibit these characteristics even more pointedly.

APPENDIX C: WHO ROSE HIGHEST IN THE NAZI PARTY

In the text we have noted the distinctive traits of certain subsamples of the Nazi elite. In the course of collecting this data, there emerged a few additional facts of interest which, although they do not differentiate between the subsamples, throw light on the traits of different strata within all of them. Specifically, we note that the persons who rose highest in the

Nazi Party (whether Propagandist, Administrator, or Random) had less education and less military experience and status than the rest. In a way, this is remarkable, since in most movements of a similar sort the leaders have been better educated than the people they have led, and in most nationalist political movements military stature is an asset.

The key facts on education are presented in Table 82, which shows that the highest officers of the Party had less education than the less exalted officers and still less than the ordinary members. This cannot be accounted for by any tendency of more active Nazis to disrupt their schooling by political activities. Like the Russian revolutionaries of the Czarist era, the Nazis did sometimes fail to complete their academic courses because they became involved in political activities. But in Table 82 we do not differentiate completed from incompleting courses. If we were to do so, we would find that the higher Nazis not only attempted less schooling but also, to a limited extent, failed more often in their attempt.

A more adequate explanation of the lesser education of the higher Nazis would be that the men without education faced greater frustrations and had fewer opportunities to make an acceptable career for themselves along normal lines. For the others, education facilitated an extra-party career, as indicated by the fact that the more educated subsamples (Propagandists and Administrators) got their first responsible jobs earlier than Administrators.

TABLE 82. EDUCATION BY PARTY RANK

	Propagandists			Administrators			Random		
	High Off.	Mid. Off.*	Non-Off.	High Off.	Mid. Off.*	Non-Off.	High Off.	Mid. Off.*	Non-Off.
Highest Sch. Attended									
University	48.6	37.5	64.7	19.2	32.4	33.3	47.8	42.9	70.4
Other Higher School	5.7	25.0	11.8	20.5	21.6	7.4	8.7	9.5	7.4
Trade, High, or Grade School	54.7	37.5	23.5	60.3	45.9	59.3	43.5	47.6	22.2
Total	100.0 (35)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (78)	99.9 (37)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (27)

*There are too few low officers to include them.

Especially in the early years, educated people avoided the Nazi movement. Education is here an index of social status. The Nazi movement started as a plebeian movement of low respectability. In its later years, when it had grown strong, rich, and more conservative, people with more education—that is to say, people with better non-political jobs and higher status—joined it in increasing numbers. On the other hand, the people who joined the Party early and became the alter Kämpfer and high officers were people without much status or good job prospects. These facts are shown in Table 83.

TABLE 83. PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS
IN EACH GROUP WHO HAD ATTENDED UNIVERSITY

	Propagandists	Administrators	Random
Joined 1923 or before	38.5	17.1	26.7
Joined 1924-1928	50.0	20.6	72.8
Joined 1929 on	72.3	26.5	63.2

Thus we find that in the Nazi movement the uneducated were leading the educated. In the same way, although it was a militaristic movement, the non-veterans were leading the veterans. Table 84 shows that in each case those without military service tended to be found in larger numbers in the higher ranks than in the lower ranks.

TABLE 84. RANK IN NAZI PARTY BY MILITARY SERVICE

	Propagandists			Administrators			Random		
	High Off.	Mid. Off.	Non-Off.	High Off.	Mid. Off.	Non-Off.	High Off.	Mid. Off.	Non-Off.
Those with No Serv.	66.7	37.5	15.0	20.7	33.3	14.8	43.5	28.6	19.2
Those with Serv.	33.3	62.5	85.0	79.3	66.7	85.2	56.5	71.4	80.8
Total	100.0 (36)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (77)	100.0 (36)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (26)

Furthermore, there is some tendency, although a less clear-cut one, for Party rank to be negatively correlated with military rank. Except among the Propagandists, the proportion of enlisted men and N. C. O.'s among the Party officers is greater than among the Party non-officers. The higher military rank of the Propagandists is due to their recruitment from higher social strata. The higher Party rank of the Administrators, on the contrary, is due largely to their recruitment from lower social strata. They were the plebeians who, having least to lose in the old order, came earliest into the new movement and took control over its Party apparatus. The negative correlation between military and Party rank thus is accounted for by the differential social ranks which competed for top power in the complicated power-structure of the Nazi period. Behind this correlation, therefore, lie those differences of social position and perspective which led to the internal dissension between the Party and military hierarchies that we have discussed in Parts V and VI of this study. In the focusing of such conflicts, the Nazi movement was indeed a "social revolution" characteristic of our times.

NOTES

1. Otto Dietrich, Auf den Strassen des Sieges (München: Zentral-verlag der NSDAP., F. Ehrer nachf., 1939); and Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei (München: Zentral-verlag der NSDAP., F. Ehrer nachf., 1934).
2. War Department, General Staff. Strength and Organization of the Armies of France, Germany, Austria, Russia, England, Italy, Mexico, and Japan, No. 22. (Washington, 1916).
3. See Hans Gerth, "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," American Journal of Sociology, XLV, No. 4 (1940), p. 525.
4. Hans Fallada (pseud.), [Rudolf Ditzgen], Kleiner Mann, was nun? (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1932). English translation, Little Man, What Now? (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1933).
5. The equilibrium metaphor is here used for expository purposes only. As formulated by Pareto, and as implied by Toynbee and others, the equilibrium metaphor has been used for purposes irrelevant to this discussion. Our data could be accounted for by other metaphors, e.g. the developmental metaphor, with equal plausibility but less facility of exposition.
6. Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944), pp. 28-29.
7. See Serge Chakhotin, Rape of the Masses (London: Routledge, 1940). The other party whose official dogma sanctioned such tactics, the Communists, were not included among the Weimar elite.
8. Still the most brilliant exposition of this process in the Kaiserreich is Thorstein Veblen's Imperial Germany and The Industrial Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1946).
9. All figures from Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das deutsche Reich, 1892 ed.
10. Cf. the ranking of professions at this period given in Hans L. Menzel, Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen des Studiums vor und nach dem Kriege (Inaug. dissertation, University of Berlin, 1931), pp. 19-20.
11. It is of some interest that corporal punishment of school children was reinstituted in Bavaria at the end of World War II.
12. See Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic (London: Methuen, 1936), chapter 5.
13. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
14. Available in translation as Class 1902 (London: Secker, 1929). The postwar sequel is entitled Frieden [Peace] (Berlin: Kiepenheuer, 1930).
15. These figures are taken from Hans L. Menzel, op. cit., p. 2.
16. Konrad Heiden, op. cit., p. 510.
17. Ibid., p. 153.
18. Quoted from Walter Goerlitz, Der deutsche Generalstab (Frankfurt: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1951), p. 546.
19. Alfred Vagts, Hitler's Second Army (Washington: Infantry Journal, 1943), p. 17.
20. Ibid., p. 18.

21. A well-known verse favored by the S. A. ran as follows:

Wetzt die langen Messer an dem Buergersteig,
dass sie besser flutschen in der Pfaffen Leib...
Und kommt die Stunde der Vergeltung,
stehn wir zu jedem Massenmord bereit!

(Sharpen the long knives on the sidewalks,
so that they cut better into the clergy's flesh...
Comes the hour of revenge and
we stand ready for any mass murder.)

22. Vagts, op. cit., p. 22.

23. Hermann Goering, Germany Reborn (London: E. Mathews and Marrot, 1934), p. 121.

24. See: Daniel Lerner, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany (New York: George W. Stewart, 1949), pp. 294 ff. Also: Ernst Kohn-Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control By Fear (London: Kegan Paul, 1945).

25. The sequence of these relationships between Party-Soldiers-Police can be traced through three lucid books: for the period to 1933, see Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer; for the decade 1933-43, see Alfred Vagts, Hitler's Second Army; for the final scene analyzed with great clarity, see H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (London: Macmillan, 1947).

26. Alfred Vagts, op. cit., p. 241.

27. This study supplements the study of the German cabinet from 1890 to 1945 by Max Knight (The German Elite, Monograph No. 4 in this series). This supplement is designed to secure more intensive data for the Nazi period on certain points dealt with above. Knight's paper places the Nazi cabinets in the perspective of the previous ones. Unlike this paper it deals with all Nazi ministers, not just the cabinet as of 1934, and with cabinet ministers only. The results of the two studies, however, generally confirm each other.

28. There is a rather wide discrepancy between these figures and those reported in Monograph No. 4 of this series, The German Elite, by Max Knight. The discrepancy arises from the method of computation. This study of the Nazi elite includes political occupations and reports the predominance of party leadership among the professions of Nazi ministers. The Knight study reports only non-political occupations which were usually not the main occupations of the Nazis, but were the occupations to which they might have devoted their lives in quieter times.

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NOTE: These references include only those titles cited by the authors, plus a few titles which contain data supplementary to those presented in this study. It is not a checklist of relevant titles, which would number several hundred items.

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